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PREFACE
The CPA’s Handbook ofFraud and Commercial Crime Prevention (Fraud Handbook) provides CPAs
with practical information, checklists, and examples to help identify and respond to fraud in the
workplace. Although it is impossible to eliminate the risk of fraud completely, effective prevention
policies can reduce opportunities for fraud to occur. At the same time, sophisticated detection
methods can help uncover fraud in the early stages, minimize losses, and enable those affected by
fraud, particularly CPAs or financial managers responsible for fraud prevention, to react to fraud in
a way that could solve or mitigate the problem rather than contributing to it.

Handbook Overview
The focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention. Since prevention cannot be realized without
understanding how fraud is perpetrated and concealed, the material in this Handbook has been
written to explain to CPAs the nature and extent of fraud and to familiarize them with general
fraud prevention techniques. In addition to the core topics of fraud prevention and methods of
combating specific kinds of fraud, two chapters are devoted to computer security and the unique
kinds of crimes and criminals related to computer crimes.

This Handbook has been carefully designed to address not only the “whys” or reasons that fraud
exists, but also the “hows” or the methods by which fraud takes place. The Fraud Handbook
provides invaluable guidance and tools for preventing fraud from ever occurring in the first place.
Highlights of the Handbook’s coverage are outlined below.

Managing the Risk of Fraud
Chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,” describes the concept of fraud risk: understanding it and
guarding against the threat posed by it. The specific factors that affect fraud risk are addressed,
including the key internal controls—basic, supervisory and audit—that help prevent fraud. Since
detecting and preventing fraud in books of account is key to any prevention strategy, there is a
section devoted exclusively to this topic, with fraud and AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 99, Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 316) discussed in relation to fraud auditing.
Appendix B, a complete text version of the current SAS No. 99, is provided on the Fraud Prevention
Checklists CD-ROM 2003-2004 included with the Handbook. An overview of SAS No. 99’s content
includes the following:
• Description and characteristics offraud
• The importance of exercising professional skepticism
• Discussion among engagement personnel regarding the risks ofmaterial misstatement due to fraud
• Obtaining the information needed to identify risks of material misstatement due to fraud
• Identifying risks that may result in a material misstatement due to fraud
• Assessing the identified risks after taking into account an evaluation of the entity’s programs and controls
• Responding to the results of the assessment
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• Evaluating audit evidence
• Communicating about fraud to management, the audit committee, and others
• Documenting the auditor’s consideration offraud
In addition, SAS No. 99 amends SAS No. 1, Codification ofAuditing Standards and Procedures (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work”),
and SAS No. 85, Management Representations (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 333).

SAS No. 99 is effective for audits of financial statements for periods beginning on or after
December 15, 2002. Early application of the provisions of this Statement is permissible.

A comprehensive and practical “Risk Management Checklist” is included at the end of the chapter
with specific risk factors as they relate to internal control.

Promoting an Ethical Environment
Because an ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy, chapter 2,
“Promoting an Ethical Environment,” describes the various steps that can be taken to promote an
ethical environment within an organization, and thereby reduce the risk of fraud. A sample code of
ethics and business conduct, which can be reproduced and/or adapted for use in any organization,
is included, along with an ethical environment checklist.

Insurance Against Fraud (formerly Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance)
Risk management is a key component of fraud awareness and is essential for providing protection
against potentially catastrophic risks, including fraud-related losses. Every organization must
identify its risks and implement a strategy that balances the cost of potential losses with the cost of
an acceptable level of risk management. Chapter 3, “Insurance Against Fraud,” examines the
concept of risk financing and reviews the kinds of insurance coverage generally available against
employee fraud and dishonesty. It also highlights some of the issues found in insurance policies,
common exemptions, and some of the important duties of the insured.
In addition, the chapter provides a step-by-step guide to making a claim after the discovery of the
dishonest act. A “Fraud Insurance Checklist” is included as well.

Computer Security and System Recovery
Adequate computer security is an indispensable fraud prevention tool. Chapter 4, “Computer
Security and System Recovery,” provides a comprehensive overview of computer security,
including physical security, logical security, and system recovery. A checklist is also included with
this chapter.

Internal Fraud
Chapter 5, “Internal Fraud,” addresses the various ways fraud is committed against an organization
by a perpetrator from within that organization, meaning, by officers, managers, or employees—the
most common form of fraud. Frauds are classified according to the various accounting cycles to
which they relate: sales and collection, acquisition and payment, payroll and personnel, inventory
and warehousing, and capital acquisition and repayment. Since cash is the focal point of most
entities, a separate section is devoted to cash misappropriation.

vi
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External Fraud for Personal Gain
Fraud can also be committed against organizations by suppliers, professional con artists and other
outside perpetrators. Chapter 6, “External Fraud for Personal Gain,” is a discussion of the various
ways frauds are committed against small businesses and individuals, the government, and financial
institutions, such as banks and insurance companies. Case studies are included to clarify the
various kinds of fraud perpetrated by outsiders.

Commercial Crime
In addition to being victimized by fraud, organizations can also be the perpetrators of fraud.
Chapter 7, “Commercial Crime,” provides an overview of the various forms of commercial crime
and methods of preventing them. The crimes considered include false advertising, industrial
espionage and trade secret theft, insider trading, securities fraud, organizational bribe giving.
Interesting and informative case studies are included to exemplify the different kinds of
commercial crime.

Computer Crime and Computer Criminals
Although it has created very few genuinely “new” frauds, the computer has dramatically changed
the environment in which fraud is committed. Chapter 8, “Computer Crime and Computer
Criminals,” describes the nature of computer crimes and computer criminals and details the
controls that prevent and detect fraud. The section, “Fraud and the Internet” describes the
characteristics of the Internet that make it an inadvertent facilitator of fraud. The most common
Internet frauds are identified along with the steps you can take to avoid being victimized.

Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud
Despite the best prevention strategies, fraud may occur. Chapter 9 familiarizes CPAs with forensic
accounting and the techniques of fraud investigation. Beginning with the fundamental concepts of
forensic accounting, this chapter details a straightforward five-step investigative process to help
CPAs understand the role of forensic accountants and others involved in fraud investigations. A
comprehensive checklist of steps to be followed in a fraud investigation is included at the end of
the chapter.

Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud
The costs of financial statement fraud have been realized with the recent revelations in the
marketplace and the media that once respected companies (and the darlings of Wall Street) were
built on fraudulent manipulation of their financial statements. The resulting aftermath has included
stock market upheaval, huge financial losses for investors and employees, and additional oversight
demands and actions from regulatory agencies. The costs of financial statement fraud have never
been more in focus than now.

In this atmosphere, it is more important than ever for financial professionals to understand
financial statement fraud and how it might be used to deceive boards of directors, senior
management, auditors, and investors.
Chapter 10 focuses on the pervasive nature and special areas of financial statement fraud, the
impact of SAS 99, and the changing regulatory environment. Chapter 10 highlights recent audit
failures with guidance for auditors, and discusses the emerging new fraud profile.

A comprehensive checklist is included at the end of the chapter.
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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Corporate Security: Threat and Crisis Management
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have prompted businesses to reassess their ability to deal
with security threats. Although most corporations have formal plans for fire and systems disasters,
many would be forced to improvise if confronted by an emergency, whether man-made or natural.
Chapter 11, “Corporate Security: Threat and Crisis Management” identifies the types of threats a
business faces and addresses the primary issues involved in preventing or detecting such threats.
Since there are certain threats that no plan can anticipate, this chapter also includes emergency,
business resumption, and physical security planning. This comprehensive chapter concludes with a
useful checklist.

Bankruptcy Fraud
For CPAs to understand bankruptcy fraud, it is necessary to understand the bankruptcy process.
Chapter 12, “Bankruptcy Fraud” begins with a primer in bankruptcy that discusses insolvency, the
filing process and the bankruptcy petition, then identifies fraud in bankruptcy filings, provides
thorough descriptions of the elements of bankruptcy fraud and details various kinds of bankruptcy
fraud. In addition, this invaluable chapter discusses punishment provisions and the necessity of the
mandatory referral report. The comprehensive checklist at the end of the chapter is organized
according to elements and kinds of bankruptcy fraud. Selected bankruptcy forms are available on
the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM.

Detecting Procurement Fraud
Procurement fraud is one of the most difficult white-collar crimes to detect. All too many
companies refuse to entertain the thought that their team of loyal employees could harbor
fraudsters. When fraud strikes the management team is taken by surprise. Regrettably, it is only
after the insurance company has refused to pay the employee fidelity claim, that it decides to
implement tighter controls and actively seek to deter fraud among its employees.
Much of the damage caused by procurement fraud can be easily combated by separation of
employee duties coupled with surprise audits and continuing management oversight.
Chapter 13 provides an overview of procurement fraud and the specific tasks and controls needed
to combat it: Screening Procurement Contracts, Scrutinizing Suspect Procurement Contracts, Indepth Examination of Suspect Procurement Contracts, and Reporting Fraud in Procurement
Contracts. The chapter includes red flags in various areas under scrutiny.
The Costs ofFraud. Fraud is estimated to cost the United States economy more than $600 billion (six
percent of revenues as applied to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product) in the year 2002 according to
the 2002 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, by the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners. That translates to about $4,500.00 per employee! The full report can be downloaded at
www.cfenet.com/media/2002RttN/.

Despite these staggering numbers, fraud is primarily a silent problem. Though fraud experts
estimate that more than 75 percent of frauds are undetected, it’s difficult to reach a precise number
because fraud not only evades detection by company management, but also goes unreported or
underreported in many instances. Firms do not disclose their losses resulting from fraud for many
reasons, including that they are embarrassed that they have been defrauded, or they want to keep
the bad news from investors, clients, and customers.

viii
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It is with this in mind that the Fraud Handbook is written. Perhaps because fraud is so under
reported, many companies think it will never happen to them. Unfortunately, an organization
unwilling to consider that its personnel, agents or vendors could act dishonestly is a fraudster’s
dream. What better environment to exploit than one in which the guard is down?
It is our hope that the Fraud Handbook will provide invaluable guidance and tools to assist users in
preventing fraud from ever occurring in the first place.

Appendixes
A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector
This comprehensive section outlines a breakdown of fraud in the different sectors, complete with
checklists and fraud vulnerability grids for each of the following sectors:
• Construction
• Financial services
• Government
• High technology
• Manufacturing
• Media and communications
• Nonprofit
• Professional services
• Real estate
• Recreation
• Natural resources
• Retail
• Small business
• Transportation
• Wholesale

B—Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit
Appendix B, the complete text version of the current SAS No. 99, is provided on the Fraud
Prevention Checklists CD-ROM 2003-2004 included with the Handbook. SAS No. 99 is provided in
portable document format (PDF) and is readable with Adobe Acrobat Reader. You can download
the reader from http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep.html if you do already have it
installed on your computer.

References
This alphabetical listing of the most current and relevant sources of information, including a
separate section for Web sites and books, pertaining to fraud, commercial crime, and other closely
related topics for further reading.
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Glossary
The comprehensive glossary is an effective quick-reference tool that provides an alphabetically
arranged listing of definitions and explanations for all fraud-related terms and kinds of fraud.

x
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CHAPTER 1:
Managing the Risk of Fraud
1.1

The Nature and Extent of Fraud
1.1.1 Definitions
The key word used in most dictionaries to define fraud is deception. In the broadest sense of
the word fraud, this definition may be sufficient However, in the context of this Handbook, a
slightly more restrictive definition is appropriate. Fraud is criminal deception intended to
benefit the deceiver financially. Both of the qualifiers in this definition are necessary—that is,
the deception must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.

Criminal Deception
The qualifier criminal is necessary to exclude certain deceptions that may financially benefit
the deceiver—for example, the mild overstatement of one’s skills on a job application;
however, this kind of transgression will not be examined in this Handbook Although such
an overstatement could be labeled fraudulent in the broadest sense of the word, it can
hardly be described as criminal.

Note that, for purposes of this definition, the word criminal not used in a strict legal sense.
Rather, it refers to a seriously “wrong” action taken with malicious intent. Thus, even if
perpetrators of fraud are able to avoid successful criminal prosecution—for example,
because a particular jurisdiction has lax laws or enforcement, or because of some legal
technicality—their actions are still considered “criminal” for purposes of this Handbook

Financial Benefit
The qualifier financial benefit is necessary to exclude certain types of criminal deception that
we do not commonly think of as fraud and therefore, are not addressed in this Handbook—
for example, a wealthy bigamist failing to disclose a previous marriage.

The financial benefit accruing to the fraudster from an action need not be direct for that
action to be considered fraudulent. Indirect financial benefits are also possible, for
example, environmental criminals (fraudsters) who dump toxic waste into rivers to avoid
higher disposal costs and falsify records to conceal their actions.

1.1.2 Magnitude of the Threat
Because the essence of fraud is deception, determining its prevalence is problematic. Many
frauds go undetected—probably more than 75 percent—and many frauds that are detected
are not reported. It is virtually impossible to compile reliable statistics under these
circumstances.
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Simply based on the largest reported frauds—for example, the recent corporate scandals
(Enron, Worldcom, et al), the U.S. savings and loan scandal, BCCI, Ivan Boesky, and
Michael Milken—it is safe to say that fraud in the United States runs into the billions of
dollars. In its 2002 Report to the Nation: Occupational Fraud and Abuse, the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners estimates $600 billion in revenues or 6 percent of GDP will
have been lost to fraud in the United States in 2002.1

Macro statistics are not particularly meaningful, however, even if you could obtain accurate
statistics. The fact is that the threat of fraud depends largely on the circumstances, that is,
the environment in which it takes place. Let’s begin with a view of personal integrity, as
illustrated by Figure 1-1, “One View of Personal Integrity.”
Figure 1-1. One View of Personal Integrity

One View of Personal Integrity

Views of commitment to personal integrity vary, and the percentage figures shown are not
definitive. Some views suggest a more even split between the three categories, while others
state that the honest and dishonest categories may be as low as 10 percent each. However,
all of these views point to one important conclusion: Exclusive reliance on the honesty of
individuals is the surest way to be victimized. More than half the population—actually,
probably more than two-thirds—is quite capable of committing dishonest acts in the right
(or should we say wrong?) environment.

The importance of creating an environment that discourages fraud brings us back to the
question, What is the magnitude of the threat? The answer is: the threat offraud is as big as it
is allowed to be.

1 http://www.cfenet.com/media/statistics.asp
4
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1.1.3 Sources of the Threat
The magnitude of the fraud threat is only one dimension contributing to the extent of the
problem. The breadth of the fraud threat—that is, the various sources of fraud—must also
be considered. A truly comprehensive prevention strategy must address the full spectrum
of fraud sources.

You can classify the sources of the fraud threat as either internal or external These threats
may or may not involve collusion, which can be defined as an agreement between two or
more persons to defraud another or to obtain something forbidden by law. A brief
description of the two sources of fraud threat follows.

Internal Sources
Internal opportunities to commit fraud differ from company to company. Some typical
examples, which illustrate the broad nature of these internal opportunities, include the
following:
• Officers of a company create false financial reports to improve their own performance
measurement.
• Managers inflate their expense accounts or turn a blind eye to supplier fraud in
exchange for kickbacks.
• Other employees commit fraud such as embezzlement, cash skimming, or accounts
receivable lapping.
• Corporate directors defraud a company’s shareholders through fraudulent financial
reporting, stock market manipulation, or insider trading.
• Employee theft/misappropriation of assets, which may involve collusion with outside
vendors or suppliers.

External Sources
Typical examples of external opportunities to commit fraud include the following.
• Suppliers falsify or duplicate invoices.
• Competitors victimize a company through industrial espionage or price fixing.
• Con artists defraud a company with schemes involving products, services, or investment
opportunities that never materialize.
• Customers commit fraud through false credits posted to their accounts or through rebate
coupon frauds.

See Figure 1-2, “How a Company Can Be Victimized,” for a depiction of the various
internal and external sources of fraud.

1.1.4 The Causes of White Collar Crime
The theory of differential association is undoubtedly the best known among all explanations
offered to account for crime. Although it applies to all forms of crime—not just white collar
crime—it is nevertheless useful for the purposes of this Handbook.
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This theory first appeared in 1939 in the third edition of Edwin H. Sutherland’s Principles of
Criminology. Later, Sutherland would make his best-known contribution to criminology by
coining the phrase white-collar crime and writing a monograph on the subject.

Based on nine concepts or points, the theory of differential association begins by asserting
that criminal behavior is learned. Expanding on that assertion, Sutherland specifies as a
second point that criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other people in a process
of communication. If individuals acquiring criminal habits or propensities were exposed to
situations, circumstances, and interactions totally of a criminal nature, it would be relatively
easy to comprehend how this process of communication operates. In view of the enormous
variation in standards and personalities to which any individual in our society is exposed, it
becomes exceedingly difficult to discern the elements that induce criminal behavior
without some additional principles.

Sutherland’s third point is that criminal behavior is acquired through participation within
intimate personal groups. This suggests that the roots of crime are in the socializing
experiences of the individual. Unfortunately, the process of socialization is far from
adequately understood. Sutherland’s fourth point indicates that the criminal learning
Figure 1-2. How a Company Can Be Victimized

How a Company Can Be Victimized
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process includes not only techniques of committing crime but also the shaping of motives,
drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. Crime techniques often can involve a high degree of
skill. For example, picking pockets (and not getting caught) demands considerable
adroitness.

Fifth, Sutherland stipulates that legal codes define the specific direction of motives and
drives as favorable or unfavorable.
Sixth, Sutherland establishes the principle of differential association. According to this
postulate, a person becomes a criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law. Sutherland states in
his seventh point that differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and
intensity. But he does not suggest which of these elements is apt to be more important than
the others.
Sutherland’s eighth point is that learning criminal and delinquent behavior involves all the
mechanisms that are involved in any other learning. As his next to last proposition,
Sutherland stresses that learning differs from pure imitation.
The last point is a worthwhile reminder that while criminal behavior is an expression of
general needs and values, it is not explained by these general needs and values because
noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values. This means that the
generalizations sometimes employed to account for crime—that people steal because they
crave “esteem” or are “greedy” or kill because they are “unhappy”—have little scientific
merit.
In other words, much of the same needs and values motivate criminals and noncriminals
alike. People become or do not become criminals on the basis of their unique responses to
common drives for prestige, happiness, success, power, wealth, and other human
aspirations. One person with a pressing need for money may take an extra weekend job
pumping gas, or try to borrow from a friend. Another person, feeling the same need, may
hold up a fast food outlet.

1.1.5 Understanding the Risk
Of the two available ways to combat fraud—prevention and detection—a prevention
strategy is obviously the preferred approach. Such a strategy can be either general or
specific in its objective. General prevention techniques for risk management involve two
main elements:

1. Understanding the risk

2. Guarding against the threat
Fraud Versus Theft

Resolved: Fraud is not the same as theft.
In a debate, most people would choose to defend the above statement. They might win by
arguing that:

• Theft is like robbing a bank; fraud is like cooking the books to create the impression of
improvement in the financial results of the enterprise.
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• People committing theft do so at night, wearing masks; people committing fraud do so
during the day, wearing suits.
• Theft is direct; fraud is indirect.
• Theft is what lower-class criminals commit; fraud is what upper-class criminals commit.
Few people, if any, however, will point out what is perhaps the most important difference
between fraud and theft: The risk of fraud is much greater.

With an increasingly high media profile given to crime, particularly in large cities, most
people are acutely aware of the need to protect themselves against crime’s overt forms. In a
bad neighborhood, for example, you would not leave the keys in your car or the doors
unlocked. In fact you probably would not want to be there at all. In this case the risk of
theft, a more overt and direct form of criminal act than fraud, is easy to assess and deal
with.

Now consider a different scenario. If you were to leave your wallet briefly on your desk at
work, you would also be exposing yourself to a risk. However, assuming that access to your
workplace is restricted to other employees, in all likelihood, you would consider this risk
very small. Presumably, the people you work with are not criminals and would never pick
up your wallet in a direct act of theft. The risk of being detected, as perceived by a
perpetrator, would be relatively high. You would certainly know that your wallet had been
stolen and a thorough investigation would ensue, possibly implicating a coworker.
Herein lies the first of two pillars on which the greater threat of fraud is built. One pillar is
based on the premise that most people believe that those who are relatively close to
them—their friends and coworkers—are basically honest. Potential victims may rationalize
about those around them: “They would never steal. As long as we lock the doors at night to
keep out the ‘real crooks,’ we’ll be safe.”
The other pillar is based on the perception that fraud is in some sense an indirect form of
theft. Although a criminal act, people who perpetrate fraud will in many cases rationalize
their behavior, believing that because it’s indirect, it’s victimless. Alternatively, the
perpetrator may rationalize that the victim deserves it, or where the amount involved in the
fraud is low in relation to the total assets available, that the victim can afford it and/or
won’t even miss it. And so the second pillar is formed from the rationalizations of most
fraudsters—the denial that the fraud is morally wrong: “No one will be hurt by this. The
company won’t even miss it. Besides, they deserve it for the lousy way they treat me.”
These two pillars—low perception of the threat of fraud by potential victims, and a high
degree of rationalization by potential perpetrators—combine to make fraud a much more
insidious threat than ordinary theft. A further illustration of this greater risk: according to a
report in a 1999 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Law Enforcement Bulletin, check fraud
in 1994 was estimated to have an impact on financial institutions, private business, and the
public that ranged from $815 million up to $10 billion. Further, according to bank
executives, check fraud is the major crime problem facing the financial community. The
enormity of the fraud problem is illustrated by another FBI report that indicated that about
$60 billion in mortgage loans processed annually involved some degree of fraud, and that
in 1996, 35 percent of the $3.3 billion of reported losses in the financial institution fraud
criminal referrals the FBI received involved some type of loan fraud or false statement.

8

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

Chapter One: Managing the Risk of Fraud

Generic Versus Individual Risk Factors
A large number of factors can determine the risk of fraud. This Handbook contains an
approach—a system of categorization that facilitates the understanding of fraud risk and the
development of an appropriate strategy to manage it.
The literature is filled with many different systems of categorizing fraud risk. The system
developed for this Handbook splits the risk factors into two groups:
1. Generic
2. Individual

Generic risk factors remain relatively constant in their impact on any subject individual or
group of individuals. They are largely within the control of the organization or entity that is
protecting itself, and largely outside the control of potential perpetrators. Because these risk
factors apply in the same way to any employee, they can be set and manipulated by an
organization without considering individual differences among employees. Employee
turnover has virtually no effect on these risk factors. For example, if there is no dollar limit
on checks that employees in the accounting department can issue, this risk would exist no
matter who is employed in the accounting department.
Individual risk factors change from person to person and can even change for the same
individual over time. They are only partially within the control of the organization or entity
that is protecting itself, and this control is more difficult to exercise because it applies to
each individual separately. Whenever turnover occurs, the individual risk factors change
and must be managed. Even worse, whenever an individual’s personality, state of mind,
circumstance, or motivation changes—which, after all, is a constant process—the associated
risk factors may also change.
See Sections 1.2.1, “Generic Risk Factors,” and 1.2.2, “Individual Risk Factors,” for a more
detailed discussion of generic and individual risk factors.

1.1.6 Guarding Against the Threat
On understanding the risk of fraud, you must develop an appropriate strategy and
implement policies to guard against the threat. The main elements of this process are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Choosing acceptable risk levels
Developing and implementing internal controls
Promoting an ethical environment
Arranging appropriate risk financing (insurance)
Ensuring adequate computer security

Choosing Acceptable Risk Levels
The risk of fraud can never be completely eliminated. Even if this were possible, it would
probably not be desirable because of prohibitive costs and extremely tight controls that
would stifle creativity and make employee morale suffer. The first step in a fraudprevention strategy is to determine the acceptable level of risk.
Choosing acceptable risk levels intertwines with assessing the various risk factors. For
example, one of the generic risk factors is the opportunity risk available to potential
perpetrators. Assessing this opportunity risk enables you to make other decisions, such as:
“Do we need to lower this risk, and if so, by how much?”
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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Developing and Implementing Internal Controls
Internal controls—consisting of basic controls, supervisory controls, and audit—represent
the cornerstone of any fraud prevention strategy.
To ensure complete and accurate reporting, an internal control system must be designed
and implemented regardless of the risk of fraud. However, a system should never disregard
the risk of fraud; such disregard would amount to a virtual invitation to potential
perpetrators.

See Section 1.3, Internal Controls and “Fraud-Proofing,” for a detailed discussion of
internal controls.

Promoting an Ethical Environment
Promoting an ethical environment is another key element in a prevention strategy. In
particular implementing a formal code of ethics and business conduct helps set the tone for
all employees within an organization. See Chapter 2, “Promoting an Ethical Environment,”
for further discussion.

Arranging Appropriate Insurance
Recognizing that there will always be some risk of fraud, organizations must finance this
risk either externally and explicitly (fidelity insurance) or internally and implicitly (selfinsurance). See Chapter 3, “Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance,” for further discussion.

Ensuring Adequate Computer Security
Computers and information technology play an increasingly important role in business and
society in general. The pervasive nature of these technologies demands that adequate
computer security be an integral part of any prevention strategy. Although computer
security may be considered a subset of internal control, it is still an important aspect. See
Chapter 4, “Computer Security and System Recovery,” for details.

1.2

Fraud Risk Factors
Several factors contribute to the risk of fraud. Organizations use various systems for
categorizing these factors; however, under most systems, the elements that combine to
determine fraud risk are largely the same.

For example, one classification system is known as the GONE theory, an acronym for
greed, opportunity, need, and exposure. Under this system, the greed and need factors relate
largely to the individual (that is, the potential perpetrator), while the opportunity and
exposure factors relate largely to the organization (that is, the potential victim). The four
elements of the GONE theory interact to determine the level of fraud risk, and no one
factor is universally more important than another. Each of the factors is unfavorable, to
some extent, in virtually all situations. However, an organization that allows a sufficiently
unfavorable or an out-of-balance combination of all four factors may face serious troubles.
As one fraud investigator observed, “You can consider your money GONE.”
In this Handbook we use a slightly different system that groups the risk factors into generic
or individual, as previously defined. However, as described below, many of the same
elements of the GONE theory apply under this system as well.

10
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1.2.1 Generic Risk Factors
Generic risk factors—those largely under the control of the organization or entity that is
protecting itself—include:
• The opportunity given to potential perpetrators
• The likelihood of discovering a fraud that was committed
• The nature and extent of the punishment a perpetrator will receive once the fraud is
uncovered and the perpetrator is caught

Note that the first factor corresponds to the O or opportunity in the GONE theory, while
the second and third factors correspond to the E or exposure risk element. The exposure
risk under the GONE theory is a product of two generic factors, which are the likelihood of
getting caught and the subsequent consequences.
A brief description of each generic risk factor follows.

Opportunity to Commit Fraud
The opportunity to commit fraud refers primarily to allowing a potential perpetrator access
to the assets of the organization, the accounting system or the object of the fraud. No
organization can completely eliminate opportunity; experts consider such attempts
uneconomical and counterproductive. As long as organizations have assets of value and
these assets flow, are traded or come under the control of others—such as employees,
customers, and suppliers—the opportunity to commit fraud will always exist.

For organizations the challenge in fraud prevention is ensuring that the opportunity risk
level is minimal under the circumstances, that is:
1. Assign, either explicitly or implicitly, to each employee an appropriate maximum
opportunity level. For example, limit a junior clerk’s opportunity level to certain smaller
fixed assets not bolted down in the office. Allow a more senior clerk’s maximum
opportunity level to include an additional $500 petty cash fund, or the day’s cash
receipts. Allow a senior executive an additional $5,000 check-signing limit. Consider
similar limits regarding level of access to the accounting system.

2. Prohibit catastrophic opportunity levels. The definition of a catastrophic level depends
on the circumstances—in particular, the size of the organization. For example, a small
business with $50,000 in cash should probably not allow anyone but its owner(s) access
to the full amount.

Likelihood of Discovery
If an opportunity to commit fraud exists, making the chances of discovery high reduces the
risk. In fact, even the perception that the chances of discovery are high can act as a deterrent.
Of course, if a fraud does occur, discovery may result in recovery of some of the lost assets.

The likelihood of discovery stems primarily from the system of internal controls. Although
these controls can never be so tight as to preclude any fraud from taking place, ideally they
should be sufficient to prevent most material frauds from going undetected for any length
of time.
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Another factor that could increase the chance of discovery is encouraging employees to
take an active role in reporting suspected fraud activities. Publicizing the negative impact of
fraud on the stock price, employer profitability, and employee profit-sharing or retirement
benefits has worked to stimulate employee efforts to curtail fraud.
See Section 1.3 for a closer look at internal controls.

Nature and Extent of Punishment
Discovery of a fraud is, in itself, insufficient to act as a deterrent against future fraud.
Organizations must put in place some adverse consequences for potential perpetrators,
who, most importantly, must understand these adverse consequences.

Although research has not provided proof, conventional wisdom holds that the nature and
extent of punishment can be a deterrent.
Organizations or entities wishing to protect themselves from fraud should have clear
policies regarding the nature and extent of the consequences of getting caught; for
example:

• Anyone who commits a fraud will be dismissed.
• All frauds will be reported to the authorities, and charges will be laid.

1.2.2 Individual Risk Factors
Individual risk factors—those that vary from employee to employee largely outside the
control of the organization or entity that is protecting itself—fall into two categories:
1. Moral character
2. Motivation

Moral character corresponds to the G or greed factor in the GONE theory, while
motivation is equivalent to the N or need factor. Each of these categories is described
below.

Moral Character (Greed Factor)
Greed represents broad concepts, such as ethics and moral character, or the lack thereof.
Moreover greed and ethics essentially relate to the internal or personality attributes of an
individual, as do character, integrity, honesty, and the like. You cannot know whether an
individual possesses these attributes without the ability to read that individual’s mind. Even
if this were possible, personal interpretation would still come into play.

Social values also have an impact on moral character. Many sociologists lamented a trend
in Western societies during the 1980s, namely the pursuit of wealth as an overriding
objective. The Me Generation and the Decade of Greed were phrases coined in connection
with this trend, which was perhaps best epitomized by the memorable speech made by
Michael Douglas when he played the character of Gordon Gekko in the 1987 movie, Wall
Street: “Greed is right. Greed is good. . . .”
In fact, Gordon Gekko’s philosophy may hold some element of truth. A certain amount of
greed, tough-mindedness, and competitive instinct could greatly enhance the chances of
success for an organization or an individual in a free enterprise society. Regardless of one’s
own value judgment, there is no doubt that these attributes do exist in society. This poses a
12
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problem, however. Greed may not necessarily preclude the existence of ethics and good
moral character, but, if left unchecked or promoted to a great extent, it can have an adverse
impact vis-a-vis the risk of fraud. This leads to the essential question at issue here: What can
or should an organization do to minimize the risk of fraud posed by greed and other
negative attributes? Consider the following:

1. Corporate mission statement. Set the goals of an organization in a corporate mission
statement and communicate it to all managers and other employees. The primary goal
of most businesses is to maximize profits, presumably over the long term in order to
survive. Other objectives might include maintaining either a high market share,
leadership in an industry, or both. However, businesses must pursue these goals in a
manner consistent with good corporate citizenship and standing in the community. This
emphasis on corporate responsibility sets the tone for management and employees, and
encourages personal responsibility. Conversely, business should discourage
irresponsible actions—and by extension, fraud.
2. Written codes of business conduct. “Good moral character” means different things to
different people. An organization must define this term and relate it to particular types
of behavior. For example, does your organization consider it moral and ethical for its
employees to accept gifts from customers and, if so, is there a specified value or limit? A
written code of ethics and business conduct can help translate the relative concepts of
greed, ethics, and morality into more specific behaviors that are either acceptable or
unacceptable.
3. Management style and role models. Management must set the right example for employees
by acting responsibly and living up to the spirit of the corporate mission statement and
code of business conduct. Moreover, management must clearly and visibly appear to do
so in its dealings and communications with employees. Policy statements mean nothing
if they are undermined by management’s actions. In fact, such a situation may be worse
than having no policy at all because management’s failure to adhere to its own
guidelines would foster a kind of cynicism and “rules are made to be broken”
philosophy that might potentially encourage fraud and commercial crime.

4. Hiring practices. Regardless of corporate mission statements, codes of business conduct,
and good role models, moral character ultimately depends on the individual employee.
To the extent possible, set hiring practices that weed out prospects with low moral
character. See chapter 3 for further discussion.

Motivation (Need Factor)
Why do people commit fraud? There is obviously no single, specific answer. People
commit fraud for a variety of reasons.

Probably the most common group of fraud motivations relates to economic need. For
example, the perpetrator may be experiencing an actual or perceived cash emergency;
there is a mortgage to pay, drugs to purchase to satisfy an addiction, or gambling losses to
win back. Alternatively, there may be no emergency but simply an unchecked desire for
the good life, meaning the expenses of upscale restaurants, clothes, furs, jewelry, vacations,
cars, homes, and summer cottages.
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In addition, there are several motivations for managers to commit financial statement
fraud. For instance, managers could have bonuses or incentives tied to revenue or earningsper-share figures. Also, managers who own a large portion of company stock may be
motivated to falsify financial statements to meet earnings-per-share projections and
maintain or raise the company’s stock price.

Less frequently, there might be other reasons, such as disenchantment, revenge, or simply
the perception that everyone else seems to do it. Even more rarely, the motives could be
eccentric: a sense of challenge or thrill. Finally, the cause may be some form of
psychological illness, such as compulsion, anxiety, paranoia, or outright psychosis.

What can be done about all of these complex motives, seemingly locked up in the
Pandora’s box of an employee’s mind? Admittedly, the options are limited but they
include:
1. A favorable environment. Creating the right environment can reduce the motivation
among employees to commit fraud. In an unfavorable environment, morale suffers and
feelings of disenchantment—even hate and the desire for revenge—may take hold. Try
to promote the right environment by treating employees fairly, keeping communication
lines open, and providing mechanisms for discussing and resolving grievances.

2. Performance appraisal and reward systems. Measure each employee’s work fairly by
implementing a performance appraisal and reward system.
3. Employee assistance programs. Many enlightened employers provide free counseling and
other assistance to employees facing personal problems, for example, alcohol and drug
abuse. From the point of view of fraud prevention, this approach is preferable to
keeping these problems “bottled up.” This approach helps prevent resentment that
could ultimately lead to the commission of fraud.
4. Employee testing and screening. As part of their hiring practices and sometimes on a regular
basis thereafter, some employers use testing and screening procedures to identify and
weed out high-risk individuals, or form the basis for remedial action, or both.
Procedures include psychological testing, drug testing, and even honesty testing in the
form of lie detector tests where not prohibited by law. Highly controversial, these tests,
in some instances, could cause more harm than good, for example, to employee morale,
the organization’s reputation among prospective employees, and so on. Nevertheless, in
especially sensitive occupations or circumstances, employers might find this testing
appropriate and even necessary.
5. Common sense and a watchful eye. Although motives are not observable, the result of
certain motives often is. An employee with a drug or gambling problem may not be
able to keep it a secret. And beware the $25,000-a-year bookkeeper who drives to work
in a Mercedes or who, wary of getting caught, never takes a vacation.

Profiles of Fraud Perpetrators
Although external pressures do play a major role in whether or not an individual commits
fraud, internal characteristics can affect a potential fraud perpetrator as well. Gwynn Nettler
in his book, Lying, Cheating and Stealing, makes the following observations:

• People who have experienced failure are more likely to cheat.
• People who are disliked and who dislike themselves tend to be more deceitful.

14
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• People who are impulsive, distractible, and unable to postpone gratification are more
likely to engage in deceitful crimes.
• People who have a conscience (fear, apprehension, and punishment) are more resistant
to the temptation to deceive.
• Intelligent people tend to be more honest than ignorant people.
• The easier it is to cheat and steal, the more people will do so.
• Individuals have different needs and therefore different levels at which they will be
moved to lie, cheat, or steal.
• Lying, cheating, and stealing increase when people are under great pressure to achieve
important objectives.
• The struggle to survive generates deceit.

The highly publicized cases in recent years of computer hackers committing high-tech
crimes have resulted in a public perception that individuals who are highly knowledgeable
about computers are more likely to commit fraud; however, there is no evidence to support
this premise.

1.2.3 High Fraud-Low Fraud Environments
Employee fraud, theft, financial statement fraud, and embezzlement are more likely to
occur in some organizations than others. The most vulnerable organizations are usually
hampered by weak management and inadequate accounting and security controls.
Solutions often proposed include:
1. Tight accounting and audit controls

2. Thorough screening of applicants for employment
3. Close supervision and monitoring of employee performance and behavior
4. Explicit rules against theft, financial statement fraud, embezzlement, sabotage, and
information piracy
Other considerations also affect the likelihood of employee crime. See Table 1.1, “A
Comparison of the Environments and Cultures of Organizations With High and Low
Fraud Potential,” for a comparison of the environment and culture of organizations with
high fraud potential and organizations with low fraud potential.
Table 1.1

A Comparison of the Environments and Cultures of Organizations

With High and Low Fraud Potential
Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

Management style

Autocratic

Participative

Management orientation

Low trust

High trust

Power-driven

Achievement-driven

Centralized, reserved by top
management

Decentralized, dispersed to all
levels, delegated

Distribution of authority

(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

Planning

Centralized

Decentralized

Short range

Long range

Performance

Measured quantitatively and on a
short-term basis

Measured both quantitatively and
qualitatively and on a long
term basis

Business focus

Profit-focused

Customer-focused

Management strategy

Management by crisis

Management by objectives

Reporting

Reporting by routine

Reporting by exception

Policies and rules

Rigid and inflexible, strongly
policed

Reasonable, fairly enforced

Primary management concern

Capital assets

Human, then capital and
technological assets

Reward system

Punitive

Generous

Penurious

Reinforcing

Politically administered

Fairly administered

Critical

Positive

Negative

Stroking

Interaction mode

Issues and personal differences
are skirted or repressed

Issues and personal differences
are confronted and addressed
openly

Payoffs for good behavior

Mainly monetary

Recognition, promotion, added
responsibility, choice
assignments, plus money

Business ethics

Ambivalent, rides the tide

Clearly defined and regularly
followed

Internal relationships

Highly competitive, hostile

Friendly, competitive, supportive

Values and beliefs

Economic, political, self-centered

Social, spiritual, group-centered

Success formula

Works harder

Works smarter

Human resources

Burnout

Not enough promotional
opportunities for all the
talent

High turnover

Low turnover

Grievances

Job satisfaction

Company loyalty

Low

High

Major financial concern

Cash-flow shortage

Opportunities for new investment

Feedback on performance
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

Growth pattern

Sporadic

Consistent

Relationship with competitors

Hostile

Professional

Innovativeness

Copy cat, reactive

Leader, proactive

CEO characteristics

Braggart, self-interested, driver,
insensitive to people, feared,
insecure, gambler, impulsive,
tight-fisted, numbers-oriented,
materialistic, profit-seeker,
vain, bombastic, highly
emotional, partial

Professional; decisive; fastpaced; respected by peers;
secure risk-taker; thoughtful;
generous with personal time
and money; people- products
and market-oriented; builder
helper; self-confident;
composed; calm; deliberate;
fair; and know who and what
he or she is, and where he or
she is going

Bureaucratic

Collegial

Regimented

Systematic

Inflexible

Open to change

Imposed controls

Self-controlled

Many-tiered structure, vertical

Flat structure, horizontal

Everything is documented, and
there is a rule for everything.

Documentation is adequate but
not burdensome, and some
discretion is afforded.

Internal communication

Formal, written, stiff, pompous,
ambiguous

Informal, oral, clear, friendly,
open, candid

Peer relationships

Hostile, aggressive, rivalrous

Cooperative, friendly, trusting

Management structure, systems
and controls

1.3 Internal Controls and “Fraud-Proofing”
Developing an understanding of the various factors that contribute to the risk of fraud is
only the first step in a fraud prevention strategy. Following this, it is necessary to
implement policies that will help to reduce the threat.

Some of the measures that can guard against the threat of fraud were explained previously
in this chapter. Consider what is perhaps the main, and certainly the most common,
prevention tool, namely, a good system of internal controls.

1.3.1 Defining Internal Control Objectives
Fraud-proofing is a term that can be used to describe an effective system of internal controls.
However, this term is somewhat misleading because no internal control system can
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completely eliminate the risk of fraud. What fraud-proofing should do, in theory, is reduce
the risk of fraud to an acceptable level. If you have suffered from a fraud attack, consider
interviewing the fraudster after the case is closed. Many fraudsters have a bit of
braggadocio in them and, as a result, are only too willing to let you in on the very holes in
your control system they exploited.

The risk of fraud is not the only factor in defining internal control objectives. For example,
management information and reporting requirements are important considerations as well.
However, the acceptable levels of risk and opportunity, as defined in Section 1.1.6,
“Guarding Against the Threat,” should also be considered. This means effectively
combining the three levels of internal control to limit the risk of fraud to acceptable levels.
See the discussion that follows in Section 1.3.2, “Basic Controls,” Section 1.3.3,
“Supervision,” and Section 1.3.4, “Audit.”

1.3.2 Basic Controls
A variety of basic controls exist in a typical system of internal controls. The most relevant
basic controls are grouped into three categories:

1. Physical access
2. Job descriptions
3. Accounting reconciliations and analyses

Physical Access
Most people acknowledge the need to control physical access to valuable assets, including
intangible assets such as information. Measures to control physical access include the
obvious practice of locking doors, desks, and file cabinets so that unauthorized personnel,
either within or outside the organization, cannot gain access. Other measures include
employee IDs and passwords, computerized security systems (for example, access cards
that record time of entry and exit), and electronic surveillance systems, which should
include every new innovation, such as biometrics—including, for example, iris scans and
voice recognition—that the business can afford.
As a general rule, organizations should restrict physical access to those who require it to
perform their job function. Of course, controlling physical access in this way will not
completely reduce the risk of fraud. However, it will help to reduce the risk in the following
ways:

1. Many frauds require that the perpetrator come into physical contact with either the asset
being misappropriated, or the related asset records, in order to conceal the fraud.
Reducing physical access reduces opportunity.
2. Physical access controls are often the most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong
controls in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the
system. Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
3. Access controls that do not prevent fraud often assist in the fraud investigation process
(for example, determining what actually happened and narrowing down suspects).
Carefully screening who had access to cash receipts would have saved one U.S. County
Clerk much grief. According to a newspaper report, a temporary employee was stationed at
the front desk to handle passport applications, including collecting the necessary fees. The
18
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temp properly recorded and submitted for processing those applications paid for by check
or money order. She pocketed any cash received and destroyed all evidence of the cash
applications so that there was no record of the transaction. Not paying attention to
controlling physical access led to several thousands of dollars in losses.

Job Descriptions
Formal, specific job descriptions are a very effective fraud prevention tool. These
descriptions should spell out exactly what is expected of each employee. Generally,
employees should not perform duties outside their job description. Those who do represent
a significant red flag.

Create job descriptions that reflect the important principle of division of duties. For
example, employees with physical control over an asset should not also keep the records
relating to that asset (this will only make it easier for them to cover up the fraud). Segregate
all other especially sensitive duties—for example, purchasing and check signing.

The need for job descriptions goes beyond the widely recognized concept of segregating
duties, although it is certainly one of the important consequences of job descriptions. Some
cases may result in an entirely appropriate duplication of duties, for example, double
signing checks. Specify in the job description that all employees must take annual vacations
(another well-known fraud prevention tool, because an employer is more likely to discover
an ongoing fraud scheme when the perpetrators are removed from the scene).
Thus, it is apparent that employers must approach the process of formulating job
descriptions for their employees in an integrated fashion. From an internal-control and
fraud-prevention perspective, different tasks performed by different individuals may be
interrelated; therefore, an appropriate job description for one employee will often depend
on the job descriptions of others, and vice versa.

Employers often ignore or underestimate the need for formal job descriptions, writing them
off as “more useless paper.” At other times, employers create job descriptions but then
ignore them. This attitude invites trouble. As one leading fraud investigator put it, “When
people begin to do things outside their job description, you have reason to be concerned. If
it goes unrewarded, they begin to develop a justification to steal. It’s very important that
job descriptions are clear, agreed upon, and adhered to.”

Accounting Reconciliations and Analyses
After access controls and job descriptions, accounting reconciliations and analyses are the
third most important group of basic controls. An essential ingredient of a successful fraud is
successful concealment. Regular, appropriately performed accounting reconciliations and
analyses often make such concealment difficult or impossible.

Perform accounting reconciliations regularly (for example, monthly basis) including:
• Bank reconciliations, for all accounts
• Accounts receivable reconciliations (both month to month and general ledger to
subledger)
• Accounts payable reconciliations (again, both month to month and general ledger to
subledger)
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The exact nature of the accounting analyses performed depends on the nature of the
organization’s operations. Analyses relevant for most organizations include:

• Variance analysis of general ledger accounts (budget to actual, current year versus prior
year, and so on)
• Vertical analysis of profit and loss accounts (that is, the calculation of expenses as a
percentage of sales, and comparison of these percentages with historical standards, or
budgets, or both)
• Detailed sales and major expense analyses (for example, by product line or territory)
Of course, organizations often undertake accounting reconciliations and analyses with
other purposes in mind—for example, to make management decisions or to ensure the
accuracy of the accounting records, or both. Nevertheless, this process also can highlight
discrepancies that point to fraud.

1.3.3 Supervision
Supervision represents the second level of internal control. From a fraud prevention
perspective, strong supervision is vital—especially in small businesses that may have
difficulty achieving segregation of duties.

Active supervision differs significantly from supervisory or management override, in which
a manager or supervisor actually takes charge of or alters the work of a subordinate. In fact,
override itself is a red flag—that is, it suggests that the manager or supervisor may be
engaged in fraud or the concealment of one. Ideally, a supervisor or manager should allow
basic controls to operate as they were intended, rather than to be circumvented by those at
higher levels.
As a fraud prevention mechanism, good supervision consists of:

1. Fraud awareness
2. Approval, review, double-checking, and redoing

Fraud Awareness
Fraud prevention specialists constantly emphasize the need for “fraud awareness,” to the
point that the term has almost become a cliche. However, such awareness is perhaps the
key prerequisite in building any effective fraud prevention strategy, and is especially
important at the supervisory level.

Specifically, supervisors must be alert to the possibility of fraud whenever an unusual or
exceptional situation occurs, such as complaints from suppliers or customers, discrepancies
that don’t make sense, or accounting reconciliations that don’t balance. If a manager’s
mind is closed to the possibility of fraud during an unusual or exceptional situation, the risk
of the fraud continuing unabated greatly increases.
Several businesses have had positive results in raising employees’ awareness by publishing
regular internal newsletters. In addition to reporting actual fraudulent activities, the
newsletters relate the impact of the fraud on both the employees and the bottom line.
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Approval, Review, Double-checking, and Redoing
In addition to awareness, fraud prevention demands that supervisors actually supervise.
This means going beyond the typical approval function, such as initialing invoices or
performing other duties of supervisors and managers. A more thorough review, double
checking employees’ work, and redoing some tasks, may be necessary and should be
approached diligently. For example, assign supervisors the responsibility of double
checking important procedures such as the monthly bank reconciliation—that is,
comparing the numbers on the bank reconciliations to those on the bank statements and in
the general ledger, making certain those numbers total correctly, test-checking outstanding
items at the very least, and so on. To simply initial bank reconciliations in a habitual or
reflex-like manner without really reviewing and actually redoing them invites fraud.

For example, the owner of a busy downtown restaurant used the following system of
internal control for sales. Employees entered all prenumbered customer bills into the cash
register, and at least once each day the hostess/bookkeeper batched the customer bills,
listed them on a deposit sheet, and made the related bank deposit. The owner then
matched the totals on the deposit sheet with the amounts shown in the stamped deposit
book, and believed this to be adequate supervision.
The owner’s supervision of the bookkeeper, however, was inadequate especially because
she was responsible for handling the cash (the bank deposit) and related records (customer
bills, cash register tapes, deposit sheets). In fact, over a three-month period, the bookkeeper
skimmed a portion of each day’s cash receipts by omitting some of the cash sales bills and
pocketing the corresponding amounts. The owner might have uncovered the fraud by
using any one of the following methods:

1. Segregating duties. The owner rejected this method because he trusted the bookkeeper
and did not want to incur the cost of an additional employee.
2. Accountingfor all prenumbered bills. The owner opted not to use prenumbered bills
because it was too time-consuming. The bookkeeper intentionally did not list the bills in
numbered order on the deposit sheet and prenumbered books were issued out of
sequence to waiters and waitresses.
3. Matching daily cash register tapes to the daily cash deposit. The owner rejected this simplest
and most appropriate method, not wanting to check his employee’s work in this way
because the tapes were a messy “dog’s breakfast” kept in a shoebox by the bookkeeper.
The disorderly recordkeeping was entirely by design, of course, to cover up the fraud.

The owner eventually uncovered the fraud when the bookkeeper became too greedy and
withheld a bit too much from what the owner knew was an especially good cash sales day,
which raised his suspicions and led to an investigation.
This example illustrates the necessity of supervision. Often, it is the primary defense against
ongoing frauds such as financial statement fraud, the skimming of cash, or the lapping of
accounts receivable. The maximum opportunity level for the bookkeeper in the previous
example should have been the outright theft of the day’s cash receipts—typically less than
half of a day’s total receipts of about $10,000. However, inadequate supervision allowed a
smaller amount of cash—about $700 a day—to be stolen over a period of three months,
which amounted to a total loss of over $60,000.
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1.3.4 Audit
From a fraud-prevention perspective, audit represents the third level of an organization’s
internal control system.

Internal Audit
Internal auditors work for the organization and perform the kinds of work defined by
senior management. In this sense, internal auditors are an extension of senior
management—they have the same concerns and deal with the same issues described
throughout this chapter. Therefore, their work might include fraud detection, or developing
fraud prevention mechanisms, or both.

The duties of internal auditors include the analysis of accounting policies and procedures
for potential risk areas. The internal audit department submits recommendations to the
controller to minimize the risk of financial statement fraud or the misappropriation of assets
by accounting personnel. These recommendations might include increased segregation of
duties, or modification of journal entry procedures.
The training programs and available literature for internal auditors—as provided by the
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)—pay specific attention to the issue of fraud prevention
and detection. Historically, the perspective of internal auditors differs from that of the
external auditors, which is described below.

External Audit
External auditors are independent of the organization. They report on financial statements
and perform other independent reviews. The restricted role of the external auditor has
evolved over time. During the late 1800s and into the early 1900s, auditors actively looked
for fraud—to be a kind of “bloodhound.” Court rulings gradually redefined their role to
that of a “watchdog.”
This watchdog metaphor has persisted throughout most of the twentieth century. In
particular, the concept of materiality has played an important part in the accounting
profession’s view of fraud, which is, specifically, that an auditor’s procedures cannot be
expected to detect immaterial frauds. No audit can be expected to give absolute assurances
in this area, since Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration ofFraud in a
Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), only requires
that an auditor obtain reasonable assurance that there is no material misstatement as a result
of fraud. If a fraud is material enough to affect the financial statements of an organization—
and an auditor’s opinion on those financial statements—then the auditor’s procedures may
uncover it. However, there is certainly no guarantee of detection. For example, even when
the auditor’s procedures are sound, the perpetrator(s) may go to great lengths to deceive
the auditor and hide the accounting fraud.

In recent years, the public’s expectations has reopened to some extent the bloodhoundwatchdog debate primarily because of the perception that auditors should bear
responsibility for detecting significant frauds even when immaterial to the total worth of an
organization. In a 1998 speech by then Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Chairman Arthur Levitt, the issue of immateriality in contemporary financial statements
was broached: “Some companies misuse the concept of materiality. They intentionally
record errors within a defined percentage ceiling. . . . When either management or the
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outside auditors are questioned about these clear violations of GAAP [generally accepted
accounting principles], they answer sheepishly, ‘It doesn’t matter. It’s immaterial.’ ” This is
an example of the attempts to increase the responsibility of both management and external
auditors in the detection of fraud.

1.4 Detecting and Preventing Fraud in Books of Account
1.4.1 The Auditor’s Duty to Detect Fraud
Accountants and auditors have had to contend with dishonest practices in accounting
records since commercial activities were first recorded using the double-entry system. Since
that time, there has developed a division of responsibility between accountants and
auditors. In general, the accountants are responsible for the preparation of the financial
statements under the double-entry system. The auditor has a duty to report whether the
results of operations and balance sheets reflected in those financial statements have been
prepared in accordance with GAAP.
In addition to the auditor’s duty to determine whether the financial statements have been
prepared in accordance with GAAP, historically auditors have had a corollary
responsibility to determine whether any material entries were false (that is, fraudulent). But
there has been much debate about whether the latter was the peculiar province of the
auditor or of management. In general, management is primarily responsible for detecting
fraud in the accounting records.

According to SAS No. 99, the auditor is responsible for obtaining reasonable assurance that
there is no material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud. Federal courts
seem to hold auditors to a higher duty of professional care than do state courts. But even
state courts tend to impose a duty to detect fraud under some circumstances. In fact, a large
number of professional malpractice suits brought against outside auditors in state courts
involve allegations of undetected embezzlement or failure to detect materially fraudulent
financial reporting.
Recent events regarding very large public companies in the United States and elsewhere
have heightened the sensitivity of the investing public to fraudulent financial reporting. It is
safe to assume that the public has an expectation that auditors should consider the
detection of material financial reporting fraud as an important part of their overall
responsibility.

1.4.2 Fraud and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99
SAS No. 99 carries the same title as its predecessor SAS No. 82 (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 110, 230, 312, and 316), but is clearly more far-reaching. The
new provisions in SAS No. 99 include sections dealing with: brainstorming the risks of
fraud while exercising increased professional skepticism; discussions with management and
others as to whether they are aware of fraud; the use of unpredictable audit tests; and
responding to management override of controls by requiring on every audit certain
procedures responsive to detecting management override. The new auditing standard is
effective for audits of financial statements for periods beginning on or after December 15,
2002. All auditors should understand SAS No. 99 and be ready to implement it.
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Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Fraud detection is not the primary objective of a financial statement audit. Yet the auditors’
responsibility for detecting fraud is increasingly controversial. With the release of SAS No.
99 in October 2002, the auditor now has more in-depth guidance to assist him and more is
expected of the auditor in his role of detecting financial statement fraud. However, as a
result of the expectation gap, the controversy still exists.

The expectation gap is the difference between what the public expects auditors to do and
what auditors in fact, do. In other words, the public remains ignorant of the extent of the
auditors’ responsibilities. This contrasts with the limitations of what auditors can reasonably
expect to achieve. The general public and certain media, regardless of the efforts by the
AICPA and other professional groups, still lack a true understanding of the role of the
auditor.
Auditors should be fully aware of their responsibilities under the AICPA’s SAS No. 99,
which supercedes SAS No. 82.
As stated in SAS No. 99, the auditor should consider the risk that the financial statements
are materially misstated due either to unintentional error or fraud. Accordingly, the auditor
must specifically consider factors that bear on the likelihood of fraud. The level of risk
assessed may affect engagement staffing, extent of supervision, overall strategy, and the
degree of professional skepticism applied. In addition, as stated above, SAS No. 99
includes additional procedures to be performed by the auditor in their role of detecting
financial statement fraud.

Auditors' Responsibility
SAS No. 99 states, in part, “If the auditor believes that misstatements are or may be the
result of fraud, but the effect of the misstatements is not material to the financial statements,
the auditor nevertheless should evaluate the implications, especially those dealing with the
organizational position of the person(s) involved.” With this in mind, the crux of the
auditor’s responsibility in conducting a financial statement audit, as it relates to fraud, is to
determine whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement. To achieve
this, the following steps should be followed (bearing in mind the items noted above):
1. Assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud and
consider that assessment in designing audit procedures.
2. Inquire of management about its understanding of the risk of fraud and its knowledge of
frauds perpetrated on or within the organization.
3. Plan and perform the audit to achieve reasonable assurance of detecting material
misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud.
4. Consider whether misstatements detected during the audit are the result of fraud and, if
so, evaluate the implications and communicate the matter to appropriate client
personnel.
5. Document the facts that evidence the auditor’s assessment of the risk of fraud and the
auditor’s response to the risks identified.
For a more detailed discussion of these steps, see SAS No. 99 attached on the Fraud
Prevention Checklists CD-ROM.
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Types ofFraud
The misstatements most relevant to an audit of financial statements originate from two
types of fraud:
1. Fraudulent financial reporting The client intentionally misstates the financial statements
through phony accounting records or documents, the misrepresentation or omission of
significant information, or the misapplication of accounting principles. Fraudulent
management usually directs or performs these activities. In most cases, there will be
collusion between members of management and possibly third parties.
2. Misappropriation ofassets. Client personnel steal entity assets and conceal the theft
through misstatement of financial records. Fraudulent employees usually perform these
activities.

The auditor has no responsibility for detection of misstatements, whether caused by error
or fraud, that are not material to the financial statements. For example, the
misappropriation of assets often is not material to the financial statements. However, the
client might incorrectly expect that the auditor should detect all cases of fraud, whether or
not the financial statements are materially misstated.

1.4.3 Fraud Auditing Versus Financial Statement Auditing
Financial statement audits are usually conducted in the context of an annual recurring
function (a process which, to a certain extent, assumes a level of stability in the enterprise
being audited). On the other hand, fraud audits are usually only commenced when there is
a concern that something very unusual has occurred. For example, allegations of fraud
have been made, a whistleblower has come forward, accounting entries appear to be
unsupported, or revenue recognition appears to have been accelerated.
Financial statement auditing is a methodology for evaluating the level of accuracy,
timeliness and completeness of the recordings of business transactions. However, auditors
do not review all transactions. Auditors use sampling and confirmation techniques to test
accuracy, timeliness, and completeness. The purpose of testing is to determine whether
transaction data are free of material error and to confirm that financial statements
accordingly are free of material misstatement.

Fraud auditing, while borrowing many techniques from financial statement auditing, is
more a mind-set than a methodology. It relies on creativity (right-brain thinking) as much
as it does on reasoning (left-brain thinking). It requires that the fraud auditor think, but not
act, like a fraudster by considering the following:
• Where are the weakest links in the internal controls?
• How can the controls be circumvented and what financial statement elements are most
at risk?
• How would a fraudster create support for false entries?
• What would be a motivator for management to commit fraud?
• How would management rationalize the fraud?
The more fraud auditors can learn to think like fraudsters, the more effective their efforts
will be in detecting fraud.
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Financial statement and fraud auditing also differ in the degree of concern for evidence of
material error or misstatement. Although the materiality rule in financial statement auditing
has its place partially in a cost-benefit context, materiality is not a guiding principle in fraud
auditing. The amount of a visible fraud may be small, but frauds in books of account can
be like icebergs—the biggest part is below the surface. Discovering even small
discrepancies can reveal large issues. Are all frauds in the accounting records discovered on
the basis of undetected discrepancies? No. Many frauds surface on the basis of allegations
or complaints by coworkers, coconspirators, customers, competitors, suppliers, or
prospective suppliers.

1.4.4 Fraud Auditors Versus Financial Statement Auditors
Skills of fraud auditors include:
• Reconstructing financial transactions through third-party sources
•
•
•
•
•
•

Gathering and preserving accounting evidence for trial
Testifying as expert witnesses
Calculating net worth and living expenses
Inspecting documents for authenticity, alteration, forgery, and counterfeiting
Documenting a fraud case for criminal, civil, and insurance claim purposes
Designing fraud scenarios, that is, imagining what a fraudster might think and do in
situations in which internal controls are loose or not enforced and the fraudster has
certain powers and authority over assets and accounting records

What distinguishes fraud auditors from financial statement auditors? In most respects, they
are the same. Fraud auditors must make order out of what looks like chaos in books and
records. Many of the supporting documents the fraud auditor must access for confirmation
lie in the hands of third parties who might be reluctant to assist in the audit effort. Fraud
auditors are usually retained after an alleged fraud is discovered or allegations have been
made and are given the tasks of finding any additional fraud and validating or refuting the
allegations of fraud.

1.4.5 The Risk of Fraud
Some organizations suffer more fraud than others. What increases the risk or exposure to
loss from fraud in any organization? The answer depends on a number of factors. The
incidence of fraud in the accounting records is distributed unevenly. Some industries, some
companies, some occupations, and some individuals are higher risks than others.

High-risk industries are noted for intense rivalry, low profits, and unethical business
practices. Some members of these industries are controlled by underworld figures and may
enjoy sweetheart arrangements with corrupt labor unions. Disputes are often settled by
bribes, or, when necessary, by force.
High-risk companies are noted for poor management, loose controls, loose cash, and loose
business morality.
High-risk occupations provide easy access to cash and accounting records, and are often
characterized by low pay, long hours, and job-related stress.
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High-risk individuals are financially overburdened people with low self-esteem, addictive
personalities (prone to gambling, substance abuse, and high living); are poor managers of
their financial resources; have worked their way into positions of trust; and rationalize their
thefts as “borrowing” or getting even for imagined exploitation. Such people often work
long hours at their own discretion, and take no vacations for fear their defalcations might
be discovered while they are away. A growing number of these thieves also keep elaborate
records of their thefts. The records usually contain dates, amounts, and details of the
conditions in their lives at the time the cash or property was taken. It is believed that such
scrupulous bookkeeping is a defensive ploy. If they get caught, they think they can make a
credible defense of their intention to return the money or property. This defense may cast
doubt on one element of proof needed to convict, that is, the intent to permanently deprive
the owners of their property.
People commit crimes for a number of reasons. The main motives are economic,
egocentric, ideological, and psychotic. The economic motive (need or greed) is the most
common one found for the crimes of fraud, theft, and embezzlement.

In large corporations, with promotional policies and compensation plans geared to short
term bottom-line results and little else, a form of competitive greed can set in at the profitcenter management level. Even well-managed companies have become victims of their
own compensation designs. Therefore, falsifications of unit profits, revenues, and expenses
have become a greater problem in the U.S. corporate landscape.

1.5

Risk Management Checklist
Table 1.2, “Risk Management Checklist,” is designed to assist CPAs in assessing and
managing the risk of fraud in their organizations and in those of their clients. Generally, all
no answers require investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented.
The final section entitled “Specific Risk Factors” generally requires investigation and
follow-up for all yes answers. Use the “Ref" column to cross-reference any additional
documentation to the appropriate working papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist
does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute
for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital concerns about fraud prevention or who
suspect fraud should seek the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.
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Table 1.2 Risk Management Checklist
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Does the organization have an adequate level of fraud
awareness, and are appropriate policies in place to minimize
fraud risk, specifically:

a. Generic risk factors
• Has the organization assigned each employee a maximum
“opportunity level” to commit fraud, that is, has
management asked itself the question, “What is the
maximum amount this employee could defraud the
organization, and does this represent an acceptable risk?”
• Has the organization set a catastrophic opportunity level;
that is, has management asked itself the question, “Have
we ensured that no single employee—or group of
employees in collusion—can commit a fraud that would
place the organization in imminent risk of survival?”
• Does the organization have a policy of immediately
dismissing any employee who has committed fraud?
• Does the organization have a policy of reporting all frauds
to the authorities and pressing charges?
• For all frauds experienced by the organization in the past,
has management evaluated the reasons that led to the
fraud and taken corrective action?
b. Individual risk factors

• Does the organization have a corporate mission statement,
which includes an objective of good citizenship or the
maintenance of good standing in the community?

• Does the organization have a written code of ethics and
business conduct (see the checklist in Chapter 2 for
details)?
• Does the organization conduct ethical and security training
for new employees and periodic updates for existing
employees?
• Does management set the right example; that is, does it
follow the organization’s mission statement, code of ethics
and business conduct, and other policies of the
organization; and is it clearly seen to be doing so by
employees?
• Does the organization’s culture avoid characteristics that
promote unethical behavior, for example, high or even
hostile competitiveness within the organization that might
push employees to the point of burnout; pointless rigid or
petty policies, or both; overcentralization of authority?
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Do the organization’s hiring policies, to the extent
possible, seek out individuals of high moral character and
weed out those of low moral character (see the checklist in
Chapter 3)?
• Does the organization use screening and/or testing
procedures for especially sensitive positions; for example,
psychological tests, drug tests, or lie detector tests, or a
combination of all three, where permitted by law?
• Does the organization provide or encourage counseling, or
both, for employees with personal problems, for example,
alcohol and drug abuse?
• Does the organization have fair policies in the area of
employee relations and compensation, for example,
salaries, fringe benefits, performance appraisal,
promotions, severance pay; and do these policies compare
favorably with those of competitors and promote an
environment that minimizes disenchantment and other
similar motives to commit fraud?
• Does the organization have fair mechanisms in place for
dealing with employee grievances?

—

• Does the organization, as a feedback mechanism
concerning employee relations’ policies, conduct exit
interviews with departing employees?

c. Overall risk factors
• Does the organization exhibit an awareness of fraud and its
possible manifestations, for example, signs of employee
problems such as drug addiction, employees who are
living beyond their means, etc.?

2. Does the organization have an adequate system of internal
controls, specifically:

a. Internal control
• Has the organization explicitly considered the need for
fraud prevention in the design and maintenance of the
system of internal controls?

b. Control over physical and logical access
• Does the organization have a policy of locking doors,
desks, and cabinets after hours and when unattended,
especially in areas with valuable assets including files and
records, for example, personnel and payroll, customer and
vendor lists, corporate strategies, marketing plans,
research?
(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Does the organization use IDs and passwords, for
example, for computer files?
• Does the organization state and enforce a policy that
restricts access to those requiring it for job performance,
including a strict policy against employees allowing access
to unauthorized personnel, for example, by loaning keys
or sharing passwords?
• Has the organization installed, for especially sensitive
areas, the computerized security or electronic surveillance
systems, or both?

• Does the workplace appear to an impartial observer to
have adequate access controls?
c. Job descriptions

• Does the organization have written, specific job
descriptions?
• Are job descriptions adhered to?
• Does the organization have an organization chart that
reflects and is consistent with the job descriptions of its
employees?
• Are incompatible duties segregated, for example, the
handling of valuable assets—especially cash—and related
records?
• Does the organization properly segregate the purchasing
functions, that is, ensuring that one individual cannot
requisition goods or services, approve and make the
related payment, and access accounts payable records?

• Are especially sensitive duties duplicated, for example, the
double-signing of checks over a specified amount?
• Do job descriptions specify that employees must take
annual vacations?
• Is the overall process of formulating job descriptions
integrated with adequate consideration to the importance
of fraud prevention?

d. Regular accounting reconciliations and analyses

• Are all bank accounts reconciled?
• Are all accounts receivable reconciled, for example, month
to month, general ledger to subledger?
• Are all accounts payable reconciled, for example, month
to month, general ledger to subledger?
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Has the organization performed a variance analysis of
general ledger accounts, for example, budget to actual,
current year versus prior year?
• Has the organization performed a vertical analysis of profit
and loss accounts, that is, as a percentage of sales against
historical or budget standards, or both?
• Has the organization performed an analysis of detailed
sales and major expenses, for example, by product line or
geographic territory?
e. Supervision
• Do supervisors and managers have adequate fraud
awareness, that is, are they alert to the possibility of fraud
whenever an unusual or exceptional situation occurs, such
as supplier or customer complaints about their accounts?
• Do supervisors and managers diligently review their
subordinates’ work, for example, accounting
reconciliations, and redo the work when appropriate?

• Does close supervision adequately compensate against the
increased risk of fraud in smaller businesses or where an
inability to divide duties exists.
• Is supervisory or management override prohibited and are
others within the firm alert to the fraud risks associated
with management override?

f.

Audit
• Is there an internal audit function?
• Does the internal audit function perform regular checks to
ensure that fraud prevention mechanisms are in place and
operating as intended?
• Are external audits performed on a regular basis, for
example, quarterly for larger businesses?
• Are the timing demands of management on external
auditors reasonable?
• Do external auditors receive full cooperation from
management with respect to their work in general and
fraud matters in particular, for example, through the audit
committee?

3. Has the organization specifically addressed the following fraud
prevention issues:

a. Ethical Environment
(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Risk Financing

c. Computer Security
Specific Risk Factors

Fraudulent Financial Reporting

1. Is the organization’s financial stability or profitabilty
threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions?
2. Is there excessive pressure on management or management
incentives related to reaching earnings expectations or certain
revenue benchmarks?
3. Are there significant balances in the financial statements
which are based on subjective management estimates?

4. Are there significant cash balances or significant transaction
activity in overseas banks in tax havens such as the Cayman
Islands or the Channel Islands?

5. Does the entity have an overly complex organizational
structure or a large number of complex subsidiaries?
6. Does management consistently use materiality as a basis for
justifying marginal or inappropriate accounting methods?

Misappropriation of Assets
1. Are there planned layoffs which have become known by
employees throughout the company?

2. Are the company’s assets easily convertible and are they
physically available to employees?
3. Is there insufficient segregation of duties related to check
writing, wiring of funds, or cash?
4. Are the controls over the accounting system or automated
records inadequate?
5. Do certain employees exhibit a change in behavior to a
disagreeable or discontent state?
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CHAPTER 2:
Promoting an Ethical Environment

2.1 Ethics: A Framework
An ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy. This chapter
will acquaint you with the field of applied ethics, provide essential tools for promoting an
ethical environment within an organization, and conclude with a diagnostic tool that you
can use when evaluating an organization’s current ethical status.

2.1.1 Overview
Ethics—derived from the Greek ethos, meaning character or custom—is a very broad term
referring to principles or standards of human conduct. Ethics has been, and continues to be,
one of the key concerns of all religions, schools of philosophy, sciences, liberal arts,
professions, and political movements. Moses, Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Kanto, and many
others devoted a great deal of their recorded teachings to the subject of ethics. It is
impossible to engage in any human endeavor, including business, without entering the field
of ethics.

Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the science devoted to the study of the “walk,” rather than the talk, of
ethics. According to Lisa H. Newton, in her text Doing Good and Avoiding Evil: Principles and
Reasoning ofApplied Ethics, “Applied ethics, then, is the field that holds ethical theory
accountable to practice and professional and business practice accountable to theory.” It’s
where the rubber meets the road.
Personal Versus Organizational Ethics
Whose principles and standards should we adopt? There remains much confusion about
this fundamental question. Some believe that ethics are a matter of personal choice.
Therefore, any attempt to establish a code of ethics, or conduct, would result in a narrow
flight of parochial fancy that would be so patently offensive to so many, it would render
itself immediately irrelevant. Others believe that a kind of universal genetic code of ethics
or conduct exists. This theory suggests that we are all born with an inherent sense of right
and wrong. So, any artificial code of ethics is unnecessary and would be flawed in any way
in which it conflicted with the natural code. Both groups believe it would be wrong for any
organization to impose ethical standards on its members, employees, or other stakeholders.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
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It is an organization’s right and duty to clearly communicate its values and expectations
regarding the conduct of its affairs to all its stakeholders. Employees or members may freely
choose to join, or not to join, any given organization. But, once individuals choose to join
an organization, they assume a duty to respect the organization’s values and abide by its
code of conduct.
Ethics and the Law

When confronted about unethical behavior, many people will point out that their actions
were not illegal. This would be roughly analogous to saying that because a person follows
the rules of law, he or she would be an excellent judge. According to the Professional Ethics
for Certified Public Accountants (a publication of the California Certified Public Accountants
Foundation for Education and Research) “Laws and rules establish minimum standards of
consensus impropriety, they do not define the criteria of ethical behavior.”

2.1.2 Ethics at Work
In the Professions
Most, if not all, recognized professions have developed written codes of ethics, professional
conduct, or both. They also have implemented means to assure that members of the
profession abide by these codes. Violators are usually disciplined or expelled, sometimes in
public proceedings, to demonstrate the profession’s commitment to its code and willingness
to effectively police itself.

Some would argue that the professions became interested in ethics for entirely selfish
reasons. They see the rise of successful plaintiffs’ litigation in the 1970s as a key motivator
in the promulgation of professional codes of ethics and conduct They also point out that,
during the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government demonstrated an interest in playing an
increased role, including the actual promulgation of codes of conduct, in the regulation of
professions. The AICPA has written and rewritten its code of professional conduct many
times during the past 100 years or so. In fact, according to Professional Ethics for Certified
Public Accountants, a complete restatement of the code was made in 1973.
Whatever the motivation, professional codes of conduct have been effective. The reason is
simple: if you do not abide by the ethics code of your profession, you lose the right to
practice and earn a living. Coupling this reason with the profession’s corporate interest in
maintaining its standing and authority, thus minimizing its exposure to litigation and
intrusion by the government, demonstrates the steps taken toward promoting an ethical
environment.

But, how do we apply this model to businesses, including professional firms?

Business Ethics
Should business be concerned with ethics? The answer was not always a unanimous yes.
Who hasn’t heard the appropriated maxim: All is fair in love and business. You may recall
Shakespeare’s merchant and Dickens’ Fagan as examples of at least the perception of
business motives in western society. In this country, tales of the robber barons of the
nineteenth century suggest that business ethics were not at the top of the enterprise success
factor list. That was then, but what about now? As recently as the 1970s, mainstream
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economist Milton Friedman said that the only obligation of a business is to make a profit.
This became dogma in American business schools in the 1970s and 1980s.

So, why should business be concerned with ethics today? One could argue that after
November 1991—the effective date of the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations—
business became concerned with ethics in order to guard against huge fines and penalties.
But there are other, pragmatic reasons for business to be concerned with ethics:

Enlightened self-interest. According to the Professional Ethics for Certified Public Accountants, a
business needs to avoid scandals, keep government off its back, protect itself from internal
corruption, avoid fines and penalties, and keep its executives out of jail. Also, there is the
value of a good corporate image, the internal cost of investigations and legal fees, the value
of good employee morale, and the impact of wrongdoing on the share value of public
companies to consider. In fact, ethics may have a great deal more to do with making a
profit than Mr. Friedman imagined.

2.1.3 Promoting an Ethical Environment
The Tone at the Top
You’ve heard it before and it must be said again. The tone of upper management is most
important in the field of ethics. Ethics will not suffer senior management’s clever
rationalization or thinly veiled hypocrisy. Fortunately, or unfortunately, ethics always
comes down to a simple choice of right over wrong. Even the most learned defense of
improper conduct in the executive suite would fail the ethics test. If the bosses aren’t ready
to walk the talk, the process simply will not work.
Senior management must be made aware of this essential element. Some will raise
objections about the cost of an ethics program or its potential negative impact on revenue.
Even today, the best way to communicate the value of an effective ethics program is to
quantify the cost of not having an ethics program. Statistics and examples abound.
According to an Association of Certified Fraud Examiners report, it was estimated that in
1996 U.S. organizations lost over $400 billion to occupational fraud and abuse. But, to
bring the point home, you need look no further than your favorite daily business journal.
Virtually every issue contains stories of businesses and other organizations that have been
victimized through fraud and paid dearly for it. Those businesses that allegedly “benefited”
from the fraud end up losing the most.

The Current Situation
All ethics, like all politics, are local. Resist the temptation to run out and “buy” someone
else’s ethics program for your organization. An ethical environment flows from an ethics
program that is tailored to the organization. If you try to develop a rule in advance for
every situation, you will fail. If you try to fix things that are not broken, you will fail.
Finally, if in the process of installing your new, super-deluxe, off-the-shelf ethics program,
you communicate your distrust of employees and other stakeholders to them, they, in turn,
will justify that distrust.
For all of these reasons, begin by analyzing your individual organization. Involve everyone
in the process. Get their input. Develop a brief statement (mission statement) of the
organization’s core values and mission.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Perform a diagnostic to identify weak and strong areas of ethical conduct within the
organization. You should consider using the Ethical Environmental Checklist at the end of
this chapter, or you could use this checklist as a template to develop a diagnostic tool of
your own. Once you compile the results of your diagnostic exercise, analyze the results,
make any necessary decisions, and begin designing the program.

Designing the Ethics Program
The most important requirement when promoting an ethical environment is having a
written code of ethics and business conduct. A written code helps to set the right ethical
tone within an organization. Figure 2-1 is an example of a written mission statement.
Figure 2-1. A Written Mission Statement

Mission Statement

The Organization’s mission is to provide the highest quality goods and services to its
customers; to strive at all times for market leadership and in so doing, to benefit the
Organization’s shareholders and its employees.
The Organization is committed to a policy of fair dealing and integrity in the conduct of all
aspects of its business. This commitment is based on a fundamental belief in law, honesty
and fairness. The Organization expects its employees to share its commitment to high legal,
ethical and moral standards.
This Code of Business Conduct is mandatory, and the Organization expects full
compliance by all of its employees and by its subsidiaries under all circumstances. The
Organization will monitor compliance, and any violation of the Code may result in
disciplinary action that could include termination of employment.
Employees uncertain about the application of the Code should consult with their superior.
Similarly any employee who becomes aware of, or suspects, a contravention of the Code,
must promptly advise his or her superior, or report the matter directly to Human
Resources, Internal Audit or the Law Department.

Figure 2-2 is an example of an organizational code of conduct, which includes definitions
of what is considered unacceptable, and the consequences of any breaches thereof. Note
that figure 2-2 is only an example. The specific content and areas addressed in your
mission statement and code should flow from your own analysis of your organization.
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Figure 2-2. An Organizational Code of Conduct

Organizational Code of Conduct
The Organization and its employees must, at all times, comply with all applicable laws and
regulations. The Organization will not condone the activities of employees who achieve
results through violation of the law or unethical business dealings. This includes any
payments for illegal acts, indirect contributions, rebates and bribery. The Organization does
not permit any activity that fails to stand the closest possible public scrutiny.

All business conduct should be well above the minimum standards required by law.
Accordingly, employees must ensure that their actions cannot be interpreted as being, in
any way, in contravention of the laws and regulations governing the Organization’s
worldwide operations.
Employees uncertain about the application or interpretation of any legal requirements
should refer the matter to their superior, who, if necessary, should seek the advice of the
Law Department.

General Employee Conduct

The Organization expects its employees to conduct themselves in a businesslike manner.
Drinking, gambling, fighting, swearing and similar unprofessional activities are strictly
prohibited while on the job.
Employees must not engage in sexual harassment, or conduct themselves in a way that
could be construed as such, for example, by using inappropriate language, keeping or
posting inappropriate materials in their work area, or accessing inappropriate materials on
their computer.

Conflicts ofInterest

The Organization expects that employees will perform their duties conscientiously,
honestly and in accordance with the best interests of the Organization. Employees must not
use their position or the knowledge gained as a result of their position for private or
personal advantage. Regardless of the circumstances, if employees sense that a course of
action they have pursued, are presently pursuing or are contemplating pursuing may
involve them in a conflict of interest with their employer, they should immediately
communicate all the facts to their superior.

Outside Activities, Employment and Directorships

All employees share a serious responsibility for an Organization’s good public relations,
especially at the community level. Their readiness to help with religious, charitable,
educational and civic activities brings credit to the Organization and is encouraged.
Employees must, however, avoid acquiring any business interest or participating in any
other activity outside the Organization that would, or would appear to—
(continued)
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• Create an excessive demand upon their time and attention, thus depriving the
Organization of their best efforts on the job.
• Create a conflict of interest—an obligation, interest or distraction—that may interfere
with the independent exercise of judgment in the Organization’s best interest.

Relationships with Clients and Suppliers
Employees should avoid investing in or acquiring a financial interest for their own accounts
in any business organization that has a contractual relationship with the Organization, or
that provides goods or services, or both to the Organization, if such investment or interest
could influence or create the impression of influencing their decisions in the performance
of their duties on behalf of the Organization.

Gifts, Entertainment and Favors

Employees must not accept entertainment, gifts, or personal favors that could, in any way,
influence, or appear to influence, business decisions in favor of any person or organization
with whom or with which the Organization has, or is likely to have, business dealings.
Similarly, employees must not accept any other preferential treatment under these
circumstances because their position with the Organization might be inclined to, or be
perceived to, place them under obligation.
Kickbacks and Secret Commissions

Regarding the Organization’s business activities, employees may not receive payment or
compensation of any kind, except as authorized under the Organization’s remuneration
policies. In particular, the Organization strictly prohibits the acceptance of kickbacks and
secret commissions from suppliers or others. Any breach of this rule will result in
immediate termination and prosecution to the fullest extent of the law.

Organization Funds and Other Assets
Employees who have access to Organization funds in any form must follow the prescribed
procedures for recording, handling and protecting money as detailed in the Organization’s
instructional manuals or other explanatory materials, or both. The Organization imposes
strict standards to prevent fraud and dishonesty. If employees become aware of any
evidence of fraud and dishonesty, they should immediately advise their superior or the Law
Department so that the Organization can promptly investigate further.
When an employee’s position requires spending Organization funds or incurring any
reimbursable personal expenses, that individual must use good judgment on the
Organization’s behalf to ensure that good value is received for every expenditure.
Organization funds and all other assets of the Organization are for Organization purposes
only and not for personal benefit. This includes the personal use of organizational assets
such as computers.
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Figure 2-2. (continued)

Organization Records and Communications
Accurate and reliable records of many kinds are necessary to meet the Organization’s legal
and financial obligations and to manage the affairs of the Organization. The Organization’s
books and records must reflect in an accurate and timely manner all business transactions.
The employees responsible for accounting and record-keeping must fully disclose and
record all assets, liabilities, or both, and must exercise diligence in enforcing these
requirements.

Employees must not make or engage in any false record or communication of any kind,
whether internal or external, including but not limited to—

• False expense, attendance, production, financial or similar reports and statements
• False advertising, deceptive marketing practices, or other misleading representations
Dealing With Outside People and Organizations

Employees must take care to separate their personal roles from their Organization positions
when communicating on matters not involving Organization business. Employees must not
use organization identification, stationery, supplies and equipment for personal or political
matters.
When communicating publicly on matters that involve Organization business, employees
must not presume to speak for the Organization on any topic, unless they are certain that
the views they express are those of the Organization, and it is the Organization’s desire that
such views be publicly disseminated.
When dealing with anyone outside the Organization, including public officials, employees
must take care not to compromise the integrity or damage the reputation of either the
Organization, or any outside individual, business, or government body.

Prompt Communications
In all matters relevant to customers, suppliers, government authorities, the public and
others in the Organization, all employees must make every effort to achieve complete,
accurate and timely communications—responding promptly and courteously to all proper
requests for information and to all complaints.

Privacy and Confidentiality

When handling financial and personal information about customers or others with whom
the Organization has dealings, observe the following principles:
1. Collect, use, and retain only the personal information necessary for the Organization’s
business. Whenever possible, obtain any relevant information directly from the person
concerned. Use only reputable and reliable sources to supplement this information.

(continued)
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Figure 2-2. (continued)

2. Retain information only for as long as necessary or as required by law. Protect the
physical security of this information.
3. Limit internal access to personal information to those with a legitimate business reason
for seeking that information. Only use personal information for the purposes for which it
was originally obtained. Obtain the consent of the person concerned before externally
disclosing any personal information, unless legal process or contractual obligation
provides otherwise.

When designing your program, implementation strategy and training, remember the
following bit of wisdom:
Give a person a fish and he or she will be able to eat today. Teach a person to fish and he
or she will be able to eat for a lifetime.
If you try to create a rule for every ethical dilemma, your people will focus on how to fit
their decisions to the rules. On this premise, if there is no rule, there is no problem. If you
train your people to make ethical decisions for themselves, however, they will focus on
doing just that.

Training and Communication
After writing your organization’s code of ethics and business conduct, ask everyone to read
it and have them confirm in writing that they have done so and understood the content.
Keep a record of this acknowledgment.
You should consider seminar training for all employees and agents. The training doesn’t
have to be long and complicated. Use the KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) method to develop
your ethics curriculum. Instead of giving them rules, give them tools. These tools can be as
simple as a list of broad principles to follow and questions to ask when making decisions.
In Policies and Persons: A Case Book in Business Ethics, John B. Mathews and coauthors suggest
the following tools.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Avoid harming others.
Prevent harm to others.
Respect the rights of others.
Do not lie or cheat.
Keep promises and contracts.

6. Obey the law.
7. Help those in need.
8. Be fair.
So, when a considered action may raise serious ethical questions, try applying the
generalized criteria. For example, you can use the guidelines above and ask yourself the
following specific questions.
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1. Does the considered action violate any of the following?:
—A criminal law
—A civil law

—A company policy

—A professional code
—An industry code
2.
3.
4.
5.

—My personal values
Is the action fair, just, and equitable to all parties?
Does the action serve the common good and the public’s interest?
Does it provide the greatest good for the greatest number?
Does it do the least harm to the greatest number?

6. Does it cost more than its social benefits?
7. Would you like it if it were done to you (known as “The Golden Rule”)?

8. Would an ethical role model (for example, your parent, priest, or minister) approve of
this act?
Enforcement
As discussed in chapter 1, an effective prevention strategy demands there be some adverse
consequences when an employee is caught committing fraud (for example, dismissal of the
employee and the pressing of charges). Similarly, there also must be some adverse
consequences—commensurate with the severity of the breach—when an employee
contravenes an organization’s stated policies, and in particular its code of ethics and
business conduct For severe breaches, or for repeat offenders, dismissal may be an
appropriate consequence and the organization’s policies should so state.

To ensure that all employees are aware of their responsibilities, organizations should
require that the staff sign an annual declaration stating they are aware of the company’s
code of ethics and business conduct policies, and confirming they have complied in the past
and will continue to do so.
Employee Hiring and Employee Relations
Ultimately, the employees, not the organization’s policies, create a good ethical climate.
Employee hiring practices and employee relations are therefore important fraud prevention
variables. The Ethical Environment Checklist (at the end of this chapter) provides a fairly
comprehensive list of the factors to consider.
Generally, organizations face a balancing act. On the one hand, they must minimize the
risk of fraud and be cost-effective in employee remuneration. On the other hand, they must
promote an open environment in which employee morale and creativity flourish, while
employees feel rewarded for their efforts. Tipping the scale too far to one side or the other
can lead to problems, or reduce the competitiveness of an organization, or both.
Organizations can achieve success at a point somewhere in between and only through the
good judgment of management.
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2.1.4 Ethics and Information Technology
The ever-accelerating information revolution—particularly during the latter half of the
twentieth century—has raised special ethical issues. In particular, makers, distributors,
owners, managers, and users of information resources have ethical responsibilities for the
products and services that they create, own, sell, manage, and use. The ethical issues raised
by information technology include the following:
• Privacy
• Piracy
• Safety and health

• Data security
• Data integrity
• Competence
• Honesty
• Loyalty
• Fairness
Privacy
A myriad of both private-and public-sector organizations collect data for a wide variety of
purposes. The U.S. government alone has gathered and stored four billion records on
individuals. The development of database management software for personal computers
has extended these capabilities to anyone with a few hundred dollars. Although databases
have grown explosively, controls over access and disclosure of confidential data have not
kept pace. Unauthorized access to databases and disclosure of confidential information
contained therein are commonplace.
There are legal constraints on the improper collection and dissemination of personal data in
the United States and Canada, embodied in their respective Constitutions, Supreme Court
decisions, tort law, and in federal and state privacy and consumer rights enactment.
However, these laws and rulings are not sufficiently clear to reach consensus. For example,
on the question of access to personal history databases versus an individual’s right of
privacy, an ethicist might ask the following.

● Who is collecting the data?

● For what use are the data being collected?
● How, to whom, and for what purpose will the data be disseminated?
How well protected is that data against unauthorized access and disclosure?
●
● How accurate, complete, and timely are the data?
● What degrees of confidentiality should be accorded to such disparate data as medical,
psychiatric, credit, employment, school and criminal records?

If medical records were considered the most confidential of the lot, the ethical standard for
the care accorded such data would be higher; that is, medical records should be gathered,
stored, and disseminated with great care and caution.
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Piracy
Software piracy signifies that the creative work of another has been used or duplicated
without permission or payment of royalty, or both. The definition assumes that the
software’s creator has complied adequately with the legal requirements of the federal
copyright law. Therefore, the software pirate commits an act of infringement and may be
civilly sued for damages, criminally prosecuted, or both.
Software piracy is probably the most common breach of ethics in the field of information
technology. For each software program sold, developers claim that another two to five
copies are bootlegged. The lost royalties of developers are staggering. Some thieves
rationalize that software prices are too high and that the developers are large and will not
miss the lost royalties. In reality, the software industry has become increasingly competitive
and losses to piracy can have a serious impact on a company’s viability. Moreover, even the
largest and most profitable developers have a right to seek a fair price and return for their
development efforts, the costs incurred and the risks taken.

Safety and Health
The widespread use of computers in today’s information-driven economy has contributed
to and in some instances created, unique safety issues that can be divided into the following
two distinct categories:
1. Accidents resulting from the use of computer-controlled systems
2. Occupational health and safety problems for users caused by long-term or improper use
of computers, or both
Computer-controlled systems safety issues—The accelerated pace of technological change in this
century has resulted in an exponential increase in new industries with many innovative
products and processes. Dangerous substances and sensitive information are being handled
on an unparalleled scale. New systems are being built—using computers to control them—
that have the capacity to cause extensive destruction of life and the environment. A single
accident could be catastrophic. Computers now control most safety-critical devices and they
often replace traditional hardware safety interlocks and protection systems. Even when
hardware protection devices are retained, software is often used to control them. Because of
the explosive increase in the use of, and reliance on computers, methods to ensure the
safety of computer-controlled systems have not always kept pace with the development of
these very systems. Ethicists recognize there is a serious danger of overreliance on the
accuracy of computer outputs and databases. The nonoccurrence of particular types of
accidents in the past is no guarantee that they will not take place in the future. Software and
hardware developers and information technology professionals alike must recognize their
moral and ethical responsibilities. We can’t wait to learn from experience, but must attempt
to anticipate and prevent accidents before they occur.

Computer-related safety and health issues—Today’s computer operators, particularly heavy
users, may develop problems caused by the repetitive motions used daily in operating their
machines. The most common problem is repetitive stress injury (RSI), in which workers
experience moderate to severe pain in the muscles and joints of the hands, wrists, arms,
shoulders, neck and back. RSI can be caused by carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), irritation of
the nerves leading to the fingers due to the prolonged use of a keyboard while the body is
in an unnatural or strained position. RSI can be completely incapacitating, sometimes
13
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requiring surgery if not treated early. According to Patrick G. McKeown in his text, Living
With Computers, these injuries are epidemic in computer-related jobs; RSI constitutes more
than 60 percent of work injuries and costs employers $20 billion annually. Other healthrelated problems involve radiation emissions from the monitor and eyestrain from watching
the screen for long periods of time without proper lighting or screen glare protection, as
well as noise-induced problems caused by the pervasive low-level noise in today’s computer
environment.

Because of the enormous costs resulting from worker’s health and safety issues, many
organizations are opting for ergonomically designed work environments. Ergonomics, or
human factor engineering, is the science of designing equipment for the workplace to keep
employees safe and healthy while they work, which usually results in fewer physical
complaints, higher employee morale and increased productivity. An ergonomically
designed work area considers the following factors:

• The height and position of the monitor
• The height and angle of the keyboard
• A fully adjustable chair that provides lower back and adjustable arm support and height
adjustment capabilities
• A keyboard that allows users to work with their hands in a natural position
• A mouse designed for either a left- or right-handed user with wrist support
• An anti-glare monitor screen

• Noise reduction measures

• Proper indirect and task lighting
• Adequate ventilation

In addition, employers should emphasize the proper use of equipment, encourage regular
breaks, and provide stress reduction training for employees to further minimize the risk
factors related to RSI and related injuries. In an ethical environment management is
sensitive to the well-being of regular employees and applies the same principles to part-time
workers and support staff.

Data Security
The protection of personal information from unauthorized access, disclosure, and
duplication obligates a database owner to—

• Formulate and enforce standards for the proper use of the data.
• Communicate to, educate, and train users about their responsibility for protecting such
information.
• Plan for likely contingencies.
• Establish adequate security controls.
• Monitor control exceptions.
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Data Integrity
An incorrectly entered arrest report, credit report, insurance rejection, debt default, or lab
test can cause great emotional and financial damage. Yet the error rates of databases with
such sensitive information are often higher than the standards of quality set by the original
designers of these systems. Accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and relevance are what give
information its value. In particular, creators of personal history databases have a special
obligation to compile and process such data accurately and to protect it from the prying
eyes of snoops, browsers, and hackers.

Today people can collect, process and disseminate information at a high speed. If
information is irrelevant to the needs of users or is flawed in logic, assumptions or
conclusions, relying on such specious data can cause catastrophic damage. Therefore,
quality begins with clear objectives, exacting designs, flawless development and proper
training of users. People and organizations involved in software development and database
design are obliged to make products that are fit for their intended uses and have no
fundamental defects.
Competence
The field of information technology is notable for its fast growth and complexity, and the
sweeping social, economic, and political changes it has wrought. At times, change seems
overwhelming. Skills and products become obsolete overnight. Companies must invest
large sums of money in research and product development.

In the race to get new products out of the labs and into the market, people often
compromise quality, safety and security. New products might contain design flaws, software
errors, bugs and glitches, and other impediments to proper functioning. These impediments
can be costly to uninformed and unsophisticated users. Makers and providers of
information technology products—both hardware and software—must take great care and
caution in their work to avoid damage or interruption of service to their users. Providers of
information technology should seek the most competent people available for sensitive
design and product development projects. They should also create an ethical climate in
their firms and foster responsible behavior among all employees.
Honesty
Makers, sellers, dealers, distributors, and installers of information technology products—
like all other business people—must be honest in their dealings with one another. All
parties should use truthful representations, nondeceptive advertising, and accurate labeling,
as well as fulfill contract requirements.

Loyalty
The information technology industry is large, complex, fast changing, and highly
competitive. Some information products—such as chips and PCs—have become
commodities. The relationship between buyers and sellers is changing from one in which
mutual trust, confidence, and faith give way to arms-length transactions. Sellers attract
buyers on the basis of price alone. The service-after-sale element is forgotten.
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These same industry dynamics have also changed the relationship between employers and
employees. Loyalty is supposed to be a two-way street. In today’s competitive environment,
some high-tech, high-talent employees are loyal only to their paychecks thereby blurring
obligations between employers and employees, sellers and buyers, and manufacturers and
suppliers.

Fairness
Normally people conduct business on the basis of mutual faith and trust. You cannot,
however, provide for all contingencies in a formal contract. The writing and execution of a
detailed contract would take too long, thus frustrating the objectives of both parties.

Assuming business ethics are a matter of mutual rights and obligations of the transacting
parties implies that fairness is the rule by which we measure whether a transaction is right
or wrong. In theory, both parties have equal bargaining power in a commercial transaction.
Therefore, ethics should leave the parties to their own negotiations. Often in the
information industry, both parties are not of equal size, competence, skill, knowledge or
experience. In these circumstances, fairness may mean that the more powerful of the two
has an added measure of obligation. The English common law treated buyers and sellers as
equally competent to transact business. Yet in the modern era the notion of caveat emptor (let
the buyer beware) has been diluted. Sellers with superior knowledge, skills, and resources
must be most forthcoming. Fairness may no longer be a 50-50 proposition. Fairness
depends on the relationship between the parties, their relative power positions, and the
context of the business transaction.

2.2 Ethical Environment Checklist
CPAs can use table 2.1, Ethical Environment Checklist to help promote an ethical
environment in their organizations and in those of their clients. No answers may require
investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented. Use the Refcolumn
to cross-reference the checklist to appropriate work papers.

Some sections in this comprehensive checklist may not be applicable or appropriate in
certain instances. For example, most organizations will not conduct the entire employee
screening procedures described in section 4 of the checklist. This checklist is intended for
general guidance and information only. Use of this checklist does not guarantee the
prevention of fraud. If fraud prevention is an especially vital concern or if fraud is suspected,
consider seeking the advice of a knowledgeable fraud practitioner.
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Table 2.1 Ethical Environment Checklist
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Organizational Approach to Ethics

a. Does the organization have a Mission Statement that
emphasizes respect for the law, ethics, and ethical conduct?

b. Does the organization have a written and enforced Code of
Ethics?

c. If the organization or its employees are subject to outside
ethical standards and rules (e.g., industry or professional),
does the organization’s code refer to and emphasize their
importance?
d. Does the organization have—

• Internal auditors?
• Electronic data processing (EDP) auditors?
• At least one Data-Security Officer or Administrator?

• A Corporate-Security or Loss-Prevention Unit?

• An investigative staff?
e. Does the organization, as a matter of written policy, refer
incidents of employee crimes on the job to police or
prosecutorial authorities?
f. If the organization has experienced fraud in the past five
years, has management established the causes and taken
remedial action for any of the following:

• A substantial inventory shortage corporate-wide
• A substantial inventory shortage in a major operating
division
• A major embezzlement involving a loss of more than
$10,000
• A successful penetration of the main office computers by
outsiders
• An accounts payable, accounts receivable, payroll, or
benefit claim fraud of any amount

• A commercial bribery of purchasing or other personnel

2. Situational Approach to Ethics
a. Are ethical considerations a critical element in corporate
policies, tactics, and decision-making?

b. Is there a specific framework—especially for important and
difficult corporate decisions or actions—for addressing the
ethical element, such as a series of questions like those set out
in item 2c (below)?
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist
c. Does the organization, when contemplating actions or
decisions that may raise ethical concerns, consider the
following:
• Does the action violate any law or code to which the
organization is subject?

• Is the action fair, just and equitable to all the parties
involved?
• Does the action serve the common good and the public’s
interest (for example, does it: (i) provide the greatest good
for the greatest number, (ii) do the least harm to the
greatest number, and (iii) yield social benefits that exceed
the cost)?

• Would an ethical purist or role model (for example, the
stereotypical good parent, priest or minister) approve of
the act?

3. Policy Approach to Ethics
a. Does management set the right tone for employees and
demonstrate the organization’s commitment to ethical
conduct (for example, by regularly referring to the
organization’s code of ethics in policy meetings and
communications) ?

b. Do the organization’s policies in all activities,
communications, and transactions reflect a commitment to
the following:
• Honesty and integrity

• Competence and due care
• Commitment to excellence
• Fair and prompt dealings
• Respect for privacy and confidentiality
c. Does the organization have written policies that restrict or
prohibit the following:
• Engaging in outside employment (moonlighting)

• Engaging in conflicts of interest
• Accepting gratuities, expensive gifts or lavish
entertainments from vendors, contractors and suppliers

• Compromising or bribing customers
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Engaging in false advertising and deceptive marketing
practices

• Disclosing company trade secrets to unauthorized persons
• Fixing prices with competitors

• Gambling on the job

• Abusing drugs or alcohol, or both
• Fighting on the job
• Stealing company property, including personal use of
company property (for example, computer time)
• Destroying company property

• Falsifying time or attendance reports
• Falsifying production reports
• Falsifying personal data on a job application
• Falsifying or forging accounting records

• Destroying accounting records
• Falsifying expense accounts
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to confidential
records (for example, payroll and personnel records,
customer and vendor lists, research results, product and
marketing plans)
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to company
buildings or critical work areas

• Loaning company building access identification cards,
badges or door keys to unauthorized persons
• Disclosing computer log-on codes or passwords to
unauthorized persons

• Allowing unauthorized persons use of computer terminals
4. Ethics and Human Resources
a. To the extent necessary, when considering an applicant and
depending on the importance and sensitivity of the position,
does the organization perform reference checks, background
inquiries or investigations, or any combination thereof, to
confirm the applicant’s—

• Identity
• Educational achievements
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

• Credit standing
• Satisfactory past employment history
• Absence of criminal convictions (including name or
fingerprint checks, or both)
• Reputation

• Character

b. Especially for very sensitive positions (for example, those
affecting public safety, the custodianship of large amounts of
cash or securities, the secrecy of important information), and
to the extent allowed by law, does the organization
administer any of the following to employees and
prospective employees:
• Polygraphs

• Paper and pencil honesty tests
• Voice stress analyses

• Handwriting analyses

• Intelligence tests
• Psychological diagnostic tests

• Drug tests
c. Does the organization conduct or provide (or both) any of
the following:

• Security orientation training for new hires
• Ongoing security awareness training programs for all
employees
• Written rules of employee conduct to all employees

• Annual, signed employee declarations acknowledging
awareness of the company’s code of conduct, and past and
future adherence to it
• Hearings for employees charged with punishable offenses
• Employee representation at such hearings

d. Does the organization use or provide any of the following:
• Job descriptions
• Organization charts
• Performance standards

• Performance appraisals
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Coaching and counseling of employees whose work is
unsatisfactory
• Counseling of employees with drug abuse problems
• Technical training programs
• Human resource development programs

• Tuition reimbursement
• Time off for study

• Time off for family emergencies
• Employee involvement programs

• Job enlargement, enrichment or rotation programs
• Exit interviews for departing employees
e. Does the organization compare favorably or at least equally
with other firms in its industry, or areas of operations, or
both, with respect to any of the following:
• Salaries

• Fringe benefits
• Blue-collar turnover
• White-collar turnover

• Absenteeism
• Employee firings
• Promotions from within the company
• Ability to recruit new employees

• Skills of its employees
• Educational level of employees
• Employee attitudes toward their work
• Employee loyalty
5. Ethics and Information Technology

a. Does the organization’s code of conduct specifically address
the importance of using information technology (especially
computers) in an ethical manner?

b. Are the following specific ethical concerns relating to
information technology adequately addressed in the
organization’s code of conduct and in its policies:
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist
• Privacy of information (for example, information related
to employees, customers or clients)
• Prohibition of software piracy
• Safety and health (for example, ergonomically sound
computer workstations)

• Quality standards for information technologies and the
information they process (for example, accuracy, integrity,
security)
© Relationship of technology and human resources (for
example, communication with employees concerning
technological change, adequate training)
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CHAPTER 3:
Insurance Against Fraud
3.1

Financing the Risk of Fraud
Every organization must identify its risks and implement a strategy that balances the cost of
potential losses with the cost of an acceptable level of risk management. Although the risk
of loss from fraud and other forms of dishonesty can be reduced, no amount of spending
on prevention can eliminate it completely.
As with any area of risk, an organization can select an acceptable level of potential loss and
finance it from its own resources by, in effect, self-insuring or through the purchase of
appropriate insurance coverage. It would be imprudent not to consider purchasing
insurance from a reputable insurance company, particularly in situations in which there is a
significant risk of potential and possibly catastrophic loss. In reality, however, some
organizations do not even consider, let alone acquire, the appropriate insurance because
they do not know how to assess the risk and its financial impact correctly or they are
simply unfamiliar with the nature of available insurance coverage.

Most individuals and businesses should never consider self-insurance, that is, waiting until a
loss occurs and then absorbing the costs out of their own resources. This is particularly true
where there is a risk of a catastrophic loss that may threaten the very survival of a business.
In other areas of risk, it would be unthinkable to not obtain insurance against potential
catastrophes such as life and disability insurance for breadwinners supporting families, fire
insurance for homeowners, and liability insurance for professionals and automobile
owners.

This chapter reviews the kinds of insurance coverage generally available against employee
fraud and dishonesty. It also reviews some of the issues found in insurance policies,
common exemptions, and some of the important duties of the insured. In addition, the
chapter will provide a step-by-step guide to making a claim after the discovery of the
dishonest act.

It must be stressed that an insurance policy is a contract. Insurance and legal advisers
should be consulted to consider whether insurance is appropriate, the nature and extent of
coverage required, and how any losses sustained should be handled.
3.2 Fraud Insurance
Chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,” of this Handbook provides a definition of fraud as
criminal deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver. In that same chapter is a
description of how a company may be victimized from outside by customers, suppliers,
competitors or “con men,” and from inside by directors, officers, and employees (see
Figure 1-2, How a Company Can be Victimized).
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3

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Basic coverage insures a business against losses suffered directly as a result of fraud or
dishonesty committed by employees of the insured (as defined in the policy). It typically
forms part of a crime or dishonesty policy that also covers losses due to theft,
disappearance, or destruction of the insured’s property.

Such coverage does not, however, protect against losses suffered as a result of the
fraudulent and dishonest conduct by outside (nonemployed) directors or external parties
when not in collusion with employees. Dishonest acts by outside directors may be covered
under a separate director and officer policy although fraud against the insured or against a
third party is not generally covered.

3.2.1 Overview
Insurance policies providing coverage against losses from employee fraud and dishonesty
have many names including commercial crime, blanket bonds, and 3D policies
(dishonesty, destruction, and disappearance). The desired coverage may be reflected in
standard bond or policy language, as an extension of coverage or rider to existing
insurance policies or in a manuscript format, that is, written for a specific company or set of
circumstances.
Coverage and wordings may be specific to certain industries. For example, there are
specific forms for financial institutions such as banks, brokerage houses, and insurance
companies. For other industries, including manufacturing, health care, retailing,
transportation, or service providers, dishonesty coverage is more generic. Regardless of the
name used by a particular insurer, policies generally follow a similar format. This Handbook
uses the term commercial crime policy when referring to coverage for employee fraud and
dishonesty, unless otherwise noted.
When a company applies for a policy, the insurer will ask for information to be used in
evaluating the risk and determining the premium. Although the type of details requested
may vary from insurer to insurer, the information will always show how the applicant
operates its business and the controls and procedures in place to prevent loss. If this
information is false or erroneous or the insurer is not advised of changes such as
discontinued or weakened controls, the ability to make a successful claim may be
jeopardized. Therefore, the insurer must be informed of any changes that may affect
assessment of the risk to be covered.

3.3

Important Provisions in Commercial Crime Policies
The principal components of a commercial crime policy are the Insuring Agreements.
Their purpose is to describe and define the kinds of losses covered under the policy and
make clear what needs to be demonstrated as proof of a valid claim, in addition to listing
the various conditions and limitations. The first Insuring Agreement is typically for
Employee Dishonesty or Employee Theft. The following types of losses, which do not reflect
losses identifiable with or attributable to the conduct of employees of the insured, are also
covered by Insuring Agreements:

4
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1.
2.
3.
4.

Loss inside the premises
Loss outside the premises
Depositor forgery
Money order fraud and counterfeit paper

The conditions and limitations further defining the coverage include the following:

• Definitions
• Exclusions

• Duties of the insured

3.3.1 Insuring Agreements
Employee Dishonesty or Employee Theft
Although the wording of this agreement may vary among insurers, there are certain
important common elements that should be noted:

•
•
•
•

The indemnity is for loss of money, securities, and other property
The loss must result directly from one or more acts of an employee of the insured

The employee can be acting alone or in collusion
Coverage continues even when individual employees cannot be identified.

The meaning of various terms used, such as property or employee, may be given specificity in
the “Definitions” section of the policy. It is essential, therefore, to refer to and understand
the definitions outlined in the terms of coverage to ensure that the policy meets the
particular needs of the organization. Some of the more significant terms, as they are
typically defined in a policy, are discussed later in this chapter.

Where the Insuring Agreement is for Employee Dishonesty (sometimes described as Employee
Fidelity), coverage for loss resulting directly from employee fraud or dishonesty is further
qualified by wording that refines the scope of possible losses covered. Some typical
wording is shown in Figure 3-1, Dishonest or Fraudulent Acts.

Note the reference to the manifest intent to cause the loss and obtain a financial benefit.
Unfortunately, the courts have shown no consensus in the interpretation of manifest intent.
Some have found this term applicable only where the employee intends to gain a benefit at
the expense of the insured; others have found a broader meaning and afford coverage if the
employee acted with such disregard for the insured that the loss was a virtual certainty. In
one case, a court ruled: “Such a person is deemed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts.”
It is important to note, in the wording of Figure 3-1, the restriction on the type of financial
benefit that disallows claims in situations in which the employee receives the benefit
because of his or her position in the company. Therefore, in a situation in which the benefit
intended and obtained by the dishonest employee is, for example, a bonus, there would be
no grounds for a claim under the policy.

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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Figure 3-1. Dishonest or Fraudulent Acts

DISHONEST OR FRAUDULENT ACTS

Dishonest or fraudulent acts are committed by an employee with the
manifest intent to:
(1) Cause the loss
(2) Obtain financial benefit for the employee or any other person or
organization intended by the employee (other than salaries,
commissions, fees bonuses, promotions, awards, profit sharing,
pensions or other employee benefits earned in the normal course of
employment).

In a commercial crime policy in which the insuring agreement is for Employee Thefts
coverage is for loss resulting directly from theft. The term theft may be defined as, for
example, the unlawful taking of money, securities, or other property to the deprivation of
the insured. There is no reference either to the intent of the person committing the theft or
to their financial benefit. Although the word fraud is not used, the circumstances and
resulting loss would be tantamount to fraud as defined in the policy.

Other Insuring Agreements
A typical commercial crime policy includes an insuring agreement against loss of money
and securities by the theft, disappearance, or destruction within the insured’s premises or
any banking premises (usually referred to as Loss Inside the Premises) or outside the insured’s
premises while being conveyed by messenger or armored car company (usually referred to
as Loss Outside the Premises).
A policy may also contain insuring agreements providing coverage against:

• Money Order and Counterfeit Paper Currency. Money order fraud and counterfeit paper are
typically defined as loss due to the acceptance, in the normal course of business, of
counterfeit currency, money orders, and so on.
• Depositor Forgery. Losses as a result of the insured having someone process forged checks,
money orders, and so on, through its bank account.
A rider can provide additional coverage for risks not covered by a standard policy. Riders
may provide coverage for losses from unauthorized electronic transfers, pension plan
frauds, credit card forgeries, computer fraud, and the unauthorized use of telephone
services. An insurance professional can ensure the rider provides the required
supplementary protection.

3.3.2 Policy Definitions
Definition of words and descriptions adds specificity. In some policies, however, what is
included by definition may be excluded in the “Exclusions” section. Therefore,
“Definitions” should be read carefully and in conjunction with the “Exclusions” section.
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Employee
One of the most important definitions is that of employee. The definition of employee limits
the coverage. Make sure the definition gives the kind of coverage required in the case of
loss.
In a typical policy, an employee is defined as any person who, while in the regular service
of the insured and in the ordinary course of business, is compensated by way of salary,
wages, or commission. A policy may also be written to include temporary staff under the
definition of employee.

Some persons defined as employees may be excluded from coverage. For example, a paid
outside director of the insured not retained in any other capacity may be expressly
excluded from the definition under the policy. Further, the definition may also exclude
such third parties as agents, brokers, consignees, or independent contractors.

3.3.3 Policy Exclusions
An insurer will write policies with its own list of exclusions. Commonly found exclusions
are losses from:
• Acts committed by the insured (the owner) or a partner
• War and insurrection
Read carefully and understand the terms before purchasing the coverage and obtain
competent advice when preparing a proof of loss. The following sections describe other
examples of commonly found exclusions.

Indirect Losses
Commercial crime policies specifically exclude indirect and consequential losses such as
lost income, lost business opportunities, or lost interest on stolen funds. Although the
insurer’s intent is to limit its obligations to direct losses only, court rulings have not
consistently recognized this position. Discuss the relevant case law with legal counsel for
any jurisdiction in question.
An indirect loss would also include investigative costs incurred in establishing the existence
and amount of a direct loss. Separate coverage may be available from an insurance carrier
to cover these costs; some write policies covering all or part of the costs of investigation,
while others cover costs shared between the insurer and the insured. You should weigh the
cost of this coverage in light of the potential cost of any investigation. A typical wording of
an indirect loss exclusion is excerpted in Figure 3-2, Indirect Loss Policy Provision.

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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Figure 3-2. Indirect Loss Policy Provision

INDIRECT LOSS EXCLUSION

Indirect Loss: Loss that is an indirect result of any act or “occurrence”
covered by this insurance including but not limited to, loss resulting
from:

(1) Your inability to realize income that you would have realized had
there been no loss of, or loss from damage to, Covered Property
(2) Payment of costs, fees or other expenses you incur in establishing
either the existence or the amount of loss under this insurance.

Atlas Construction Case Study

Atlas Construction, Inc. had a long history in construction and commercial
development and was widely regarded as one of the most reputable companies in
the region because it completed all projects on time and within budget Much of
this reputation was attributable to the hands-on management style of project
managers and the sophisticated accounting and management reporting system that
could provide up-to-the-minute actual costs with a comparison to budget.

As part of risk-management, the operation was assessed annually for vulnerability
to fraud and the effect of potential losses. In consultation with its insurance advisers,
a standard commercial crime policy was in place, which provided annual coverage
of $500,000 with a $5,000 deductible. There had been no claims made against the
policy since its inception.

One day, an anonymous letter was received alleging that one of the project
managers was colluding with a supplier to inflate invoices in order to receive
kickbacks. A discrete investigation was undertaken to get to the heart of the
problem without alerting or confronting the project manager.

Internal auditors together with external investigators and forensic accountants
conducted a thorough review of bids for the supply of goods and services and the
payment of supplier invoices. It soon became apparent that not only were certain
suppliers’ invoices, which were consistently 7 percent higher than agreed, approved
for payment by the project manager, but also numerous suppliers were found to be
connected to the project manager and his close family members. Strong evidence
showed that some “suppliers” were merely shell companies supplying no goods or
services; their only purpose was to receive the payments from Atlas. The project
manager was confronted with the evidence and confessed to the scheme although
he claimed to have spent all the proceeds of the fraud.
Atlas determined it had lost almost $350,000 to the fraudulent suppliers. The police
were notified and civil proceedings were initiated to recover. A claim against the
insurance policy was made for $422,000 representing the loss from fraudulent
8
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suppliers plus $72,000 in investigation costs (internal audit and external
professionals) and legal costs. Atlas considered the $72,000 to be directly
attributable to the fraudulent and dishonest acts of its employee and would not
have been incurred but for his conduct. This part of the claim was denied on the
basis of the policy’s explicit exclusion of such costs as indirect.

Inventory Losses
One of the most common types of business loss is inventory loss. A company comes to the
end of a reporting cycle and compares the value of inventory reflected in the perpetual
inventory records to the value of the physical inventory on hand, and notes a significant
discrepancy for several product groups. The value of physical inventory on hand is far less
than the accounting records indicate. Is the discrepancy the result of recording errors in the
perpetual system, a flawed physical count, errors in the values applied to the physical
inventory or, possibly, theft?

A claim citing the discrepancy as proof of employee theft and the loss suffered would be
denied under a commercial crime policy. The coverage would be denied on the basis of
the policy’s “inventory loss exclusion” clause stating that an inventory loss, the existence of
which is based solely on an inventory or profit-and-loss calculation, is excluded from
coverage.

The inventory loss exclusion disallows claims for losses resulting from errors in the
accounting records or improper physical inventory counts and pricing. A claim can only be
successful if the evidence demonstrates there is no error or inaccuracy in the records and,
in the absence of overt evidence of theft by employees or others, there is no plausible
explanation for the discrepancy other than theft. It also excludes claims made where the
discrepancy reflects inventory shrinkage occurring in the ordinary course of business. Such
shrinkage may be the result of physical decline or reduction caused by evaporation, the
disposal of damaged goods, promotional giveaways, and the distribution of samples to
prospective customers.
There may indeed be suggestive evidence of inventory theft by employees. For example,
employees may have been seen loading inventory into their cars after work on a Friday.
The perpetual records may even show the items to be in stock despite the fact they cannot
be physically located. The volume and frequency of the thefts must now be investigated.
One Friday-night theft does not create a significant discrepancy.

The first step to determining whether an actual inventory loss has occurred is to understand
the company’s accounting system as well as the internal control processes of the inventory
cycle, the perpetual accounting system, and the physical inventory system.

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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The inventory cycle includes:

• Manufacturing or purchasing process
• Warehouse receiving process
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sales order process
Warehouse shipping process
Perpetual inventory accounting system:
Purchase journal
Sales journal
Reconciliation process with physical count
Physical inventory system

• Count process
• Pricing process
• Adjustments (obsolescence, shrinkage, and sales cutoff)

Understanding the control processes permits investigation of their operation during the
period of the alleged theft. This knowledge should identify exploitable weaknesses and
help focus the detailed investigation. It may also identify changes introduced by a
particular employee or group.
If the accounting records are to provide the proof needed to substantiate a theft claim, the
investigation should start with the most recent accounting period in which the perpetual
system and the physical count were in agreement. Care must be taken, however, to identify
and explain any accounting adjustments or unusual entries made to reconcile the perpetual
system to the physical count. A comparison of the inventory accounting activity between
the base period and the period of the alleged theft should identify some red flags. Pay
particular attention to any large or unusual adjustments to the inventory records.
Investigate and understand these adjustments because fraudsters often hide their thefts
temporarily with accounting adjustments.
Another step is to interview the personnel working at the different stages of the inventory
cycle including those involved in accounting for purchases and sales, receipts and
deliveries, and those physically handling the inventory in the warehouse or transport and
delivery. A productive interview requires a thorough understanding of what should have
occurred. The interviews may identify control overrides and/or control weaknesses
exploited by the fraudster. Also inquire about new employees or employees who have
recently left the company and interview them, if necessary. The discrepancy could be
revealed by a new employee’s activities or by a departed employee no longer able to
conceal the theft.
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If an employee theft is uncovered, the insured will be required to file a Proof of Loss that
identifies:

•
•
•
•
•

The thief (if known)
The circumstances of the theft
Period in which the theft took place
The amount of stolen inventory
The value of stolen inventory

As always, get advice from attorneys and insurance advisors when acquiring coverage or
making a claim.

Inventory Loss Case Study
Jetro, Inc. has been a wholesaler of men’s clothing in Pennsylvania for the last ten
years. The company maintains an integrated perpetual inventory system tied to
purchasing and deliveries and sales. Historically, Jetro has taken annual physical
inventory counts on December 31, the last day of the fiscal year. In 2002, however,
Jetro’s internal accounting group requested a surprise count to be scheduled for
March 31 and employees were notified just two days in advance.
The physical inventory count showed only $6.4 million, while the perpetual
inventory system identified $6.5 million. After the internal auditors had
doublechecked the numbers, they conducted an investigation to find the missing
$100,000.

Using their knowledge of the entire inventory cycle, the internal auditors reviewed
the activity recorded in the December 31, 2001, perpetual-to-physical inventory
working papers. They also interviewed various warehouse and accounting
personnel as to possible reasons for the shortage.
Their investigation uncovered the following red flags:

• Three purchase orders for $45,782, $48,925, and $49,818 were identified in
December 2001 to three different companies that had not done business with
Jetro for about two years. Internal audit found these amounts interesting since
they were all just under the $50,000 limit requiring management approval.
Further review of the invoices showed all three companies had processed billing
address changes to P.O. boxes in South Carolina.
• As of March 31, 2002, all three companies still had the over-90-day receivable
balance outstanding.
• During an interview, a part-time weekend warehouse employee said that, on
Saturdays, he always noticed about 15-to-20 garment boxes stacked in pick-up
bay 1. He found this strange since only bays 4 through 8 were used for Saturday
shipments. When he questioned his supervisor, he was told not to concern
himself with that order. He continued to notice this pattern on subsequent
Saturdays but never inquired about it again. When questioned further by
internal audit, the employee recalled this had been going on since about
October or November 2001.

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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• Upon further review of the March 31, 2002, physical count sheets, internal audit
noted several handwritten adjustments to the count sheets. These adjustments
increased the quantities on several brands of men’s suits.
Internal control became increasingly suspicious of Walter Wilson, the Saturday
warehouse supervisor, because of what they knew from the interview with the
warehouse clerk and from the fact that it was Mr. Wilson who had adjusted the
count sheets. Internal audit decided to do some background checking before they
confronted Mr. Wilson.

An outside investigation agency uncovered the following:

• The owner of the P.O. boxes in South Carolina belonged to Jennifer Hickey.
Ms. Hickey was also identified as Jennifer Wilson Hickey, Walter Wilson’s
married sister.
• It was discovered that Walter Wilson was the coowner of a small discount retail
clothing outlet in New Jersey.
• Upon inspection of the New Jersey clothing store, the investigative agency
identified numerous matches of suits sold by Jetro.
Based on the results of the investigation, Jetro confronted Mr. Wilson. After his
initial denial, Jetro began to unveil the evidence. In the end, Mr. Wilson admitted
to stealing an unknown quantity of men’s suits for sale in his store. He admitted to
starting the theft in November 2001. He covered his 2001 theft with the three
fictitious purchase orders and shipments. He estimated he stole another $250,000 of
men’s suits in 2002. He was planning to leave Jetro before collection efforts
commenced on the three fictitious December 2001 sales. In the meantime, the
surprise inventory required him to adjust the March 31, 2002, physical counts to
buy more time (and apparently steal more suits).
Now that Jetro had Mr. Wilson’s confession, they needed to quantify the amount of
loss for their insurance claim. A $489,525 “Proof of Loss” was eventually filed. The
breakdown and support follow:

• $144,525 in 2001 representing the three fictitious invoices. Mr. Wilson utilized
three former Jetro customer names because these customers were already
approved to do business with Jetro. The billing address was changed to his
sister’s P.O. boxes to assure that the three companies would not receive the
billings. With the fictitious shipments to the three customers, no significant
discrepancies would be noted in the December 31, 2001, perpetual-to-physical
reconciliation.
• $345,000 in 2002 represents the theft in the first quarter. After reversing the
March 31, 2002, handwritten count-sheet adjustments made by Mr. Wilson, the
physical inventory totaled approximately $6.1 million, not $6.4 million. This
now resulted in a $400,000 discrepancy. Based on a reconciliation of purchase
and sale information in 2002, the investigation identified a purchase value of
$345,000 in suits with no matching sales and no physical inventory of the suits.
The reconciliation involved taking the perpetual inventory from December 31,
2001, adding in all purchases of a particular brand of men’s suits (the
merchandise Mr. Wilson was stealing) and subtracting all sales of the suits. This
amount was then reconciled to the March 31, 2002, physical count to quantify
the amount stolen.
12
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The remaining $55,000 ($400,000 less $345,000) does not relate to suit theft and thus was
not included in the claim. Internal control has attributed the $55,000 to shrinkage for the
first quarter of 2002.
In conclusion, a surprise physical inventory count, an observant part-time warehouse clerk
and some diligent investigation on behalf of internal audit resulted in Jetro stopping a
potentially larger theft and a being able to present a well-supported “Proof of Loss.”

Is this documentation enough to assure a full recovery? No claim payment can be
guaranteed; however, every link between the employee and the claimed loss strengthens
the insured’s claim.

Figure 3-3. Standard Inventory Loss Exclusion

STANDARD INVENTORY LOSS EXCLUSION
Loss, or that part of any loss, the proof of which as to its existence or
amount is dependent upon:

(1) an inventory computation; or
(2) a profit or loss computation.
Source: Employee Dishonesty Coverage Form (CR 00 01)

Loan Loss
Among the various commercial crime policies available from insurers, financial institution
bonds are specifically for financial institutions such as commercial banks, savings
associations, savings banks, credit unions, insurance companies, and securities brokers.
Lending institutions suffer losses if the borrower fails to repay the loan and the market
value of the collateral is too impaired to permit full recovery of the amount owed. Upon
investigation, the borrower is sometimes discovered to have falsified the loan application
by submitting false financial statements or appraisals. If a bank victimized by such a
borrower were to file a claim under a financial institution bond, the claim would be denied
under the “loan loss exclusion” clause that states that loans obtained through “trick, artifice,
[or] fraud” on the part of the borrower are excluded. The loan loss exclusion specifically
disallows claims for losses as a result of dealings with a deceitful borrower if no bank
employee is involved in collusion with the borrower or other third-party beneficiary.

If the credit officer had an undeclared interest in the borrower and accepted a loan
application he knew to be fraudulent, the financial institution bond might provide coverage
for a loss. The loss must be shown to have been a direct result of his dishonesty and his
manifest intent both to cause a loss to the financial institution and to obtain a financial
benefit for himself or a third party. (See Section 3.3.1, Insuring Agreements, and Figure 31.)

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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As with commercial crime policies, legal counsel should always guide a forensic accounting
assignment involving a financial institution bond. This is true not only for the purpose of
maintaining privilege but because certain provisions of the bonds are subject to varying
and often conflicting interpretations in different jurisdictions. Moreover, certain elements of
the coverage itself are controversial due to these same conflicting court interpretations or
the lack of applicable court rulings.

Guidance and advice should be sought from legal and insurance advisors when acquiring
coverage under a financial institution bond and making a claim.

The Kindly Old Loan Officer Case Study

A large multibank holding company acquired a small bank. Approximately one
year after the acquisition, the bank experienced significant losses from a portfolio of
small business installment loans that were all collateralized by 18-wheeler tractor
trailers.
Initially, the bank did not have any proof of employee dishonesty but the size of the
loss encouraged a closer look. Since loans can be manipulated in two ways, that is,
to make dishonest loans or disguise the loan’s performance by making a delinquent
loan look current, the bank decided to look first at those individuals who made
decisions affecting the loan portfolio. A review showed the portfolio had been
created and administered by one particular loan officer in the bank, who
immediately became suspect. The bank’s investigation revealed that the loan officer
had manipulated the monthly reports to show delinquent loans as current. The
bank filed a claim with the insurance company alleging employee dishonesty.
The forensic investigation that followed included a review of bank documents as
well as the personal financial records of the bank loan officer. Each loan was
reviewed to determine whether it had complied with the bank’s loan policy and
had been approved by the loan committee. Loan department reports were also
reviewed for proper disclosure and loan histories examined for any payments
made.

The documents reviewed included the loan applications, internal analysis and
approval memos and documents, financial information provided by the borrowers,
collateral information, and verifications. The loan closing documents, specifically
the settlement or disbursement sheets, were also reviewed to discover whether the
loan proceeds might have been used to pay kickbacks. Loan histories and loan
delinquency reports were analyzed in detail. The delinquency and cash payment
reports were compared to determine whether the loan payment status had been
manipulated to show the loans as current when, in fact, they were past due.
This comparison showed the loan officer had intentionally falsified loan
delinquency reports to make the loans look current. When confronted with the
evidence, he admitted he had falsified the loan records to show payments when
none had been made. He said he felt sorry for the borrowers who were suffering
from the economic difficulties of the area and wanted to give them every chance to
repay the loans. If the loans had been reported as delinquent, the bank would most
likely have repossessed the vehicles. The loan officer either had a heart of gold or,
as the bank suspected, was receiving kickbacks from the borrowers.
14
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The loan officer’s personal bank accounts were examined for evidence of financial
benefit. The bank interviewed some of the borrowers and, in some instances,
obtained updated financial information. The forensic investigation showed the loan
officer did not obtain any financial benefit from making the loans and the
borrowers obtained only the obvious benefit of the use of the loan proceeds.
A detailed review of the loan origination documents showed the loan officer
initiated the loans, which were approved with no evidence that false information
had been submitted to the loan approval committee. Moreover, the loan proceeds
were indeed used to purchase the 18-wheelers. It was also noted that in most cases,
the borrowers made consistent monthly payments for at least a year and all
acknowledged their debt and made efforts to repay past due amounts.

The bank filed a claim under its financial institution bond with the insurer for
reimbursement of the unpaid interest costs. The insurer denied the claim, and the
bank turned to the courts for recovery. The court ruled in favor of the insurer on
the grounds that the bank had failed to prove manifest intent to defraud on the part
of the loan officer.

The Bank President Makes His Move Case Study
A bank made a large loan to a condominium developer for a new project that was
bigger than anything the developer had built before. After a few months, the
developer was unable to make interest payments and the loan appeared on the
bank’s delinquency list. A preliminary review of the borrower’s history showed he
had had financial troubles with other banks and should never have been granted
the loan. A subsequent forensic investigation focused on the bank president who
was also the senior loan officer. Deeper probing showed the bank president/loan
officer had received a financial benefit in the form of ownership of a condominium
unit in the project. The bank president held title through a shell company set up as
a limited partnership whose general partner was a corporation he also owned. The
manifest intent of the president was determined by the way the project financing
was structured on false and/or incomplete information that was presented to the
bank’s loan committee, which ultimately approved the loan.

The documents examined to discover the fraud included:

1. The loan request/application
2. The financial information provided by the borrower
3. The bank’s analysis of the financial information, including:
• Project budget and costs
• Projected sales proceeds
• Use of proceeds and loan repayment
4. The bank’s internal approval documentation, including:
• Loan officer’s recommendation
• Loan committee minutes
• Board of directors’ approval minutes
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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5. Loan closing documents including disbursements
6. Settlement sheets and closing information for the sales of the condominium
units.

A background investigation of the project developer/borrower showed that he had
been a small player on other projects and lacked the resources to finance the kind
of project presently in question. A review of the documents prepared and presented
to the loan committee by the president raised serious questions about the
borrower’s cash-flow projections and his capacity to service the loan. A search of
the public records to discover the owners of units whose sale had already closed
showed a company owned by the bank president holding title to a luxury unit
whose price was far beyond anything he could have afforded on his known
financial resources.
The bank filed a claim under its financial institutions bond and was ultimately
reimbursed by the insurer.

3.4 Insured’s Responsibilities in the Event of a Loss
3.4.1 Duties of the Insured
Issuers of dishonesty policies typically impose several duties on the insured to protect their
ability to recover. The insured must take action to prevent further loss, mitigate the
damage, and recover from any loss sustained. These duties include:
1. Timely notice of potential loss
2. Filing of a “Proof-of-Loss” form
3. Cooperation with any insurance investigation
See Figure 3-4, Insured’s Duties to Insurer in the Event of Loss, for an example of the
specific language spelling out the insured’s duties in a commercial crime policy.

Most dishonesty policies typically contain two additional obligations for the insured:
agreeing not to prejudice the rights of the insurance carrier and accepting the procedures
for filing a lawsuit in the event of a claim denial. See the following section for more
information on these duties.

3.4.2 Handling the Discovery of Employee Dishonesty
Dealing with an allegation of wrongdoing against an employee provokes feelings of shock
and betrayal within the firm and often causes a decline in internal morale and external
goodwill. A large loss may also hurt the bottom line if it is not covered by fidelity
insurance.

Dishonest acts must be addressed immediately whether by the police or pursued within the
organization. In either case, your actions will influence whether or not you can recover
under your fidelity insurance. Therefore, it is important to know how to respond when
allegations of wrongdoing arise. Most victims (and even most claims adjusters), however,
rarely deal with these types of situations and, as a result, they are often an education for all
concerned.
16
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Figure 3-4. Insured’s Duties to Insurer in the Event of Loss

INSURED’S DUTIES TO INSURER IN THE EVENT OF LOSS
After you discover a loss or a situation that may result in a loss of, or
loss from damage to, covered property you must:

(1) Notify us as soon as possible.
(2) Submit to examination under oath at our request and give us a
signed statement of your answers.
(3) Give us a detailed, sworn proof of loss within 120 days.
(4) Cooperate with us in the investigation and settlement of any claim.
Source: Crime General Provisions (CR 10 00)

Victims of dishonesty should never forget that it is their property that has been lost. No one
can relax when this kind of incident occurs. You must conduct yourself as if there were no
insurance policy, make every effort to minimize or prevent additional loss and initiate
proceedings for maximum recovery.

It is important to note the right offirst recovery provisions in fidelity coverage. Typically, if a
loss does not exceed the policy limit and recoveries are made, the right of first recovery is
to the underwriter and then to the insured to satisfy any policy deductible. If, however, the
loss exceeds the policy coverage amount, the right of first recovery is to the insured for the
amount of the loss in excess of the bond coverage only and the aforementioned rule
applies.

3.4.3 A Course of Action
The first decision to make on the discovery of any form of dishonesty is whether or not to
conduct an investigation. Some victims choose not to proceed even when they have fidelity
coverage. They consider the potential cost of an investigation, including time lost, external
investigators’ expenses, legal fees, and the possibility of unknown additional costs, to be
prohibitive.
There are, however, many reasons to proceed with an investigation. The loss may be
covered under the fidelity insurance policy and therefore would be recoverable. In
addition, there may be more to the dishonest scheme than was initially realized. Failing to
investigate and take appropriate action when the crime is first discovered may prejudice
the insured’s rights and result in coverage denial when the true extent of the loss surfaces.
The involvement of more people than originally believed could make any initial corrective
actions ineffective.

A victim who fails to report a loss or reports it late risks the possibility of coverage denial.
The typical policy includes the standard requirement that a loss be reported as soon as
possible (see Section 3.4.4, “Notice of Loss”). In addition, the insurer also immediately
cancels coverage for any employee discovered to have committed any dishonest act.
Therefore, it is extremely risky to continue the employment of an individual who has

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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defrauded or stolen from the company. If management determines that the best course is to
continue the employment of the dishonest employee, they should consult with the insurer
and request a waiver of the provision canceling coverage for that employee.

Assuming the organization decides to proceed with an investigation, management should
assign a representative of the firm the responsibility of coordinating efforts to investigate,
document, and prepare a proof of loss. In view of the timing obligations under the policy,
this individual should be available immediately to prepare the claim. This claim coordinator
should have a financial background and the authority to cross departmental boundaries if
necessary. The claim coordinator must also understand all the policy details before
beginning an in-depth investigation. This individual, together with legal counsel, should
bear responsibility for all communications with the dishonest employee, the insurer, and its
representatives including the agent.

3.4.4 Notice of Loss
Immediate action after discovery is critical because discovery triggers the policy’s notice
and proof-of-loss timing requirements. The insured should notify the insurer by telephone
and a follow-up letter. Although the coverage states “as soon as possible,” sooner is always
better than later, as the date of notification is determined by the circumstances of the case
and can become a question for a jury. One jury found seventeen days to be an
unreasonable delay in notifying the insurer but for another a fifteen-month delay was not
deemed too long.

Some victims opt to allow the dishonest individual to continue his or her wrongdoing in an
attempt to gather evidence. This is not advisable because, as previously discussed, an
insurer will cancel coverage for any dishonest employee immediately upon discovery, and,
therefore, the policy will not cover subsequent losses.
When providing notice, it is not necessary to have developed all the facts or even the
extent of the loss. After a more comprehensive investigation, the insured can then provide
the details of the claim in the form of a written and sworn proof of loss. The typical policy
requires the insured file the proof of loss within 120 days from the discovery of the
dishonest act—not from the time the insured gave notice. If it seems impossible to meet this
deadline, ask for an extension-in advance—from the insurer and request a response in
writing. Most insurers will accommodate this request, thereby providing an extension
under a reservation of rights.

3.4.5 Supporting Documents
Although insurers value statements made by the dishonest employee, they also require
documentation supporting the claim of dishonesty and the resulting loss amount. Make it a
priority to obtain and secure the relevant documents. Verify what may seem obvious or
conclusive in appearance using the most complete documentation possible. Use discussions
with other employees to determine the existence and importance of the documentation.
Since dishonest employees often purposely understate or overstate the extent of their
transgressions, the gathering of supporting documents is critical to correctly quantifying the
loss.
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Early in the investigation, identify those employees or outside parties who may be able to
assist in the loss analysis. Although there are myriad factors that affect the timing and
appropriateness of interviewing these employees, remember that over time memories not
only fade but also become selective. Conduct these interviews individually and take
detailed notes. If possible, the claim coordinator should attend all interviews.

An Academic Love Story Case Study
The president of a small liberal arts college became concerned about possible
wrongdoing as rumors reached him that a certain professor Smith was having
extramarital affairs with some of his young students. The college had been founded
by a Protestant denomination in the nineteenth century, and was known for its
competitive admissions. In the president’s view, such conduct by a faculty member
put the college’s very reputation at stake.
The president, a wise old bird, knowledgeable in the ways of the world, knew
professor Smith’s salary and general financial circumstances were such that he
could not finance his amours out of his tight family budget without alerting his wife.
If the rumors were true, professor Smith would have to find the money elsewhere.
He also knew that as a department head, professor Smith had a great deal of
discretion in approving departmental expenditures, including those he made for
himself.

The president began his investigation by assigning the college’s internal audit
department (IAD) to look at professor Smith’s departmental purchases and travel
expenses for the previous three years. Supporting documentation for all
departmental purchases was analyzed, including purchase orders, invoices, shipping
documents, and printouts of the relevant general ledger accounts. A “routine”
inventory count of departmental equipment was also performed. The IAD noted
that the transfer of equipment was properly documented on a few occasions.
Nevertheless, of the 59 items purchased within the past three years, 33 could not be
located in the departmental offices or elsewhere at the college.
A special review was made of all departmental travel and entertainment expenses,
including individual time and expense reports (TERs) and original restaurant, hotel,
airline, and taxi receipts. Usually, professor Smith maintained detailed, descriptive
records when he traveled or entertained on college business. He wrote the names of
his dinner companions on the actual restaurant receipts and included these names
plus additional details such as titles, companies, and events on the TERs. The
information could always be corroborated by other documents such as promotional
material for an out-of-town conference or the visit of a distinguished scholar who
had been entertained by professor Smith during his or her stay.
A review and analysis of recent TERs, however, revealed certain departures from
these practices. Beginning in November 2000, professor Smith began using
descriptions such as titles, organizations, etc., for his eating companions on the
TERs but not the actual names. Of the approximate 67 dining companions on the
TERs from November 2000 through June 2002, a total of 32 were not specifically
named. Conversely, of the approximate 69 dining companions from January 1999
through October 2000, all 69 were named.
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Examples of descriptions used on the TERs during the period from November
2000 through June 2002 included the following:
1. Dinner at the ABC Restaurant with three representatives from the DEF Medical
School
2. Dinner with Dean of Undergraduate Studies and Associate Dean [at GHI
University]
3. Dinner and beverages at M&S Chicago [with] Sr. Program officer-JKL
Foundation
4. Lunch with MNO faculty and staff-PQR Restaurant.
In addition, professor Smith no longer wrote names or descriptions of dining
companions on restaurant receipts for six of the TERs that were submitted for
February through June 2002, as had been his normal practice prior to that time.

Without original supporting documentation, patterns (or deviations from patterns)
such as these may not have been noted. Departures from previously used
procedures can be an indicator of potentially fraudulent activities. The choice of
periods for selecting the documents to be reviewed must also include a “clean
period,” that is, a period before the dishonest individual was employed or before
the fraudulent acts began. In this matter, it was suspected that the fraud began
sometime in 2001. If the period selected for review had been limited to just 2001
and 2002, the deviations from the “normal” patterns or procedures evident in 1999
and 2000 might not have been discovered.
As the fraudulent activity escalates, patterns can also often be found in either the
increasing frequency of the occurrences or the increase in dollar amounts. This
often occurs as a result of the dishonest individual becoming bolder as more and
more of the dishonest acts go undetected.
Since professor Smith could not name legitimate dining companions to include on
his submitted receipts as he had done during the “clean period,” he used instead
vague or general descriptions that made it appear that his travel expenses were for
legitimate college business. This deviation was noted both on the original receipts
and on the TERs. The analysis provided other deviations from the “clean period”
including more out-of-town stays that extended into the weekends and later meal
times.

Based upon these findings, a number of individuals from organizations outside the
college were contacted in order to corroborate the information recorded on the
TERs as part of a “routine” IAD examination. A total of 26 documented dining
companions were contacted in an attempt to verify the information recorded on the
submitted TERs. Fifteen of the 26 interviewees stated that they did not dine with
professor Smith on the date or at the location noted on the TERs.
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Conclusion and Analysis
Professor Smith was confronted with this information and confessed to bringing “a
friend” and submitting false expenses on a number of his purported business trips.
Professor Smith also admitted to submitting false and fraudulent TERs to the
college including false statements of business meetings and fictitious dining
companions as methods for justifying meal, travel, and hotel costs as reimbursable
expenses incurred in connection with college business. He also admitted to giving
equipment that had been purchased for his department to these same “friends” as
gifts. So much detailed information and supporting documentation was gathered for
each missing piece of equipment and questionable “business” trip that professor
Smith was compelled to admit the full extent of his wrongdoing.
This detailed information gathering also simplified the quantification of the loss to
the college. After all of the original receipts and invoices had already been
collected, it became a simple matter to add up the fraudulent expenses and costs of
the stolen items. Finally, the corroborative evidence also facilitated the insurer’s
claim verification process.
After the full story had been pieced together, it turned out that professor Smith was
indeed wayward and had been supporting one-half of his double life on the
departmental budget. As the college president had suspected, professor Smith could
not afford these activities on his academic income alone and did not want to reveal
his philandering to his wife. He had his cake and ate it too by developing this crude
scheme to finance his amours and escape the oversight of both his wife and the
college auditors. He was reprimanded but not dismissed and the college was
successful in its claim against the insurance company. His wife was never any the
wiser.

3.5 The Insurer

3.5.1 The Insurer’s Investigation
After receiving the proof of loss, the insurer may send an independent investigator to
analyze the claim. Start preparing for this investigation by designating one contact
person—usually the claim coordinator—to act as liaison for all requests from and
discussions with the insurer’s representative. Provide a secure working area close to the
contact person and segregated from the general business operations so that the insurer’s
investigators can review documents but are in no danger of having unauthorized
communication with the insured’s staff.

Control the flow of documents. All documents to support the claimed loss should be
segregated and examined by the claim coordinator before the insurer’s examiner arrives.
They should be well organized and, if possible, indexed. The investigators should address
any requests for additional documents in writing to the designated contact person. No
documents should be given to the insurer’s investigators without having been first reviewed
by the claim coordinator.
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The independent investigators will probably want to interview the dishonest employee’s
superiors and coworkers and talk to the person who “discovered” the loss. The insured’s
representatives have the right to attend these interviews and should do so. The investigators
may request the interviews be taped but either the insured or the interviewees may refuse
this request. If the interview is recorded, ask for a transcript; if not, take comprehensive
notes.

Do not give independent investigators access to a photocopier. Instead, designate someone
from the insured organization to copy all documents. Two copies of each document should
then be made or the copied documents should be flagged in some other manner.

3.5.2 Subrogation Rights and Duties
If the insurer pays any portion of the claim, the insurer is subrogated to the insured’s
recovery rights. This is covered under Section B 17 of the crime general conditions policy
form.

Although subrogation is thought of as arising in the context of a resolved claim, it also
imposes a further duty on the insured long before resolution. The insured must in no way
jeopardize the subrogation rights of the insurer.
However, if the insured has the opportunity to maximize its recovery as a result of
accepting a setdement offer from the dishonest employee or the employee’s attorney, the
insured could appear to be acting contrary to the language of the subrogation provision. In
this case, the insured should bring the settlement offer to the attention of the insurer and
demonstrate its benefits. Generally speaking, insurers will agree to reasonable settlement
offers. As always, get all such “side agreements” with the insurer in writing.

3.5.3 Response to a Claim Denial
Denial of a claim is not necessarily the end of the matter. Request a detailed, written
explanation for the denial. Ask independent advisers to review the claim and the reasons
for its rejection to determine carefully whether the denial is warranted. If you can make a
good argument for coverage and it becomes necessary to file a lawsuit against the insurer to
invoke coverage, the provision form stipulates certain procedures for the insured to follow
(see Figure 3-5, Legal Action Against Insurer Provision).
As stated in the clause in Figure 3-5, the insured must give the insurer at least 90 days from
the date the proof of loss was filed to investigate and make a decision about the claim. Only
after this period has expired, may the insured file a lawsuit against the insurer. The insured,
however, is permitted two years following discovery of the crime to bring such an action.
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Figure 3-5. Legal Action Against Insurer Provision

LEGAL ACTION AGAINST INSURER PROVISION
You may not bring any legal action against us involving loss:

(1) Unless you have complied with all of the terms of this insurance;
(2) Until 90 days after you have filed proof of loss with us; and
(3) Unless brought within 2 years from the date you discover the loss.

3.5.4 Summary
Fortunately, most organizations experience few employee dishonesty losses of any
consequence. The strict policy requirements and sensitive nature of the investigation
required to document claims and the entire process of asserting a fidelity coverage claim
can be quite intimidating. If addressed in a well-thought-out and logical manner, however,
you can effectively handle employee dishonesty claims. The process reviewed in this
Handbook should give risk and insurance professionals some guidance for planning a
response.
3.6 Fraud Insurance Checklist
Table 3.1, “Fraud Insurance Checklist,” is designed to assist CPAs in addressing risk
financing and insurance for fraud and dishonesty in their organizations and in those of their
clients. If necessary, investigate and follow up “No” answers, and then document the
results. Use the “Ref" column to cross-reference the checklist to any additional
documentation.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If risk financing is a
concern, seek the advice of a risk management specialist.
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TABLE 3.1 FRAUD INSURANCE CHECKLIST
Fraud Insurance Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Purchase of Insurance Coverage Against Fraud

a. Has management reviewed operations to determine the nature
and extent of potential losses from fraud and commercial
crime?
b. Has management considered the extent to which the
organization can self-finance this risk (that is, could it survive a
major or catastrophic loss without insurance)?

c. Has management taken all reasonable steps to remedy any
previously identified vulnerable areas of the business or any
weaknesses in internal controls?

d. Has management established contact with a reputable
insurance broker capable of placing the required fraud and
theft coverage?

e. Has management assigned an appropriate person the task of
liaising with the broker to determine alternative kinds, levels,
and costs of coverage, and to report back to management on
these alternatives with appropriate recommendations?
f. Are procedures in place to provide for the timely and
appropriate response to circumstances where dishonesty is
identified, suspected or alleged?

g. Prior to finalizing the recommended coverage, has
management and, if necessary, legal counsel, carefully
reviewed the wording of the policy to ensure the following:
• Definitions, exclusions, and other clauses are acceptable
and consistent with the nature of the business.
• When possible, duplication with other insurance (for
example, fire policies) has been avoided.

• All statements and information provided on the application
for insurance are complete and accurate (for example,
where an internal control is indicated, does it exist and is it
operating effectively).
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Fraud Insurance Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

i. Prior to signing, has management reviewed the wording of the
policy to determine what changes, if any, are required and
which of these changes should be made in the conduct of the
business, including the following:
• Hiring and screening of new employees
• Use of contract employees, who may not be covered

• Bookkeeping and reporting practices
• Internal controls

2. Maintenance of Insurance Coverage

a. Is a mechanism in place to ensure that the organization meets
the important terms in the policy in order to keep the policy in
good standing, including the following:
• Paying premiums when due
• Reporting any loss incidents to the underwriter, even those
below the deductible when no loss claim is filed

• Maintaining adequate internal controls and good security
practices (for example, locking safes)

• Reporting to the underwriter any changes in the accounting
system
• Reporting to the underwriter any changes in the nature and
scope of operations from that may affect risk
b. Does the organization review its coverage on at least an annual
basis to ensure that the coverage remains adequate and
continues to meet acceptable cost-benefit criteria?

c. Does the organization assess its risk and its financing through
insurance on at least an annual basis?
3. Discovery of Dishonesty and Theft Insurance Claims

a. Immediately upon suspicion or discovery of a loss incident, has
the organization implemented the following steps:
• Protection of assets from further loss

• Preservation of relevant documentation and other evidence
• Notification of the underwriter by hand delivery or
registered (certified) mail (“return receipt requested”)
• Involvement of legal counsel and a claim coordinator

Never ignore this issue; you must act as if there is no
insurance
(continued)
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Fraud Insurance Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Internally, or in cooperation with the underwriter (or both), are
adequate resources in place to undertake a thorough and
timely investigation?

c. After establishing reasonable suspicion of a criminal act, has
management called in the police?
d. Has management ensured that no actions are taken to
prejudice the insurance claim, or the underwriter’s ability to
make recoveries, or both (for example, obtain underwriter’s
permission before reaching settlement with third parties or
suspected perpetrators) ?

e. Has management considered initiating legal proceedings to
ensure maximum recovery?
f. Are adequate personnel and procedures in place to perform
the following:
• Document the insurance claim (that is, the “Proof of Loss”)
• Follow up with the underwriter as required until the claim
is settled
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4.1

The Role of Computers in Modern Corporations
It is fair to say that modern multinational corporations could not exist without the
computer. The size of today’s enterprises, the globalization of trade, the velocity of business
and the sensitivity of financial marketplaces to news are all driven by the ability to move,
store, analyze, and present huge volumes of information quickly, cost-effectively, and
accurately. Computers track every type of asset, manage accounting, handle word
processing, operate phone and voicemail systems and control communications. Computers
have evolved from large mainframes to networks of PCs—each of which has capabilities
greater than those mainframes from the sixties and seventies—to provide a wide range of
services to the modern corporation. Even in those systems whose development was the
prime mover of computers from government laboratories to corporate use such as airline
reservation systems and banking, we are witnessing a rapid development away from the
legacy mainframe to networks of file servers. COBOL, FORTRAN and the other
programming and machine languages that facilitated the computer revolution have become
largely anachronistic and will inevitably become the digital equivalent of ancient Egyptian
hieroglyphs.
This trend toward digitization is not hidden within corporations and government agencies.
More and more, it intrudes into everyone’s life. Going to the bank used to mean interacting
with a teller. Now we interact with an ATM. Our phone systems have digital backbones
where our words are translated into binary impulses speeding through optical fibers or
shooting into space on their way to or from satellites.

If those computers on which we depend both as corporations and as individuals fail or are
compromised, whether by accident or by deliberate action, we are in trouble. Preventing
an incident is infinitely preferable to dealing with one after the fact. If an incident occurs,
however, the corporation must have a way of recovering operations quickly and efficiently
and of understanding how and why the incident occurred. The establishment of
appropriate policies, procedures, and tools to provide computer security and to facilitate
system recovery has become a vital function of any organization.

Make no mistake: computer and information security are complex subjects that grow and
become even more complex every day. Surveys indicate that the security of information
stored in and processed by computers has become a major issue at the most senior levels of
management. Businesses spend many billions of dollars each year on hardware and
software to control access to computers, secure the data they contain, and detect intrusions.
They invest hundreds of millions more in systems that permit efficient recovery should a
problem occur. There are firms, some with thousands of employees, specializing in
computer security. Clearly, this is a highly specialized field. One chapter in a Handbook
cannot make you an expert in computer security and it is not intended to do so.
Fraud Supp. 2—3/02
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This chapter orients you to the field of computer security so that you, as a CPA, can be
certain not only to handle computer security and systems recovery appropriately but also
to consider the major risk factors.

4.2 Management’s Security Issues
In the modem, global business environment, the computer has evolved from being a
number cruncher used by the accounting department and tended by a priesthood of
mathematical geniuses in a glass-fronted, fire-protected, climate-controlled computer room,
to infiltrate virtually every facet of the corporation. The computer has replaced typewriters
with word processors, adding machines with spreadsheets, and voluminous physical files
with database programs. Timeclocks have morphed into automated timekeeping systems or
become integrated into access control systems. The eyes of inventory control specialists
have become bar code scanners. In many companies, all significant information
concerning assets, transactions, and operations are held on one or more computers. The
twenty-first century organization likely makes use of hundreds of computers connected in
local area networks (LANs) and wide area networks (WANs). An organization may have
dozens of these networks each using servers ranging in power from PCs to mainframes.

4.2.1 Components of Security
Data Communications
Businesses do not exist in a vacuum. Increasingly, companies are dedicating more
resources to data communications. Many companies—perhaps most, by now—have
moved onto the Internet both as a way of distributing information and transmitting
information between people or units. Usually, this refers to the World Wide Web, but often
through the use of what are called virtual private networks (VPNs). VPNs include electronic
mail (e-mail), instant messaging, which has moved from being a favorite communication
tool of teenagers to an increasingly important tool in business, and the use of various
techniques (or protocols) to move files across the Internet. Some of these provide a good
level of security. Others do not. The space on business cards that formerly held a Telex
address now has an e-mail address and a Web site identifier.
Many companies are developing and fielding what are sometimes called extranets that link
their suppliers and distributors through Internet connections. Other businesses seeking
more security than is provided on the global public Internet have turned to private network
providers who operate worldwide data communications networks. These providers use the
same tools and protocols as the Internet but limit their availability to subscribers and
employ various encryption tools to safeguard the information from eavesdroppers.
The latest communication tools have eliminated the use of wires or fibers. Businesses are
rapidly installing wireless communication systems either entirely in-house, for example, a
wireless LAN, or globally, through tools such as Internet-enabled cell phones.
Unfortunately, the security of proprietary information broadcast through the air is not
automatically assured. We have entered the age of the “drive-by hack” intruders can enter
our networks by simply driving near our buildings with a wireless-enabled laptop computer
to intercept or send messages over insufficiently secured networks.
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Security and System Structure
Before computers, businesses achieved information security by installing locks on file
cabinets and file-room doors and by restricting access to various files and documents.
“Intelligent” security systems generally involved underpaid security guards who might (or
might not) provide an increased level of protection. During the initial period of
centralization, organizations used mainframe computers with attached terminals; effective
access control existed on the central system and, since the hardware outside of the
computer room generally consisted of “dumb” terminals and local printers, the security
situation seemed manageable. Today, the situation is different. How is it possible to secure
computer networks and data communications structures that are not only complex but also
may exist on a global scale? How do we secure systems that may have dozens of servers in
dozens of locations and that use private circuits, the Internet, and wireless channels to tie
the pieces together?

As businesses increasingly rely on computers and networks, they have a greater need to
secure their information-processing infrastructure against accidental or deliberate damage
and to provide an efficient, effective, and secure system for backup of data and programs
on a regular basis. Organizations need security systems to restore information following an
incident or outage. Systems are virtually impossible to manage and keep secure if they are
not properly organized and structured. As a key aspect of security and recovery and as a
measure of preventive maintenance, businesses should implement a structure for
organizing and storing information, for example, data files, spreadsheets, word processing
documents, and so on. In developing an effective information storage structure, you should
consider issues such as file nomenclature and file access privileges.

There is a lesson that too many organizations have learned the hard way: The worst
possible time to discover that your recovery system is not good enough is just after an
incident has occurred and your management and your users are screaming for the system
to be restarted.

External Versus Internal Security
As people recognize that information has enormous value—sometimes, in fact, an even
greater value than anything else in the organization—their need to safeguard this
information increases. The risks inherent in the processing, storage, and transmission of
that data have also increased, however, particularly as the Internet has flourished. There
have been many documented cases of industrial and economic espionage designed by
organizations attempting to jump-start their business activities by stealing proprietary
information.
Companies have also been victimized because management believed the major risk they
faced was from outside the organization. They spent substantial resources on firewalls and
very little on other forms of security. Unfortunately, every study indicates that 80 percent
or more of crime against business is perpetrated within the company, that is, from inside
the firewall. This is not meant to suggest that the external threat can be ignored. That threat
is growing, as we can see from the highly publicized incidents of viruses, worms, and
“denial of service” attacks. But many of these could be prevented by using a combination
of straightforward technological safeguards and common sense.

Fraud Supp. 2—3/02

5

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

As systems grow more complex with the increase in bandwidth connecting to the Internet,
it is important when assessing security that you consider a wide range of threats and a wide
range of ways in which to thwart those threats. Although an outsider can hack into your
network to gain access to a specific file, an insider might be able to pick up a carelessly
stored backup tape and walk out with a copy of every file in your system recorded on a
tape small enough to fit into a shirt pocket.
Because of a corporation’s vulnerability, no one should question the need for computer
security and the ability to recover from problems both natural and human-generated. It is
useful, therefore, to focus on some of management’s key concerns.

4.2.2 Management’s Key Concerns
Managers in business and government have recognized the growing importance of
computer processing to their organizations. Over the last few years, they have expressed
their concerns in a wide variety of surveys and publications. These concerns generally fall
into one of the following three functional categories:

1. Theft of confidential information

2. Information integrity
3. System availability
Each of these concerns is addressed in the sections that follow.

Theft of Confidential Information
Recognizing that companies increasingly store more information in computer systems,
management must have assurance that this information is well protected and that only
appropriately authorized employees have access.
For example, theft of proposed pay scales or negotiating positions during labor negotiations
would be detrimental to the collective bargaining process. Theft of marketing or pricing
plans would result in a loss of competitive advantage. Similarly, theft of personal or
financial customer information could result not only in embarrassment but also in a direct
loss of business and possible litigation.

The threat to the national economy of the loss of valuable intellectual property has become
so great that the government has enacted the Electronic Espionage Act, which makes the
theft of intellectual property a federal crime punishable by up to ten years in prison.
Increasingly, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act is also being used as a basis for
safeguarding confidential information and for prosecuting those who seek to distribute
protected proprietary data.

Information Integrity
Because of the large volume of information processed by computers, it is not always
feasible to confirm the validity or accuracy of processing results. To a large extent, users of
a system make the assumption that the information presented to them by various
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applications is correct. Therefore, management seeks assurance on the integrity of
computer-generated information: that the information is reasonably protected against
unauthorized tampering by employees, computer viruses, hackers or other forms of
sabotage.
For example, tampering that results in inaccurate reporting of sales figures could, in turn,
cause inappropriate production, excessive inventory levels, and lost product sales.
Inaccurate unit production costs could result in disastrous pricing decisions. Unauthorized
altering of the accounts-payable records could result in incorrect check routing and
amounts, and thus create direct financial loss.

System Availability
While recognizing their organization’s dependence on the data processing service,
management needs to be reassured not only that everything has been done to reduce the
likelihood of disruption but also that there are plans in place for resuming data processing
in the unlikely event of a major catastrophe. The total or partial loss of data processing
services would make it difficult, if not impossible, for most organizations to perform routine
business operations. This must also be understood in light of so-called “denial of service”
attacks in which hackers do not attempt to break into a system but just to flood it with data
and thus render it inaccessible to authorized users.

4.2.3 Effective Computer Security Systems
An effective computer security program can help to manage and, to a certain extent,
alleviate the above concerns. The design of an effective computer security program must
take into account the nature of the risk as well as the nature and cost of the controls
required to reduce exposure. Note that there is no such thing as 100 percent protection.
The growth of networking and particularly of the Internet has materially increased the risk
of computer crimes and incidents. The following areas are among those that management
must address.

Accidental Versus Deliberate Events
The events that result in breaches in confidentiality, integrity or availability may be
accidental or deliberate in nature and may be the result of actions either internal or
external to an organization.

On a day-to-day basis, statistics indicate that management should be able to trace most
incidents to internal accidents such as an employee entering incorrect data or inadvertently
deleting an essential file. Accidents also include failures arising out of undiscovered
program errors or bugs.

Virtually every system in use today is built on a software platform that exists as one or
more software packages procured from manufacturers. A few may be custom written but
even these almost universally operate on a standard, purchased operating system such as
Windows®. In any case, the systems that support an organization, whether procured or
written in-house, may consist of tens or even hundreds of thousands of lines of code. It is
virtually impossible to test every possible condition that might occur in these immensely
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complex systems. Program bugs exist in every major system. With the marketplace
demanding speedier program development cycles, manufacturers have converted at least a
part of their traditional testing procedures into beta testing in which the manufacturers
release an advance version of the software to customers to assess its capabilities.
It is important to understand the difference between beta testing and the more traditional
system testing. In system testing, the software is stressed with deliberate input errors,
processing problems and anything else the testing team can do to cause the software to fail.
In beta testing, however, the users are not deliberately stressing the system in an attempt to
make it break down. Nonetheless, commercial-software beta testing is valuable, and results
in reports to the manufacturer of hundreds or even thousands of potential program bugs.
Regardless of how thoroughly a program is tested, it can still fail and fail disastrously as the
result of an accidental bug. Indeed, there has been a continuing problem with newly
identified security issues in widely used packages, which has forced vendors to issue a series
of software “patches” designed to close specific security holes. Any organization that is not
closely monitoring the manufacturers of every piece of installed software for newly
identified problems and that does not have a procedure in place to rapidly install new
patches across all relevant systems is likely to be running with security “holes” that may
place the integrity of proprietary information at extreme risk!

Prevention, Detection and Recovery Controls
Prevention is the best and most effective way to minimize the impact of an unwanted event
that could affect information confidentiality, integrity or availability. In the case of
deliberate acts, preventive controls will reduce opportunity and thereby remove
temptation. Another important factor in preventive control is the notion of deterrence
because it creates a belief in the mind of would-be perpetrators that they are likely to be
caught and punished if they attempt a computer-related crime.
Preventive controls, however, cannot and do not provide a 100-percent guarantee that a
problem will not occur. As a resul , organizations typically use complementary detective
controls to highlight any actual or attempted security violation. For example, existing
software features may successfully prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to data.
In these situations, the software is programmed to produce reports that document all
attempts by unauthorized users to access restricted data—a feature known as detective
control.
In addition to preventive and detective controls, organizations must prepare in advance for
recovery from unexpected events. For example, a plan to use backup copies of files to
retrieve an accidentally deleted data file constitutes a recovery control.

A well-designed security program includes elements of all three types of control:

1. Preventive
2. Detective
3. Recuperative
The mix of controls used depends on the nature of the information stored on the computer
taken together with the degree of reliance that can be placed on the computer plus
management’s willingness to accept the associated risks. In the rapidly changing global
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environment in which we work, where Internet connectivity grows at an unprecedented
rate and new equipment and software may become obsolete in months, it is no simple
matter to keep security features ahead of or at least in line with potential threats.
4.3 Physical Security
Physical security is the generic term used to describe the protection of the computing facility.
The controls exercised under the heading physical security are typically preventive and
detective in nature.
Many may think that physical security has become unimportant in the age of the personal
computer when virtually every employee has a powerful workstation with a fast processor
and access to company networks that are often equipped with huge local storage disk
drives. But the reality is that mid- to large-size organizations still use midrange computers
(such as the IBM AS400, Digital Vax and Alpha systems, HP 9000s, and similar systems
from other manufacturers), mainframes (such as the IBM System 390) and large scale DEC,
SUN, HP, Dell and Unisys servers. Even managers at companies that base their computing
on a LAN often realize that smaller file servers are best protected by placing them in a
dedicated and protected operating facility.

Physical security primarily addresses the accessibility concern—the ability to physically
access a machine—and attempts to minimize the potential for system loss as a result of
equipment theft or damage. To achieve physical security, consider each of the following
areas:

1. Computer Room Construction
2. Fire Detection and Suppression
3. Water Protection

4.
5.
6.
7.

Electrical Power Reliability
Environmental Control
Physical Access Controls
Physical Security for PCs

8. Physical Security for Portable Computing Devices

Details on each of the components of physical security are presented in the sections that
follow.

4. 3.1 Computer Room Construction
The National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) standards provide the most concise
specifications for recommended mainframe, midrange, and server computer room
construction. In summary, to provide an appropriate level of protection, computer room
perimeter walls should be constructed to a minimum of a one-hour fire-resistance rating.
These walls should extend from concrete ceiling to concrete floor (slab to slab). Obviously,
slab-to-slab walls also protect the facility against unauthorized entry from a false ceiling or a
raised floor.
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This construction minimizes the possibility of fires originating in general office areas
migrating to the computer room before they can be extinguished. The use of standard-glass
partitions to segregate the computer room from the general office environment usually
does not provide sufficient protection against a migrating fire.

Computer rooms have come full circle. During the sixties and seventies, the only
computers in most organizations were large mainframes kept in presumably secure
computer rooms. As companies changed from central computers to client-server
environments, file servers, which had become the departmental version of a mainframe,
did not need special environments. They were placed anywhere—on the floor, under a
table, or sometimes in a closet. This led to a lot of problems. Often, they were accidentally
turned off or damaged. They did not always have power protection and, on more than one
occasion, companies suffered when someone accidentally pulled the server’s plug from the
wall. With servers in a closet or under someone’s desk, backup was sometimes forgotten,
and even when carried out, the backup tapes were often stored adjacent to the server. The
trend now is to collect servers and large-scale storage devices into dedicated rooms that can
provide proper protection.

4. 3.2 Fire Detection and Suppression
Fire detection and suppression systems are essential in the computer room to protect the
investment in computer equipment and the information stored thereon. These systems are
designed to detect and suppress fire before it advances to a serious state. Security experts
recommend automated detection and suppression systems because these systems reduce
the dependence on manual fire-fighting techniques that may prove unsatisfactory or arrive
too late.

The most common fire-suppression systems are water sprinklers and various fire
suppressing gasses. A gas, Halon 1301, formerly the most popular fire suppression gas, is
no longer manufactured because it turned out to be a significant environmental hazard.
There are a number of fully acceptable replacement fire-suppression gases that do not have
Halon’s environmental issues. These can be engineered to fit any size computer facility
and, although they can be expensive, they provide a very high level of protection. It is
particularly important to recognize that these gases do not damage computer equipment.

Water-based systems may serve as the primary fire-suppression system or as a backup to a
fire-suppressive gas system. Some building codes may require that sprinklers be installed.
Water sprinkler systems may be wet or dry. Wet systems contain water in the pipes at all
times. Dry pipe systems, also called pre-action systems, do not contain water until an alarm
is activated that usually involves a products-of-combustion detection unit. At this point, a
valve automatically opens to charge the system. A high-temperature event must also occur
to open a sprinkler head.
Fire detection systems can also provide a direct linkage to other significant support
functions such as opening fire exits, shutting off equipment and fans and providing
immediate notification to an alarm company or the fire department via a communications
link.
In thinking about the use of sprinkler systems, remember that water is not a good mix with
computers or any other electrical equipment. Severe damage can be done to system
components. A sprinkler system should be considered a backup to alternative systems.
10
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It is also important to have handheld extinguishers around. A handheld unit can put out
many fires and prevent the room-wide system from being used. If you have them, please
take the time to have your staff trained in their use. Fire departments will usually be glad to
help provide this kind of training if you contact your local department’s fire prevention
unit.

Finally, remember that a large percentage of computer-room fires result from having too
much combustible material lying around. A computer room is not a good place to store
paper, checks, or anything else that can bum. For a computer-room wastebasket, consider a
self-extinguishing waste container. These containers have domed tops which are designed to
snuff out a fire by blocking the supply of air.

4.3 .3 Water Protection
Water and electrical systems do not mix but both are generally found in computer rooms
protected by sprinkler systems. Water can also enter computer rooms through leaks that
may originate on another floor of the building. Therefore, it is vitally important to ensure
that precautions are taken to detect and remove water leakage before it contacts the
electrical supply. Water protection usually involves the provision of the following:

• Underfloor water detectors normally located in the vicinity of air-conditioning units.
Water detection systems are usually monitored in the same manner as fire alarms.
• Floor drains remove any water buildup. Unless specified during construction, floor
drains typically are not provided in modern office towers.
• Waterproof equipment covers should be on hand where sprinkler systems or other
above-floor water sources are present. If they are available, equipment covers or rolls of
plastic can be pulled over the equipment in the event of a problem. A simple and
inexpensive solution might be to have some roles of plastic table-covering material
(available from party-supply stores). These can be quickly unrolled and cut to size when
emergency water protection is needed.

4.3 .4 Electrical Power Reliability
Unless suitable precautions are taken, a disruption of the electrical power supply will result
in the loss of computer service. The provision of backup-power sources can be expensive
and may not be cost justified if the computer center is located in an area where the electric
power supply is reliable. If the electric-power supply is unreliable or the nature of
processing critical, consider using uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and backup
generators.

Uninterruptible Power Supply
UPS provides battery backup in the event of power failures or brownouts. The regular
power supply is monitored at all times and battery power automatically provided when
required. These systems have become increasingly affordable. Systems sized for PCs can
now be purchased at discount stores and warehouse clubs. However, it is important to
remember that these systems generally have a very limited operational time. Some may
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only give a few minutes of power if an outage occurs. If power fails when no one is present,
the UPS can run until its battery power is expended. You will then find that you have both
a dead system and a dead UPS. If reliable operations are critical, you need to add a backup
generator to your UPS.

Backup Generators
Backup generators are recommended because UPS can only provide battery-backup power
for a limited time. In computer centers that provide critical processing services or in areas
where electric power is unreliable, diesel or turbine generators that can produce electric
power for an indefinite period (provided fuel is available), often support UPS systems.

Pourer Conditioners and Surge Suppressors
Finally, regardless of the local power supply outage record, it is likely that power
conditioners will be used in the larger computer installations and surge suppressors
provided for desktop PCs. Power conditioners and surge protectors monitor the electric
power supply and remove voltage sags and surges that can severely damage computer
equipment.

4.3 .5 Environmental Control
Environmental control is an issue that primarily has been a concern for larger mainframe
computer environments. Even the users of the smaller machines whose manufacturers
claim that they operate in a general office environment cannot totally ignore the following
environmental issues:

1. Temperature
2. Humidity control
3. Environmental contamination

Temperature Control
Computers cannot operate in extreme temperatures. It is true that the range of operating
temperatures has increased over the years. However, even if the specifications indicate that
the machine will operate in a wide temperature range, for example, 59 to 90 degrees
Fahrenheit or 15 to 32 degrees Celsius, it is not advisable to operate these machines near
either limit. Air conditioning is usually installed to reduce the likelihood of system outage
or damage as a result of overheating. Where it is necessary to install an unusual amount of
heat-generating equipment in a PC case, for example, if a number of hard drives are added,
consideration should be given not only to operating the machine in a climate-controlled
location but also to installing an extra fan in the case to dissipate the heat. There are fan
units available through a number of vendors that can be placed into a standard drive bay
or standard circuit card position.

Humidity Control
The computer manufacturers normally indicate a range of humidity acceptable for their
machines, for example, a 20 to 80 percent humidity tolerance. Normally, the air
conditioning unit provides humidity control.

12
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Environmental Contamination
Dust can cause major problems in a computer environment. If dust gets into a removable
storage unit, it may cause a head crash and make information on that disk inaccessible. In
addition, accumulations of paper dust from printers are a potential fire hazard. To
minimize the potential for dust contamination, you should regularly vacuum the areas
where dust normally accumulates.

4.3.6 Physical Access Controls
The importance of physical access controls over all assets and related records is obvious.
Such controls help to reduce the risk of fraud and commercial crime for the following
reasons:
• Physical access controls are often most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong controls
in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the system.
Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
• Perpetrators of many frauds must come into physical contact with either the asset being
misappropriated or the related-asset records in order to cover up the fraud. Reducing
physical access reduces opportunity.
• Access controls that fail to prevent fraud and commercial crime still often assist in the
investigation process, for example, the determination of what actually happened and the
narrowing of the list of possible suspects.

The physical security of computer installations and equipment is particularly important.
Sometimes white-collar criminals and irate employees resort to blue-collar crimes, such as
arson and the willful destruction of property. When this happens, these blue-collar crimes
may be classified as being commercial or economic in nature. There are also new
categories of computer crimes defined by most states and the federal government. To
combat these new crimes, new laws have been passed specifically directed at protecting
computers. The destruction of a computer may involve a number of chargeable offenses,
some of which are general in nature, for example, malicious mischief. Others are more
specific, such as economic espionage or computer tampering.

The only employees who should require physical access to computer equipment are those
responsible for its operation. Any third-party engineers performing maintenance should be
accompanied by operations staff or otherwise monitored at all times. Providing more access
increases the potential for vandalism, mischief, and human error; any of these threats could
result in processing disruptions.
Limiting access to the computer room involves securing the doors and keeping them closed
at all times. There are a variety of devices available for achieving this. The most common
include the following:
• Key locks. These are the cheapest to install but are usually the least secure because
duplicate keys can be made and distributed without control. At the very least, all
authorized keys should be marked by the locksmith with the words DO NOT
DUPLICATE. Reputable locksmiths will not duplicate a key with such a marking.
Although this does not prevent extra keys from being made, it sharply reduces the
number of sources for such duplication.
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• Cipher locks. These are push-button combination devices and are generally more secure
than key locks provided the combination is changed on a regular basis. The downside
of these locks is that the combination can be easily shared with unauthorized persons.
Whereas a physical key is needed for a standard lock, only knowledge of the
combination is required to operate a cipher lock.

• Card-access devices. These are probably the most secure mechanisms because cards
cannot be readily duplicated and card distribution can be controlled. There are also
card-access devices that require the user to enter a pass code along with the card key.
These are more secure than standard card-access devices since the user must have both
a physical device (the card) and knowledge of a secret piece of information (the pass
code).
• Biometric locks. These provide access based on physical characteristics. Perhaps the most
commonly used involve hand geometry, but devices based on fingerprints, iris
recognition, and facial recognition are also becoming commercially viable.

4.3.7 Physical Security for PCs
Much of the preceding discussion relates to computer systems of any size. The following is
important information to secure PCs physically:
• Restrict physical access. Lock doors during off-hours or whenever an office is vacant, or
both.
• Use the security features provided on many PCs, such as passwords, that prevent access
by unauthorized individuals.
• Ensure that all employees watch for unauthorized personnel in areas where personal
computers or servers are located.

4.3.8 Physical Security for Portable Computers
Portable computers such as laptops, notebooks, subnotebooks, and personal digital
assistants (PDAs) also present security issues. With large storage capacities, they can hold
huge volumes of confidential information. Experience indicates that these are attractive
targets to both thieves and those who would commit industrial espionage. Security tips
follow:
• When taking a computer through an airport security checkpoint, do not put the
computer into the x-ray machine until the metal detector is clear for your use. There
have been a large number of incidents in which one member of a criminal gang delays
you after you have put your computer case onto the x-ray belt by finding more and
more metal objects on his or her person. By the time you can go through the metal
detector, a confederate of the “blocker” has already taken your PC case off of the belt
and departed.
• Do not leave your PC unattended in your hotel room. Where possible, put it in the safe
in your room (if one is provided) or in the hotel safe-deposit box. Another option is to
keep all of your confidential data on a removable device or to remove the hard drive
from the laptop and take the data with you. If the machine gets stolen while you are out,
you still have the data.
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• Consider installing software that can detect whether the computer is stolen. This
software attempts to contact a data center through an Internet connection to report its
location. Such software is available from several vendors.

4.4 Logical Security
Logical security is the term used to describe the overall method for the protection of
information stored on a computer system. The controls involved are usually a blend of
preventive and detective controls. Organizations use logical security to address
confidentiality and integrity concerns and to reduce the potential for inappropriate
information disclosure, modification, destruction, or deletion.
Achieving an appropriate level of logical security involves giving careful thought to how
the user gains access to information. In addition to the security controls for the data itself,
you should consider the controls over the software that provides access to the data and to
the system. In so doing, keep in mind the following:
•
•
•
•
•

Communications security
Data security
Software integrity
Computer operations security
Logical security for personal computers

A description of each is given in the following sections.

4 .4.1 Communications Security
Communications security focuses on controlling the various methods of access to the
computer system. Of course, communications security serves primarily to ensure that valid
transmissions between computer systems are complete and accurate. As an added benefit,
communications security also presents an obstacle to criminal activity.

Passwords and Administration
A valid user identification and password is the first line of access control on most computer
systems. The validation of the ID and password by a computer program represents the
preventive part of the control while the rejection and recording of an invalid ID or
password represents the detection control. To be effective, the detective aspect of password
control requires an investigation of all reported access failures.
For effective password controls, procedures should be installed to ensure the following:

1. Users choose passwords that are not simplistic in nature. Because simplistic passwords
can be readily guessed and the system compromised, never use initials, a spouse’s name,
or other similar personal passwords. For example, you could implement a policy that
requires passwords to have a defined minimum length and require them to contain at
least one letter, one number, and one special character. A password like interaction
would be more secured if it was replaced by !nterAct1 On.
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2. Management distributes new user IDs and passwords to users in a controlled manner.
The initial password should be required to be used within a limited period and users
required to change the initial password to a new one on their initial log-in.
3. Users change passwords regularly, approximately every thirty to ninety days, depending
on the nature of the information accessed. The system should keep track of a number of
prior passwords to prevent their reuse.
4. Management revokes IDs and passwords of users who have left the organization.
Similarly, when users move from job to job within an organization, management
modifies their access rights so they can only access the data required for their current
job.

Network Security Features
The programmed network security features that are available vary from system to system.
Some of the common features include the following:
• A maximum number of log-on attempts. If the user has not successfully logged on in the
specified number of attempts, the session is terminated and the incident is recorded on a
log for investigation. To prohibit additional attempts to compromise the account, some
systems lock the user’s account either for a limited time (5 to 30 minutes) or until reset
by the information security unit.
• Automatic log-off of inactive terminals. If an employee leaves a terminal logged-on, anyone
who gains access to that terminal has the access rights of the previous user thereby
breaching password security. Therefore, many systems automatically log off users when
the terminal has been inactive for a defined period of time. Alternatively, some systems
invoke a screen-saver that prevents using the system until the password is entered.
• Restriction of users to specific terminals. Users must be restricted not only to specific
terminals, but to specific times of the day, or both.
• Echo checking. The protection of transmitted information by echo checking ensures the
information is complete and accurate. This is achieved by a retransmission of the
message to the source terminal for validation.

• Firewalls. Provide the security necessary to control unauthorized access to the system
from the Internet with firewalls. Ranging from relatively simple hardware or software to
complex and hard-to-maintain packages, firewalls have become a requirement for
systems attached to the Internet. Careful installation is essential to prevent making
unintended access points available to an invader.
• Intrusion Detection Systems. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) consist of hardware and
software that monitor activities within a system to determine whether those activities
represent a potential problem. For example, a user who suddenly begins to download
large amounts of proprietary information might be reported for investigation or,
alternatively, have their access privileges suspended pending a review. These systems,
which are now evolving, may be either network-based, that is, they review traffic on a
given communication channel, or host-based, whereby they monitor the work of a given
server.
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Remote-Access Security
Hackers have received considerable publicity in recent years after successfully gaining
unauthorized access to numerous computer systems. In response to the problems created
by hackers, several companies have developed and marketed security devices to limit
remote access to authorized employees.

One common device available to help control dial-up computer access is the callback
device. When an employee dials in, the callback device intercepts the call, the employee
enters a special code, and the device then calls back the phone number associated with the
code entered. The communications link is then established and the user ID and password
are entered in the normal way. This, of course, is based on dial-up access. As more and
more corporate communication goes over the Internet, this security tool is becoming less
important.
For both dial-up access and Internet access, there are a number of devices that provide
security by effectively providing authorized users with a new password for every log-on.
Some systems accomplish this by providing the user with a small keychain-sized device
called a token, which has a window that displays a new code every minute. The user must
enter this code along with a memorized password to gain access.

Another version looks much like a calculator. When a user requests access, the system
provides a random number called a challenge that the user then enters into the special
calculator with a password. The calculator then displays another number (the response),
which is entered into the system to gain access.

Another class of access control based on biometrics involves the measurement of a physical
characteristic. Currently, manufacturers offer devices that can check identity based on
fingerprints, hand or facial geometry, and iris or retinal patterns. Systems based on
voiceprint or signature dynamics are also under development. These systems are becoming
increasingly cost effective. For example, a number of fingerprint-reading devices can be
had for less than one hundred dollars.

4.4.2 Data Security
Unauthorized access to information can result in its disclosure, modification, or deletion.
To achieve efficient data security, you should implement a system capable of evaluating the
sensitivity of the data to provide a level of protection commensurate with the nature and
perceived value of the information. Data security addresses the issue of protecting
information stored on computer files, magnetic media, and hard copy reports.

On-line Data Files
On-line data files are those files stored on disk that users of a computer system can access
directly. The following two effective techniques are available to secure on-line data files:
1. Software restrictions. A program or series of programs that reference established security
tables to determine whether the user is allowed the requested access, for example, read
or write, to the requested data file. If the request is valid, the user will be permitted
access; if not, access is denied and the access violation is reported on a log file for
subsequent investigation. The security software process is illustrated by Figure 4-1, “The
Security Software Process.”
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Figure 4-1. The Security Software Process
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On some computer systems, the software restriction facility is an integral part of the
operating system, while on others a separate security software product that interfaces with
the operating system is used.

2. Data encryption. This technique scrambles information using a predefined algorithm or
key so that the information is not meaningful to anyone who merely gains access to the
disk file. There are a number of mathematical systems (algorithms) in use as the basis of
encryption systems. These systems use keys of various length and complexity. Longer
keys usually provide more security than shorter keys. On the Internet, all browsers
provide some level of security through encryption. Some have short-key capabilities
generally employing 40-bit keys that provide a basic level of security while other
versions are often export-restricted and use much stronger 128-bit keys. Some dataencryption packages, for example PGP, can provide for even longer keys often 1,024
bits in length, which provide incredibly robust security against unauthorized
interception. Companies using the Internet to transmit confidential data should
seriously consider using encryption to protect that information from unauthorized
interception. Encryption should also be considered for e-mail as well because standard
e-mail is not secure.
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Offline Data Files
Offline data files are information stored in libraries on magnetic tape, removable disks, and
diskettes. Information stored on these media is as readily susceptible to inappropriate
disclosure, amendment, and deletion as online data files unless it is properly controlled.
The preventive controls usually applied include the following:

• Keep the media library in a physically secure room where the door is locked unless an
authorized staff member is present.
• Adhere to media library procedures requiring that files be issued from the library only
for approved purposes, for example, production use and transport to off-site storage.

• Assure that the media, when no longer needed for storage of confidential data, are
erased or destroyed. As long as they contain data, they should be protected.
The detective controls normally include an investigation of all materials borrowed but not
returned in a reasonable time as well as the performance of periodic inventory checks.
However, many smaller organizations consider the use of comprehensive library
procedures impractical because of limited staff availability. In these situations and in
personal computer environments, you should regularly back up computer information on
hard disks and diskettes and store the backups in a secure location away from the
computers.

Reports and Documents
It is easy to become preoccupied with protecting information on computer systems while
neglecting the information printed on input forms and computer reports. Generally, people
rely on internal controls exercised by user departments to ensure that data approved for
input is not modified before it is entered into the computer. Frequently, however, people
pay less attention to securing input documents before and after input. Yet these input
documents contain all of the confidential information ultimately stored on disk.

You should also pay attention to printed output, including the following:

• Printing control. Completely destroy any partially printed reports that result from printer
problems.
• Distribution control. Ensure that the appropriate staff distributes computer-printed reports,
particularly reports containing sensitive or confidential information, only to authorized
recipients.
• Storage security. Staff should secure computer reports in the user department for
protection after office hours.

• Destruction control. Staff should completely destroy all reports when no longer required.
This practice applies to all offices, not just computer areas. Even when information is
outdated, improper disclosure may still prove embarrassing.

4.4.3 Software Integrity
Software integrity refers to the protection of all system software stored on magnetic media
and the migration of programs to production. The integrity of information depends on the
integrity of the programs that produce and use that information. Integrity of information
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also depends on the integrity of the communications software, transaction processors, file
access software, security software and operating system—known collectively as the system
software—that control the operation of and possible use by application programs.

Online Software Libraries
Computer programs are stored on disk files in libraries or software directories. The most
effective means of restricting user access to these libraries is through security software
restrictions as described earlier in the section entitled “Online Data Files,” although library
control software may also assist in restricting user access.

The programming staff requires access to copies of the programs to perform their jobs.
They do not, however, require access to the production versions. Providing programmers
with direct access to production versions compromises software control and increases the
possibility that unauthorized changes may be made. In general, only qualified production
librarians should require access to the production programs and those individuals should
copy only new versions of programs into production as required.

Offline Software
Offline software refers to the backup copies of program libraries or directories stored on
magnetic tape, exchangeable disks and diskettes. The controls required to secure these
versions of the software are identical to those described earlier in this chapter in the section,
“Offline Data Files.”

Migration of Programs to Production
If a programmer can gain access to a program and make changes between the program
tests being performed by the user and the program being put into production, the version
used in production may not be the same version that was originally tested and approved.
Changes may be introduced that could affect information integrity and expose the
organization to financial loss. Organizations can address this problem in a variety of ways
including the following:
• Restricting access to the test version of the program to the users who are running the test
and the individual(s) who are performing the librarian function responsible for the
transfer to production.
• Record and monitor the time when the last change was made provided the system or
library control software retains that information. The date of the last change should not
be later than the date the tests were run and the software approved for use.
• Assure that all updates provided by software manufacturers are applied promptly. These
should always be tested before being put into production to assure that the updates have
not had an unintended result.

4.4.4 Computer Operations Security
Improper operator intervention also can affect the proper operation of computer programs
and, therefore, the integrity of information. In particular, computer operators can create
problems by performing the following:

20

Fraud Supp. 2—3/02

Chapter Four: Computer Security and System Recovery

• Run the incorrect version of a program against the correct data files. This may introduce
errors through the use of untested program code or the possibility of fraud through the
use of unauthorized code.
• Run the correct version of the program against incorrect versions of data files.
Obviously, the results produced by this action would be incorrect and could have
serious implications.

To control operator activity effectively, you should consider taking certain measures
including the following:

• Restrict an operator’s ability to change the Job Control Language. Job Control
Language directs the processing of a program and identifies the program to be run and
the data files to be used.
• Use internal tape, disk-label checking, or both, to ensure use of the correct file.
• Provide detailed operating instructions to reduce accidental error.
• Monitor operator intervention by reviewing the computer activity-console logs and
investigating unusual activity.
• Reconcile data file totals from run to run to ensure use of the correct version of the file.

4.4.5 Logical Security for Personal Computers
The important points to note with respect to logical security for PCs include the following:
• Be wary of leaving sensitive information on hard disks unless the files are encrypted.
Consider using removable disk-cartridge devices.
• Use cryptic passwords. Do not leave passwords on or near computer workstations.
• Back up hard disks regularly to CDs, network drives, or tape.
• Remember when erasing a hard disk that the normal erase procedures of some
operating systems leave the file on the disk, that is, it may only remove the file name
from the directory. Even reformatting a PC hard drive does not make the data
unrecoverable. To prevent any possible recovery of sensitive files, use the disk-wiping
functions provided by commercial hard-drive utilities programs. These programs
overwrite the space used by the file—often several times—to make the information
completely unrecoverable.
4.5

System Recovery
If properly applied, the preventive and detective controls provided by physical and logical
security will minimize the possibility of problems occurring. However, problems do
occur—either accidentally or deliberately. System recovery procedures are intended to
assist in implementing an orderly and controlled return to normal operations in the event
of a problem.

You should consider using recovery controls to address any computer-related availability
concerns. These controls are necessary to address short-term problems as well as more
catastrophic long-term events.
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4.5.1 Recovery From Operational Failures
Operational failures are those problems that occur during the performance of day-to-day
processing. Examples include the following:
• Incorrect file usage
• Disk files deletion
• Disk files destruction
• Job processing failure
• Computer equipment or media failure. For example, most people have seen cassette
tapes that have been “eaten” by players. Drives fail. Tapes can break.

Overcoming problems of this nature requires an appropriate combination of back-up and
written recovery procedures.

Data File and Software Backup
To protect against accidental or deliberate destruction by hackers, for example, it is
essential that you and your staff regularly make copies of all data files and software libraries
directories. How often is “regularly?” This will vary from installation to installation. To
determine an appropriate backup cycle, you should consider the following factors:
• The frequency at which file managers update the file, library, or directory. This will help
managers determine when to make backup files. For example, for system-software
libraries that are rarely changed it may be more effective to make backup copies only
after making changes.

• The number of transactions processed each time the file is updated. This total helps
managers determine the amount of effort required to reprocess all transactions entered
since the last available backup was taken.
• The amount of processing time available for backup.
In the past, a backup cycle was often determined on an application-by-application basis.
Today organizations typically take a weekly copy of all files and libraries and supplement
this with daily incremental backups. Incremental backups take copies of only those files and
libraries that have been updated during the day.
In many firms, employees frequently work off-line from their server either away from their
office or saving files directly to their local drives. To ensure that all necessary data is
properly backed-up at appropriate times, you should establish guidelines that stress the
importance of the employees moving their work to the server as soon and as often as
possible. This not only provides back-up protection in the event of a personal computer
failure but also maintains a complete data record on the server for back-up purposes.

To assist in recovery from day-to-day operational failures, keep a backup copy of the data
files and software on site. In addition, send a copy off site for use in the event of more
catastrophic problems such as when all on-site material is either unavailable or destroyed.
(See section 4.5.2., “Disaster Recovery Plans”).
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Recovery Procedures
In addition to providing backup copies of the files and libraries, provide the required
detailed written instructions for the operators so they can efficiently and effectively recover
any necessary files. These procedures are described in most computer-operational manuals
and should address issues such as:

• Application failure recovery measures. These measures are normally documented for each
application and for each job step within the application. These measures describe how
operators can restore processing at an earlier point, and reprocess transactions. In some
cases when restoring and reprocessing is not possible, the manual should provide
direction for obtaining programming or technical support to resolve the problem.
• Use of utilities to recover from backup copies. The involvement of operators in recovery
varies from organization to organization. In some installations, the operators copy the
files and libraries to a predefined recovery area on disk and it is the responsibility of a
user or support group to copy them from the recovery area to the production area.
Other organizations will recover directly to the production areas.
• Vendor support for equipment failures or head crashes. Users should document all equipment
failures including details of the request for vendor assistance and the vendor’s response.

4.5.2 Disaster Recovery Plans
Disaster recovery plans are intended to assist with recovery from a catastrophic event. They
are not intended to deal with day-to-day operational failures. The term disaster is used in
the broadest sense; it need not be an act of God. It could be anything from a drunken
driver knocking down a power pole to terrorism. As previously noted, white-collar
criminals can also arrange disasters to cover up their crimes.

Definition
A disaster recovery plan is a documented description of the action to take, resources to be
used, and the procedures to be followed before, during and after a disruption of data
processing capability.

Given the business community’s current reliance on computers, many executives would
probably find the loss of the computer center for a lengthy period of time inconceivable.
However, the same executive’s organization has probably taken little or no action to
develop or maintain a contingency plan. A survey completed several years ago suggested
that less than 50 percent of the Fortune 1000 companies had disaster recovery plans and,
for the companies that had, only half the plans were feasible.
Elements of Effective Disaster Recovery Plans

Before disaster occurs, you should take action to ensure that off-site backup is capable of
supporting recovery operations. Keep off-site backup copies of data files and software some
distance from the principal site so that these vital records will be accessible in the event of a
disaster affecting the local geographic area. Where appropriate, companies should contract
for services with disaster recovery centers that maintain hardware for use when needed.
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Consider what happened when a train derailed in Mississauga, a suburb of Toronto,
Canada, a few years ago. In this case, the authorities closed access to a sizable-city area for
five days because of a dangerous chemical spill. Any organization housing both its data
center and off-site storage in that geographical area would have had difficulty
implementing its disaster-recovery plan.

In addition to keeping off-site backup copies of data files and software, consider keeping
off-site supplies of other materials required for processing. Examples include: check stock
files, special invoice forms and forms for laser printers, operations documentation, and a
copy of the recovery plan.

Documenting detailed recovery procedures and implementing regular tests of the recovery
plan are the most important actions to be taken before the advent of a disaster. Disaster
recovery operations require the channeling of information to management to assist in
decision making during the chaos of a disaster. Without clearly identifying reporting
channels and decision points in advance, employees may later take inappropriate action.
Similarly, prepare detailed procedures for system recovery because operations staff may
not perform standard procedures as expected when affected by the stress of a disaster.
Remember that in a disaster personnel who might be expected to participate in the
recovery—either on the operations team or the management team—may themselves be
victims of the disaster. The plan must anticipate this possibility by designating one or more
alternates for each recovery position. Regular testing ensures that the plan is workable and
helps to keep the plan current.

During the disaster, the staff with recovery responsibilities should follow documented
procedures to:

1. Notify all necessary parties that a problem has occurred.
2. Assess the extent of the damage and the expected period of system outage for
communications to the recovery team.
3. Report to a predetermined emergency control center.

After invoking the disaster recovery plan, the recovery staff should follow the documented
procedures for:
1. Recovering the critical systems at the identified alternative-processing location.

2. Operating at the alternative site.
3. Refurbishing or replacing the damaged site.
4. Returning to normal operations once the damaged site has been refurbished.
Most organizations plan to recover only the critical systems at the alternative-processing
site. These are the application systems needed to ensure continued business operations. If
sufficient resources exist at the alternative site to run other systems, do not recover them
until the critical systems are running.

See figure 4-2 for a schematic of an approach to developing a disaster-recovery plan.
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Figure 4-2. The Disaster Recovery Planning Process
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4.5.3 Insurance
For most businesses that rely heavily on computer processing, an effective disaster
recovery plan is likely the only effective means of ensuring continued business survival
following a major computer-system disruption. However, it is possible to mitigate some of
the financial loss through insurance coverage. Some examples of the kinds of insurance
coverage available include:

• Data processing equipment coverage. These policies assist in defraying the cost of
replacement-computer hardware and air-conditioning equipment. Some policies also
cover the cost of removing the debris from covered equipment.
• Data, computer programs, and media coverage. These policies cover only data and programs
in computer format, not hard copy. Organizations can take out insurance to cover the
estimated potential loss if data and programs are destroyed.
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• Extra expense coverage. These policies cover the extra expenses involved in continuing
data processing operations if the equipment, air conditioning, or building housing the
equipment is damaged.

• Business interruption. These policies cover the business losses incurred following a
disaster in the computer department but are subject to limits on the amount to be paid
per day and a total amount payable.
• Fidelity coverage. These policies may cover costs associated with the unlawful acts of a
dishonest employee. There are various new forms of crime coverage that may extend
cover to certain acts by outsiders as well.

4.5.4 System Recovery for Personal Computers and Servers
Equipment failure for PCs generally is not a major concern for organizations, particularly
compared with similar situations associated with larger computer systems; however,
considering the dependency of many businesses on PCs and local area networks, it should
be given more attention. If a PC fails, normally another machine is available or can be
obtained with relative ease. LAN file servers and the communications gear associated with
connecting LANs to private and public networks, including the Internet, may be highly
specialized and take one or more days to replace and reconfigure. The biggest concerns are
the potential damage to communications facilities that would cause a loss of electronic mail
functions and the loss of data stored on hard disk or diskettes. If the failed system was
running the firewall, loss of a PC server could seriously compromise the security of the
organization’s information.
Good PC and LAN security should be a priority to avoid situations requiring recovery.
However, as noted earlier, disasters do occur. Therefore, a regular policy of backing up
hard disks is advisable. Consider using one of the specialized backup-software packages
that will help you manage the process. Also be aware that computer forensic specialists can,
under some circumstances, help you recover information that has been accidentally or
deliberately lost.

4.6 Management’s Responsibilities in A Security Program
Management is responsible for protecting the organization’s assets against both dishonest
employees and outside criminal acts. The information asset, administered in most
organizations by the information systems or computer department, is as vital and
vulnerable as any other asset. Although many organizations have invested heavily in the
development of computerized systems to support their business operations, they have not
invested sufficient effort to establish a security program that would properly protect that
investment. Computer security is often neglected because of pressures to deal with day-today operating needs first, yet security can be fundamental to business survival.

You can implement effective security by identifying the following:
• The information in your organization that requires protection
• The level of protection currently provided for that information
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• The risks and exposures that currently make that information vulnerable

• The right combination of information security tools and techniques based on your needs
analysis
Using this approach you can achieve a level of security that is appropriate to the
requirements of your organization. The objective is to provide sufficient security without
going overboard and making security more complex than necessary. After taking the steps
outlined in this chapter, your organization can implement a security program to address the
exposures. This program should incorporate the development of policies, standards,
guidelines and procedures, the assignment of security responsibilities and the monitoring of
progress.

4 .6.1 Policy, Standards, Guidelines and Procedures
It is generally unwise to assume that employees will act in a security-conscious manner
particularly if the organization’s expectations in this regard have never been
communicated. Companies can communicate policies through the development and
implementation of policy statements on computer security and should emphasize security
and fraud awareness.

Effective policies must be succinct. If policies are too detailed and lengthy, they probably
will not have the desired effect, especially with junior-level employees. For brevity, simply
cross-reference the more detailed standards rather than attempting to include this material
in the policy statement itself. The policy, standards, guidelines and procedures provide a
framework for effective security in any organization.

Many organizations in consultation with legal counsel have determined that it is important
to have employees sign security and confidentiality agreements that defines the person’s
responsibility for safeguarding information in all forms. Indeed, many organizations have
also developed agreements to be completed by contractors, vendors and temporary
workers who require access to confidential and proprietary information. You should give
careful consideration to implementing a policy calling for employees and others, such as
temporary workers, who have access to your systems to sign these security and
confidentiality agreements on an annual basis, perhaps in conjunction with an annual
review program.

4 .6.2 The Security Function
Having recognized the importance of computer and information security to the
organization, management must assign responsibility for carrying out the duties associated
with this function. The person identified to take on the security function will usually be
responsible for:

• Assisting in the development of policies, standards, and guidelines and procedures.
• Developing a formal security program to improve the level of security in accordance
with management’s expectations.
• Raising security and fraud awareness.
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• Reporting on progress to senior management.
• Remaining in close contact with specialists such as police, forensic accountants,
computer forensics experts, and specialists in computer viruses who can assist in
implementing the program or help in the event of a crisis.
This may be either a full- or part-time responsibility according to the size of the
organization. Initially, setting up the program probably will require a full-time position and
can be aided by outside, experienced assistance. One important function of the person or
team charged with the computer-security function is to check the Internet regularly for new
information about the latest trends in fraud prevention and fraud techniques. Another
specific responsibility is to maintain liaison with the manufacturers of the hardware and
software that is in use within the company to get the latest security “patches” as they are
issued.

4.6.3 Policing
Once the security program is underway and the policy, standards, and guidelines and
procedures are in place, an organization must ensure compliance with expectations on an
ongoing basis. This is a policing function.
Most organizations have an internal audit department that performs the policing function
for controls that operate in other areas of the business. As such, internal audit may be an
ideal candidate to become involved in testing compliance with corporate security
expectations. Alternatively, external auditors or consultants can fill this role. In addition, it
should be remembered that many software packages generate both activity and security
logs. Reviewing the security logs is an important aspect of the policing function.

4.6.4 Evidence Recovery
If a security incident occurs, computer and security personnel may find themselves
pursuing different objectives. In an actual case in which a company’s e-mail servers
suddenly reformatted their hard-disk drives, the computer-operations department saw as its
objective repairing the damage and restoring e-mail services within the company as quickly
as possible. In contrast, the security people regarded the data center as a crime scene and
wanted to collect evidence to determine whether the incident had been a technical accident
or the deliberate act of a perpetrator. The two groups had to work together to ensure that
the technical personnel assigned the task of restoring service and the hastily summoned
outside consultants would understand the importance of identifying any evidence of
wrongdoing and call in the security people to gather and secure the evidence so that it
would be admissible in court.

In cases in which the crime scene is, in fact, the surface of a hard drive, the collection of
evidence becomes critical. As with any other evidence, it is necessary to ensure that the
process of collecting and safeguarding the evidence also preserves that evidence from any
changes. Courts will not turn a blind eye when recovery technicians have made changes
and later claim that the hard drive bears evidence of a crime. Under these circumstances,
how would it be possible to prove that the purported evidence of a crime was not planted
to incriminate an innocent person? In complex or important cases, this task is often
assigned to experts in the field of computer-evidence recovery—a discipline known as
computer forensics.
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4.7

Computer Security Checklist
Table 4.1, “Computer Security Checklist,” is designed to assist CPAs address computer
security in their organizations and those of their clients. Generally, all no answers require
investigation and follow-up. The results should be documented. Use the “Ref" column to
cross-reference the checklist to any additional working papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist
does not guarantee the adequacy of computer security, and it is not intended as a substitute
for audit or similar procedures. If computer security is an especially vital concern or if
computer fraud is suspected, seek the advice of a knowledgeable computer professional.
Table 4.1 Computer Security Checklist
Computer Security Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Physical Security
a. Computer Room: Most medium and larger organizations will
have dedicated computer rooms for their mainframe
computers or file servers. The following are basic questions to
answer when looking at such a facility:
• Are adequate fire detection and suppression systems in place?
For example, does the computer-room construction have a
minimum one-hour fire-resistance rating in addition to smoke
detectors, fire alarms, fire extinguishers, and sprinklers?
• Where sprinkler systems are in use, are adequate systems in
place to protect against water damage? For example, are
there underfloor water detectors, floor drains, and waterproof
equipment covers?
• If power supplies are unreliable or the nature of processing is
critical, are suitable precautions in place? For example, are
there battery-equipped Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS)
or backup generators and surge protectors for PCs?
• Are appropriate environmental controls in place with respect
to temperature, humidity and dust particles?

• Is access to especially sensitive computer installations
appropriately restricted? For example, are there key locks,
combination or cipher locks, or card-access systems along
with access-control policies and procedures?
• Is overall physical computer security on the premises
adequate?

b. PCs and Workstations
• Are PCs and workstations in areas where theft is a threat
secured by cables, locks, or other antitheft devices?
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist

• Are PCs and workstations secured with screen-saver
programs that require passwords to unlock?

Yes

No

NA

Ref

—

• Are computer users prohibited by written policy from
installing unauthorized software including encryption
software on company-provided PCs and notebook
computers?

2. Communications Security

a. Is a user ID and password system or stronger system with one
time passwords or biometric security in place?

b. Are the ID and password systems properly administered? For
example, is the distribution of new IDs controlled and are
terminated users promptly deleted from the system?
c. Does the system have reasonable rules such as password
length, and requirements for numeric and special characters to
prevent users from selecting passwords that are easy to guess
or hack?
d. Are users aware of the responsibilities associated with their
password example? For example, are they required to sign
computer-use and confidentiality agreements and are they
instructed to maintain password secrecy and not to choose
simplistic or easily-guessed passwords?
e. Are passwords changed regularly? For example, every 90
days?
f. Does the system monitor and control use? For example, by
restricting users to specific terminals or specific times,
automatically logging out inactive users, limiting the number of
log-on attempts, and recording all usage for later follow-up and
investigation if required?

g. For especially sensitive systems, is security to control remote
access in place? For example, are there callback devices,
biometric devices, or one-time password devices?

h. Is a person or persons assigned to be responsible for the
security function including a regular check of Internet sources
and contact with vendors for information on fraud prevention
and fraud techniques?
3. Data Security

a. Is access to on-line data limited to authorized individuals
through built-in software restrictions or screening?
b. For extremely sensitive data, has data encryption been
considered as a security measure?
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

c. Are data files including all backups stored on magnetic media
and kept in a physically secure location away from the
computers to which only authorized persons are allowed
access?
d. Are all printed reports subject to appropriate control and
appropriate destruction when no longer required? For
example, are there provisions for shredding?

4. Software Integrity
a. Is access to production versions of all software tightly
controlled by a production librarian or similar authorized
person?
b. Is access to all software programming code controlled so that
programmers or others cannot subsequently alter tested and
approved software?
c. Are appropriate policies in place to guard against computer
viruses? For example, is the installation of any copied or
borrowed software prohibited, and are all software with virus
detection programs screened?

d. Are controls in place to ensure that the organization is not
using unlicensed (pirated) software?
5. Operations Security

a. Do detailed operator instructions or manuals exist?
b. Is computer activity logged and is any unusual operator
activity investigated?

c. Are computer-operations personnel prohibited from altering
the program code and the Job Control Language, which match
the program and data files to be run?
d. Are all software and data storage media clearly and correctly
labeled and dated to avoid errors?

e. Are data files reconciled from run to run?
f. Before they are disposed of, are all data storage media
including hard disk drives erased (wiped clean)?

6. System Recovery

a. Are copies of all data files and software made on a regular
basis? For example, are copies made weekly, with daily
backups of transaction files?
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Are guidelines in place to ensure that all employee work is
saved to the network-server to ensure a complete backup of all
data files?
c. Is at least one backup copy of all data files and software stored
off site?
d. Has training been provided and do written instructions exist
for the disaster recovery procedures?
e. In the case of catastrophic failure, do alternative processing
arrangements exist?

f. Have the backup plans been tested in a realistic simulation to
provide assurance that they can work if needed?
g. Is adequate insurance in place covering computer equipment,
software, recovery expenses, and business interruption?
h. Is there a written contract or agreement in place to provide for
recovery services? For example, use of a replacementcomputer system?
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CHAPTER 5:
Internal Fraud

5.1

Asset Misappropriation from Within
As difficult as it is to believe, many experts are convinced that the worst threat to business
is from the people who work there. Fraud committed against an organization by a
perpetrator from within that organization is probably the most common form of fraud.
Certainly it is the most widely recognized.
It is estimated that at least one-third of all employees steal to some degree. In retail
organizations, shoplifters are responsible for only thirty percent of retail losses; employees
steal the remainder. Probably the worst case of insider misappropriation is the infamous
U.S. Savings and Loan scandal; the billions of dollars stolen by trusted insiders has no equal
in history.

5.1.1 Classification of Fraud
Regardless of the industry, you can classify internal fraud in several different ways. One
way is by the method of concealment, including on-book and off-book frauds.

On-Book Fraud
On-book fraud principally occurs within a business when an employee creates an audit trail
(which is sometimes obscure) that inadvertently aids the employer in detection. Examples
include phony vendors and ghost employees. On-book fraud is normally detected at the
point of payment.

Off-Book Fraud
Off-book fraud occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit trail is likely to
exist. Examples include bribery and kickbacks. If an employee receives a bribe for
selecting a certain vendor, that payment would be made by the vendor and, therefore,
would not be reflected on the books of the affected company. These frauds are detected in
an indirect manner (that is, responding to other vendor complaints, investigating the life
style of the person receiving the bribes, and so on). If you suspect that an employee is
receiving illicit payments, examining the employee’s personal finances should prove this.

5.1.2 Cycles
You can classify fraud occurring within the business environment by one of the five cycles
in the accounting system. These cycles are:
1. Sales and collection
2. Acquisition and payment
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3. Payroll and personnel
4. Inventory and warehousing
5. Capital acquisition and repayment

All of these cycles flow through the cash account. Accordingly, cash misappropriation is
discussed separately in this chapter. The following sections discuss the more common
frauds occurring within each cycle.

5.2 Sales and Collection Cycle
The sales and collection cycle deals with the billing of goods or services to customers’
accounts receivable and the collection of funds relating to those receivables.

5.2.1 Functions
The functions of the sales and collection cycle include:

•
•
•
•
•

Receiving orders from customers

Administering credit approvals
Invoicing customers
Collecting receivables

Adjusting sales and receivables for allowances, returns and write-offs

5.2.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Sales revenue on the income statement and accounts receivable and cash on the balance
sheet are affected by the sales and collection cycle. See Chapter 10 for further information
on reducing the risk of financial statement fraud.

5.2.3 Perpetration
Frauds in the sales and collection cycle most commonly involve the theft of cash, the theft
of other assets, and kickbacks to customers. It can also involve off-book fraud in a situation
described as front-end fraud, that is, when an employee diverts company revenue before
entering it on the books.

Theft of Cash
By far, the most common sales-cycle fraud is the theft of cash. The main schemes include:
not recording sales, under-ringing sales, lapping, theft of funds from voids and returns,
overbilling and keeping the difference, simple theft of cash, writing off receivables as
uncollectible, and issuing bogus credit memoranda.

For example, in one lapping fraud, a cashier was able to misappropriate cash receipts
totaling over $35,000 and cover the shortage by subsequent receipts. The prelisted receipts
were not compared to the deposits by an independent person, allowing the fraud to go
undetected over time. This scheme was eventually discovered as a result of a CPA
following up on the clearing of deposits in transit listed on the year-end bank
reconciliation.

4
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Theft of Other Assets
These schemes include ordering and shipping company goods to the residence of the
employee, and ordering goods for personal use.
Kickbacks to Customers
The most common schemes for kickbacks to customers include underbilling for
merchandise and splitting the difference, and writing off receivables owed to the company
for a fee.

Front-End Fraud
A front-end fraud occurs when a company’s customers are improperly directed to take their
business elsewhere, thereby depriving the company of profits it could otherwise have made.
Another example is the receipt of a purchase rebate that is misappropriated and not
deposited to the company’s bank account.

5.2.4 Detection
Generally, CPAs can best detect frauds in the sales and collection cycle by analyzing cash
or inventory, or both.

Theft of Cash and Front-End Fraud
Following are some methods for detecting the theft of cash and front-end fraud:

• Investigate customer complaints.
• Insist that customers examine receipts.

• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices.
• Compare receipts with deposits.
• Follow up on deposits in transit at the end of each period.

• Account for consecutive sales orders and cash register transactions.
• Compare volume of credit memos by period.
• Verify independently customers who don’t pay.
• Examine gross margin by product.

• Use a computer to—
— Identify missing invoices by number.
— Match shipping documents, sales invoices and customer orders.
— Verify numerical sequence of documents.
— Analyze sales volume by employee.
— Match daily deposits with customer credits.

For example, in one fraud case, a CPA for a retail client noted a skip in the perpetual
transaction count for one of the cash registers. During a one-year period an employee had
destroyed sections of cash register tapes totaling $17,000. The irregularity was directly
related to the company’s failure to institute and maintain adequate internal controls and
procedures over cash register tapes.
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Theft of Other Assets
You can detect theft of other assets by using the following methods:

• Resolve customer disputes.
• Conduct periodic surprise inventory counts.
• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices, including examining the shipping address.
• Use a computer to—
— Match sales invoices with customer orders.

— Compare customer names and addresses with employee names and addresses.
— Verify delivery addresses against addresses of customers.
Kickbacks to Customers
You can use one or a combination of the following to detect the common schemes in
kickbacks to customers:

• Follow up on customer disputes.
• Conduct statistical sampling of sales invoices by contacting customers regarding prices
and terms.
• Conduct computer analysis of—
— Prices charged by product to customer.
— Credit granting approval versus actual sales to customers.
— Customer balances versus sales.
— Customer balances versus length of time doing business with the customer.

— Receivable write-offs.
— Credit memos to customers.
— Time between order and delivery.
— Discounts to customers in descending volume of purchase.

5.2.5 Prevention
Employers can generally prevent sales and collection frauds by using adequate internal
controls. More specifically, the following methods typically form part of an overall
prevention strategy:

•
•
•
•
•
•
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Honesty testing
Separation of duties
Physical safeguards over assets
Proper documentation
Proper approvals
Independent checks on performance
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Honesty Testing
The legality of using certain kinds of honesty testing as part of the hiring process varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, since the advent of the U.S. Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, generally it has been unlawful to require preemployment
polygraphs of prospective employees. A number of companies have turned to pencil and
paper honesty tests, which their designers tout as accurate.

Separation of Duties
Employers can prevent most frauds by properly segregating the custody, authorization, and
record-keeping functions. In the case of sales and collections, it is important to separate the
functions of credit granting and sales. In addition, the functions of sales, record keeping,
and cash handling should also be separate.

Physical Safeguards over Assets
If assets and records have physical safeguards, misappropriation is much more difficult. In
the area of computers, physical safeguards such as restricted access, locks, and similar
controls are especially important.

Proper Documentation
Proper documentation requires adequate records, including prenumbered checks and
invoices, to make fictitious entries more difficult. Documentation in sales and collections
should include the following prenumbered documents:
• Sales orders
• Shipping documents
• Sales invoices
• Credit memos
• Remittance advices

Proper Approvals
Approval should be sought and evidenced before each of the following:

1. Granting credit

2. Allowing write-offs
3. Shipping goods

Independent Checks on Performance
In addition to a necessary independent review of employee adherence to internal controls,
you should make the potential perpetrators aware that their performance is being
monitored. Independent verification steps include reconciling bank accounts, audits and
supervision.
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5.2.6 Sales, Receivables and Receipts System
The sales, receivables and receipts system is the part of the accounting system that records a
company’s sales and revenue collections. Individuals can use false books and supporting
documentation for sales, receivables and receipts to perpetrate a fraud on a company. This
section covers three such methods:

1. Front-end fraud

2. False sales invoices
3. Lapping

Front-End Fraud
As discussed in section 5.2.3, employees may divert company revenues before that money
ever reaches the sales, receivables and receipts system, thus circumventing the accounting
system entirely. This is commonly called front-end fraud.

A front-end fraud occurs when company products are sold for cash, the sale and the receipt
of the cash are not recorded, and the cash is diverted—usually, directly into the pocket of
the perpetrator. A front-end fraud also occurs when a company’s customers are improperly
directed to take their business elsewhere, thus depriving the company of profits. Finally, a
front-end fraud occurs when an employee receives and misappropriates special or unusual
revenues and cost reductions, such as a purchase rebate.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are:

1. Do recorded sales represent all company sales? Where no sale has been recorded, there
is nothing in the sales accounting system to red-flag an unpaid or overdue account. As a
result, unrecorded sales are difficult to detect; however, actual inventory on hand has
been depleted. Therefore, if the company has a good inventory accounting system,
unrecorded sales may be detected.
2. Has the company unexpectedly lost some of its oldest and best customers?
3. Are all revenues recorded? Service businesses, such as parking lots, theatres and movie
houses operate primarily with cash sales and have no inventory systems. Front-end
frauds in these kinds of businesses, therefore, are extremely difficult to detect.
When allowed under local law, a review of a suspected perpetrator’s personal bank
accounts may reveal unexplained cash deposits, which could be important in establishing
circumstantial evidence of front-end cash skimming. Otherwise use of the net worth
approach may be necessary to establish that the suspected perpetrator has benefited.

Investigators should analyze the sales records and other supporting documents of the victim
company for the period both before and after the assumed occurrence date of a front-end
fraud. When possible, the investigators should interview customers as well.

8

Chapter Five: Internal Fraud

“Taxes ‘R Us” Case Study

Jane Brown and Jack Smith were cashiers who worked at a county tax office.
Investigation revealed that, over a two-month period in 1997, thirteen individuals
apparently paid tax for vehicle tags and did not receive an official receipt.
On a review of all the official receipts issued during this period of time it was found
that:

1. The numerical continuity of the prenumbered receipts was complete; that is, all
of the issued receipts were accounted for in the bureau’s records.
2. There were no receipts to support the thirteen payments made by those
individuals identified as exceptions.

The county tax office’s banking records were then reviewed for the days on which
people reportedly paid for their tags but did not receive a receipt. The review
disclosed that the amount of cash and checks relating to the tax deposited to the
county bank account totaled only the amount of receipts issued for that date.
Five of the individuals who reportedly paid for their tags, but were not issued an
official receipt, paid by check. In the case of each of these five individuals, the
checks were deposited to the county bank account, but the checks, upon deposit,
were applied to cover actual receipts issued. With respect to those individuals who
were known to have paid for their tags by check, but who did not receive an official
receipt, it was noted that a like amount was included on the county tax office
deposit slip.

During the same period, cash totaling $4,600 was deposited to the known bank
accounts ofJane Brown. The source of that deposited cash was not identified.

Front-end fraud of this type is very difficult to detect. Larger frauds may be uncovered if the
perpetrators become too greedy because the resulting unusually low daily deposits may
highlight the problem. In fact, skimming of small amounts may be detected only through
customer complaints: as in the case study, by the lack of an official receipt. This illustrates
the need to thoroughly investigate similar complaints and any other irregularities.

False Sales Invoices
Employees can alter a company sales invoice to show a lower sale amount than what was
actually received. They can misappropriate the difference between the real sale amount and
the adjusted lower amount without the accounting system showing a redflag.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud include:

1. Are recorded sales amounts the actual sales amounts?
2. Can customers confirm the sales?
3. Are sale amounts reasonable in the circumstances?
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Investigators should obtain and examine all original copies of invoices and all the related
books of original entry. Again, the investigator must become familiar with the accounting
system in effect and understand the accused’s position within that system. Did the accused
have the necessary authority to perpetrate this crime? Did the accused have the
opportunity?

“Ms. Wanda Cash” Case Study
Wanda Cash was the bookkeeper for Anytown Animal Center. She looked after all
customer records including preparing bills and collecting payments. The owners of
the business became suspicious when daily bank deposits were not as high as
expected considering the level of business. Upon investigation by the owners, the
police and forensic accountants, it was discovered that Wanda Cash, through
altering sales invoices, had misappropriated approximately $11,700.
The investigation revealed that:

1. The 183 customer copies of sales invoices showed a total-charge amount higher
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash receipts journal. The customer
copy of sales invoices indicated total charges to be higher by $2,579 than the
amount recorded in the cash receipts journal.
2. The 549 office copies of the sales invoices indicated a total-charge amount higher
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash-receipts journal. The office
copy total-charge amount was higher by $8,941 than the amount recorded in the
cash-receipts journal.
3. Approximately 68 office-copy invoices were apparently altered so that the total
charge after alteration balanced with the total charge recorded in the cash
receipts journal.

To uncover this fraud and measure its magnitude, investigators compared the
following:
• Customer copies of invoices obtained by the investigating officer
• Office or accounting copies of the company’s sales invoices
• Entries in the customer ledger cards and the cash-receipts journal

The result was that the amount of the total charge on the customer copies of sales
invoices exceeded the amount of the total charge recorded in the cash-receipts
journal by an aggregate amount of $2,579. An examination of these documents
disclosed that in 54 separate cases the corresponding office copy of the invoice was
altered so that the altered amount agreed to the total-charge amount recorded in the
cash-receipts journal.
Investigators compared the office copies of the sales invoices with the total charge
recorded for those invoices in the cash-receipts journal and found that the total
charge amount on the office copy exceeded the total charge amount recorded in the
cash receipts journal. In aggregate, the excess was $8,941.
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This case illustrates the need for close supervision in small businesses, in which adequate
division of duties is difficult to achieve.
Lapping

Lapping occurs when cash receipts from Customer A are misappropriated and the
misappropriation is subsequently concealed by recording the receipt of monies from
Customer B to the credit of Customer A (to the extent of the earlier misappropriation).

The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are as follows:
1. Are the amounts recorded as owing to the company actually still owing to the company?
2. Are deposits from Peter being used to cover Paul’s debts?

To handle these questions, the investigator should understand the organization’s system for
receiving customer payments, making bank deposits, and preparing entries to customer
accounts. The following is a guide to understanding an organization’s account management.

1. Who first received the payments?
2. Who prepared the company bank deposit?

3. Who updated the customer accounts?
4. Has an individual written offany accounts?
5. Who approved the write-offs? (It is also often necessary to contact customers and obtain
their records of payments, including paid checks and remittance advices.)
6. Do the customer’s records show payment of specific invoices that are shown as unpaid
in the victim company’s records?

“Ms. B. A. Lapper” Case Study

Jones Transport Company operated a trucking terminal in Norcross, GA. Their
accounts receivable clerk, Ms. B.A. Lapper, had been a loyal employee for over
eight years. The terminal manager often complimented her for the extra effort she
put into the business, evidenced by the amount of work she frequently took home.
This employee was so loyal that her only time off was attributable to sickness.

Ms. Lapper was responsible for preparing the day’s deposit to the bank and for
preparing input to the computer systems for updating payments on accounts
receivable. (The processing of the sales invoice as an account receivable was outside
her control.) Every month the head office in Atlanta forwarded aged listings of
accounts receivable to the manager’s attention at the terminal. He gave the analysis
to the accounts receivable clerk—Ms. Lapper—satisfied that the aged analysis was
relatively current.

Investigators determined that Ms. Lapper had conducted a lapping scheme over a
period of six years. The lap grew so large during this period that she had to take the
aged receivable analysis home in the evenings, along with the paid and unpaid sales
invoices. There, she would set aside invoices for payment during the next day to
ensure a favorable aged receivable analysis in the following month. As the lap grew,

11

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

the new cash receipts were no longer sufficient to cover the previously
misappropriated funds. Accordingly, Ms. Lapper began to apply checks received
from the larger customers of the company to cover up the already-paid sales
invoices.

Investigators examined the known personal bank accounts of the accused and her
husband. An amount of $35,000 was found deposited to these bank accounts over
and above personal income during the relevant period.
Accounts Receivable Routines: Ms. Lapper’s main function each day was to
balance the cash with the pro-bills (sales invoices) and prepare a cash deposit for the
bank in Norcross and a cash report for processing by the head-office computer. She
would process all incoming checks from charge account customers by matching
checks to the applicable pro-bill control copies and preparing a deposit for the bank
in Norcross and a receivable report for the head office. She would present the
deposit slips and receivable reports to the manager for his signature, along with the
customer’s checks and cash in an envelope.

The supporting documents were always in sealed and stapled envelopes for each
report. The envelopes were not opened and verified by the manager. If the total of
the bank deposit agreed with the total of the receivable report, he would sign the
report. One copy of the report, the bank deposit slip, and pro-bills were then
forwarded to the Atlanta head office, while a second copy of the report and the
remittance copies of pro-bills were retained on file at the Norcross terminal.
Ms. Lapper would work on the company’s Accounts Receivable Aged Analysis, a listing
of all outstanding pro-bills prepared at the Atlanta head office, and would appear to
question certain delinquent accounts for payment. She would often take the analysis
home because she said she was too busy during the day to perform this function.

The Atlanta terminal manager would look at the receivable analysis printout and
tell Ms. Lapper to question certain delinquent customer accounts, which she
appeared to do. She would inform the manager of checks arriving after her contacts
with the customer. For instance, in regard to the Best Quality Cheese account, she
informed the manager that Best Quality was having serious problems converting to
a computer accounting system and as a result had requested that Jones Transport be
patient with the amount of old outstanding receivables.

Jones Transport hired a new person to replace Ms. Lapper when she became
seriously ill. Her replacement began the collection work on the two largest charge
account customers, Best Quality Cheese and Anyco Inc. Successful collection of
these accounts would immediately reduce the analysis’ sixty- and ninety-day totals,
which had become very high.
Customer Best Quality: Best Quality was advised that their pro-bills dated July
and August were still outstanding on the receivable analysis. Ms. Brown asked Best
Quality if they were having computer problems and the response was negative.
Subsequently Best Quality informed Jones Transport that the pro-bills mentioned as
outstanding were all paid by checks issued in July and August.
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Jones Transport then examined copies of the reports around the dates of the Best
Quality checks, together with check stubs and supporting pro-bills. Although the
pro-bills that were paid with the Best Quality checks were all Best Quality, all were
dated April and May. Jones Transport wondered if Best Quality had made an error,
because their August check, which was paying July and August pro-bills, did not
appear to apply to the pro-bills in the deposit that were all dated May and June.
Best Quality responded that there was no error on their part, and they could not
understand how there could be a mistake because they had attached all the
applicable pro-bills with their remittances.
Customer Anyco: Jones Transport then called Anyco Inc. and asked when they
would be paying certain outstanding pro-bills. Anyco indicated that these bills had
been paid by checks that had been issued and received as paid. When Jones
Transport checked their copies of the reports, they found that Anyco checks were
deposited, but that the checks were applied to older Anyco pro-bills and other
customer pro-bills and not to the pro-bills submitted by Anyco with its checks.

The outstanding pro-bills totaled about $47,000 at Best Quality and about $12,000
at Anyco. At this point Jones Transport recognized that the customer checks were
not applied to the pro-bills as intended by the customer. Instead the checks were
applied either to the customer’s older pro-bills or to other customers’ pro-bills.
Further investigation revealed that these other customers were normally cash
paying customers.

Examination of the Amount of Money Due Jones Transport: To determine the
correct amount of money owing to them by all their customers, Jones Transport
communicated directly with each customer, based on their accounts receivable
analysis. For each customer, Jones Transport prepared from their analysis a list of
pro-bills by number, date, and amount that the customers had not paid and
requested verification that the information concerning the outstanding pro-bills was
accurate.
A reply made by all customers indicated that several pro-bills shown in the analysis
of Jones Transport were, in fact, paid and were, therefore, not outstanding. This
finding confirmed the evidence of the samples and the discussion by Jones
Transport with both Best Quality and Anyco, that a customer’s check was applied
not to his current pro-bills as intended by the customer, but rather to a combination
of the customer’s older pro-bills and other customer’s pro-bills that had been paid in
cash.
From the information provided by the customers, the investigators determined that
the dollar value of the pro-bills, which had been paid by these customers, was
$115,132.

Jones Transport fell victim to a fraudulent scheme commonly called lapping. Cash
and checks were received at the Hamilton terminal of Jones Transport and
controlled by Ms. Lapper. The cash was removed from Jones Transport while the
checks were applied to the pro-bills that were to have been paid by the cash.
Consequently, the pro-bills remitted with the checks remained outstanding on the
accounts-receivable analysis published at the end of each month.
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As a result, the amount of the outstanding pro-bills, which Jones Transport found
through direct communication with their customers to have been paid, represented
that amount of the cash that had been misappropriated over the time period under
investigation, that is, $115,132.

Victims most often detect lapping frauds through accounts-receivable reconciliations or
confirmations, or both. Supervision is also important. Organizations can prevent lapping by
appropriately dividing duties (for example, assigning someone other than the accounts
receivable clerk the duty of handling cash receipts). You should also consider establishing a
policy of mandatory vacations, which could be helpful.
5.3 Acquisition and Payment Cycle

The acquisition and payment cycle includes the procurement and payment of all goods and
services except for payroll and capital acquisitions. This cycle is especially vulnerable to
fraudulent transactions because this is the point where funds flow out of an entity.

5.3.1 Functions
The functions of the acquisition and payment cycle include:

• Processing purchase orders and dealing with vendors.
• Receiving and recording goods and services.
• Accounting for the liability of items or services purchased.
• Processing and recording cash disbursements.

5.3.2 Financial Statements Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment cycle:
• Cash
• Inventories

• Prepaid expenses
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Buildings
Equipment
Accumulated depreciation
Accounts payable
Deferred taxes
Other payables
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Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment
cycle:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Cost of goods sold
Advertising expenses
Travel and entertainment expenses
Miscellaneous expenses
Income tax expenses
Professional fees

All expense accounts
Gains and losses on sales of assets

5.3.3 Perpetration
By far the most common fraud in the acquisition and payment cycle involves the
purchasing agent (buyer), who is especially vulnerable to the temptation of accepting
kickbacks and gifts from outside vendors.

One study revealed that companies who caught employees accepting small gifts were
hesitant to discharge their employees. Two percent suspended the employees, while only
12 percent fired them. Sixty-six percent reprimanded the employees and made them return
the gifts.
There are three general kinds of acquisition and payment-cycle frauds:
1. The buyer-employee acts alone, and without outside assistance.
2. The vendor acts alone.
3. The buyer acts in collusion with the vendor. As is the case with other methods of
prevention and detection, the collusion between both parties is the most difficult to
prevent and detect.

Buyer Acting Alone
Noncollusive purchasing frauds usually involve the use of a nominee entity, commonly
called a shell company, that is, an apparent third party owned by the buyer. Examples
include the use of a nominee entity to submit fictitious invoices (the most common fraud),
or to order goods for personal use.
Shell company schemes can be quite sophisticated using bank accounts, corporate filings,
and mail drops to assist in the fraud. One common shell company failing is using a post
office box rather than a street address. The post office box address has come to be
recognized as a red flag.

In one case, a 61-year-old employee of a major department store was indicted for allegedly
stealing $2 million from the company. His responsibilities included leasing buildings to
house the retailer’s stores. On twenty-two leases over a two-year period, through a nominee
company, he altered leases to receive overpayments, and forged invoices billing the
company for fictitious legal and building services.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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In another example, an executive was indicted for defrauding a large cosmetics company
of $1.1 million over four years. During this period, he allegedly approved more than 150
vendor invoices for services that were never rendered in connection with a newsletter the
company was going to publish. The executive (whose salary was $124,000 per year) helped
set up two nominee printing companies, which bilked his employer with the fraudulent
invoices.
Finally, a director of customer-service technology was able to defraud his employer of over
$2 million in one year by taking advantage of defects in internal control. The fraudster set
up a legitimate agreement with a legitimate vendor to provide certain equipment. Then he
set up a fake distributorship and told the vendor the company would purchase only from
this one distributor. The vendor was content to have the business and proceeded to invoice
the distributor. The fraudster, through his nominee distributorship, then inflated the
invoices and billed them to his employer. The fraud was possible because the employee
had the authority to set up the agreement, and to approve invoices for payment. The fraud
was discovered by a manager who thought it was strange that the employee was delivering
the invoices to accounts payable by hand.

Buyer and Vendor in Collusion
Nearly all collusion between buyer and vendor involves some form of secret commission
or kickback from the vendor to the buyer. In these cases, secret benefits are given by a
vendor in order to buy business, or are requested by the buyer for direct financial benefit.
Collusion fraud often involves more than one kind of scheme perpetrated over time. Of
course, there is always the question of who took the initiative, that is, the buyer or the
vendor.

For example, one case started out involving inferior goods and later graduated to inflated
invoices. A county purchasing agent was responsible for acquiring a long list of janitorial
supplies, including mops, pails, soap, plywood, rakes, and paper goods. Area paper
jobbers—experienced connivers—approached the purchasing agent with a deal. “Without
changing our invoice price,” they told him, “if you agree, we can deliver a cheaper brand
of paper towels. Half the extra is for us; the other half is for you.” Once the purchasing
agent accepted a lesser brand, the vendor began squeezing for more by raising the price on
the invoice and billing for five times the amount of merchandise actually shipped.
Monetary payments are not the only benefit that can be offered. Other common ways of
corrupting a buyer include products or services; gifts, trips, or sex; promises of subsequent
employment; reduced prices for personal items; and employment of friends or relatives.

Vendor Acting Alone
Common schemes used by vendors include product substitutions, billing for work not
performed or services not provided, undershipping, padding overhead charges, and
courtesy billings.

5.3.4 Detection
Because of the difficulty of detection, fraud awareness and prevention is the best policy,
that is, know your vendors, and have an effective tendering process for all contracts. Fraud
in procurement contracts always poses special problems, and detection is difficult.
Common red flags include sole source contracts, unhappy purchasing agents, significant
price changes or changed orders (especially after a contract is awarded), and vendor
complaints.
16
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In one case detected through vendor complaints, a buyer with six years’ seniority obtained
purchase requisitions from various departments at his plant. He then created a nominee
company and placed orders with this firm. The nominee company would place real orders
with a legitimate vendor and have them ship the merchandise to his employer. The
merchandise would be billed through the buyer’s company at 150 percent of the real
amount. The scheme was unraveled when the buyer failed to pay one of the vendors, who
then complained to the buyer’s employer.

Sometimes you can also detect schemes through a computer analysis of the following:

•
•
•
•
•

Timing of bids
Patterns of bids
Amount of work performed by vendors
Patterns of hiring new vendors
Vendors with post-office-box addresses

In an example involving post-office-box addresses, a junior buyer, who had been with his
company for two years, created five nominee companies that he then placed on an
approved vendor list. Thereafter, he did business with these phony companies, placing
various orders with them. The scheme was unraveled when the auditors noticed that these
particular vendors all had post-office boxes for addresses and were not listed in the
telephone book. The amount of money lost was in excess of $250,000 over a period of
more than a year.

If you suspect that a buyer and vendor are in collusion, consider the following items:
•
•
•
•
•

Assessment of the tender process, if any
Patterns of business and bids
Noncompetitive pricing
Products of inferior quality
Buying unnecessary goods or services

• Lack of competitive bidding

5.3.5 Prevention—Key Controls
As previously noted, prevention of procurement fraud can be achieved best through fraud
awareness, effective tendering and budgeting, and knowledge of your vendors. Other
prevention controls include proper documentation, approvals, and segregation of duties.

Proper documentation includes prenumbered purchase requisitions, purchase orders,
receiving reports, and checks. Proper approvals should include detailed background
information on the vendor; ideally, purchase contracts should include a right-of-auditaccess clause to the vendor’s books. In addition, conduct both irregularly scheduled audits
of the purchasing function as well as assessments of the performance and happiness of the
purchasing agent.

5.3.6 Prevention—Policies
Organizations should have established prevention and detection policies. The following are
some policies to consider implementing.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Accepting Gifts
The following is a sample policy statement covering the acceptance of gifts and gratuities:

“Employees, and members of their immediate families, should not accept gifts,
favors or entertainment that might create or appear to create a favored position
for someone doing business with the company. Advertising novelties or trinkets
are not considered as gifts and are excluded from these restrictions.
Gifts that are received by an employee should be returned to the donor and may
be accompanied with a copy of this policy. Perishable gifts should be donated to
a charitable organization and the donor notified of the action taken.

It is not the intent of this policy to preclude the acceptance by the company’s
employees of occasional meals or refreshments that are provided in the normal
course of business-work relationships, with other individuals. Discretion must be
used, however, in the limited acceptance of meals, refreshments or incidental
hospitality to avoid situations that could create a conflict of interest or appear to
do so.”

Providing Gifts
The following is a sample policy statement covering the giving of gifts:

“Occasionally, it may be appropriate for employees, acting for the company, to
provide people outside the company with promotional items, meals, refreshments,
transportation, lodgings or incidental hospitality. Expenditures for such purposes
should be moderate and should be done only within the framework of good taste. All
expenditures are subject to the overall company policy that an employee shall avoid
constituting improper influence over others.”

Use of Hotlines
You should study the feasibility of installing hotlines to monitor complaints by employees
and other vendors. Make sure the hotline staff is not associated with either the purchasing
or payment functions. Failure to take this precaution could result in the fraudster receiving
the whistle blower’s call.

Disposition of Materials
The purchasing department normally should not be in charge of disposing of obsolete
inventory, scrap, or fixed assets.

Rotation ofJobs
Rotate buyers frequently within a department to keep them from getting too close to
vendors. In addition, enforce a mandatory vacation policy.

Competition in Bidding
Ensure that bidding policies and procedures are thoroughly reviewed. Whenever possible,
enforce competitive bidding.

Compensation of Buyers
Buyers should be well paid to reduce the motives and rationalizations for fraud.
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5.3.7 Purchasing, Payables and Collection Systems
The purchasing, payables, and collection systems are part of the accounting systems that
record a company’s purchases and expense payments. Employees can falsify books and
supporting documentation for purchases, payables and collections to perpetrate a fraud on
their employing company. This section covers three categories of perpetrating fraud:
1. False expense reports
2. False supplier invoices
3. Other false information

False Expense Reports
Expense reports prepared and submitted to the company for payment are false if they
include any of the following:

• Overstated items
• Fictitious items
• Duplicate items
An employee could use a company credit card for personal items. If the company pays the
entire amount of an employee’s account, that employee may be committing a fraud.
Ultimately, the answer depends on the first accountability for the disbursements.
Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:

1. Is the expense item an allowable business-related expense? It is necessary to determine
the company’s policy regarding allowable business expenses.
2. Is the expense amount the actual amount incurred? It is necessary to obtain the
suppliers’ copies of the original expense vouchers and compare them with those
submitted in support of the expense report.

3. Is the expense ultimately charged directly to the business? If yes, is there evidence of
any reimbursement?
It is also necessary to understand the approval and payment system in effect. Who
approved the expense reports? How were the expense reports categorized in the accounting
records? Were the expense reports adjusted at a later date to reflect those items of a
personal nature? Was there any pattern in the submission, approval or recording (or any
combination thereof) of the fraudulent expense reports?

“Manny Miles” Case Study

Manny Miles had been the Business Administrator and Secretary-Treasurer for The
County Hospital since shortly after it was formed in 1983. In addition to overseeing
the administration of the hospital and its 145 employees, Miles’ duties included
preparing budgets. He had check-signing authority and payment approval for the
hospital’s annual budget of about $5 million.
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The governing body of the hospital consisted of a board comprised of twelve
members; eight were elected and four were appointed as representatives of the
county. In 1993, the board members hired Dr. Jane Wilson as Medical Officer.
Almost immediately Miles and Wilson developed a severe personality conflict;
accusations and negative feedback caused a division between the personnel of the
hospital and members of the board. Attempts to terminate Dr. Wilson’s services
failed due to the intervention of the hospital board members on her behalf. The
hospital conducted studies to improve conditions but never implemented any
recommendations.

In mid-1996, during its audit, the auditors found irregularities in travel claims
submitted by Manny Miles, and the hospital referred the matter to the police for
investigation. In December 1996, and January 1997, the police executed search
warrants not only on the hospital but also on the residence of Manny Miles. They
seized the hospital’s financial records along with Miles’ personal banking records.
Examination of the records revealed that from 1993 to 1996, Miles had continually
made claims for travel expenses while using a hospital car. Additionally, he claimed
mileage from both the hospital and the county for the same trips. Furthermore
Miles had used his hospital credit card to repair his own vehicle and purchase
numerous personal items, including restaurant meals on weekends, when he was
not working. The card was in Miles’ name but the hospital paid the bills.
As business administrator, Miles could approve his own expenditures and authorize
the checks. To conceal his spending, Miles had authorized the listing of these
expenditures in the hospital’s financial records under other categories. Invoices
were missing for some checks issued and for credit-card expenditures. The financial
records of the hospital did not show any reimbursement by Miles to cover the vast
majority of his personal purchases, although on several occasions he had made
restitution for small purchases on the hospital card.

The Manny Miles case shows that independent approval and division of duties is essential
in the payment of all travel claims and other expenses. Employees should not be able to
approve their own expense reports. In addition, check signers should not be the same
people approving expense reports.
False Supplier Invoices
Suppliers’ invoices prepared and submitted for payment to the company are false if either:

1. No goods have been delivered or services rendered
2. The quantity or value (or both) of the goods are inflated
The delivery of goods or services to a location other than a business location (for the use
and benefit of the perpetrator) is a common technique, as is the payment to a friendly
supplier when no goods or services were actually provided. Payments of inflated amounts
to suppliers often reflect the existence of secret commissions.
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Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:

1. Were goods and services actually provided? Find out, first, whether the supplier
company actually exists and next, whether any goods or services were in fact provided.
If they were provided, determine to whom.
2. Did the company receive the benefit? It is often necessary to obtain the bills of lading,
that is, the freight companies’ proof-of-delivery slip, to confirm where the goods and
services were delivered.
3. What was the approval and payment system? As with false expense reports, you should
understand the approval and payment system.

“Credit To You Inc.” Case Study
In January 1993, Jones and Smith signed an agreement to start Smith Construction,
a business that primarily consisted of erecting service stations. It was agreed that
Smith would provide the financing while, for a salary of $600 per week plus
expenses, Jones would manage and operate the business. Smith and Jones were to
share equally any profits from the business. The business progressed well and
showed a profit for the first three years.

Smith did not take an active part in the construction business, as he continued to
operate his own plastering company. Smith Construction operated as a division of
Smith Plastering Corp. Smith initially invested $42,000 as capital to start the
construction business, and as sole signing officer, would attend the Smith
Construction office regularly to sign checks, some of which were blank when
signed.

Jones tendered and obtained contracts, hired subcontractors, hired and fired
employees and purchased the goods necessary to operate the business, without
interference from Smith. Jones could also purchase material he required for himself
through the construction business and charge these amounts to himself on the
business books as a form of salary.
Smith was aware that over the years Jones had erected a bam on his farm,
renovated other buildings including his residence, and continued to operate the
farm. Jones informed Smith that he had obtained a grant from the government of
$300,000 to finance these endeavors.

In 1998, Smith Construction had difficulty paying its suppliers (creditors) and was
eventually forced into bankruptcy by creditors in June 1998. The company’s debts
exceeded $300,000. Jones gave no explanation for the shortage of funds except to
say that he had miscalculated the actual cost of various construction jobs. An
examination of Smith Construction’s books, canceled checks and available
supporting documentation revealed that Jones had defrauded Smith Construction
of $861,000 by various means.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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As general manager, Jones was responsible for the day-to-day operations and in this
capacity, he was afforded a degree of trust. At the same time, Smith, the absentee
owner, retained signing authority over all checks and, thus, thought he had control
over all policy decisions.

In his private life as a farmer, Jones incurred debts with suppliers who also dealt
with him as general manager of Smith Construction. Jones personally owed one of
these suppliers, Credit To You Inc., more than $25,000. In June 1997, Jones
purchased a $12.30 item, documented by the supplier invoice made out in pencil.
Later, the penciled information on this invoice was erased. Information was typed
onto the invoice, indicating instead that the company, Smith Construction, had
purchased $9,500 worth of material for a job then in progress. On the strength of
this typed document, Smith signed a check for $9,500 to the supplier, believing, of
course, that the disbursement was for the benefit of Smith Construction. When the
supplier received the check, on Jones’ instructions, he credited Jones’ personal
account, reducing the debt to $15,500. This altered document was the prelude to a
fraud of more than $861,000.
The alteration of documents (erasures, stricken information, or both) is at times the
only indication of a fraud as it can disclose a change of mind (intent) by the person
making the entry. Such alterations frequently occur in the earlier stages of a fraud as
the perpetrator has yet to perfect the scheme.
Acme Products Inc. invoiced Smith Construction for the sale of roof trusses, with
delivery scheduled for a gas station being built by Smith Construction. However, a
description of the route to Jones’ farm appeared on the back of the invoice. The
building of Jones’ barn required roof trusses. A review of the bill of lading
confirmed the redirection.

Investigators can also review delivery instructions as another technique for identifying
fraudulent transactions.

Other False Information
A business receives vast amounts of information, and subject to the existing systems of
internal control, relies on it in making decisions, initiating, executing and recording
transactions. If this information is false, a business can be deceived, resulting in deprivation
of some sort and hence the company is put at economic risk.

Examples of false information that businesses may rely on include:
• False financial statements (See Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement
fraud.)
• Overstated accounts receivable listings
• Overstated statements of income and net worth
• False general journal entries
• Altered internal company records
• Fictitious customer credit information
• False asset valuations
22
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Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Is the summary information presented (accounts receivable listings, financial statements)
consistent with the underlying books and records, and are the real assets on hand? It is
necessary to determine the representation made by the person or entity under
investigation and the understanding reached between that person or entity and the
victim. Once accomplished, you can examine the books and records supporting the
summary financial information in question from the appropriate perspective.
2. Have the correct authorities properly approved entries in the general ledger? Are the
entries appropriate and consistent with the facts?

3. Can customers confirm transactions?
To address the second and third questions above, you should understand the accounting
systems in effect. Also, you should contact third parties to review and discuss with them
their books and records, and then compare that information to the victim’s information.

“Ms. I. O. Much” Case Study

Ms. I.O. Much was the office manager of Anyco Inc. from May 1995 to May 1998.
As office manager, Ms. Much, together with the general manager and president of
the company, had check-signing authority for the company payroll account.

While Ms. Much was office manager, the company’s auditors frequently had
difficulty completing their audit work primarily because of the poorly maintained
books and records. Finally, Ms. Much was replaced with a new office manager, who
found irregularities in the company’s bank reconciliations. After the company,
police, and forensic accountants completed an investigation, they determined that
I.O. Much received unauthorized payments from the company totaling at least
$11,195. These payments were covered up in a variety of ways.
After examining banking records for the payroll account of Anyco Inc.,
investigators noted all checks payable to the order of I.O. Much. They found that
eight checks totaling $9,126 were paid to I.O. Much but were not recorded in the
payroll journal.
June 15, 1997: A check dated June 15, 1997, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to
I.O. Much but not recorded. Attached to the December bank statement was a note
dated June 15, 1997, which stated, “This is to certify that I.O. Much received a loan
of $2,500 from Anyco Limited to be repaid before the end of the year.” The bottom
of the note had a legend stating “paid Dec. 28/97.” It appeared that no record had
been made of this apparent loan transaction until December 1997.
A review of relevant accounting records disclosed that on December 28, 1997, a
deposit of $2,500 was made to the Anyco general bank account. The deposit slip for
this $2,500 showed that the deposit consisted of three checks, as follows: $350,
$178, and $1,971. The sources of the three checks noted on the deposit slip
appeared to be as follows:
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1. William Smith—$350: A check was issued to Anyco on the account of William Smith,
dated September 8, 1997. The current office manager at Anyco stated that this check
was a repayment to Anyco as a result of an over-advance of funds to Smith, an Anyco
employee.

2. Anybank—$178: A check was issued from Anybank to Anyco Limited.
3. Bank draft—$1,971: The check was a bank draft purchased from Otherbank. When this
deposit was recorded in Anyco’s records, someone apparently recorded it as a reduction
of the company loan to I.O. Much. This loan was reflected in the books as having been
advanced and repaid in the same month, that is, December 1997.
March 1, 1998: A check dated March 1, 1998, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to
I.O. Much but not recorded in the payroll journal. It appeared that a journal entry
was prepared to record this check. This journal entry suggested that the $2,500 was
paid with respect to five different accounts as follows:

1. Account #99-6, salespeople’s salaries, Boston
2. Account #99-2, salespeople’s salaries, Dallas
3. Account #99-7, salespeople’s salaries, Washington, D.C.
4. Account #199-12, delivery salaries, New York

5. Account #99-8, salespeople’s salaries, Seattle
The journal indicated that this entry was “to record checks cashed but not recorded
or deposited.” The only check apparently not recorded in March 1997 was check
#2000 for $2,500 payable to I.O. Much.

It is significant that the checks paid to I.O. Much in 1997 and 1998, which were not
noted in the payroll journal, were not available in the corporate records.
Investigators obtained copies of these checks from the microfilm files at Anybank.
A review of the payroll records indicated two apparent discrepancies related to I.O.
Much. The April 7, 1997, payroll records indicated “income tax withheld” of $200
more than apparently had been withheld from I.O. Much’s pay. Similarly on
August 11, 1997, payroll records indicated $1,000 more income tax withheld than
apparently had been withheld to date. In that time period an offsetting adjustment
was made to the net pay figure, thereby indicating that the net amount of money
paid to I.O. Much was $1,000 less than apparently had been paid to her at that
time.

The effect of these adjustments was an apparent benefit to I.O. Much of $1,200. Her
W2 for the year ended December 31, 1997, indicated that she paid $1,200 more
income tax than she had actually paid. The Anyco Limited employee deduction
account was not reconciled at the time of the investigation, and thus it was not
readily apparent how the $1,200 tax benefit was accounted for in the company’s
books.
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While the amounts involved were not terribly large, this case points out a number of internal
control weaknesses that can result in fraud, including lack of supervision, inadequate division
of duties, and failure to perform appropriate accounting reconciliations.

5.4 Payroll and Personnel Cycle
The payroll and personnel cycle handles the hiring, firing, and payment of employees,
along with timekeeping, expense-account and travel reimbursements, and insurance
matters.
The hiring function can play an important role in reducing the risk of potential fraud
through the careful vetting of employment applications. Adding an employee whose
resume is not truthful is opening the business’s door to a potential fraudster.

5.4.1 Functions
The functions of the payroll and personnel cycle are as follows:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Personnel and employment
Preparation of timekeeping and payroll
Payment of payroll
Payment of payroll taxes and other withholdings
Reimbursements of expense accounts and travel expenses
Processing and payment of employee insurance, pension withholdings, and other
employee benefits

5.4.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle (see
Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement fraud):
1.
2.
3.
4.

Cash
Salaries payable
Payroll taxes payable
Other withholdings payable

Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Travel and entertainment expenses
Salary and commissions expenses
Payroll tax expenses
Medical and insurance expenses

5. 4.3 Perpetration
Payroll is particularly ripe for internal fraud. Common schemes include nonexistent or
ghost employees, fictitious hours and overtime abuses, overstating expense accounts, and
fictitious or overstated medical claims.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

25

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

In one case, approximately one month after the payroll check date, Mr. Smith attempted to
pick up his check from Ms. Doe, who was responsible for all departmental check
distributions. Ms. Doe stated that the check was lost and that she would process the paper
work necessary to obtain a new check. She then entered false payroll data in order to
generate the check. Within a few weeks, Mr. Smith received a new check. However, upon
reviewing his year-to-date earnings, he discovered that the lost check amount was included
in his earned income. When confronted with the situation, Ms. Doe admitted to her
supervisor that she had forged Mr. Smith’s name and cashed the check for personal
reasons. Ms. Doe, who had been with the company for seven years, had her employment
terminated.

Expense accounts are easily and frequently abused. For example, the president of a
subsidiary submitted requests for business travel and entertainment advances with the
parent company. The chief accountant issued the checks for the requested advances. After
one-and-a-half years, the president had not repaid the advances. When pressed, he could
not support the advances with proper business receipts. He confessed that he had none.
The president who had ten years of service, had his employment terminated. The amount
involved was $120,000.

5. 4.4 Detection
Organizations typically discover ghost employees when payroll checks are hand-delivered,
and extra checks are left. For businesses employing vigorous payroll fraud detection
procedures, investigators can perform significant computer and statistical analysis. For
example, time card approvals, which are the same as signatures and endorsements on
checks, can provide items for further investigation. Computer-generated detection methods
could indicate:

• Payments to employees not on the master lists
• Payments to employees versus those not authorized for payment
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

26

Write-offs of employee accounts
Duplicate payments to employees
Overtime by employee
Password use during vacation
Social security numbers listed in descending or ascending order
Employees with no withholding
Each kind of withholding in descending order
Salary expenses in descending order
Hours worked in descending order
Time-card hours versus authorized job orders
Hours worked by employee by pay period
Pay rates in descending order
Dates of employment versus authorized dates of payment
Travel reimbursement by employee overtime
Travel reimbursement compared to other employees
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• Travel reimbursement for specific function by employee
• Travel reimbursements by kind of expense, that is, rental car, hotel, airfare, and so on
• Date of travel reimbursements compared to dates employee worked
• Numerical sequence of employee travel reimbursements

5.4.5 Prevention
Proper Documentation
Proper documentation for payroll purposes includes time cards for appropriate employees,
prenumbered travel reimbursement forms and payroll checks, and verification of medical
services.

Proper Approval
Proper approval includes hours worked and wage rates, hiring and terminations, overtime,
medical benefits, and travel allowances.

Separation of Duties
At a minimum, you should consider separating the following duties to reduce the
possibility of one employee acting alone.
• Accounting for hours worked and processing checks

•
•
•
•

Processing and distributing paychecks

Hiring and firing from timekeeping
Claims processing, approval, and payment
Travel expense approval and payment

Independent Verification
Independent verification is especially important for preventing payroll and personnel
fraud, and includes the following:

• Using time clocks wherever possible, and verifying the hours worked against the clock
• Ensuring hours worked are approved by someone other than the employee
• Conducting surprise audits of the personnel and payment cycle
5.5

Inventory and Warehousing Cycle
The inventory and warehousing cycle includes functions relating to the purchase and
warehousing of merchandise for manufacture and resale. Because of the volume of activity
and funds involved, fraud represents a significant risk.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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5.5.1 Functions
The functions of the inventory and warehousing cycle include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Processing purchase requisitions.
Receiving raw materials and finished goods.
Storing raw materials and finished goods.
Cost accounting.
Processing goods for shipment.
Shipping finished goods.

5.5.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Inventories on the balance sheet and cost of goods sold on the income statement are
affected by the inventory and warehousing cycle. (See Chapter 10 for further information
on financial statement fraud.)

5.5.3 Perpetration
The more common frauds in the inventory and warehousing cycle include: ordering
unneeded inventory, appropriating inventory for personal use, theft of inventory and scrap
proceeds, and charging embezzlements to inventory.

For example, a loading-dock employee and delivery-route driver were able to steal
$300,000 of inventory through collusion over a six-month period. The load sheets at the
dock were either not filled out or inaccurately completed by both employees (control
procedures required the dock employee and route driver to verify the quantities loaded
and sign a load sheet). The products were transported to an independent distributor and
subsequently sold. The defalcation surfaced when outside sources informed the company
that certain products were being stolen as the result of collusion between particular
employees and an independent distributor.
In a case involving a theft of inventory, an inventory records supervisor and a security
guard colluded to steal $400,000 from a jewelry warehouse over a two-year period. The
security guard stole the merchandise, and the supervisor concealed the theft by
manipulating inventory records. An undercover investigator, who was hired because of a
significant increase in year-end inventory shortages, eventually discovered the theft. After
this experience, and following a consultant’s recommendation, the company started to
perform surprise physical inventories at varied times during the year.

5.5.4 Detection
The three primary ways for detecting inventory and warehousing frauds are: statistical
sampling of documents, computer analysis, and physical counts.
Statistical sampling includes looking for inconsistencies and discrepancies in purchase
requisitions, as well as receiving reports, perpetual inventory records, raw material
requisitions, shipping documents, job-cost sheets and similar documents.
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Computer analysis includes identifying the following items:

• Purchases by item
• Purchases by vendor
•
•
•
•

Inventory levels by specific kinds
Inventory shipped by address
Costs per item over time
Direct labor per inventory item

• Direct materials per inventory item
• Overhead per inventory item
• Disposals followed by reorders
• Shortages by inventory item

• Shipments by address

5.5.5 Prevention
Prevention is critically important in the case of inventory and warehousing fraud because
of the amounts of money involved and the relative ease with which this kind of fraud can
be concealed. Prevention includes: receiving reports, keeping perpetual records, using
prenumbered and controlled requisitions, raw material requisitions, shipping documents,
and keeping job-cost sheets.
Someone independent of the purchase or warehousing function should handle approvals of
purchasing and disbursement of inventory.

Separation of duties becomes critical in preventing this kind of fraud. Authorization to
purchase should be handled by someone not performing the warehousing function.
Someone other than the individual responsible for inventory should handle the receipt of
inventory.
Independent checks on performance are also important prevention measures. Someone
independent of the purchasing or warehousing functions should conduct the physical
observation of inventory.

Physical safeguards include ensuring that merchandise is physically locked and guarded,
and that entry is limited to authorized personnel.

5.6 Capital Acquisition and Repayment Cycle
The capital acquisition and repayment cycle, sometimes referred to as the financing cycle,
includes borrowing money and accounting for the debt of an entity.

5.6.1 Functions
The functions of the capital acquisition and repayment cycle include: borrowing funds and
accounting for debt, accounting for and paying interest, accounting for and paying
dividends, accounting for stock transactions, and equity financing.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

29

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

5.6.2 Financial Statement Accounts
The following balance sheet and income statements are most often associated with the
capital acquisitions and repayment cycle (see Chapter 10 for further information on
financial statement fraud):
• Cash

• Notes
• Mortgages
• Accrued interest

•
•
•
•
•

Capital stock
Capital in excess of par value
Retained earnings
Dividends
Dividends payable

• Interest expense

5.6.3 Perpetration
The common schemes in this cycle include borrowing for personal use, misapplication of
interest income, and theft of loan and stock proceeds.
In one case, a factoring company obtained a credit facility from a regional bank to fund the
purchase of qualified assets, primarily accounts receivable. The vice president of the
company, in collusion with a customer, purchased fictitious accounts receivables with the
proceeds of the credit facility. Part of the purchase proceeds was wired to offshore bank
accounts beneficially owned by the vice president. The activity was discovered when the
bank manager reviewed the bank account of the factoring company and saw wire transfers
made to Caribbean tax havens. He hired forensic accountants who discovered the bank
had been defrauded of $9.5 million over a two-year period.

5.6.4 Detection
Most frauds in the capital acquisition and repayment cycle involve tracing the proceeds of
loans to ensure that all of the proceeds go to the benefit of the company. This can be
accomplished by tracing loan proceeds to the bank deposits, and tracing authorization for
borrowing from the minutes of the board to the loan ledgers. In addition, a computer
analysis can do the following:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Compare addresses of interest payees.
Match borrowings with repayments.
Check the schedule of late repayments.
Check the schedule of authorization of loan proceeds.
Check the list of loan recipients.
Check the list of addresses where loan proceeds were delivered.
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5.6.5 Prevention
Proper documentation of loan documents, journal entries, interest coupons and stock
certificates can aid in prevention of capital acquisition and repayment frauds.
Proper approvals include receiving approval of the board of directors for: borrowing,
paying dividends and refinancing debt. Physical safeguards include keeping stock
certificates and loan documents under lock and key. Also, conduct independent checks on
the transfer agent and registrar.

Segregation of duties is also important in prevention. The authorization to borrow should
be separate from handling cash and accounting. Authorizations to issue stock should be
separated from the handling of cash; and accounting should be separated from handling
cash, and dividends and interest.
5.7

Cash Misappropriation
Although not a cycle, cash is the focal point of most entities. All other cycles flow through
the cash account. Because there are so many different ways to misappropriate cash, this
section covers cash exclusively.
Most organizations can divide their cash into two major categories: petty cash and demand
deposits. Petty cash consists of cash on hand that is accounted for separately. It is
reimbursed periodically, and the expenditures are then booked to the various accounts.
Demand deposits consist of checking accounts maintained by the entity; savings or interest
bearing accounts; and certificates of deposit and all other liquid investments that can be
easily converted to cash.

5.7.1 Perpetration
Frauds perpetrated on the cash accounts are normally committed in conjunction with other
cycles. The most common are the theft of petty cash and the theft of bank deposits.

Theft of Petty Cash
Petty cash thieves usually forge or prepare fictitious vouchers for reimbursement from petty
cash. As an alternative, perpetrators frequently borrow from the petty cash account and
fraudulently represent that the petty cash account is intact.
For example, the head security officer had custody of petty cash. He had altered legitimate
receipts—primarily for postage—to reflect higher amounts. Postage is an overhead item
that was loosely monitored. At a surprise count of the fund, only about $700 in currency
and receipts were on hand of the $4,000 fund. Polygraph examinations were given to all
security officers, but the head officer resigned before his test. A promissory note for the
approximately $3,300 shortfall was executed by the former head officer. He had been with
the company for seven years. The company estimated the loss at $12,000 but was unable to
prove that this amount had been stolen.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Theft of Bank Deposits
Many times employees steal cash receipts prepared for deposit. In some instances, they
change the amount reflected on the deposit. In other cases, they make no attempt to
conceal the theft.
In one case, an employee of a food services business received daily receipts from sales
along with the cash register tapes from two or three cashiers. The employee mutilated the
tapes so they could not be read, then prepared the transmittal of funds for the comptroller,
but kept the difference between the amount transmitted and the amount submitted to her
by the cashiers. She sent the mutilated tapes to the comptroller with the deposit. The
comptroller’s office did not compare the deposit with the cash register tapes. The fraud was
detected when one of the cashiers noted that the transmittal to the comptroller was small
for a comparatively busy day. When questioned about tracing the transmittal amount to the
cash register tapes, the perpetrator was unable to show completed tapes. The employee,
who had been with the company two-and-a-half years, was fired but not prosecuted.

Employees, officers, and even outsiders can steal checks, both blank and signed. One case
involved an employee—a grandmother—who was the sole bookkeeper for an electrical
supply company in Omaha, Nebraska. She wrote the company’s checks and reconciled the
bank account. Over a period of five years she stole checks totaling $416,000, which she
spent on herself and her family. In the cash receipts journal, she coded the checks as
inventory; in fact, however, she wrote the checks to herself using her own name. When the
checks were returned with the bank statements, she would simply destroy them. She
confessed after she had a nervous breakdown, caused by continuous guilt from stealing,
which she knew was wrong.

5.7.2 Detection and Prevention
Because cash can be counted exactly, most detection methods involving cash relate to its
timely counting. The proof of cash is a standard audit technique that compares cash in the
bank to reported cash on hand. Properly done, the proof of cash can not only account for
theft, but also show overstatements or understatements by expense classification.
Timely and regular bank reconciliations by a person not responsible for handling cash will
frequently reveal discrepancies. Good reconciliation methods include examining
endorsements and dates, and if staff and time permit, referencing the checks to invoices,
orders, and other relevant documentation.
For example, a misappropriation of funds was detected through a reconciliation of bank
deposits with a collection log, which was normally kept by the accounting clerk, who at the
time of the reconciliation was absent on sick leave. Because the accounting clerk prepared
the collection log, the daily cash report, and the bank deposits, she was able to alter
individual accounts receivable records and misappropriate almost $24,000. She
accomplished this by preparing daily cash reports that reflected fewer cash receipts
collected than were actually received, and depositing the lesser amount in the company’s
bank account. The accounting clerk processed virtually the entire accounting transaction.
After the discovery of missing funds, she was fired, prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and was
sentenced to ten years’ probation. She had been with the company three-and-a-half years.
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Auditors frequently use cutoff bank statements to ensure that expenses and income are
reported in the proper period. Surprise cash counts sometime turn up situations of
employees borrowing or floating small loans. It is critical that these counts be done on an
irregular basis.
Cash thefts are sometimes reported by customers who have either paid money on an
account and have not received credit, or in some instances when they notice they have not
been given a receipt for a purchase.

As an example, a client of a branch of a large bank complained that there had been a
$9,900 forged savings withdrawal from her account. The client indicated that she had
recently made a $9,900 deposit at the branch and suspected that the teller who accepted the
deposit may have been involved. The employee was interviewed and admitted to forging
and negotiating the savings withdrawal. The teller had obtained the client’s mother’s
maiden name and birthplace, fabricated a duplicate savings receipt book, and on an
unscheduled work day went to the domiciling branch and posed as the client. The
employee did not have any identification, yet was persistent enough to obtain an approval
on the savings withdrawal.
Computer analysis of the following categories can sometimes turn up fraud in a cash
account: checks that are missing, checks payable to employees, checks that are void,
comparisons of deposit dates to receivables, and listings of cash advances.

It is absolutely imperative to implement tight control of cash and to maintain the duties of
accounting, authorization, and custody.
In one case a fraud occurred at one of several campus cashier’s offices maintained by a
university for collecting and processing student tuition bills and other related charges. The
perpetrator was employed as a teller for approximately five years before being promoted to
head cashier. This position required reconciling daily cash register receipts to the cash
transmittal and bank deposits, as well as preparing deposits for funds received from outside
departments, such as the bookstore or dining service operations. These deposits involved
substantial amounts of cash. As head cashier, the employee also prepared the initial
accounting documents that served as the input to the various general ledger accounts,
including accounts receivable.

The perpetrator’s extensive knowledge and experience, coupled with the employer’s trust,
resulted in diminishing supervision, particularly of the cash register reconciliations. As a
result, the perpetrator was able to manipulate the documentation and the control
procedures necessary to conceal the continued embezzlement of funds. The employee, who
had six-and-a-half years’ service, was fired and prosecuted for stealing an estimated
$66,000.
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6.1

Fraud Perpetrated by Outsiders
Fraud is not merely the product of internal thieves acting against their employers. Fraud in
the accounting records may originate with outside suppliers and service providers as well.
It is not possible to determine the number of persons and bogus business operators
engaged in crimes of this nature. Suffice it to say that the problem is extensive. By some
estimates, nearly everyone at one time or another has been either a direct victim of such a
crime, or an indirect victim through higher fees or income taxes.

6.1.1 Classification of Internal and External Fraud
As introduced in chapter 1, for the purposes of this Handbook, commercial fraud can
generally be classified into two categories:
1. Internal fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by its employees,
officers, or directors
2. External fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by arms-length parties
(either individuals or corporations) who are outside the organization
Noncommercial fraud and other forms of white-collar crime also exist in which the
fraudster is unrelated or external to the victim (an individual).

The Impact of Collusion
Some forms of external fraud can also be committed with the help of an internal
fraudster—someone internal to the organization who is willing to assist the external
fraudster commit his or her crime. Generally, internal personnel would need some form of
an incentive—often in the form of a secret commission, kickback, or bribe—in order to be
induced to assist in this manner.
Fraud involving parties both internal and external to an organization are sometimes
referred to as collusive frauds. Another form of collusive fraud involves fraud committed by
a group of people within an organization. Both kinds of collusive frauds exist because most
internal controls are based on the principle of segregation of duties—this is circumvented
by collusion.

Another form of collusive fraud, committed totally externally, is price fixing. When
competitors agree to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their products or
services are sold, it is price fixing. The victimized customer of the colluders usually is not
aware of the price fixing unless there is a whistle blower. And, as markets are served by
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fewer and fewer entities resulting from mergers, price fixing will probably become a bigger
problem.

6.1.2 Reasons for Classification
Without some form of classification, the numerous kinds of fraud would overwhelm and
confuse the student of this topic. Learning is enhanced when long lists are grouped and
classified—for instance, students of a foreign language don’t start at a in the English
translation dictionary. Instead they start by studying the common elements of verb
conjugation, pronouns, nouns and adjectives so that they can grasp a wider cross section of
the language, and then put it all together when they begin to speak it. Of course, languages
have many exceptions to the rules. Similarly, most foreign-language pocket guides present
phrases by topic. For instance, phrases relating to money are separate from phrases relating
to restaurants, travel, shopping and health; however, certain phrases could be applicable to
more than one situation.
Much the same way, this Handbook’s approach to grouping and classifying fraud enhances
the CPA’s ability to learn about the numerous kinds of fraud. As a result, you should have
a greater appreciation for the wide variety of fraud that can occur, and should be better
equipped to recognize the signs of fraud at first sight. However, some frauds are difficult to
classify, fall into more than one category, or don’t exactly fit into any of the established
categories. These instances are mentioned as appropriate within the body of this
Handbook.

6.1.3 Classification of Fraud in this Handbook
In chapter 5, we discussed a restricted group of frauds—those committed against an
organization by its employees, officers or directors—otherwise known as internal fraud.
External frauds cover all remaining forms of fraud and represent a wide variety of frauds.
This chapter covers those external frauds that can be classified by perpetrator. These frauds
include:

1. Fraud committed primarily by individuals against a company, government, or other
individuals; this is referred to as externalfraudfor personal gain.
2. Fraud committed primarily by a company against another company, government, or
individuals; this is referred to as commercial crime.

Note that individuals using a corporate veil could also conduct certain of the frauds
presented in this chapter. Similarly, chapter 7, which primarily covers fraud by
corporations, includes fraud that could be conducted by individuals directly.

6.2 Individuals versus Individuals and Corporations
Individuals can commit many kinds of fraud against other individuals and corporations. Most
of the victims of the crimes described in this section are generally manufacturers, retailers,
wholesalers, service companies or other individuals; however, in some instances, victims
can also include governments, financial institutions, and insurance companies.
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6.2.1 Lawyers’ Schemes
Overbilling for Time
Lawyers can easily commit fraud, largely because of the nebulous nature of the services
provided. As one commentator indicated: the law lends itself to confidence scams.
Contrasted to a plumber, for example, whose failure to make the contracted repair is
quickly noticed, a lawyer’s performance of an agreed to service is not always discernable. It

(Text continued on page 5)
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could be merely some advice, a brief phone call or any number of innocuous,
commonplace actions.
The victims of overbilling can include the lawyer’s clients who are unable to assess whether
the time billed by the lawyer is reasonable, and can also include government funded legal
aid programs whose organizers are unable to assess whether the services billed were
actually performed. When in doubt, a lawyer’s invoices can be vetted; that is, they can be
assessed by another lawyer for reasonableness regarding whether the services billed needed
to be performed, and whether the time taken to perform the services was excessive or not.

Misappropriation of Trust Funds
Lawyers have access to funds provided to them by clients in trust to complete transactions.
There are many cases of lawyers borrowing client funds because they are in personal
financial difficulty. The most common crime associated with lawyers’ trust funds is the
misappropriation of client funds held in trust and the use of the money for the lawyer’s
personal purposes (for example, to subsidize a business, pay gambling debts, or support a
life-style).
There are three kinds of misappropriation:
1. Single transaction: Client funds can be traced to an unauthorized disbursement
(one-shot).
2. Several transactions: All trust-account activity is analyzed to determine which clients funds
were used for unauthorized disbursements (lapping).

3. Trust-account chaos: Usually, this kind of misappropriation is caused by poor record
keeping. Actual misappropriation of funds may or may not be found. Is the chaos the
result of poor bookkeeping practices? Are there reasons for the failure to account (such
as bad health, bankruptcy, intent to defraud, or loss of control due to numerous
misappropriations)? The answers to these questions may emerge after a complete
analysis of the trust account’s activity has been made. According to the ethical rules of
most states, if not all states, any use by an attorney of funds held in a trust account other
than that for which the funds were placed in trust is considered a serious breach of
professional conduct that may lead to disbarment, suspension or possible prosecution.
There can never be a legitimate misappropriation of funds that an attorney holds in a
trust account.

To uncover a case involving misappropriation of trust funds, the accountant should realize
that lawyers regularly maintain two sets of bank accounts and related records, consisting of:

1. One or more bank accounts, books of account, and supporting documentation for the
law practice itself.
2. A trust account together with any records reflecting the trust-account activity carried out
on behalf of the lawyer’s clientele. These are the most relevant records for investigating
alleged misappropriation of trust funds. The primary documentation required for trust
account activity consists of bank statements and bank reconciliations for the trust bank
account; the client’s ledger, which outlines all receipts and disbursements made by the
lawyer on behalf of the client concerning a particular transaction; and the client’s file,
which contains evidence of the transactions (for example, correspondence, the lawyer’s
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reporting letter, statement of receipts and disbursements, statement of adjustments,
mortgage documents, out-of-pocket vouchers, and billings).

CPAs conducting an investigation of an attorney’s trust account might also want to review
the financial statements for the law practice. These records can be used to assess the
successfulness of the lawyer’s practice, and are most relevant when the lawyer is a sole
practitioner.
See table 6.1, below, for an example of a misappropriation that would only be uncovered
by a detailed investigation of the banking transactions conducted within a trust account.

Table 6.1 Evidence of a misappropriation of a trust fund.
January 1, 1991

Deposit of $30,000

Agrees with client file

January 5, 1991

Withdrawal of $10,000

Unauthorized by client

January 29, 1991

Deposit of $10,000

Unauthorized by client

January 31, 1991

Balance of $30,000

Agrees with client file

At the end of the month the trust liability to the client, as disclosed in the client file, is
$30,000. However, $10,000 was temporarily removed during the month by an
unauthorized transaction. Thus a misappropriation of the trust fund occurred.

Skip Towne, Esq. Case Study
After twenty years in practice, a lawyer, Skip Towne, Esq., had built up a large
client base, including friends, business people and fellow church-goers. Mr. Smith,
who was selling his home, retained Mr. Towne’s services. At the time the
transaction closed on August 3, 1998, Mr. Towne received $176,574 from the
purchaser’s attorney for deposit into the Skip Towne, Esq. trust account. Mr. Towne
disbursed $5,000 of the funds in his trust account to cover various closing
adjustments including outstanding utilities and tax bills. Mr. Towne also distributed
$21,176 to his own account to cover the legal fees and other disbursements related
to the closing. The balance ($150,398) due to Mr. Smith, as shown in the Closing
Statement, was apparently paid in two distinct disbursements to Mr. Smith: an
initial amount of $65,000 on August 10, 1998, with the balance of $85,398 on
October 13, 1998. This final payment to Mr. Smith was, however, financed by the
deposit into the trust account of funds that Mr. Towne received from new clients
and other nefarious acts.

The specific funds in question, that is, $85,398 on hand as of August 10, 1998—were
not paid to the benefit of Mr. Smith. Between August 10, 1998, and October 13,
1998, Mr. Towne made a payment of $80,000 to himself that he used to invest in his
own real estate venture, and a payment of $5,398 to his other clients, to replace trust
funds that had already been spent on unauthorized disbursements. To keep the ball
rolling, Mr. Towne had to misappropriate funds from a number of other clients in
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order to repay Mr. Smith, in addition to producing false mortgage documents,
forging signatures, and resorting to other acts of deceit.

Ultimately, Mr. Towne cleared out his trust account, abandoned his law practice,
and disappeared, leaving behind at least eighty-five clients who had been
defrauded. He has not been heard from since.

6.2.2 Directory Advertising Schemes
Perpetrators of directory advertising schemes usually target businesses. In this scheme the
fraudster sells advertising in a nonexistent magazine or directory, and absconds with the
proceeds. Many directory advertising schemes are perpetrated out of storefront operations.
A fake (or in some instances, real) directory is presented to the potential victim. The victim
contracts for the display or classified advertising, which will appear some months hence. By
that time, the fraudster has collected the funds and disappeared.

6.2.3 Property Improvement Schemes
Fly-by-night operators, promising repairs to property at bargain rates, are a particular
problem for elderly victims. The typical fraudster is a professional con artist who obtains
business primarily from door-to-door solicitations. The tools of the trade are not hammers
and saws, but bogus business cards and counterfeited or preprinted contracts involving the
payment of up-front money. Note that these property improvement scams are a subset of
procurement fraud, which is covered in more depth in chapter 7. Various forms of this
scheme include substituting products, charging for false labor or overhead charges, and
absconding with retainers and down payments.

Substituting Products
In a product substitution fraud, the fraudster typically promises a property owner a
particular product or brand, and charges him or her for it but then substitutes an inferior
brand without an appropriate price reduction. Thus the perpetrator reaps a windfall profit
through this deception.
Charging for False Labor or Overhead
Many repair contracts call for labor, materials or overhead to be charged at cost, plus a
specified contractor’s profit as a percentage of that cost. Obviously the more the repairs
cost, the more the contractor makes. By fraudulently inflating costs through the addition of
bogus labor charges or overbilling of materials, the fraudster not only increases the profit
but also can keep the difference between the actual and inflated costs.

Absconding With Retainers and Down Payments
The preferred method that seasoned professionals use is to simply negotiate money in
advance, then disappear. This is essentially an advance fee swindle perpetrated specifically
in the property-improvement or repair market. This method is advantageous to the
perpetrator because it requires the least amount of capital: no storefront, props, or other
accoutrements necessary—-just “get the money and run.”
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6.2.4 Personal Improvement Schemes
The term personal improvement fraud covers the many schemes that prey on people’s natural
tendency to want to improve their job skills, appearance, education, or position in life.
Fraudsters in this category primarily use mail order as an integral part of the scheme. Some
common forms of personal improvement fraud are described below.

Vanity- and Song-Publishing Schemes
Vanity- and song-publishing schemes are common, and rely on the victim believing that he
or she has talent in a particular area, such as art or song writing. These schemes are
normally advertised in magazines or by direct mail. They usually offer to evaluate, for free,
the victim’s talent. Of course the victim is told after the evaluation that he or she is the
newest undiscovered artistic genius. And for a hefty fee, the talent company will promote
the artist’s work. The artist then remits the fee, and the fraudster uses the funds for personal
benefit, providing little or no services in the process.

Modeling Schools
Modeling schools appeal to the natural vanity of some people. Typically, the modeling
school tells the student that he or she must have a portfolio of portraits to send to potential
customers, ostensibly to enhance the victim’s potential for getting modeling assignments.
The victim is then charged greatly inflated prices for a photographer to take the pictures for
the portfolio. Many modeling schools are not legitimate. They sometimes tout connections
to famous people, or claim they have placed famous people, when in fact they have not.
These schools get most of their business through mail order or newspaper advertising.
Once a particular area is fleeced, the school pulls up stakes and moves on.

Diploma Mills
For a fee—usually a hefty one—a diploma can be granted to those persons who apply. The
fraudsters usually claim the heavy fee is for processing the application or for verifying the
experience necessary to acquire a degree. The hallmark of a diploma mill is the ease with
which the degree is obtained, and the related cost. Victims usually apply for an advanced
degree to enhance their career skills; however, diploma mills are not accredited, and their
diplomas are therefore essentially worthless. Given the nature of this kind of business, there
is usually some culpability on the part of the so-called victim.

Correspondence Schools
Legitimate correspondence schools offering advanced education do exist. However, there
are also many correspondence schools with the same modus operandi as diploma mills,
providing substandard education at superior prices. They are generally not accredited and
offer little hope of job advancement.

6.2.5 Insider Trading Schemes
Insider trading involves the use of nonpublic information to make stock trades on a
securities or commodities market. It could include purchasing shares prior to a good news
release and can also include selling shares prior to a bad news release. The perpetrators of
such crimes get rich, while other investors are unable to share in the wealth. Some might
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argue that this is a victimless crime, while others would say that the victims are the market
as a group, because each and every trade is part of the market.

Criminal charges for insider trading have become the trademark of economic crime
enforcement efforts during recent years. These efforts seek to encourage the confidence of
investors in the fairness of the markets.

A surge of prosecutions for illegal insider information transactions began in the late 1980s
when stock transactions were first subjected to sophisticated computer review, enabling
investigators to identify unusual stock movements. Soon afterwards, when some meaningful
piece of financial information about a company was released, investigators could quickly
determine who had traded the stock heavily before the news release. If, for instance, a
firm’s president executed a transaction, it seemed likely, (though not assured), that he or she
had acted on the information before it was publicly disseminated. The insider trading laws
require that specified officers or directors of a corporation must report their trading
activities. The fraudster, however, conveniently forgets to file the required information.
Of course, the notable cases of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken remain the most infamous,
and illustrate the staggering sums of money to be made from illegal stock trades. Boesky,
the Wall Street arbitrage king, was sentenced to three years in prison and fined $100
million. In his plea agreement, he gave information that led to the indictments of so-called
junk bond king Michael Milken, who eventually pled guilty to insider trading and was fined
$600 million.

6.2.6 Homicide-for-Profit Schemes
Homicide cases are quite different from white-collar crime cases in that the perpetrator is a
violent criminal, whereas most fraudsters are not violent. The tools of a murderer are guns,
knives, ropes, water (for drowning), fire (for arson) and poison, whereas the tools of a
fraudster are documents, books and records, computers, and calculators. The victim in a
homicide case loses his or her life, whereas a fraud victim generally only loses some money.
But there is one main similarity, particularly when there is a financial motive for the
homicide—the use of forensic accounting in homicide cases is similar to its use in fraud
cases and may involve corporate- or personal-financial assessments, or both.
Generally, forensic accounting may be applied in homicide investigations for one or any
combination of the following three purposes:

1. To analyze and determine a possible financial motive for murder.
2. To analyze financial documentation for possible investigative aids that may assist in
proving murder.
3. To identify possible payments on a contract for murder.

Assessing Financial Motive
In determining a possible financial motive, the investigator must direct the accounting
analysis primarily toward establishing and measuring any financial benefit to the accused as
a result of that person’s association with the murder victim. Benefit may be shown in any
one or combination of the following methods:
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• Payments by the victim to the accused (extortion).

• Assets such as real estate, collectibles, or antiques transferred to the accused.
• Insurance proceeds paid to the accused as a beneficiary under a policy.

• Other benefits, such as obtaining equity in a business or transferring of a partnership
interest to the accused.
• Other motives that don’t equate to a direct financial benefit, such as the imminent loss of
assets, involvement in drug trafficking, or marital infidelity.

Accounting evidence is not generally as significant as viva voce evidence. It may, however,
provide circumstantial evidence of a financial motive.

Assessing Financial Evidence to Assist in Other Ways in the Investigation
When assessing the financial matters of the victim in order to assist in a police investigation,
the forensic accountant may seek to determine:

• The victim’s business and social relationships and the identity of people with whom he
or she had dealings.
• The existence of any debts owed either by or to the victim, and whether evidence exists
to suggest the victim or debtor was resisting payment on them.
• The possibility of eliminating financial matters as a direction in which to pursue in the
investigation.

Investigators should examine business and personal financial records, as well as financialrelated evidence from the local real estate deed-mortgage recording office, lawyers, the will
of the deceased, and insurance policies.

Robert Kilbride Case Study
On March 29, 1998, Mary Kilbride, wife of Robert Kilbride, a veteran police officer, was
found dead outside her condominium complex. She had fallen from the twentieth floor
balcony of their condominium. Eight days later, Robert Kilbride flew to the South Pacific to
join Ms. Cathy Smith, whom he later married in May 1999 in Europe.
Ms. Sleuth, a forensic CPA, was called in to assist with the investigation. The police
suspected Mary’s death was not an accident—there was a $275,000 life insurance policy on
her life that was paid to Robert Kilbride in late September 1998.
By way of background, Ms. Sleuth was told that in July 1997, Kilbride resigned his
position from the police force. Friends and acquaintances said that about this time it
was evident that Robert and Mary Kilbride were having marital problems.
Ms. Sleuth then worked with the investigating officer to determine all she could
about the Kilbrides’ life-style. The primary objective of Ms. Sleuth’s accounting
assistance was to summarize Robert Kilbride’s financial activity for a period of
approximately one-and-a-half years prior to Mary Kilbride’s death, because of the
allegation that Robert had murdered his wife Mary for the insurance proceeds. No
summary books and records were available, a not uncommon situation in
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investigations of personal finances. Therefore, Ms. Sleuth had to reconstruct the
financial facts before they could be interpreted.

The volume of financial documents was considerable. Kilbride had numerous
credit cards, bank accounts and brokerage accounts in the United States, Canada
and Europe. Kilbride was also involved in numerous business deals of varying
nature and purpose.
In order to prove Kilbride’s financial affairs, Ms. Sleuth completed the following:

1. A summary of Kilbride’s financial history.
2. An analysis of Kilbride’s estimated net worth as of the end of July 1997 and
September 1998, based on bank statements, brokerage statements,
correspondence, contracts, appraisals, loan applications and other financial
documentation.
3. A source and application of funds analysis of Kilbride’s financial activity from
March 1997 to December 1998, primarily based on Kilbride’s banking
documents, credit card statements and brokerage statements.
4. A report on Kilbride’s monthly deficiency based on the information in the
source and application of funds analysis.
5. Graphs showing the cumulative deficiency from just prior to Mary’s death to
late September 1998, when the insurance proceeds were received.
These analyses revealed the following, which the investigating officer corroborated
by viva voce evidence from former coworkers, friends, neighbors and other people
who knew the Kilbrides.

1. When he left the force, Kilbride had no known source of steady income.
2. The Kilbrides’ combined annual salaries were less than $60,000, yet they lived in an
expensive condominium and had a leased luxury sports car.
3. After leaving the force, Kilbride’s net worth declined considerably. He began to borrow
heavily and sell off certain assets, including a rental property. He was also involved with
various unsuccessful business ventures.
4. By March 1998, substantially all of Kilbride’s net worth was represented by assets he
owned jointly with his wife. These assets included the equity in their condominium,
furniture, furs, jewelry and household effects.

5. Between the time of Mary’s death in March and his receiving the life insurance
proceeds in September, Kilbride spent more than $100,000 traveling throughout the
United States, Canada and Europe. Although Kilbride had no known employment
income, he and Ms. Smith rented a villa on the Mediterranean coast. He had
approximately $15,000 in other income during this period. Kilbride financed his life
style primarily by selling more assets, obtaining further loans and making heavy use of
credit cards.
6. In late September 1998, Kilbride received the $275,000 in life insurance proceeds from
Mary’s death.
7. Also in September 1998, Kilbride sold the luxury condominium; he and Ms. Smith
continued to live in the Mediterranean villa until he returned to the United States in
January 1999, when he was arrested.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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In summary, the accounting evidence revealed that Kilbride enjoyed a life-style he
could not afford. He was living well beyond his means—his expenses so greatly
exceeded his income during the months before and after Mary’s death that he
would have been virtually bankrupt if he had not received the insurance money on
Mary’s life.
This evidence was very useful in establishing a motive for murder, and weighed
heavily at Kilbride’s murder trial at which he was found guilty.

6.3 Individuals versus the Government
Fraud against the government is a general term for several kinds of schemes perpetrated
against federal, state, and local governments or government agencies. Typically, frauds
against the government committed by individuals involve one of the following: income tax
fraud and benefit-program fraud. (See chapter 7 for a discussion of frauds against the
government committed by corporations.)

6.3.1 Income Tax Fraud
According to some estimates, most taxpayers do one of the following:
1. Fail to disclose all their income
2. Take deductions to which they are not entitled

The most common income tax frauds involve categories of individuals who receive their
compensation in cash. These categories include waiters, restaurant owners, bartenders, and
bellhops.

For the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be successful with a claim for income tax fraud,
intent must be proven—it is perfectly legal for taxpayers to manage their affairs to
minimize their taxes—it is illegal for them to do so in a deceitful manner.

6.3.2 Benefit-Program Fraud
Another major category of fraud against the government generally involves making false
statements of various kinds in order to obtain funds. The United States and other countries
with strong social assistance programs are easy targets for fraudsters. The specific programs
targeted include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Welfare benefits
Medicare and Medicaid benefits
Unemployment benefits
Disability programs
Student loan programs
Housing programs

Often, rings of fraudsters apply for government benefits, resulting in very high losses to the
government, and ultimately to the taxpayer through increased taxes.
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According to a January 2001 report, the U.S. government has taken an increasingly active
role in pursuing health care fraudsters. The rate of criminal convictions quadrupled from
1992 to 1999. At the same time, recoveries from civil fraud cases increased by more than
50 percent, and of the $1.5 billion the government recovered from fraud cases, $840
million was from health care cases, both public and private.

6.4 Individuals versus Financial Institutions
Fraud committed externally against a financial institution can take many forms and can be
committed by anyone who deals with such organizations, including individuals and
corporations. The most common offenses committed by individuals—and sometimes
corporations—are credit fraud, loan fraud, false mortgage security, real estate fraud, money
transfer fraud, money laundering, and check fraud. These and other frauds against financial
institutions, committed by individuals, are described below.

6.4.1 Financial Institutions and Fraud
Definition of a Financial Institution
For the purposes of this Handbook, a financial institution is any organization, whether
domestic or international, that is engaged in receiving, collecting, transferring, paying,
lending, investing, dealing, exchanging, and servicing money and claims to money. This
also includes safe deposit facilities, custodianships, agencies and trusteeships.

Under the broadest concept, the term financial institution may be applied to institutions,
such as cooperatives, export-import banks, investment bankers and mortgage bankers.

Legal Aspects of Bank Fraud
In most jurisdictions, financial institutions are insured by an agency of the government and
are governed by related criminal statutes. For example, in the United States the broadest of
all federal statutes is Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1344. It covers all assets owned or
controlled by a bank, as well as employees and outsiders. It prohibits any action that would
defraud the financial institution, such as embezzlement, misapplication, false statements
and related fraudulent behavior.

6.4.2 Credit-Card Fraud
Generally, credit-card fraud can be divided into two categories. In some instances, the
fraudster uses credit information from one individual to obtain credit for use by another.
For example, John R. Fraud, with bad credit, obtains the credit information ofJohn Q.
Smith, and applies for a credit card under the name ofJohn Q. Smith, using John R.
Fraud’s address. John R. Fraud then makes charges on the account. When John Q. Smith
protests, the credit-card company attempts to locate the real user of the credit card, John R.
Fraud, who has since absconded.

The other common credit-card fraud involves duplicating credit cards and then using them
to purchase high-value merchandise, for instance, jewels, furs, and other items that can
easily be resold before the credit-card company catches up with the fraudster.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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More attention should be paid to credit-card fraud because it is growing in volume and
taking on international aspects. No longer is credit-card fraud local; the Internet has
opened the door to global possibilities. A merchant extending credit on an Internet
transaction has to rely on the honesty of the purchaser and the limited comfort a bank
authorization provides. All too often, the merchant is stuck for the shipped merchandise
and no payment.

6.4.3 Loan Fraud
Borrowers sometimes provide false information to a lending institution in order to obtain
funds to continue business activity, or simply to fraudulently get money that they have no
intention of repaying. Some of the most common schemes include loans to nonexistent
borrowers, false applications with false credit information, bribery of a loan officer,
borrower misapplication of funds, and single family housing loan fraud.

Loans to Nonexistent Borrowers
In a loan-to-a-nonexistent-borrower fraud, the borrower uses a false identity to obtain a
loan. This scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower, or with the assistance of
an insider, such as a loan officer.
Fraud committed by individuals can be difficult to detect, particularly if the identity
documents of the fraudster match his or her details as provided on the loan application.
Warning signs include:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The borrower is unknown to bank personnel.
No public credit report is available.
The borrower or loan officer requests unusual loan terms.
Loan application information does not check out.
The proposed security has an inflated value.
The proposed inventory (security) has an unrealistic value.

There is no CPA associated with the financial statements.
The loan officer’s bonus is based on volume of loans funded.
The proposed collateral is located outside the bank’s market area.
The loan proceeds are distributed prior to the loan’s closing.

False Applications with False Credit Information
False information on the credit application can include overstated assets, nonexistent assets,
understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue and understated expenses. For example,
a borrower with marginal net worth might inflate the asset and income figures on his or her
personal financial statements to convince the loan officer of his or her credit worthiness.
The loan officer and others involved in the bank loan approval process can often detect
these schemes by observing one or more of the following:

•
•
•
•
14

Appraisals-valuations that defy common sense and local knowledge
Appraisers who are paid on basis of appraisal amount
Large loans beyond experience and expertise of the loan officer
Borrowers who default on the first payment
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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• Numerous payment extensions, or payments that are placed on nonaccrual status
• No audit trail for verifying application information
• Applicant reports receiving loans from many other banks

Bribery of Loan Officers
Statutes (for example, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 201) prohibit any officer, director,
employee, agent or attorney of a bank from knowingly soliciting or receiving things of
value in connection with bank transactions. In the usual scheme, a borrower offers an
officer an inducement to grant a loan that would not otherwise be made (for instance,
because the borrower has little or no credit, or because the borrower is not using his or her
real name).
(Text continued on page 15)
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Senior loan officers can often detect these schemes by observing one or more of the
following:

• The life-style of the originating loan officer is beyond the means provided by normal
compensation.
• The loan officer has unreasonably high productivity.
• The loan officer’s compensation is based on volume productivity.
• Loan agreements contain terms unreasonably favorable to the borrower.
• There is a pattern of disbursements to particular agents, brokers, appraisers, finders, and
so on.
• There are multiple loans to the same borrower with the same agents involved.
• The loan or other bank officer has a financial interest in the customer’s project, or
stockholdings in a bank subsidiary profiting from the business.

Borrower Misapplication of Funds
Borrower misapplication is most common when the borrower has little or no personal risk
in the collateral, for example, real estate. The highest risk real estate loans are those in
which the lender provides all the funding on a nonrecourse basis. The most common ways
borrowers misapply loan funds are as follows:

• Kickbacks or profit interests in construction activities
• Brokerage or real estate fees
• Property management fees
• Related-party vendors
• Closing-statement prorations of rent, taxes, and other items

• Land flips
• Sale of property rights, such as laundry or cable TV
• Misappropriation of operating proceeds or loan proceeds
• Misappropriation of escrow payments

Single Family Housing Loan Fraud
One variation of the misapplication-of-funds fraud is the borrower who purchases single
family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality as rental property or in some
instances for resale. When applying to a financial institution, the fraudster usually
misrepresents his or her ability to finance the property and make payments. Usually loan
officers uncover these frauds by observing one or more of the following:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

There is an unrealistic change in commuting distance.
A high-income borrower has little or no personal property.
New housing expense is 150 percent or more of the previous expense.
Bank deposits are listed in round amounts on application.
The borrower reports overlapping dates of current and prior employment.
The previous employer is listed as out of business.
A high-income borrower does not use a professional tax preparer.
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• The appraisal shows a tenant as the contact person on an owner-occupied house.
• The initial title report shows delinquent taxes.

6.4.4 Real Estate Fraud
Real estate fraud is essentially a specialized form of loan fraud committed either by
individuals or corporations. Financial institutions, especially the savings and loan
associations in the United States, were badly hit in the 1980s due to fraud committed in the
real estate area. These schemes are often perpetrated in concert with the insiders of
financial institutions.

Land Flips
A land flip is the practice of buying and selling a parcel of land very quickly, often in a
single day or month, at a successively higher price to related parties, until a lender—who
believes the transaction is at arm’s length—provides financing on an unrealistically inflated
loan amount. The key components of the scheme in sequential order are as follows:
1. The same piece of property is sold back and forth between a borrower—the fraudster—
and dummy or shell corporations.
2. Each time the land is sold, the price is inflated.

3. To support each sale, the borrower secures an appraisal based on an unrealistic or
favorable set of assumptions, or performed by a friendly, incompetent or dishonest
appraiser.
4. The borrower goes to a financial institution—the victim—and mortgages the property
for its appraised value, keeping the grossly inflated loan proceeds.
5. The fraudster defaults on the loan.

False Appraisals
Fraud perpetrators use false and inflated appraisals to support loans larger than the true
value of the property. Appraisers are either parties to the fraud or paid off, or they are
merely unqualified—that is, easily fooled by bogus transactions like land flips—to perform
the appraisal.

Nominee Loans
Nominee loans are those made in the name of a straw (dummy) borrower or agent—that is,
a borrower having no substance—while the identity of the real borrower is undisclosed to
the lender.

Double Pledging Collateral
This scheme involves fraudulently pledging the same collateral with different lenders,
before the related liens are recorded and registered. This obviously hinders the lender’s
ability to look to the collateral as a source of recovery when the borrower defaults.

Real Estate Fraud Detection
Lenders or other interested parties can often detect real estate fraud by observing one or
more of the following warning signs:
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• A single borrower has received multiple loans.
• The same appraiser has appraised two or more different properties for the same
borrower within a short period of time.

• The same appraiser has made successive appraisals of the same property at high values
in a short period of time.
• The property was bought or sold many times in a short period.
• The borrower is a shell with no real substance or a holding company whose substance
lies hidden in its numerous subsidiaries.
• The buyer is obviously shopping for a loan instead of a long-term banking relationship.
• The seller of the property is another bank.
• The borrower has a prior default history.
• The borrower has a history of loan payoffs by obtaining other, larger loans.
• The loan application contains requests for several loans to different persons on the same
property.
• The borrower requires the loan as a condition before delivering large deposits to the
bank, with the loan being the inducement for establishing a continuing banking
relationship.

6.4.5 Money Transfer Fraud
Wires totaling two to three times a bank’s assets may be processed every business day. It is
rare that wires do not at least equal a bank’s total assets, and they can sometimes be ten
times the assets for banks that have a large correspondent network. The process is highly
automated at most banks.
In the most common money transfer fraud, an outsider or bank employee with access to the
correct identification numbers needed to wire transfer funds, steals the funds. In one case in
Chicago, a bank insider with knowledge of the wire transfer codes and procedures
conspired with his friends to wire nearly $70 million out of the country. The scheme was
detected (early enough to avoid a loss to the bank) when the transfer was made from a
customer’s account, thereby overdrawing the account balance.

Warning signs for this kind of fraud include:
• Clerks rather than more senior personnel perform actual processing.
• Managerial personnel conduct frequent overrides of the established approval authority
controls.
• There is evidence of wires to and from offshore banks in countries known for their bank
secrecy laws.
• There are routine high volume, high dollar transfers.
• There are frequent wires for persons with no account at the bank.
• Access to the wire room is often not properly restricted.
• Employees become very comfortable with the routine of the job and with their
coworkers.
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Variations of these schemes involve misrepresenting the customer’s identity. The fraudster
will use pretext telephone calls to obtain correct account information from the bank. Then
the fraudster obtains the codes from an insider. Thereafter, the fraudster makes a telephone
call to transfer the funds out of the bank.

6.4.6 Money Laundering
Money laundering refers to the process of turning dirty money into clean money. The primary
objective is to conceal the existence, source or use of illicit money and thus the underlying
offence—whether the offence is trade in illegal narcotics, robbery, fraud, illegal political
contributions, tax evasion, prostitution or any other criminal activity. Money launderers
may also want to obstruct investigative efforts, preserve assets from forfeiture, and evade
taxes.

Perpetrators may launder money in the country in which the crime is committed or where
the funds originated; more often, however, they send the money across an international
border. Usually they deposit the money in a bank or other institution in a tax haven and it
comes back clean in the form of salaries, loans, fees or services.

Money Laundering Methods
There are three main methods for laundering money:
1. Through legitimate fronts

2. Through couriers and smurfs
3. Through the cooperation of a bank insider who ignores the reporting guidelines
Each of these methods has certain unique characteristics; however, they also have some
common characteristics:
1. Large cash shipments
2. Large volume of wire transfers to and from offshore banks (However, not all offshore
wire transfers involve money laundering—see below.)

Legitimate Fronts. Many money launderers open a legitimate front business that handles a
great deal of cash—for instance, a casino, restaurant, parking lot, vending machine
company, or pawnshop—and then deposit the ill-gotten gain along with the legitimate
income of the business. Perpetrators then commingle the illegal cash with the legitimate
receipts thereby disguising any illegal sources. They then withdraw the cleaned money or
wire-transfer it to a final destination.
Interested parties, for example a bank or bonding company, can usually detect this kind of
fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• Accounts accumulate deposits that are subsequently transferred out.
• Cash deposits from sources are not identified as customers of the business.
• There is a sudden and unexplained increase in the volume of cash deposits.
Money launderers can use gambling casinos. The ill-gotten cash is used to purchase chips.
Later the launderers exchange the chips remaining at the end of a controlled (carefully
limiting losses) gambling session for money and receive the proceeds in the form of a check
from the casino, thereby creating a seemingly legitimate paper trail.
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Smurfing. One variation of the money laundering scheme is to use special couriers, called
smurfs, to make relatively small deposits and withdrawals. For example, cash deposits of
$10,000 or more must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a special form
called a Currency Transaction Report (CTR). To avoid this reporting requirement, smurfs
make deposits or withdrawals just below this threshold amount.
Banks and other interested parties can usually detect this kind of fraud by observing one or
more of the following warning signs:

• Withdrawals made in numerous transactions just under $10,000.
• Customers who are not account holders exchanging large amounts of small bills for
large denomination bills.
• Inquiries as to policies of the bank regarding reporting currency transactions.

• Large dollar volume of cashier’s checks and money orders sold for cash to customers
who are not account holders.
• Persons shown as unemployed and self-employed on a CTR.
Breaches ofthe Reporting Guidelines. In still another variation, the money launderer conspires
with a bank insider, who agrees to make deposits for the money launderer and forego the
reporting mechanisms. The bank gets free use of the deposited funds, and in some
instances, the bank officer is compromised through a bribe or kickback. Banks can usually
detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:

• An account with many different individuals making deposits, and only a few making
large withdrawals.
• Accounts with accumulated deposits that are subsequently transferred out.

• High dollar limits and large numbers of bank customers exempted from CTR
requirements.
• An incorrect or incomplete CTR.

Money Laundering Mechanics
Although laundering and offshore banking conjure up images of financial wizardry and
international tax lawyers and accountants, most illegal activity involves the simple addition
of some layers to the basics common to ordinary business transactions. In essence,
laundering works like this.

Party A, who has come by the dirty money (or legitimate money that needs to be
laundered) gives it to Party B, who is the laundryman. Party B sends the money offshore
where it is deposited and funds are subsequently disbursed or laundered and then returned
to Party A for use.
During the laundering, Party B, having received the money from Party A, sets about
concealing it. Having the money in currency upon receipt makes the job easier. If the
money is in paper (checks, and so on), Party B may have to first start the laundering process
by converting it to local currency. Party B has, or sets up, one or more local companies, of
which he or she is the owner, manager or employee, depending on the relationship to Party
A.
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Now the offshore part of the process begins. Party B goes to a tax haven lawyer and
establishes an offshore company: loan companies, finance companies, or trusts are
preferable. Party B’s name does not appear anywhere in the legal documents.
The company in the tax haven opens an offshore bank account. Party B travels to the
haven with the currency, and Party B or the lawyer buys a cashier’s check at the bank with
the tax haven company as remitter. The lawyer then draws up the necessary loan
documents to show a loan from the haven company to Party B’s local company. Party B
then returns home with the cashier’s check. Thus, the money is brought back home as a
loan (which being capital, not revenue, is not taxable) and is clean.

Party A on his own, or through Party B, now makes use of the laundered funds by drawing
out salaries, obtaining loans from Party B’s local company, paying dividends, opening a
corporate expense account, using a company car, and so on.
Party B’s local company files appropriate tax returns and makes note of payments, or at
least interest payments. Interest is deducted on the company’s tax return. If the company
loses money, it has a tax offset. Party B does nothing illegal in the local country and, of
course, makes interest payments on the loan payable to the offshore company, allowing
further funds to be moved.

If a law enforcement agency questions the loans, the company will obtain full
documentation from Party B’s attorney in the tax haven. Inquiries beyond documents will
be blocked by the haven’s secrecy requirements.

Offshore Banks and Tax Havens
There are many reasons, some legitimate and some not, why money launderers transfer
money and other valuable securities from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction that has
secret banking privileges. These foreign jurisdictions are commonly referred to as tax
havens because, in addition to bank secrecy laws, they had no income taxes so people or
companies first used them to (legally) minimize or to (illegally) evade taxes.

Tax haven is now a misnomer, since funds may be deposited for reasons other than escaping
tax. Tax havens have grown in popularity in recent times as one of the few means of
placing funds beyond the reach of creditors or other investigators. It did not take long for
criminal organizations and individuals to exploit the sanctuary of the tax haven. With the
development of multinational banking systems and international business and commerce, it
became easy to put together sophisticated laundering schemes to move the proceeds of
crime to foreign banks protected from intrusion by law enforcement officials.
The World’s Tax Havens. Switzerland has a long history as an international tax haven,
imposing little financial regulation and strict secrecy laws. Many other countries have
jumped aboard the bandwagon. The key tax havens include—

• Bermuda and the Caribbean: Antigua, Bahamas, Caymans, Montserrat, Netherlands
Antilles, St. Vincent, and Turks and Caicos.
• Central America: Panama and Costa Rica.
• Channel Islands: Guernsey and Jersey.
• Pacific: Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vanuatu.
• Other locations: Liberia, Bahrain, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Cyprus.
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Offshore Facilities. Typically, the tax haven’s biggest domestic industries are banks, financial
institutions, companies, trusts, agents, accountants and attorneys who collectively constitute
offshore facilities. Facilities that are available in tax havens include—

• Banks. There are two classes of banks. Class A banks conduct local business transactions
in the tax haven. Class B banks exist on paper only, as they conduct no local business
transactions.
• Companies and trusts. Companies can be incorporated in the tax haven; trusts (such as
family, estate, or other kinds) can be set up.
• Offshore agents, accountants and attorneys. These are an essential element of the offshore
facilities in a tax haven.
The Tax Haven’s Rationale. Tax havens encourage offshore facilities for economic, political
and social reasons, all of which benefit their residents. For example, offshore facilities
generate up to 20 percent of the Caymans’ revenues, balance the budget in Montserrat
(through licensing fees) and have a huge impact on local economies, particularly those of
economically emerging countries.

For example, in 1964 the Caymans had one or two multinational banks and virtually no
companies. By 1981 they had thirty multinational banks, 300 Class B banks, and about
13,600 companies, the latter handled by a small number of lawyers, accountants and
agents. The Caymans’ total population in 1981 was about 15,000.

Many havens claim that the United States blames them for problems that it is unable to
solve domestically. Furthermore, offshore competition is so stiff that it is estimated that if
one country were to cease being a tax haven three more would start. (When Switzerland
relaxed its secrecy laws, Bahamian and Caymanian business grew at a rapid rate.) Also,
bank brokers move from island to island as laws tighten or loosen.

A local Bahamian bank executive summed it up when he said
The Bahamas must do things which are not allowed in the United States because
to do things which are allowed in the United States is noncompetitive, since in
every instance the United States does it better than the Bahamas do. The
Bahamas are therefore compelled in banking and trust operations to appeal to
unallowable activities and by inference to appeal to activities disallowed in the
United States.
Secrecy. The vital characteristic of a tax haven is that it allows offshore facilities to conduct
their affairs behind a veil of secrecy. Tax havens offer not only secret, numbered bank
accounts but also corporate laws and secrecy provisions that prevent law enforcement
officials from intruding. In addition, lawyers from tax havens offer a further level of secrecy
because they too are shielded by the haven’s secrecy laws, they maintain attorney-client
privilege, they sometimes do not know who their clients are, or they may be coconspirators,
or any combination thereof.
Tax havens view secrecy as a necessity for keeping offshore business. Business people from
various parts of the world (the Middle East and South America, for example) consider
secrecy to be a normal characteristic of business affairs. Flight capital (money being sent out
of politically unstable countries) has to be transferred secretly. Thus, it is not only criminals
but also politicians and governments to whom secrecy is attractive.
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Civil secrecy exists in common law as the result of a British case, Union v. Tournier (1907).
This case established that a banker had a duty to treat his customer’s affairs as confidential.
Many havens follow this law. Some jurisdictions have passed stringent, criminal laws to
buttress Tournier—for example, the Bahamas and the Caymans. Corporate laws in the
havens also aid secrecy by permitting nominee owners and bearer shares, prohibiting
disclosure of the beneficial owner, not requiring financial statements and audits, and
allowing the purchase of companies off the shelf.
Quite apart from the law, secrecy prevails in some tax havens by virtue of inadequate
records, unskilled administrators and corruption.

Vehicles Used to Transfer Funds to Tax Havens. Individuals or businesses can use several kinds
of institutions to transfer funds to tax havens. These include banks with international
branches or facilities, smaller trust companies and banking institutions, shipping companies,
real estate companies, travel agencies, money changers, insurance companies, finance
companies, brokerage and investment companies, international trading companies, holding
companies, and multinational corporations. The transfers themselves may be legal or
illegal. The transfer can be accomplished by means of letters of credit to a bank in a tax
haven, a bank draft, a wire transfer, or the transport of cash itself.
File Folders. Money launderers can purchase a set of legal papers in tax havens—for
example, legal documents, financial statements, and banking documents dated some years
before they are purchased. These documents make it appear that the company has been in
business for several years. In reality, of course, it never previously existed. These
companies have no substance.
Tax Havens and Law Enforcement. The combination of offshore corporate entities and secret
bank accounts in tax havens permits entities to construct a maze of financial transactions.
The tracing of assets becomes a very complex task. The transferring of questionable funds
from one tax haven jurisdiction to another greatly compounds the complexity.
Enforcement problems are pervasive, affecting not only criminal but also civil actions (such
as divorces, bankruptcies, and so on). Investigating cases takes a tremendous effort, and
conviction is by no means certain. There is no central clearing house to handle offshore
inquiries.

Investigations into Narcotics Trafficking
Narcotics trafficking is currently the primary source of laundered funds. The sophistication
and complexity of laundering schemes are virtually infinite and are limited only by the
creativity and expertise of the criminal entrepreneurs who devise the schemes. Organized
crime uses banks and other financial institutions in the course of laundering as routinely, if
not as frequently, as legitimate businesses use banks for legitimate purposes.
Previously, much of the investigation into narcotics trafficking occurred on the street in
which the drugs were followed to identify the dealers. Although this led to many successful
prosecutions, it seldom exposed the leaders of the organizations. The problem with a street
investigation is that the authorities generally cannot make a buy from, or a sale to, the top
person in the organization without the use of an informant, who is generally unreliable.
Furthermore, because the sentences received by drug traffickers were often so light,
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perpetrators considered the risk worth taking—and the leaders of the organizations
continued to be insulated.

Currently, law enforcement authorities obtain financial documentation during seizures in
order to establish that certain individuals possess goods that far exceed their known sources
of income. This technique has made possible the successful prosecution of the leaders in
drug trafficking schemes. Generally investigators use two methods to prove the flow of
funds obtained from narcotics trafficking:
1. Net worth analyses
2. Sources and uses of funds

6.4.7 Check Fraud
Check fraud is a general term for the attempted negotiation of bad checks at a financial
institution. Typically con artists prey on banks in an attempt to negotiate fraudulent or
fictitious instruments. Common kinds of check fraud include forged, altered, and stolen
checks; new account fraud; and check kiting.

Forged, Altered, and Stolen Checks
Most attempts to defraud banks involve one or more of the following:
1. Checks bearing the forged names of makers, endorsers or payees.

2. Altered checks showing increased amounts.
3. Counterfeit checks.

4. Stolen checks passed by others.
Bank officers and other investigators can detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more
of the following warning signs:

•
•
•
•
•

Obvious written alterations on checks
Illegible maker, endorser or officer signatures
Checks imprinted with a maximum amount, or the term void, or nonnegotiable

Unprofessional printing
Business checks presented for cash instead of deposit

New Account Fraud
Check fraud is much more likely to occur in new accounts than in established accounts.
Bank employees must make special efforts to properly identify the potential new customer,
without offending existing customers. Banks should establish screening criteria that must be
enforced by everyone handling new accounts. These employees must take prompt, decisive
action to manage or close (or both) apparent problem accounts.
Most perpetrators of new account fraud use false identification. Examples include
fraudulent birth certificates, fraudulent passports, duplicate social security numbers,
fraudulent voter registration cards, stolen credit cards, stolen driver’s licenses, stolen
paychecks, front (shell) businesses, fraudulent student-identification cards, and disguised
identities (including post office box mail address, lock box rental, mail forwarding,
telephone answering service, and rented office space).
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New-account criminals are professionals. They use false identification to open new accounts
and steal money before the bank collects the funds. Bank officers can normally detect newaccount fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:

1. The customer resides outside the bank’s normal trade area.

2. The customer rushes to open an account and obtain a loan.
3. The customer’s dress or actions, or both, are inappropriate for his or her stated age,
occupation or income level.

To help prevent this kind of fraud, banks should consider adopting the following
procedures:
1. Implement well-defined procedures for increasing employee awareness of new-account
fraud.

2. Establish specific guidance about acceptable identification and its reporting.
3. Require detailed verification of customer’s information, including—
— Previous checking account history (internal and external investigation).

— Credit reports and credit scoring systems.
— Dun & Bradstreet reports.
— Better Business Bureau reports.
— Special requests for no mail contact.
— Post office box or hotel address.
Check Kiting
Check kiting is a term for building up large apparent balances in one or more bank accounts,
based on uncollected or floated checks drawn against similar accounts in other banks. As
banks decrease the amount of time taken to clear checks, this kind of fraud is becoming less
common. Although many individuals engage to some degree in kiting, a commercial
customer can perpetrate this scheme by using several bank accounts to increase available
cash reserves.

The brokerage firm, E.F. Hutton, committed one of the most significant check-kiting
schemes perpetrated in the United States. They engaged in a $20-million kiting scheme to
decrease the cost of their funds during the late 1980s. The resultant bad publicity eventually
led to the company’s demise.
Check Kiting, Illustrated. In commercial bank accounts established over a period of time to
avoid suspicion, a fraudster starts with little or no money in Bank A and Bank B, and writes
$5,000 in checks on each for deposit in the other:

Apparent Balances
Actual Balances
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Total

Bank A

Bank B

$5,000

$5,000

$10,000

-0-

-0-

-0-
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The process is quickly repeated (for example, the next day) with $8,000 in deposited
checks:

Apparent Balances

Actual Balances

Bank A

Bank B

$13,000

$13,000

$26,000

-0-

-0-

-0-

Total

A $6,000 down payment is made on a Mercedes from a check written from Bank A.

Bank A

Bank B

Apparent Balances

$7,000

$13,000

$20,000

Actual Balances

($6,000)

-0-

($6,000)

Total

The next day additional checks for $4,000 each are written and deposited into each
account:

Bank A

Bank B

Apparent Balances

$11,000

$17,000

$28,000

Actual Balances

($6,000)

-0-

($6,000)

Total

The balances are then paid to a travel agent, and the fraudster takes a long trip:

Apparent Balances
Actual Balances

Bank A

Bank B

-0-

-0-

-0-

($17,000)

($17,000)

($34,000)

Total

Check Kiting Characteristics. Bank personnel usually uncover check-kiting schemes by
observing one or more of the following warning signs:

• Frequent deposits and checks in same amounts.
• Frequent deposits and checks in round amounts.
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• Frequent deposits of checks written on the same paying bank, which is not the deposit
bank.
• Little time lag between deposits and withdrawals.
• Frequent Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) account balance inquiries.
• Many large deposits made on Thursday or Friday to take advantage of the weekend.
• Large periodic balances in individual accounts with no apparent business explanation.

• Low average balance compared to high level of deposits.
• Many checks made payable to other banks.
• Bank willingness to pay against uncollected funds (note that not all payments against
uncollected funds are check kites, but all check kites require payments against
uncollected funds).
• Cash withdrawals with deposit checks drawn on another bank.

• Checks drawn on foreign banks with lax banking laws and regulations.

Slowing the Bank-Clearing Process. Before the days of sophisticated computer systems, a
check-kiting scheme could develop using less paper, fewer financial institutions, and smaller
amounts than are commonly used today. Banks can still be hit with large losses when a
fraudster slows down the bank clearing process. Typical fraudsters’ procedures include—

• Using counter checks without any computer or Magnetic Ink Character Recognition
(MICR) coding.
• Providing insufficient information on checks (for example, using an incomplete name of
a bank and branch, leaving out the account number, giving an illegible signature).
•
•
•
•

Making errors on the face of checks such as date and figures.
Defacing the check (for example, by using staples).

Placing stop payments on certain documents.
Having accounts in institutions other than chartered banks (that is, trust companies and
credit unions).

New Techniques. It is now very difficult to effect a check-kiting scheme employing the same
procedures as in the past. Banks are reluctant to accept counter checks; more significantly,
checks usually take only one day to clear. This is true even for checks issued on out-of-town
or out-of-state banks. The financial institutions claim that, in the near future, checks will
clear instantaneously. To counteract the tightening of bank procedures, the fraudster has
had to increase the number of financial institutions used, the dollar amounts, and frequency
of checks issued.

Check-Kiting Scheme Investigations. The main issues to be addressed when investigating a
check-kiting scheme are as follows:
1. The loss does not necessarily occur at the time of detection. Banks are usually put at
increasing financial risk over a period of time.
2. Accounting evidence must show that—
a. Control was exerted over a number of accounts.

b. A loss did occur.
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c. Economic risk has increased as shown by day-by-day analysis.
d. Every time the perpetrator withdraws money from the system of accounts (in excess
of the deposits put into the system), the bank incurs a loss or risk of loss.
e. The volume of inter-account checks is high.
3. The bank must determine whether it gave implied credit to the accused through daylight
overdraft privileges, which allow an overdraft balance at the end of a business day to be
cleared up before the close of the next business day to cover the previous day’s
overdraft.
4. The timing of the investigation and the availability of legible microfilm documentation
are important.
5. Documentation of the modus operandi needs liberal use of visual aids.
Accounting Assistance. When investigating check-kiting, the CPA should—

• Identify the fraudster-controlled accounts because the financial institutions where they
are maintained risk suffering economic losses.
• Identify and demonstrate the loss. This task is difficult because there is a mistaken
tendency to regard loss as occurring at the termination of the check-kiting scheme. In
fact, however, the risk of loss usually builds up day by day, over a period of several
months. Recognition of the economic loss occurs when the perpetrator abandons the
fraudulent activity for whatever reasons (this is equivalent to the game of musical
chairs—the loss isn’t recognized until the music stops).
• Perform a day-by-day analysis to show both the buildup of the loss and the increase in
economic risk to the financial institutions.
• Recognize that a check-kiting scheme could take place over an extended period of time
without the knowledge of the bank. This is an issue that is frequently raised in court.
This component is an educational aspect for many: lawyers, police, bank officials,
laymen, and even CPAs find check kiting difficult to understand.
• Try to accomplish the difficult task of demonstrating to a court of law that this case was
not merely an unbroken circle of checks and that this shell game, which was apparently
tolerated by the financial institutions, resulted in economic loss to them.

Mr. I.M. Kiter Case Study
Recently, between January and the middle of March, an extremely busy, wellrespected professional, Mr. I.M. Kiter, operated a massive check-kiting scheme that
employed at least eight bank accounts at three separate financial institutions. For
two-and-a-half months he was able to falsely inflate the value of his accounts by
issuing checks to or from his various accounts.
About four weeks before the scheme was uncovered, one of the financial institutions
was sufficiently concerned about the status of Mr. Kiter’s accounts that it would
only accept certified checks for deposit. This had the effect of reducing the clearing
time to zero days or in certain instances to minus one day (the check was certified
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the day before it was deposited). Despite these restrictions, Mr. I.M. Kiter was able
to continue his check-kiting scheme for the following reasons:

1. The other financial institutions did not require deposited checks to be certified.
2. Some overdraft privileges were permitted.
3. Mr. Kiter spoke with the financial institutions daily and explained away his
suspicious conduct.

4. Checks were not return marked not sufficient funds (NSF), as required by bank
policy, because the bank’s normal policies were changed for Mr. Kiter, a good
customer.
5. The bank permitted daily daylight overdraft privileges.
Forensic accountants performed an analysis of the deposit and disbursement activity
in the various bank accounts. With the exception of the closing bank overdraft, the
deposits totaled about $87.5 million, of which more than $85 million represented
money circulated among the eight accounts controlled by Mr. Kiter. The total
amount of actual deposits from noncontrolled accounts only amounted to about
$2.5 million. The ending balance in one of Mr. Kiter’s accounts at Anytown Bank
was a negative $1.7 million. This overdraft balance resulted in a loss that was fully
absorbed by Anytown Bank. Forensic accountants also performed an analysis of an
account maintained by Mr. Kiter at Bigtown Bank for the period March 1 to March
10. This analysis indicated that Bigtown Bank permitted ongoing overdraft
privileges to Mr. Kiter in amounts up to almost $1 million. Closer inspection
revealed the extent of Mr. Kiter’s abuse of the daylight overdraft privileges.

This practice was confirmed by the review of Bigtown Bank’s credit
correspondence, and demonstrated that the departure from Bigtown Bank’s policy
allowed Mr. Kiter to continue the check-kiting scheme in an uninterrupted fashion.
In fact, when the kiting scheme fell apart, it provided Mr. Kiter with a defensible
position for court purposes (that is, his conduct was condoned or blessed by Bigtown
Bank).
The practices of Bigtown Bank also raised the questions as to whether the economic
loss suffered by Anytown Bank was because of the check-kiting scheme, or because
of the conduct of Bigtown Bank. Evidence introduced during the trial did not
establish that the banks were aware of the kiting scheme. However, there was
evidence that Bigtown Bank knew that Mr. Kiter was having some cash flow
difficulties pertaining to closing a number of real estate deals. Handwritten
comments from the Bigtown Bank branch manager to his credit department
indicated that—

The bank closely monitored Mr. Kiter’s account.
The bank allowed certified checks to cover the overdraft daily.
The bank tolerated daily overdraft amounts of approximately $ 1 million.
The bank received substantial revenues via overdraft and service charges (an
example of the bank greed factor).
5. The bank indicated at a meeting held with Mr. Kiter on February 25th that it
would permit the overdraft arrangement to continue for another sixty days.

1.
2.
3.
4.
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6. Mr. Kiter had social connections and was a source of business for the bank.

Although Mr. Kiter was found guilty, the judge’s ruling implied that prior
knowledge of the check-kiting scheme on the part of one of the banks weakened
the prosecution’s case.

6.5 Individuals versus Insurance Companies
Insurance fraud generally consists of a presentation to an insurance company of a
materially false or misleading written statement relating to either an application or claim
for insurance. Fraud occurs not only when there is an actual loss (that is, a claim is made
based on bogus information), but also when there is a risk of loss. This distinction is
important for insurance fraud because insurance policies relate to risks. Accordingly, if an
insurance policy based on a material misstatement is placed, the insurance company is the
victim of a fraud because there was the risk of a claim, even if no claims are made on the
policy.

Some insurance policies relate to risks faced by individuals, whereas others relate to risks
faced by corporations. This section deals with both kinds.
Computers have become an important tool in discovering insurance fraud. The most
common use is to let the computer discover clusters or interrelated data; for example, an
unusual number of claims filed from the same address. This kind of screening is effective in
insurance scams because the fraudsters often work in consort, for example, with doctors or
auto repair shops, to file inflated claims that a search engine seeking commonality can
discover.

6.5.1 Life Insurance Fraud
Life insurance is a policy that pays the insured’s beneficiary a predetermined amount of
money in the event of the insured’s death. Common life insurance frauds include homicide
fraud, staged-death fraud, preexisting health condition fraud, and double-indemnity fraud.

Homicide Fraud
A beneficiary of a life insurance policy may commit homicide to collect benefits. In these
cases, there are actually two victims—the person who has been murdered (see section
6.2.6), and the insurance company, which is required to make a payment on the policy.

Staged Death Fraud
An insured might fake his or her death in order to collect benefits. A variation of this
scheme occurs when a policy is taken out on an insured who is already dead.

Preexisting Health Condition Fraud
An otherwise uninsurable person obtains a life insurance policy through false health
statements on the application describing preexisting health conditions. The normal,
minimal medical examination would not be sufficient to expose the condition. The insured
hopes to die of causes unrelated to the feared condition—that is, a condition that would
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otherwise prevent the policy from being issued—and without an autopsy being performed,
so that the insurer will pay the policy benefits.

Double Indemnity
In some cases, a beneficiary of a life insurance policy will report the death as having been
accidental in order to obtain twice the face value of the policy. A variation of this scheme
occurs when a beneficiary attempts to make a suicide appear to have been accidental.

6.5.2 Casualty Insurance Fraud
Casualty insurance covers the personal injuries and property damage that result from an
accident or other covered occurrence. While accidents can occur anywhere and at any
time, a large number of casualty claims involve injuries sustained in traffic accidents. The
following are the common casualty insurance frauds:
•
•
•
•

Staged accidents
Mortgage insurance fraud
Legitimate accidents with false claims
Personal injury insurance fraud

• Fraudulent claims

Staged Accidents
A staged accident is one in which, for example, an individual will purposely pull out into
the path of an oncoming vehicle or will allow themselves to be rear-ended in order to cause
a collision. A fraudulent claim is then made for nonexistent personal injuries or a falsely
inflated claim is made for real injury. These kinds of insurance fraud usually involve rings of
individuals, including unscrupulous doctors, attorneys and claim adjusters.

Mortgage Insurance Fraud
Mortgage insurance is a policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the
purchaser of the property defaults on those payments because of death or disability. A
typical mortgage insurance fraud is a variation on a staged accident fraud—for example, an
employee who is laid off from work claims that he is disabled, so his mortgage is paid via
his mortgage insurance policy.

Legitimate Accidents with False Claims
In many cases, an individual is involved in a legitimate accident and later exaggerates his
or her personal injuries (usually soft-tissue injuries) to bilk the insurance company.

Personal Injury Insurance Fraud
Personal injury insurance fraud usually involves lying about the circumstances of the cause
of an injury so as to bring it within the insurance coverage. For example, a worker covered
by workers compensation insurance injures his back while working at home but reports it
as a job-related injury to come within the workers compensation insurance coverage.

Fraudulent Claims
A fraudulent claim is one in which, for example, an insured’s auto is brought into a body
shop for repair after a legitimate accident. The body shop inflates the claim, typically to
30
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cover the deductible. The body shop may then pay a cash bribe to the claims adjuster or
intentionally cause additional damage to the car to maximize its profit.

In another example, an insured seeks the cooperation of a scrap yard that has the
capability to crush autos. The insured has his auto crushed and files a theft claim. If the
auto is not recovered within a reasonable span of time, the claim is paid. The insured then
pays the scrap yard for destroying the vehicle without a trace.
In still another variation, a wrecked vehicle is located and insured. A bogus accident is
concocted and a fraudulent claim is filed. Using the same vehicle, this scheme is often
repeated with different insurance companies.

6.5.3 Health Insurance Fraud
Health insurance is a policy that covers someone’s health in the event that the person is
injured or becomes ill. Common health insurance schemes include mobile labs, bundling
and unbundling claims, and collusion between an insured and a provider.

An insurance industry representative reported, in January 2001, that fraud claims in both
the public and private sector reach about $53.9 billion annually. The U.S. government has
increased the funding of law enforcement agencies in the health-care fraud area, with some
U.S. attorneys offices setting up special health-care fraud units. According to one U.S.
attorney, health-care fraud is the most active area of white-collar crime, which includes
going after clinical labs and individual doctors, among others.
A growing fraud related to credit-card fraud is debit-card fraud. Many banks are now
issuing a combination ATM/debit card/credit card rather than three separate pieces of
plastic. Although merchants, generally, cannot check whether there are funds in the bank
supporting a debit card purchase, they can check a credit card with a phone call. No doubt
as the problem grows, protective steps will be installed to stop the fraudsters. Until the
preventive measures catch up, prosecuting and publicizing the fraud will help slow the
growth of this new threat.

Mobile Labs
In the usual mobile lab scam, a group of people set up a lab in a storefront located in a
blue-collar, low income area, often where English is the second language. They then pass
out fliers in the parking lot of a minimum wage manufacturing firm, offering free physicals
to people who have medical insurance. After filling out a family history, the insured is
subjected to extensive tests for a variety of maladies, and the average physical ends up
costing the insurer three to four thousands dollars. When the insured returns for the results
of the tests, the lab is gone.

Bundling and Unbundling Claims
Bundling and unbundling claims is the practice of physicians or clinics billing separately
for medical services performed at the same time. For example, an insured woman has a
hysterectomy performed and at the same time she also has her appendix removed. The
physician, however, bills the insurance company as if the appendectomy was a completely
separate procedure.
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Insured-Provider Collusion
In collusion between an insured and a provider, the provider furnishes the insured with a
bill for services not actually rendered. The insured makes an application for reimbursement
to the insurance company, and the proceeds are divided between the insured and the
provider.

6.5.4 Property Insurance Fraud
Property insurance is a policy that covers an individual or corporation’s property from loss
(whether stolen or destroyed), up to a predetermined amount of money. Common property
insurance schemes include: staged false theft, repossessed household goods, pawned
personal property, and arson.

Staged False Theft
In staged false theft, an insured secretes property he or she owns and reports it stolen, or
alternatively reports property stolen that he or she never owned.
In a recent case involving Michael Jackson CDs, a music distributor had misjudged the
demand for the CD and had excess inventory on hand. A theft was then staged in order to
offload the excess stock, which was then destroyed. When forensic accountants revealed
the lack of demand and the excess inventory, the distributor dropped his claim.

Repossessed Household Goods
Repossessed household goods fraud occurs when, for example, household items (furniture,
appliances, and so on) are repossessed, and the insured reports the property was stolen.

Pawned Personal Property
When pawning personal property, a fraudster may inflate the value of his or her personal
belongings, insure them, and then pawn them for a lesser amount of cash. The fraudster
then reports them stolen and files a claim. Once the insurance payment is received, the
fraudster then redeems the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance
payment, and pockets the difference. These schemes can be risky to the perpetrator,
however, because in most states pawnshops are required to check customer identification
and keep records of their transactions, in order to facilitate police investigations of reported
thefts.

Arson
Arson is the purposeful destruction of property by fires, sometimes for profit. For example,
an insured may be about to lose his or her house, car, or business due to an inability to
make loan payments. The insured sets fire to the property to collect the insurance
proceeds. Alternatively, an insured may replace an item with something less expensive
when he or she remodels after the fire.
Arson can also be committed by companies, which then file claims under their property
insurance policies as well as their business interruption policies. This is covered in
chapter 7.
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Commercial Crime

7.1

Overview

7.1.1 Definitions
The terms white-collar crime, economic crime, and commercial crime are not legal ones and are
often used interchangeably. This chapter covers the distinctions between these terms.

White-Collar and Economic Crimes
Although scholars differ widely in their definition of white-collar crime, the Dictionary of
CriminalJustice Data Terminology, published by the U.S. Bureau ofJustice Statistics, defines
white-collar crime as: “non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of
deception by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semiprofessional and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; also non
violent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by anyone having special
technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the
person’s occupation.” This definition includes most if not all of the crimes and behaviors
described in this Handbook.
Economic crime has a similar definition regarding its objective and methodology, that is,
crime committed for economic gain by means of deception; however, economic crime is
broader in its scope than white-collar crime: it could also include violent crimes committed
by people without any particular occupational status—for example, armed robbery.

Commercial Crime
The term commercial crime is frequently used as a substitute for the terms white-collar
crime and economic crime. However, for purposes of this Handbook, a more restrictive
definition is adopted: that is, commercial crime is white-collar crime committed by an
individual or a group of individuals in a company for the benefit of that company and,
indirectly, themselves.
This distinction, that is, between fraud committed against a business or commercial entity,
and commercial crime committed by a business or commercial entity—is a useful one.
Historically, our legal system, institutions, and even the procedures adopted by auditors
have tended to focus more on conventional fraud committed purely for personal gain. In
recent years, however, awareness has been heightened to the possibility of the business or
commercial entity itself being the perpetrator.
Frauds against investors and environmental crime are two examples that have received
increasing, media attention.
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7.1.2 Victims of Commercial Crime
Victims of commercial crime can include—

• Customers—for example, through false advertising and price fixing.

• Competitors—for example, through industrial espionage and intentional copyright
infringement.
• Creditors—for example, through a planned bankruptcy.

• Investors—for example, through false financial statements and other securities fraud.
• The general public—for example, through environmental abuse.

In addition, the practice of organizational bribe giving may victimize any one of the above
groups—for example, the general public when a bribe is given in the awarding of a
government contract.

7.1.3 Extent of Commercial Crime
Two decades ago commercial crime received much less media attention than today, largely
being confined to a short paragraph or two in the business section of the nation’s
newspapers, if it was mentioned at all. Today’s front-page stories are a testimony to the
current widespread public interest in and concern about commercial crime. Scholars
attribute this growing emphasis to, among other things, a greater skepticism about the
behavior of persons in authority. The alleged crimes of Whitewater involving President
Clinton and his associates only deepen the mood of distrust of those in prominent places.

Statistics suggest that there is some reason for distrust. For instance, KPMG Peat Marwick’s
1998 Fraud Survey reported that false financial statements caused losses of $1 million or
more in 42 percent of the reported instances, whereas in the 1994 survey, losses of this
magnitude represented only 24 percent of the total losses.

While it is true that surveys only deal with reported crime, what is clear is that the extent
and value of reported commercial crime is on the increase. Many experts believe that many
frauds go unreported and that the extent of unreported commercial crime is also on the
increase.

7.1.4 Responsibility for Commercial Crime
Some scholars debate whether individuals should be held responsible for crimes committed
on behalf of their organizations. Although some direct benefit accrues to the perpetrator, far
more benefit accrues to the organization.
Regardless of whether the organization is held liable, the frauds are a direct result of some
human action or interaction: if a business is like a dynamite charge, someone must push the
plunger.

Most criminal statutes require that the guilty person have the required criminal intent.
However, an organization can be held liable even if it were unaware of or did not
participate in the fraud. The law recognizes two theories of organizational responsibility:
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1. The identification theory. The organization is held liable when the employees and
organizations can be viewed as one and the same, for example, a small business owner
who has incorporated.

2. The imputation theory. The organization is held responsible for the actions of its
employees through the doctrine of respondeat superiour, a seventeenth century doctrine
that means “let the superior respond.” The legal theory was developed from civil
lawsuits to prevent employers from denying financial responsibility for the acts of their
employees.

7.1.5 Characteristics of Commercial Crime
While commercial crime can take many forms, often it is distinguished by one or more of
these characteristics: tolerance, diffusion of harm, and rationalization.

Tolerance
While awareness of commercial crime has increased in recent years, there still remains a
somewhat greater tolerance for this form of crime as compared to violent crimes such as
armed robbery, or those involving drugs. This greater tolerance may stem not so much
from the nature of the crime itself, but rather from the perception of the perpetrator as
being somehow more civilized. Anybody with strength, decent aim, or access to poison, can
commit murder, but only a limited number of respectable corporate executives or directors
are in a position to violate antitrust legislation.
Diffusion of Harm
Another notable characteristic of most kinds of commercial crime is that there are often
numerous victims who are frequently unaware that they have been harmed. Death from
smog or asbestos poisoning is very likely to be slow and insidious, and its victims will be
hard-pressed to relate their terminal illness to its precise cause, given the complicated
nature of other possible contributing factors. A factory worker with cancer is not likely to be
certain whether it was the toxic chemicals that he handled for fifteen years, the fact that he
smoked too many cigarettes, or bad genes or bad luck that will shorten his life.
In many other cases of commercial crime, the harm tends to be widely diffused and, for
each person, rather insignificant. But these can still be significant crimes. Companies can
earn millions over the course of a year by charging higher prices for products that do not
meet the standards they are alleged to attain. Few people who pay for a package of onehundred thumb tacks will take the time and energy to count the contents of the package to
be certain that they have gotten their money’s worth; it would be an easy and safe venture
to put ninety-two tacks in each package, and some merchandisers find the temptation
irresistible. Similarly, a customer will most likely remain unaware that the gasoline pumps
at a service station are calibrated so that they get fewer gallons than those for which they
are charged. Even if they come to know about these kinds of issues, most customers would
shrug them off as not worth the trouble it would take to do something to remedy the
situation; at most, they might take their business elsewhere.
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Rationalization

Perpetrators of white-collar crime are known for providing elaborate excuses for their
crimes, and the nature of such explanations may be a major distinguishing mark between
them and street offenders. It has been posited that embezzlers typically claim that they are
only borrowing the money; they intended to repay it once they had covered the bills and
other financial demands vexing them. Commercial criminals will similarly rationalize their
behavior; for example, antitrust violators usually maintain that they are seeking to stabilize
an out-of-control price situation when they conspire with others to fix prices, and they are
likely to insist that power-hungry prosecutors and investigators are singling them out.

7.1.6 Investigation and Prosecution of Commercial Crime
The diffuse nature of most commercial crime poses a particular law enforcement dilemma.
Without complaining witnesses, policing has to be proactive instead of reactive; that is, the
enforcement officials themselves have to decide where the offenses are being committed
and how to go about stopping them. Enforcers obviously cannot cope with all the violations
and must decide on rules to guide their efforts. Should they go after the behaviors that
cause the most harm? Should they take on the bigger offenders, or concentrate on the
smallerfry, where their chances of success are much better? They can readily accumulate ten
convictions in a year against ten insignificant companies, whereas it might take three years
to win a victory over one huge corporation. Besides, the resources of the large organization
might allow it to win its case, regardless of the lawless nature of its behavior.

7.1.7 Causes of Commercial Crime
Because businesses are bottom-line driven, it has been posited that they are inherently
prone to committing crime, yet not necessarily criminal. Without necessarily meaning to,
organizations inherently invite commercial crime as a means of obtaining goals. For
example, a department manager’s concern with reaching assigned goals, may lead the
manager to maximize his or her department’s own interests to the detriment of the
organization, or to the detriment of society as a whole.

Organizations can also be criminogenic—prone to producing crime—because they
encourage loyalty. Accordingly, this is because—
The organization tends to recruit and attract similar individuals.
Rewards are given out to those who display characteristics of a team player.
Long-term loyalty is encouraged through company retirement and benefits.
Loyalty is encouraged through social interaction such as company parties and social
functions.
5. Frequent transfers and long working hours encourage isolation from other groups.
6. Specialized job skills may discourage company personnel from seeking employment
elsewhere.

1.
2.
3.
4.

These reasons in turn cause company personnel to sometimes perceive that the
organization might be worth committing crime for.
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Another aspect that makes companies criminogenic is their compensation structures,
particularly for corporate executives who are most likely to be the perpetrators of
commercial crime. Compensation packages for senior personnel usually include a
component based on the results of their company or department, either through stock
options or bonuses. Typically, senior executives have a greater amount of compensation
tied to results than do other employees. Because commercial crime is so diffuse, and the
likelihood of being caught is low, senior executives may perceive that the incentives to
“enhance the success of their organization” through commercial crime will outweigh the
risks.
7.2 Forms of Commercial Crime
Today, the realm of commercial crime can be said to primarily involve offenses against
laws that regulate either one or both of the following: the marketplace or the established
standards of conduct for professional and political life. Some of the most common forms of
commercial crime are described in this section, along with Case Studies and other
examples that illustrate the salient features of such crimes.

The first two cover shams, which Webster’s Dictionary defines as “.. . an imitation or
counterfeit purporting to be genuine [noun]....” and “to act intentionally so as to give a
false impression [verb].”1 Shams are the result of the activities of a confidence trickster or
con artist who has been able to obtain money from the public by various means. Generally,
there are two kinds of shams: corporate shams and investor fraud.
Although these shams are discussed separately in this chapter (due to the size of each
section), in many cases the perpetrator (the corporate con artist) and the victim (individuals)
of the shams have similar characteristics, as does the way in which the sham is operated.
However, they have two major distinctions:

1. In the corporate sham a corporation exists from which the pitch is made. This is in
contrast to an unincorporated individual making a pitch, not on a corporation’s behalf,
but on his or her personal behalf.
2. In investor sham the nature of what is being sold to the victim differs. For example, an
investor sham typically involves making a speculative investment, whereas a corporate
sham typically involves the purchase of something tangible.

The remaining sections of this chapter include the following kinds of fraud as committed by
companies: procurement fraud, industrial espionage, finance fraud, securities fraud,
environmental abuse, economic extortion, health care fraud, and possession of property
obtained by crime.

7. 2.1 Corporate Shams
Corporate shams generally involve something counterfeit or false. In this case the corporate
sales pitch appears to offer something genuine, yet there is no underlying substance. The
perpetrator of the crime is often a con artist acting through a corporate entity. In fact, by
using the corporate veil as a shield from the public, the con artist gains an appearance of

1Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, 1993.
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respectability and substance that he or she would otherwise lack. The con artist’s wares may
consist of one or more of the following:
• Products oriented to individual consumers (as opposed to products that companies
would buy) that are sold by false advertising.
• Franchises or distributorships that the victim purchases in order to run a business.
• Solicitation of money donations towards a charitable or religious cause.
Generally, shams that are carried on through an incorporated business involve pyramid
sales schemes, mail order sales, advertising to be placed in charitable programs or flyers, or
donations to charitable organizations. Newer forms of corporate shams that are becoming
more common are the selling of franchises, and other get-rich-quick schemes, such as the
selling of vending or arcade game machines: the purchasers then set up their own business
using the franchise or the equipment bought.

When a con artist hides behind a corporate veil, some or all of the following characteristics
may apply:

1. The con artist uses expensive letterhead, emblazoned with a worldly name and a classy
address, to impress potential victims.

2. The company has a very informal corporate structure, and a very short life span.
3. The company’s accounting systems are primitive or nonexistent.
4. The company conducts an extensive and appealing advertising campaign.
5. If a product is offered, the product itself may be of questionable value, and there is
seldom, if any, post sale servicing.
6. The customer is expected to pay for the product via cash or readily negotiable checks on
(or before) delivery.
7. Once received, the cash is quickly removed from the company through the payment of
commission expenses, salaries, bonuses or management fees, so that the con artist can
reap the immediate benefits of the scheme.

The key to the corporate sham, as with any sham, is the effectiveness and the speed with
which the sales pitch brings results. The method of delivering the sales pitch may range
from telephone solicitation (via a boiler room operation), to either cold calls, or advertising
in local newspapers, or both.
Possible red flags for a corporate sham include elaborate representations that demonstrate
the quality of the product, proposed earnings that are excessively high for the franchise, or
an apparently hard-sell pitch to raise money for a purported charitable purpose.

Finally, you should be aware of the arguments put forward by defense counsel in corporate
sham cases. Some of the issues defense counsel might raise include:

• Caveat emptor—let the buyer beware.
• Some of the money received was in fact directed to the promoted charitable purpose.
• The investor is at fault: that is, for not working hard enough at a franchise operation to
make it succeed, or for not waiting long enough to receive the goods that would have
eventually been shipped, and so on.
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Merchandise Swindles or False Advertising
Merchandising frauds include all frauds perpetrated against purchasers of merchandise and
services. If you have ever paid for an item and received something less than advertised, you
have been the victim of a merchandising swindle or false advertising.
These frauds generally fall into one of the following four categories:

1. Representations that the purchase is a bargain when in fact it is not—for example,
department stores raise the price of a product significantly one day and then the next
day drop it back to where it had been, maintaining in their advertising that it now is on
sale.

2. Collection of money for one product and substitution of another of lesser quality or
cost—for example, claims have been made that shoes are alligator when in fact they
were made of plastic.
3. Misrepresentations regarding the quality of the product—for example, a company
selling glass demonstrated in television commercials that its car window product was so
perfect that when you looked through it you could hardly believe there was anything
between you and the outside scene; it was later proved that the ads were filmed from
inside a car with the window rolled down.
4. Failure to deliver the product or service—for example, in bait and switch tactics, stores
advertise a specific product at a strikingly low price, but then, when the customer tries to
buy the item, it is no longer available. It is the customer’s presence and attention they
want to attract—once they have him or her listening, they assume that slick sales tactics
can accomplish the rest of the deceit.

Defraud You in Writing Case Study

Between September 1997 and June 1998, Smith and Jones, partners of Defraud You
in Writing Inc. committed fraud by obtaining funds from the public for goods they
did not intend to supply.
Smith and Jones operated the business through telephone solicitation whereby
books were offered for sale, and customers’ names were entered into a drawing for a
trip to the Caribbean via Acme Tours. Door-to-door sales people would follow up
on the calls and try to obtain orders for the books. The orders set forth the terms,
the method of payment, the time and method of delivery, and an announcement for
a drawing on a certain date. The drawing date was inserted in a blank on the order
form, the first draw being December 31, 1997.
From the evidence of Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, during the period between
October 1997 and May 1998, the actual net cash receipts from orders by members
of the public totaled $75,291 (after allowances for returned checks) on 1,867 orders.

Defraud You in Writing’s suppliers were not paid during this period, so the total
number of orders filled was 311. In fact, during the three months with the largest
sales, (December, February and March) no books were ordered from Defraud You’s
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suppliers. Instead, substantial effort was being made to increase the sales force (and
thus the revenue), and new premises were being sought

The judge in this case believed that Defraud You in Writing used the 311 orders to
create a camouflage for the business’ real activity: to obtain funds for orders they
never intended to fulfill.
As for the drawing, no arrangements had been made with Acme Tours to enable
the winner to take the trip.

Franchise and Distributorship Frauds

Both franchise and distributorship frauds are characterized by a get-rich-quick business
opportunity that involves a large up-front purchase of equipment, supplies, and
promotional materials. Many such schemes are part of a pyramid scam.

CookieVend & Run Inc. Case Study
CookieVend & Run Inc. was incorporated in March 1997 to sell cookie vending
machines. CookieVend’s headquarters were located in New York City. Its office
staff generally consisted of the president, general office manager, secretary
treasurer, bookkeeper, and three typists.

Shortly after CookieVend’s incorporation, a series of ads were placed in newspapers
across the country. These ads offered a substantial guaranteed income, which could
be earned for an investment of $3,000 to $9,000. Although the ads differed
somewhat from paper to paper, they all offered a part-time job that could net the
right person an income of $2,000 per month or more.

In addition to the office staff, CookieVend employed a sales staff of approximately
ten people to interview the respondents to the ads. These sales reps traveled
independently of each other and were provided with a corporate brochure and
other material that instructed them on what to promise the new distributors.

Some 180 people purchased these distributorships for an investment of between
$3,000 and $9,000 each, depending on the number of vending machines purchased.
Supplies of cookies and insurance were also purchased. CookieVend’s total sales
from April to December 1997 were approximately $1.2 million.
In the ensuing year, not one distributor was successful in his or her business. The
complaints were generally as follows:

1. The quality of the vending machines was very poor.
2. Three distributors never received their vending machines (twenty-three
machines in all).
3. Cookies were stale when received by the distributor.
4. The price of cookies increased from fourteen cents to twenty cents each soon
after the distributors purchased their machines.
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5. The company did not honor claims of damage to machines in accordance with
the insurance protection policy on the agreement.

6. The company did not honor its three-year repair warranty on vending machines.
7. The company did not attempt to address any reasonable complaints.
Evidence ofFraud. All of CookieVend’s management personnel were found guilty of
fraud and received jail sentences. The evidence that formed the basis for the case
against them was as follows:

1. CookieVend’s revenues and expenses showed that its level of profitability was
directly attributable to the sale of machines. This also showed that the sale of
cookies resulted in losses, thus CookieVend had a motive to sell machines rather
than cookies.
2. CookieVend’s primary disbursements were for commissions, advertising, travel,
and business promotion. These expenditures occurred during a period when the
distributors’ complaints about product quality fell on deaf ears.
3. The profit-loss experience of the distributors was much worse than the profit-loss
statements represented in the newspaper advertisements. One of the highest
performing distributors realized a gross profit, assuming all cookies were sold, of
$375, on an investment of $7,941 over a period of eighteen months.
4. CookieVend never purchased a liability policy although the distributors’
purchase agreements represented that a policy did in fact exist.
5. The distributor agreement set out a nonrescission clause specifically stating, “The
distributor is not relying on any oral or written expressions, promises or
warranties made by anyone to consummate this transaction.”

Charity and Religious Fraud
Jim Bakker, former head of the defunct PTL (Praise the Lord Club) has brought
international attention to religious fraud. The essence of his scheme was to sell “lifetime
partnerships” in a luxury hotel, which his followers could use for life. Prosecutors were able
to show that Bakker’s plan was completely unworkable, because many more partnerships
were sold than could ever be accommodated. Bakker used the money to pay himself and
his lieutenants millions of dollars in salaries and bonuses. He was convicted under federal
mail fraud statutes.
Other kinds of charity and religious groups resort to fraud as a way of obtaining
contributions. In the most common of the schemes, fraudsters operating in boiler rooms call
unsuspecting victims and raise funds for allegedly good causes or for worthwhile
organizations. The funds collected are not used for their intended purpose, or the fraudsters
fail to disclose that they keep the majority of the funds raised for administration costs and
give the sponsoring charity or religion only a small portion of the money collected.
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Rob M. Blind Case Study
Between January 1997 and July 1998, Rob M. Blind and I. Swindle committed
fraud by developing a scheme through the medium of telephone solicitations that
induced the public to contribute funds allegedly for charitable purposes—to benefit
the blind.

The operation, Help the Sightless Associates, carried on by Rob and his associates, was
reasonably simple. They hired three or four blind musicians, who joined other
sighted employees for a tour of several cities. In each city they planned to visit, they
conducted a telephone solicitation campaign: literally by going through the yellow
pages and calling every business listed. The firms solicited were asked to buy an ad
in a program, which was to be distributed at a concert to be held in that city.
If the firm refused to advertise, it would be asked to buy tickets to the concert that it
could use, give away, or allow to be given away on its behalf.
The Help the Sightless Associates was not a charitable organization and never applied
for registration as such. There is no record of them donating anything to the blind
other than paying the musicians who gave the concerts.
As for the dollar amount of the fraud, according to Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, the total
gross receipts for 1997 and part of 1998 were $252,327. These funds were used in the
following manner:

Payments to the blind musicians

-50 percent

Payments unaccounted for

-48 percent

Expenses

Total

-2 percent

100 percent

7.2.2 Investor Frauds
Like corporate shams, investor frauds use techniques designed to produce a quick return or
benefit to the company that is the subject of the con. The techniques generally used are
telephone solicitation, personal cold calls, or spreading the sales pitch by word of mouth
among a particular group of individuals, such as doctors or dentists—who typically have
high incomes or high net worth, or both, but possess limited financial or investment
expertise. The con artist may succeed in persuading a member of the group to introduce
him or her to other members, thus creating confidence in both the scheme and him- or
herself. The investors are actively encouraged to spread the word to their close friends
about this opportunity for an investment. These activities are often perpetrated through a
pyramid or Ponzi scheme—both of which are described below.
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The key to the con is generally a direct pitch to the investors’ greed—that is, promises of
high returns within a short period. The scheme may entail investment in precious metals or
precious or semiprecious gems, and has been known to embrace items, such as antique
coins and commodity futures. Investor frauds have even extended to what is commonly
known as flips of real estate.

Although many of the characteristics of a corporate sham discussed in section 7.2.1 apply
equally to investor frauds, there are two characteristics that are unique to investor frauds:
1. An extensive and appealing get-rich-quick advertising campaign is conducted,
suggesting to the victims that easy money can be made with very little effort.

2. Investors, once the investment is determined to be a con, do not want any publicity that
would expose the foolishness of their investment.

Chain Referral (Pyramid versus Ponzi) Schemes
Chain referral schemes are based on the same idea as the well-known chain letter. This is a
particular kind of sham, which could involve products, or may involve only investments. In
one example of a chain letter, the con artist starts the chain letter by sending a letter to five
or more people requesting (on some pretext—often preying on people’s superstitions) the
recipients to mail money to the con artist. The letter also instructs each recipient to send the
letter to a further five people with the request that money be sent to the names in the first
two tiers of the pyramid. The third tier recipients in turn repeat the process of mailing the
request for money and adding themselves to the bottom of the pyramid. Often there is an
instruction that only four or five tiers should receive the money; the top name dropping out
with the addition of a new name(s) at the bottom. By the time the chain reaches the seventh
or eighth level (if the chain continues that long), the multiplier effect creates enormous
wealth to those higher up in the chain, because they receive money from the geometrically
growing lower tiers.

Of course, things other than money can be the objects of chain letters. Some involve
recipes, Christmas cards, and other harmless items. However, chain letters don’t work
indefinitely. That is because someone in the lower level inevitably fails to mail out his or
her five letters, and the chain is then broken; usually only those in the upper levels profit.

Chain referral schemes, also called pyramids or Ponzi Schemes (after the notorious Charles
Ponzi who successfully employed the scheme in the early twentieth century), are based
largely on the same principal. The difference is that some are legitimate and some are not.
Pyramid sales structures are generally legitimate, and Ponzi schemes are usually
illegitimate.
For example, many products sold exclusively in the home, such as Amway merchandise,
can be legitimate forms of pyramids. Individuals are recruited to sell merchandise. They in
turn recruit their friends and colleagues to sell, and get a cut of their commissions. This
recruitment continues on down, with those in the upper levels receiving a portion of the
commissions from several different layers of sales personnel. However, because of the
turnover in sales personnel, most people fail to achieve a sufficient level in the chain or
pyramid to make the touted commissions. They often get discouraged and quit, further
depressing the chain.
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Illegal pyramids (Ponzi Schemes) exist as well. One common variation is for a fraudster to
place mail order ads promising wealth to individuals for performing work in their homes
for services such as stuffing envelopes. When the victim responds to the ad, they are
informed that the opportunity requires sending in money. In return, he or she receives a
letter suggesting the victim place a similar ad and collect money in the same way, using the
same letter. In other words, the fraudster is telling the victims in effect, “do the same thing
to others that I just did to you.”
Another typical Ponzi scheme involves the diversion of investment funds. This fraud words
as follows: A company will open its doors as an investment firm, promising better than
average returns on its investment. When the company receives money from investors A
through G, the money is diverted to the personal benefit of the principals. When additional
money is received from investors H through L, those funds are used to pay off investors A
through G. When funds are received from investors M through Z, this money is used to pay
off investors H through L, or at least to pay interest, and so on. The money paid out to the
early investors, therefore, is not from returns achieved on investments, but rather a
diversion of new investments. This pyramid continues until the scheme collapses.

Many operators simply set up a mail or telephone operation, collect funds, then close the
operation and move, only to reestablish a similar operation and repeat the scheme. Law
enforcement officials acknowledge a significant problem with chain referral schemes, but
readily admit that they are incapable of adequately controlling the problem.
These schemes, or variations of them, cannot go on indefinitely because they require a
constant stream of money to cover the diverted funds. When the flow of new investments
fall below that level, there is insufficient cash to pay off old investors, and the scheme
collapses. The chain referral schemes are not dependent on a particular product or service,
but rather on the method of diverting funds. Common chain investment schemes include
franchising, sales distributorships, investment and securities of various kinds, and
merchandise.

Finally, it should be noted that many chain referral schemes involve small amounts of
money that are taken from many victims. Because victims typically feel foolish about being
fleeced, they frequently do not file charges. And even when complaints are made, the
police do not give these crimes priority because of staffing and budgetary commitments. As
a result, many chain referral operators stay around a long time.

7.2.3 Finance Fraud
False Mortgage Security
False mortgage security is a term used to refer to security that turns out to be nonexistent or to
have a value far lower than was represented. This is a kind of loan fraud whereby the
perpetrator is usually an individual acting through a sham corporation, and the victim could
be a bank, but is more likely an individual or another corporation.

The usual characteristics of false mortgage security fraud are as follows:
• An investor is persuaded to make a loan or invest funds on the assurance that repayment
of the loan or investment will be fully protected and secured in some way.
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• When the touted investment fails to materialize, the investor discovers that the assets
supposedly securing the investment do not exist, are worth much less than the investor
had been led to believe, or were pledged to numerous other investors rendering them
virtually worthless.
• The investor is often a financially unsophisticated individual who does not review the
transaction papers in detail and may not understand them but is persuaded to invest by
the prospect of a high return (for example, a well above average interest rate).
• The investor usually relies on the promises of the perpetrator or the apparent protection
afforded by the security.

It should be noted that some assets pledged as security (that is, land or stock) may lose
value for legitimate reasons such as fluctuations in their market values. In cases of false
security, however, there is intent to deceive on the part of the person soliciting the funds.

Accounting evidence in most cases can establish and document the funds’ flow in situations
of this nature. It is more likely that evidence establishing the intent to deceive will be
obtained by conducting interviews (viva voce evidence) than through the analysis of the
accounting records. It is often through the interview process that the true nature and intent
of the transactions are revealed. The nature of the documentary evidence required to
establish the economic benefit to the fraud perpetrator, and to trace the flow of funds are
dictated by the nature of the fraud scheme.

Trust Our Paper Inc. Case Study

Trust Our Paper Inc. commenced its syndicated mortgage program in 1995. The
program expanded rapidly, particularly during 1998, to include loans for property
development in Plainville. The company solicited—in appropriate private
offerings—funds from the public for investment in specific mortgages, with certain
representations made about the nature of each loan and the mortgaged property.
Unbeknownst to the investors, the mortgaged property was not as marketable or
valuable as had been represented because it did not have the necessary local
governmental approval for development.

During 1998, the period of its most rapid expansion, Trust Our Paper experienced
an increasingly severe negative cash flow from operations. This condition persisted
until March 1999, when Trust Our Paper went into receivership primarily as a
result of—
1. The apparent inability of the mortgagors (borrowers) to make interest payments.
2. The apparent inability of the mortgagors to pay principal amounts upon
maturity.
In reality, the face amount of the mortgages were much higher than the underlying
value of the property secured by the mortgages.

The problems in this case are best illustrated by a transaction that commenced in
the summer of 1998, when Trust Our Paper purchased land in Plainville at a price
of $400,000. It planned to build a 300-suite apartment complex on the land. Before
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the closing of the transaction, Trust Our Paper had been unsuccessful in obtaining
mortgage financing through normal channels because of an inability to get zoning
approval for its plans. The location of the land and environmental concerns proved
to be insurmountable obstacles.

Trust Our Paper then provided a loan of $1 million to ABC Developments Ltd., the
developer of the property, secured by a first mortgage on the property. Funds were
solicited from the public—in a properly registered offering—for investment in this
mortgage. Trust Our Paper represented to the investors that it had used the
mortgage proceeds for interim construction of a 300-unit residential complex.

However, an examination of the mortgage proceeds revealed a different story. Out
of the proceeds, $400,000 was used to reimburse Trust Our Paper for the cost of the
property. Thus, the purchase was financed entirely by the investors through their
loan to Trust Our Paper. Of the remaining funds, $115,000 was disbursed in
November 1998 to Green Investments Inc., a troubled company with a deficit of
$296,000. The balance of $485,000 was disbursed in a similar manner.
The underlying security given to the Trust Our Paper investors was highly
questionable in light of the following:

1. The mortgage for $1 million was on land purchased for $400,000.

2. The mortgage guarantor advised that the property was unsuitable for financing.
3. The property remained undeveloped.
4. The developers were unable to obtain alternate mortgage financing.

5. The mortgage proceeds were not used as purported.
Thus, the proceeds raised from the public offering were diverted from their
intended use, that is, to develop the property. This diversion diluted the value of
the security and jeopardized the achievement of the appraised potential that was
offered as security.

Advance Fee Fraud
Generally, advance fee schemes involve paying bogus corporations an up-front finder’s fee
in exchange for a promise to receive an advance on a loan. The victims of these kinds of
schemes can be both individuals and corporations. Often if an individual is seeking loan
funds but for whatever reason cannot obtain funding from traditional sources, he or she will
turn in desperation to these fraudsters.

Once the fee is paid, the perpetrator disappears. In some cases, desperate institutions are
offered access to illegal money, and they typically do not report the loss of the advance fee
when the deal falls through. General characteristics of these schemes include one or more
of the following:
• Deals too good to be true often are not true.
• The agent requests documents on bank stationery, or signatures of officers, or both.
• The bank is asked to give nondisclosure agreements to protect the agent or other parties.
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• The agent asks for an irrevocable agreement to pay commissions, expenses, and a fee.
• There are several complex layers of agents, brokers, and other intermediaries.
• The perpetrators often describe the offerings as special one of a kind offers and state that
the deal will be killed if anyone is contacted to verify the deal.
• The deal often involves foreign agents, banks, and other sources, such as an unnamed
wealthy person or government.

Debt Consolidation Schemes
People who find themselves hopelessly in debt frequently turn to debt consolidation
agencies out of desperation. Debt consolidation agencies do not advance loans, but rather
act as an intermediary between the debtor and creditor. Some are legitimate, but many are
not. Bona fide debt consolidation agencies make money by organizing the debtor’s affairs
and collecting a percentage of the money handled on the debtor’s behalf.

In the typical scenario, the debtor contacts the consolidation agency, and provides a
complete list of their creditors and the amount of monthly payments currently owed. The
agency then usually writes letters to the creditors, requesting a debt work-out plan
providing for lower monthly payments spread out over longer periods of time. The
creditors are often motivated to accept the arrangement provided they think that the entire
debt, or the major portion of it, will be repaid or that the debt consolidation plan will
prevent a bankruptcy filing or default by the debtor. The debtor then makes a lump sum
monthly payment to the consolidation agency, which then distributes the money to the
creditors.

Unscrupulous debt consolidation schemes are perpetrated when the agency collects money
from the debtor but does not forward it to the creditor. In some instances, it is months
before the debtor finds out that the money has been misappropriated. The victim debtor
has not only lost money to the unscrupulous agency, but still owes the original debt.

Bankruptcy Fraud
Bankruptcy is designed to give every corporation or individual encumbered by mountains
of debt a fresh start. In a liquidation or Chapter 7 bankruptcy, all assets and liabilities are to
be listed on the bankruptcy petition and a trustee is appointed by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Trustee’s Office in the district where the petition was filed. The role of the trustee is to
liquidate the assets of the estate and distribute the funds to the creditors pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code.
Generally there are three common kinds of fraud committed by companies or individuals
filing for bankruptcy; they are:

1. Fraudulent conveyances. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, cash or other assets
are transferred to friends, relatives or business associates. Once the bankruptcy court has
discharged the debtor’s debts, these assets are then transferred back to the debtor. This
kind of transfer is often referred to as parking assets. These prepetition transfers are often
disguised to appear as bona fide business transactions.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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2. Concealing assets or asset stripping. The debtor could: convert assets to his or her own
benefit, simply fail to disclose certain assets in the bankruptcy schedules, or deny the
existence of such assets when meeting with the trustee or at hearings before a
bankruptcy judge.
3. Planned bankruptcy. The debtor’s affairs are structured in a way that gives the appearance
of a failing business, but is actually a lucrative business that needs to avoid the
circumstances of a particular obligation, litigation, or labor dispute. This is often
accomplished through the use of transfer pricing or management fees from related
companies, which may or may not be disclosed to the trustee.
Planned Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy can be attributed primarily to one or a combination of the
following causes:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Incompetence of management
Lack of managerial experience
Neglect
Severe economic recession or depression (macro or market sector)
Disaster
Fraud

Fraud is not the cause of most business failures.
The victims, regardless of the cause of a business failure, are customers and creditors:
customers who have ordered or paid for goods that are undelivered at the time the business
goes belly up, and the various creditors of the business that remain unpaid at that time. On
many occasions the employees are also victimized because they lose their jobs or are
unable to collect unpaid wages or both.
A business experiencing financial difficulties can pursue several remedies either to rectify
the situation or to conclude the operation of the business. The owner may cease business
voluntarily, or an unpaid creditor may precipitate the closing down of the business through
the initiation of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.

Ask the following questions when considering whether a bankruptcy was planned:
1. When did the company realize it would fail? A business failure may appear to be the
result of management incompetence, inexperience and neglect. Notwithstanding the
reasons for the financial difficulties, it is crucial to establish whether management
carried on the business after a point in time when they knew, suspected or should have
known that business failure was imminent. In that case, the fraud occurs when they
solicit funds from the public, including creditors, in spite of knowing or suspecting that
the company might be unable to fulfill the representations and commitments made. The
business, however, may have continued in the honest belief that it would turn around
(the rainbow syndrome).
Establishing the point in time at which management knew, should have known, or
suspected that business failure was imminent requires a detailed review and analysis
of the financial position of the business. Financial statements, accounting records
and banking records have to be scrutinized. (See Chapter 10 for further information
on financial statement fraud.) The examination would disclose not only the
financial position and any deterioration in it, but also the level of management’s
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knowledge about the situation. Correspondence and other documents from customers
and creditors, expressing concern or demanding delivery or repayment, together with
viva voce evidence may also be useful.
2. Did the company pursue remedies? In determining whether fraud exists, the forensic
accountant must consider whether the remedies available to the business in financial
difficulty, as noted above, were pursued. In addition, the accountant must ask if honest
attempts were made to resolve the difficulties or merely to give the impending business
failure the appearance of legitimacy.
3. Has the business committed an act of bankruptcy? Bankruptcy law defines specific
activities on the part of a debtor as constituting an act of bankruptcy. These activities
include one or more of the following:
• The transfer of assets to a trustee or other third party for the benefit of creditors

• A payment to one creditor in preference over another
• The fraudulent conveyance or transfer of property
• An attempt by the debtor to abscond without paying debts
• A failure to redeem goods seized under an execution order issued against the debtor

• The presentation at a meeting of creditors of a statement of assets and liabilities
indicating insolvency, or a written admission of the debtor’s inability to pay his or
her debts (the filing of a bankruptcy petition), or both
• An attempt to move or hide any of the debtor’s property
• Notice to any creditors that the debtor is suspending payment of his or her debts

• A failure to meet liabilities, generally, as they become due
• Default in a proposal made as part of the bankruptcy proceedings
4. Was the business failure planned? A planned business failure occurs where management
has converted the assets of the business to its own, that is, personal benefit and then tries
to conceal the conversion through formal bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, the
debtor induces vendors to sell goods on credit when the debtor knows that it has neither
the intent nor the capacity to pay the creditors. Characteristics of a planned failure
include one or more of the following:
• The business has developed a reputation for trustworthiness in the business
community. This reputation may have a short history, and may have been
established for the express purpose of inducing companies to sell goods to the
business on credit.

• The business sells tangible and highly marketable products.
• The business seeks to sell, or convert the goods to cash as quickly as possible with
little care about the selling price because they have no intention of paying the
suppliers for the goods.
• The proceeds from operations are moved out of the business so as not to be
identified as an asset of the business at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.
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• The business has little net worth.
• The business has not been a financial success.

• The business departs from its normal business practices with regard to purchasing,
payments to suppliers, sales, and the granting of credit to customers.
The typical changes in business conduct of a planned failure include:

• The volume of inventory ordered from existing suppliers increases significantly. The
suppliers will probably extend credit up to sixty days, largely as a result of their wish
to retain the customer and the established reputation of the company.
• The unsuspecting suppliers will receive little or no payment. They may receive
payment for the initial order but not for subsequent shipments. The scam will
probably be completed within sixty days of the date of purchase of the inventory.
After that time, the suppliers are likely to become suspicious and might take action of
some kind.
• The company will refuse to sell the inventory to its customers on credit; that is, it will
sell on a cash-on-delivery (COD) or other cash-up-front basis only. To get customers
to pay cash, the selling price per unit is commonly at or below the company’s cost
price per unit, as shown on the supplier’s invoice.

• If inventory still remains after the company has approached its usual customers, the
inventory may then be offered to new customers. These sales tend to be non-arm’s
length and may be in cash. Although the sales invoices may indicate the payment
was made in cash, the deposit of the cash into the business’ bank account does not
necessarily follow.
• If, after all these efforts to sell, inventory is still left at the site, it can be physically
removed. The trail will be covered to prevent obvious detection.
A planned bankruptcy is designed, of course, to benefit those in control of the debtor
entity. The fraudster will make every effort to ensure that no trail is left behind to enable
the trustee in bankruptcy to retrieve the proceeds of the fraud and return those proceeds
to the creditors. The techniques employed to block the path of the trustee are limited
only by the perpetrator’s imagination and will vary according to the circumstances.

7.2.4 Arson for Profit
Arson and a planned bankruptcy share some similar characteristics. In both situations,
business problems exist and are acknowledged to exist by management. Arson, like
planned bankruptcy, can become the means of a criminal making the best of a bad
situation. The perpetrator will, of course, seek to commit the crime without leaving a trail of
criminal conduct.

The following are the chief characteristics of cases of arson:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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The fire is of an incendiary nature.
An insurance policy is in force.
There is a financial or other business-related motive.
The financial motive may not be readily apparent.
Exclusive opportunity to commit arson may or may not be evident.
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6. The prosecution’s case will often be based on circumstantial evidence.
7. Efforts may have been made to destroy some or all of the accounting and business
records.

Without a confession or an eyewitness, the evidence in a case of arson is almost always
circumstantial in nature. The prosecutor usually must depend on circumstantial evidence,
which must be sufficient to rebut every reasonable hypothesis other than a willful and
intentional burning. However, evidence supporting the incendiary origin of a fire is often
interwoven with other evidence that tends to connect the accused with the crime. The
connection to the accused is often the presence of a motive and the opportunity of the
accused to perform the act.

Historically, insurance companies have been reluctant to challenge the veracity of loss
claims arising from major fires that have damaged or destroyed commercial, industrial,
recreational or residential establishments. The reasons given for this reluctance include the
following:
• Court proceedings are protracted and expensive, and the ultimate decision is often
favorable to the insured.
• The insurance company (like a bank) is often perceived as the big, bad guy, thus, the
insured sometimes gets the benefit of reasonable doubt because they are perceived as
the little guy.
• The punitive damages awarded to a claimant often far exceed the loss claim if the courts
feel that there has been an unreasonable delay.
• The only evidence is circumstantial.
• The alleged arsonist has been acquitted in a related criminal proceeding.

Accounting Issues and Evidence
The forensic accountant in arson-related matters should differentiate the business position
of the company and its owners from the financial position. Although the financial position
may have a considerable bearing on motive, motive is better understood in the context of
the business itself and the owners, through an overview of all aspects of the operations and
ownership of the business.
Ultimately, the financial analysis is designed to determine the mindset of the company, the
money of the company, and the worker in the company. Accordingly, it is usually
appropriate to obtain as much background information as possible. A starting point may be
the acquisition of a business or the commencement of a new business venture. A review of
the annual financial statements and associated working papers will disclose the company’s
yearly performance and any underlying business problems. Motive not apparent from an
analysis of the company’s financial transactions may become apparent from an
investigation of the social relationships found within a business.

Any review of the status of a business must be objective. It should identify not only matters
that are unfavorable to management and the owners of the company, but also matters that
are favorable. The unfavorable matters may well be obvious, for example, a steady decline
in sales, worsening creditor relations, or a significant withdrawal of funds immediately
before the fire. On the other hand, an owner may have put a substantial amount of his or
her own money into the business shortly before the fire.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Accounting evidence is likely to be extremely significant in establishing motive. The fire
may have destroyed some or all of the accounting and financial records, as well as
correspondence and file material that could have a bearing on the case. These records will
have to be reconstructed to the extent possible; thus, third-party documentation will have
to be obtained and interpreted.
Issues and Sources ofInformation. A review of several recent judgments shows that the main
characteristics in an arson investigation to consider, investigate, and establish in evidence
are as follows:
1. Ownership, including business structure, style, and relationships
2. Financial motive, that is the financial position of the owners and business, and existence
of an insurance policy
3. Current events at or around the time of the fire, including the establishment of exclusive
opportunity, and the origin of the fire as incendiary

Information will be sought from people directly and indirectly connected with the business,
possibly including its bankers, lawyer, accountant, customers, suppliers, insurers,
government agencies, and realtors.
The owner should always be given the opportunity to volunteer any personal or business
records that he or she might have.
See below for a list of questions to consider and documents to examine.

Accounting Evidence. Forensic accountants can assist by investigating several issues, in
particular those involving ownership and financial motive. They can analyze information
from several sources and construct a chronology of the financial events leading up to the
fire. They can analyze the financial records of the owner, the business, and third parties,
and demonstrate the company’s position at the time of the fire, comparing it with earlier
periods.
The forensic accountant looks for significant detail when attempting to determine whether
a financial motive exists. If little or nothing is available in the way of accounting books and
records and supporting documentation, the forensic accountant will pursue other third
party sources to secure information for the examination.

Obviously, any financial and accounting records of the business that are available will have
to be examined and analyzed. As previously noted, it is important to provide the owner the
opportunity to volunteer whatever personal or business records he or she has. Beyond this,
the forensic accountant will seek information from others directly or indirectly connected
with the business.
Key questions to consider include the following:
1. What financial condition was the business really in?

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Who maintained the accounting records?
What accounting records would have been available?
What is the ownership structure?
Is the financial position of the owner solid?
What was the business’s cash flow?
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Does the business support the owner?
Does the owner support the business?
Have the essential matters been established?
Is the potential defendant cooperative?
What is the history and pattern of earnings?
Could ownership benefit from selling out to the insurance company?
What did the owner know about his financial state at the time of the fire?
Did any significant events occur at or around the time of the fire?
Who are the major suppliers and what were the business’ relations with them?
Who are the major customers and what were the business’ relations with them?
Who are the bankers and what were the business’ relations with them?
Who is the external auditor?
Who is the outside legal counsel?
Is the business for sale and are negotiations currently being conducted?
Have there been any recent changes in insurance coverage?

Third-party documents to investigate include:

• Government (usually the Secretary of State of the state of incorporation or of a state in
which the corporation is registered to do business) business registration records
• Recorded documents (for example, for land or other property)
• Work papers and files of accountants, auditors, or both
• Any secured transactions registered under the commercial code of the relevant state
• Tax returns
• Correspondence with customers and suppliers
• Bank credit files
• Credit files from other creditors
• Bank statements, canceled checks, deposit slips, credit memos, and debit memos (paper
or microfiche records)
• Payroll information
• General ledger records
• Real estate listings

7.2.5 Procurement Fraud
All organizations including manufacturers, financial institutions, governments, and retailers,
as well as private individuals are involved in the procurement process to acquire goods or
services. For each and every kind of purchased item, ranging from commodities and
equipment to a professional’s time via a consulting services contract, there is a different
kind of procurement fraud that can be perpetrated by the provider of the goods or services.
The risks and warning signs associated with each kind of procurement fraud vary
depending on what is being purchased, and also by the kind and stage of the procurement
process: Questions to ask when examining procurement fraud include:

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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• Is the purchase competitive or noncompetitive?

• What pricing method was used: fixed fee, cost per unit, cost-plus, or a combination
thereof?
• Did the fraud occur at the requirements definition stage, the bidding and selection stage,
or the contract performance and evaluation stage?
Some of the more common kinds of procurement fraud include:

• Bid rigging or price fixing

•
•
•
•

False invoices
Inflated costs
Product substitution
Secret commissions and kickbacks

Bid Rigging or Price Fixing
Bid rigging or price fixing, is the process of setting the price or terms of the contract
between the various bidders without the knowledge or consent of the purchaser.

For example, bidders on a highway construction project may secretly meet before bids are
submitted. During their meeting, they decide who will submit the low bid and what the bid
should be. They may also decide who will bid on what jobs. This is known as bid rotation.
Bid rigging is usually characterized by the lack of independent competitive bids, or by prices
that are close together. The entity seeking the bids is victimized by having to pay higher
prices than the amount that would have been charged had there been no collusion.

False Invoices
Invoices submitted by a contractor for goods that have not been delivered, or for services
that have not been performed are false.

Inflated Costs
Contractors often use a pricing method in which they invoice on a cost-plus basis. That is,
the contractor receives payment for the actual cost of the job, plus a certain profit based on
a percentage of the costs. Clearly, the successful bidder has a vested interest in keeping the
costs high: the higher the cost, the higher the profit.

Typically, in order to obtain inflated profits, contractors falsify the cost of the product or
service. This can be done through simple or complex means. Examples of the former
include adding labor charges for nonexistent (ghost) employees or adding charges for
materials not actually used. In the more sophisticated schemes, the costs are inflated
through overhead allocations.

Product Substitution
Procurement contracts sometimes call for very exacting specifications on the materials used
on the job. Contractors frequently believe the contract specifications are too rigid and,
therefore, feel justified in substituting a less costly product or service, and keeping the
difference.
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In one scheme, a contractor bid on a new runway for an airport authority and won the bid.
The contract called for the depth of the concrete covering the runway to be a certain
minimum. After hearing rumors from competitors that the contractor was pouring less
concrete than the minimum, the authority’s auditors checked the work orders and
discovered that the paperwork reflected the concrete depth to hundredths of an inch. The
auditor reasoned that concrete could not be poured so exactly, checked the actual work,
and found the depth to be less than the contract specifications. The auditors concluded that
the contractor was submitting false reports to the airport authority, and was reaping excess
profit because it was supplying less material than that called for in the contract.

Secret Commissions and Kickbacks
Secret commissions and kickbacks are one of the most common forms of procurement
fraud, and also one of the most difficult to detect. It involves the receipt of a secret
payment, usually from one company (the vendor-payer) to a corporate executive (the agent)
of another company (the procurer): the agent then exercises influence on the decision
making of his or her employer in a way that favors the vendor-payer. For example, a
vendor submits false or inflated invoices for payment, which the procurer’s corporate
executive knowingly approves. This process is often described visually by the triangle of
dishonesty shown in figure 7-1.
The key point to note is that secret commissions and kickbacks are a kind of fraud that
generally accompanies other forms of procurement fraud (such as those described in this
section).

Figure 7-1. Triangle of dishonesty

Vendor

Benefit

$$$

Employer

Employee

(Principal)
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7.2.6 Organizational Bribe Giving
The two main kinds of bribes that benefit organizations are:

1. Bribing politicians and giving illegal campaign contributions.

2. Implementing commercial bribery as related to procurement fraud. Also included here
are bribes for industrial espionage—that is, paying someone to reveal trade and other
secrets about competitors.
Political Bribery

There are three generally recognized characteristics of political bribe giving:
1. Government benefits are often extremely valuable (or, for penalties and sanctions, very
costly), but the demand for benefits can exceed the supply.

2. The government is the sole purveyor of the benefits and sanctions; you must do business
with the government.
3. The bribe is an attempt to both bypass and guarantee the result of the normal processes,
which are often lengthy, costly, and uncertain in result.
The most common form of political bribe giving is illegal campaign contributions, which
have made headlines during the Clinton Administration.
Paying foreign politicians and governments was (and perhaps still is) common in order to
conduct business in many countries. Since the mid-seventies, when the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act was enacted, paying bribes to foreign officials except in cases of national
security has been unlawful.

Commercial Bribery
Commercial bribery involves making payments in exchange for the award of a contract, for
industrial espionage, or for both.

In the triangle of dishonesty, a payment from a vendor to an employee would encourage
the employee to influence the decision regarding the recipient of a lucrative contract.
Several federal and state laws address the practice of commercial bribery. Both the act of
asking for or the making of a payment constitutes an offense. In some instances commercial
bribery may also be a violation of the restraint-of-trade laws. For example, certain industries—
notably the liquor industry—are specifically prohibited from paying for business. Over the
years, many well-known, major businesses have been guilty of commercial bribery (a listing
of names would not add learning other than the giants of industry are involved from-timeto-time in nefarious activities).
Industrial espionage can involve direct payments to third parties to secure valuable
competitive information. It can also be accomplished indirectly, for example, through the
hiring of a competitor’s employees. In one case, several U.S. military procurement agents
were charged with giving defense contractors information on more than $500 million in
Navy purchases that were going to be the subject of the competitive bidding process.
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7.2.7 Industrial Espionage
Industrial espionage is a term that is broadly applied to activities whose main purpose is to
obtain information or related assets from competitors or potential competitors. The classic
forms of industrial espionage are trade-secret theft and copyright piracy.

Trade Secrets
There are three basic elements to a trade secret: novelty, value, and secrecy. Secrecy,
concerns whether an organization handled its alleged secret in a protective manner. If a
judge deems that an organization failed to protect a secret, that organization will not win
judicial support if it charges an employee with theft of that secret
Patent laws seek a compromise between capitalistic self-interest in a trade secret and social
well-being by granting a seventeen-year monopoly to developers of innovative ideas. The
U.S. Supreme Court, in its only ruling on trade secrets (Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
1974), declared the likelihood “remote indeed” that a company would not patent valuable
information that it had developed. However, the Court overlooked the advantage, wellknown to most companies, that trade secrets can be hoarded far beyond the seventeen-year
patent limitation, a matter well documented by the success and secrecy of the formulas for
Coca-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken, among others.
Leakage of trade secret information is said to be particularly likely from employees who go
to work for competitors, careless secretaries, gregarious field sales personnel, and high-tech
computer whizzes who often are more loyal to their equipment than to their fellow
employees or employer. Temporary help is regarded as especially vulnerable: these
employees do not have any company loyalty and can be planted for purposes of trade
secret theft. Sharing sensitive information among two or more individuals, neither of whom
knows the full secret, is one way to reduce the possibility of compromising sensitive
information. Another method can be used to protect mailing lists. By including at least one
decoy address in a list, if the list is compromised, whoever uses it will be sending material
to a fictional person at an address that actually is the list-owning company’s mail drop.

A review of court cases on trade-secret theft shows that defendants are typically smaller
corporations that have hired scientists from larger organizations where they had previously
worked for six to ten years. There also appears to be an unusual amount of trade-secret
theft from family-owned businesses. The defendants in these cases claim that because they
were outsiders, they believed their chances of advancement were hopeless, so they stole the
proprietary information to benefit (ingratiate themselves with) their new employers.

Copyright Piracy
Copyright piracy is defined as the infringement of another’s copyright or other business
rights. It is an activity usually undertaken by manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers that do
not have any legal right to manufacture or copy the product, but who want to earn a quick
profit (greed motive) or to ease a financial difficulty (need motive).
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Bigtown Video Case Study

From August 1997 to May 1, 1998, John Smith was the owner, principal
shareholder, director, president, and general manager of Bigtown Video Inc., a
video store with three retail outlets. During this time Jack Brown was also a
shareholder and secretary-treasurer of the company.
Bigtown Video’s business included the sale and rental of prerecorded videocassettes
as well as the sale of blank cassettes. The videotapes sold and rented by Bigtown
Video fell into two categories: legitimate and “counterfeit.” The legitimate tapes
were obtained from sources authorized to manufacture and distribute the tapes in
compliance with all copyright and distribution rights. They were packaged with
stylized printed jackets showing the nature and content of the particular film. The
counterfeit tapes had been duplicated from legitimate tapes, many of which had not
yet been released to the public in videocassette form. The packaging of the
counterfeit tapes was like that of a blank cassette package with the title of the film
handwritten on the side panel. The legitimate tapes were displayed in the front of
the stores. The counterfeit tapes were kept in the back rooms of the stores in a closet
or in a drawer.
When cross-examined at trial, Mr. Brown testified that he and Mr. Smith had jointly
decided to deal in counterfeit videocassettes in late 1997. The decision was made as
a result of customer demands and financial difficulties. Mr. Brown would buy
counterfeit cassettes from various sources and make duplicates of them. These
actions were done with Mr. Smith’s knowledge and consent. Mr. Smith rented the
counterfeit videocassettes at rates of $5 or more and sold them for prices ranging
from $60 to $100 or more. From January 1998 until May 1998, the gross profit
made by the company from each of the three stores was approximately $1,500 per
week, of which about 60 percent was attributed to the distribution of the counterfeit
videotapes.
In Mr. Smith’s cross-examination, he revealed that he was fully aware of the
illegitimate origins of the counterfeit videocassettes supplied to him and that neither
he, his suppliers, nor Bigtown Video had the right to distribute, rent or sell the
cassettes. Mr. Smith knew that by dealing in these counterfeit tapes he was
effectively depriving their owners of copyright and distribution revenues, which
they would otherwise have been likely to earn but for the use of these illegitimate
tapes: he was prejudicing the economic interests of the real owner. Mr. Smith made
no attempt to contact the owners of the copyright or distribution rights in order to
contribute revenues for his counterfeit use, to obtain these rights, and he had no
intention of so doing.
Bob Green, a vice-president at Star-Studded Studios, testified about the effect of
pirated videocassettes on the revenues of his company. He focused on four areas of
impact and said:

1. That the inferior quality of pirated or counterfeit videocassettes tends to provide
the viewer with a poor opinion of the film and the consequent negative publicity
is harmful to the theatrical market.
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2. That people who have seen a counterfeit videocassette are unlikely to buy the
legitimate cassette upon its release.
3. That for extremely high-grossing films, much of the profit arises out of repeated
viewings of the film by the public. The effect of a counterfeit videocassette in
such a situation is to diminish the theatrical value of the film by eliminating the
possessor’s desire to return to the theater.
4. That with respect to distribution in other territories, the markets for legitimate
cassettes have vanished due to the heavy influx of counterfeit videocassettes in
those territories. In cross-examination Mr. Green admitted that he could not
quantify the loss of profit by theatres from counterfeit videocassettes, nor could
he reliably estimate the extent of loss for a given film or a given year.

7.2.8 Securities Fraud
There are four main kinds of securities fraud that fall within the category of commercial
crime:

1. Knowingly providing misleading or false information in financial statements of a traded
business enterprise. (See Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement
fraud.)
2. Churning: An activity of brokers who buy and sell their clients’ securities for the sole
purpose of generating commissions.
3. Mixing (commingling) of funds.
4. Manipulating the market for a stock by altering the stock’s price through influencing the
factors that affect the market price or by controlling the pool of shares available for sale
or purchase.

Misleading or False Financial Statements
In large companies, upper level management, whose intent is not necessarily to steal, often
manipulates financial statement information. These managers wish to manipulate data to
enhance profitability and thereby earn higher bonuses, or to impress the brass at
headquarters, or to impress stockholders or lenders, or simply to comply with the goals
imposed by senior management. In small companies, where false financial results can
create a direct benefit for senior management, the intent of management is often sinister.
Intentionally falsifying financial statements can be accomplished by one of the following
methods:
1. Misstatement of financial information by arbitrarily raising profits or lowering costs
using techniques such as plugging sales or ending inventory, incorrectly capitalizing
current expenses, deferring necessary repairs, falsifying sales invoices, and altering cost
invoices.
2. Misrepresentation or omission of significant information.
3. Misapplication of accounting principles.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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In the MiniScribe fraud, the company knowingly inflated inventories to deceive the
auditors as to the value of assets on hand; the primary goal was to maintain and drive the
share price of the company up in the public market.
In more recent instances, particularly in the high tech environment, channel stuffing (that is,
just before year end, shipping inventory to distributors and dealers whether or not ordered,
and booking the shipments as sales) was a popular method used to inflate sales to achieve
projected and expected revenue goals. In many instances, product recorded as sold was
returned shortly after year-end.

Heinz Catch-Up Case Study
Heinz has been a household name representing quality food products for more
than one hundred years. The company had been well managed, profitable and
socially responsible. But in the late 1970s, it received considerable unfavorable
publicity for accounting irregularities. Some of its profit-center managers engaged
in reducing its profits to create a cushion for the next year. The total amount of
these pseudo-profit reductions was quite small ($8.5 million) when compared to
overall sales ($2.4 billion). However, annual sales and profits were not what were
reported to the IRS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and company
stockholders.

The disclosure of these irregularities occurred as a result of an antitrust suit brought
by Heinz against Campbell Soup. In Campbell’s discovery efforts, it snagged
evidence that Heinz’ advertising agency was billing for services that had not yet
been rendered. When a Heinz executive was questioned about the matter, he
pleaded the Fifth Amendment.
The antitrust suit was settled shortly afterwards, but the disclosure caused Heinz
headquarters’ personnel to launch an investigation into the accounting practices of
several subsidiaries. Being highly decentralized, headquarters’ personnel claimed
they were unaware of the lower-level fudging. Headquarters monitored
performance through budget forecasts of sales and expenses and an incentive
compensation plan that paid off if high-end profit goals were met. Headquarters
also monitored consistent growth in profits. Top management was committed to
that overriding goal and, the company’s earnings did rise consistently: for example,
1978 marked the fifteenth consecutive year of record profits.
Heinz had an explicit policy that prohibited its divisions from having any form of
unrecorded assets or false entries in its books and records. And Heinz didn’t
measure short-term performance alone. The top nineteen executives, including
division general managers, had long-term incentive plans in addition to the oneyear plan.

What existed here initially were income transferals aided and abetted by vendors
who supplied invoices one year for services that were not rendered until the next
year. When that wasn’t enough, false invoices were submitted one year and then
reversed in the following year. But the amounts involved did not have a material
effect on the company’s reported profits.
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Strangely, the problem at Heinz started in 1974 when it appeared that profits in the
Heinz USA division would exceed those allowed by the wage and price controls in
effect at the time. World headquarters sought a way to reduce the division’s profit
Losses in commodity transactions did not reduce profits enough, so the division
booked $2 million in advertising services. Yet, instead of treating the expense as a
prepaid item, the company charged the advertising expenses off immediately.
Despite the lower profits of the division, world headquarters decided that the
division had achieved its goal and paid the relevant bonuses.

By 1977, the following practices had evolved at the Heinz USA division:
1. Employees delayed year-end shipments until the beginning of the next year to
ensure accurate invoicing dates.
2. Employees handled customer complaints about the delays by making the
shipments, but misdating the shipping and invoice documents.

3. Employees did not record credits from vendors until the following year.
4. Income management became a way of life. One employee was given the task of
maintaining private records to ensure the recovery of amounts paid to vendors
on improper invoices.
5. The practice of delayed shipment and prepaid billing to assure that departmental
budgeted amounts were met permeated the division down to the departmental
level.
6. Ten separate vendors joined in supplying improper invoices.
7. Employees used other questionable tactics to manipulate income including
inflated accruals, inventory adjustments, commodity transactions and customer
rebates.
What can be learned from this case? First, exerting pressure for continuous growth
in profits may foster improper accounting practices, particularly if coupled with an
incentive compensation plan that rewards and reinforces continuous growth on the
high side. Second, autonomous units with independent accounting capabilities
might be tempted, under the above circumstances, to manipulate performance data.

Heinz isn’t the only case in which autonomous accounting or pressure for performance led
to manipulations of records. There were similar episodes in the 1980s at McCormick and
Company, J. Walter Thompson, Datapoint Corporation, Saxon Industries, Ronson
Corporation, Pepsico, AM International, U.S. Surgical, and Stauffer Chemical. More
recently, companies like Sunbeam and Cendant have been in the news for the same kind of
earnings manipulation.

Churning
Churning occurs when a broker buys and sells stock for a client to generate fees, rather
than to protect the best interests of the client. Broker discretionary accounts are especially
ripe for churning because they can be used to generate fees for both the brokerage firm and
the broker, without much involvement or control by the actual investor.
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In one case, two sisters gave brokers $500,000 each to be held in discretionary brokerage
accounts. The brokers executed more than 1,400 stock trades, allegedly earning themselves
$400,000 in commissions, while leaving the sisters with $70,000.

Mixing of Funds
Another scheme involves mixing (commingling) client funds with the funds of the
brokerage firm, or broker, or both. In these cases, brokers will use the client’s stock as
collateral for corporate or personal loans, and post the winning trades to themselves, while
posting the losses to their clients. Some brokers also resort to out-and-out embezzlement of
their client’s money and stock.

Manipulating the Stock Market
Stock market manipulation is a crime perpetrated by a promoter who artificially influences
the market price of shares in a company for self-benefit or for the benefit of his or her
holding company at the expense of the investing public. In most cases, the promoter flogs
his or her holdings to the public, the public pays an artificially high price for the stock, and
the resulting increase in price lines the pockets of the promoter.
Promoters of the stock are usually self-styled financiers who start off owning the majority of
the stock. Often other conspirators join the promoter, forming a control group consisting of
financiers, warehousers, or brokerage salespersons, some or all of whom might be acting
under a corporate umbrella.

To increase the stock’s price, the promoter subjects it to a multipronged attack. The
promoter uses such weapons as influencing the demand for the stock and controlling the
supply of the stock, warehousing the stock (parking), paying secret commissions, wash
trading, and issuing fictitious press releases, all of which are intended to stimulate more
trading than would otherwise occur.

The victim is the investing public. In many ways this particular fraud is similar to other
investment scams that rely on telephone solicitations (boiler room operations) and high
commission rates (which are often secret).
Reasons to Study This Kind of Crime. It has been argued that stock market manipulation is a
very specialized kind of crime, restricted to the larger financial centers and, therefore, few
CPAs are likely to come across them. Nevertheless, because of the great increase in stock
market investments, residents anyplace in the country may become victims of stock market
manipulation and may look to their CPA for advice. Further, an increasing number of
CPAs are providing financial planning services, including investment advisory services, to
their clients. These CPAs must be aware of stock manipulation schemes to protect both
their clients and themselves.
In addition, stock market manipulation and the modus operandi may resemble other kinds of
scams in which the price of an investment is influenced by the laws of supply and demand.
Therefore, CPAs should be aware of this kind of crime. They could be called upon to speak
to the public about prevention of white-collar crime in general or investment scams in
particular. Also, they may become an investor in the stock market themselves.

Possible Red Flags. Red flags possibly signaling stock market manipulation, with the possible
exception of churning and commingling of funds, are not as readily apparent as they are in
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some other kinds of economic crime. Most red flags seem to originate from an informant
close to or aware of the control group. In contrast, the regularly required reports investors
receive should be reviewed on receipt to assure that there are not patent red flags, that is,
there is no churning or commingling of funds. Of course, if the fraud involves falsifying
these reports, discovery will probably be delayed until the fraudster is caught, by which
time, the investor could well be wiped out.
The SEC and stock exchanges usually carry out investigations to detect this type of crime
and the investigations are mainly analytical. Unusual price increases or large commissions
earned by salespeople may be investigated, as may press releases or assets reported on
financial statements.

Price as Determined by the Law ofSupply and Demand. The law of supply and demand states,
in essence, that the price of an item will rise when demand for the item exceeds the
available supply of that item, and the price will fall when supply exceeds demand.
Throughout a stock manipulation, the promoter attempts to control both the supply of, and
the demand for, a stock in order to move the price higher. As supply is restricted, the price
increases. As demand is stimulated, the price increases.
A stock market is a composite of the interests of many individuals and corporations offering
to buy and sell shares. Individuals, however, are influenced not only by information
(whether accurate or not), but also by motives such as greed or fear and by perceptions that
may have little to do with facts or reason. Investors are capable of changing their
investment decisions quickly, purchasing recklessly in a down cycle or staying out of the
market entirely in anticipation of disappointing financial information. The common desire
is to make profits and to prefer investments that are perceived as likely to produce profits,
whether or not these perceptions are based in reality.
Thus, investors will often overreact in seeking to take advantage of price changes or in
attempting to correct their errors. A single item of speculative news may dramatically
change the number of people who are willing to purchase, hold or sell a particular
investment, dramatically changing the demand for the shares. It is important to note that
large volumes of shares are often exchanged. Accordingly, time is of the essence in keeping
losses to a minimum and gaining the greatest possible profits. Precisely when a buy or sell
transaction takes place can make a big difference in the value of the purchase or sale.
Market prices are generally influenced by the release of corporate information, such as
news about profits, the announcement of a new product line, or the discovery of a new oil
reserve, as well as by changes in government policy, forecasts, prospectuses, and in general,
matters that occur in the ordinary daily conduct of a business.

In summary, the investing public, through the medium of publicly held stock, whether
traded on an exchange, the NASDQor over the counter, is able to place a value on a share
and to decide to buy or sell accordingly. As more people seek to buy shares, the price of a
share will increase if the number of shares for sale on the market remains the same.
Conversely, the price will fall if an excess supply of shares is available or if the public
demand for the shares drops.

The Manipulation Process. Generally, a manipulation begins with the promoter falsely
increasing demand and restricting or controlling the supply. The combined effect of this
process is an increase in price. After a certain point, called the blow off, the promoter
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attempts to increase supply and dampen demand in order to reduce the price, allowing the
promoter to repurchase at a profit. Throughout, the promoter must act as a control valve in
releasing the stock in order to control the market price, and hence the profits.
Manipulation may be motivated not only by a promoter wanting to make more money, but
also by the desire to make the asset side of an investor’s balance sheet look good or to
improve the performance of an investment portfolio.
A promoter may use any combination of the following tactics to encourage the public to
buy stock at higher and higher prices:

• Using buy or sell pressure by stock brokers who may be receiving secret commissions
• Distributing false press releases and rumors
• Releasing false ownership information
• Promoting fictitious or grossly exaggerated profits, assets or future prospects (or any
combination thereof)
• Warehousing to help restrict the supply of shares
• Using wash trading (that is, trading that results in no change in beneficial ownership) to
stimulate public interest due to high trading volumes

• Controlling the first or last trade of the day in order to set the highest possible price for
the stock
• Dumping into foreign markets

Some or all of the activities generally used in the manipulation process are shown in figure
7-2.
Figure 7-2. Activities frequently used in the cycle of manipulating the stock market
Price Increase:

Price Decrease:

• Obtaining control

• Backdooring

• Setting up a distribution network

• Blowing off

• Warehousing

• Short selling

• Using wash trading

• Issuing bad news releases

• Issuing good news releases

• Repurchasing

A promoter who wanted to manipulate the price of a stock might use any combination of
the activities listed below

7. Obtaining Control: The first step that a promoter usually takes is to gain control over an
existing company’s shares of stock to ensure that the public’s selling off large quantities
of the stock does not undermine his control over the supply of shares. Generally, 70-to90 percent of the voting shares that are issued and outstanding must be acquired to
exert effective control. The promoter can gain the necessary control by using one or a
combination of the following:
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• Buying the shares of an inactive company that is already listed on an exchange
(commonly known as cleaning up the market). The shares of the promoter’s unlisted
company (which do not meet the requirements for listing on an exchange) can then
become listed by merging the corporations and exchanging the unlisted shares for
shares of the listed company.
• Buying a shell company that may have been inactive for a number of years.
• Underwriting an issue of new shares of a somewhat controlled company. This
underwriting usually consists of a new issue of shares in an amount that far exceeds
the original number of outstanding shares. To a promoter, this is the least desirable
method, as it requires a prospectus, financial reporting, and an insider trading
report. In addition, the promoter will have to arrange for his friends to purchase the
new shares and hold them (park them) on his behalf an unequivocally fraudulent
transaction.
2. Setting up a Distribution Network. A distribution network is set up with the promoter at
its head. Immediately underneath the promoter are several distributors in cities that
have stock traders or brokerages. Each of these distributors has access to a brokerage
house’s salespeople who then have access to the active traders. Via this network, the
promoter now has control over what happens in the promoted stock’s market. Secret
commissions are sometimes paid to ensure that the network complies with the
promoter’s demands.

The traders let the salespeople know when trades are pending and keeps them
informed as to the price movement of the promoted stock so that the promoter can
take compensating action. The salesperson’s job is to give the public a sales pitch as to
why they should buy the stock and, once in, why they should stay in. In addition, the
salesperson’s activity will affect the daily trading volume. What members of the public
do not know in this situation is that the shares they are purchasing are those of the
promoters.

3. Warehousing: Warehousing places shares into the hands of people who are friendly to
the promoter. This is essential in order to maintain control of the shares and continue
to restrict and regulate the supply of shares available. This is often accomplished by
having friends buy new offerings of the stock and continuing to hold these shares until
the promoter instructs them to sell.
4. Wash Trading. To promote the public’s interest and increase demand for the promoted
stock, the promoter manipulates the volume of stock traded through wash-trading.
Essentially, this procedure consists of a stock purchases and sales with no change in
beneficial ownership. Wash trading can be accomplished through nominee accounts:
accounts at banks or trust companies set up under the names of trustees, friends,
aliases, or false company names. The promoter sells a block of shares and at the same
time a nominee enters a buy order to match the sell transaction. While the stock is kept
out of the public’s hands, this active, ostensibly normal trading is reflected in the
volume numbers the public sees. Hence, the market in the manipulated stock appears
to be an active one in the public’s eyes.
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5. Issuing Good News Releases: One or more timely news releases may be issued to promote
the stock, attracting further public interest. The news releases may include verifiable
information but may also consist of unsubstantiated rumors, such as:

• Anticipation of good results from drilling tests in resource-based companies

• Expectations for a likely acquisition of rights to explore property close to existing
known resources
• Plans for diversification into a glamour industry

Generally the good news may be described as an intangible promise of future results.
There is nothing of immediate value today. These good news releases are designed to
stimulate the public interest and encourage them to buy shares, even at a high price.
6. Backdooring: Backdooring occurs when friends operating as a warehouse, which the
promoter has previously set up, start selling their shares while the price is still
increasing—contrary to their agreement with the promoter—before getting the word
from the promoter to sell. The friends are backdooring the promoter, effectively
double crossing the promoter. In order to sustain public demand, the promoter has to
buy the backdoor shares at the market price if the existing public demand is not
sufficient to support these sales.
7. Blowing Off. After the promoter has successfully stimulated demand, members of the
public buy significant numbers of shares and then wait for the price to continue its
anticipated rise. The promoter has already picked a tentative price at which he wants
to dispose of his holdings. He starts selling his shares, as well as those of his nominees
and friends. In these circumstances, the sale of unusually large amounts of stock is
referred to as a blow off. The public, expecting a continued price rise, buy the
promoter’s shares over a relatively short period of time.

The price at which the promoter actually begins to blow off his holdings depends
primarily on how much public demand the distribution network has created and how
long the demand is sustained. By blowing off, the promoter has withdrawn all active
support of the stock price. He ceases wash trading, the reported trading volume
decreases, and the price begins to fall quickly as supply far exceeds demand.
8. Short Selling. Short selling is the act of selling stock that one does not yet own and is a
legitimate market activity. The seller is gambling that the price will decrease and that
he or she will be able to buy back the shares at a price lower than the current-selling
price. In this situation, the promoter can safely sell short, because he or she knows that
the price will go down. Thus, the promoter realizes a profit both as the price of the
stock goes up and again as the price goes down.
9. Issuing Bad News Releases: At this point, the promoter often issues a news release about
the company’s misfortunes. The exact reverse of the good news release, the promoter
intends the bad news release to drive down the price of the stock rapidly.
10. Repurchasing. The stock price has now reached rock bottom, and the public is willing to
sell at any price. The promoter often buys back control of the company when the
shares reach this low price and changes the name of the company in order to start the
process again. The same company, under a new name, will go through the cycle again
in a period of one to two years.
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Secret Commissions. Secret commissions were previously mentioned in the distribution
network discussion. Generally, secret commissions or bribes are given to people in the
securities industry to induce them to push or promote the shares in the promoter’s
company and to advise the promoter of orders to purchase shares before the orders are
entered. Secret commissions may also be paid to the wash traders in order to keep their
support. Generally, secret commissions are paid in one or more of the following ways:
• By a check drawn on either a personal or a corporate bank account and payable to the
recipient, to cash, or to a third party. If the check is paid to a third party, it will be
endorsed by the named third party and cashed, with the cash being passed on to the
true recipient of the secret commission.
• By a free delivery to the recipient of stock in signed-off or street certificate form, which
can then be sold by the recipient on the market.
• By the issuance to the recipient of call options on the stock at a fixed price below the
current market price.
• By selling a block of stock to a salesperson or another recipient at a fixed price and
allowing that buyer to sell that block back at a higher price.
The Significance ofAccounting Evidence. Accounting evidence is generally very significant in
the prosecution of stock market manipulation cases because—

• The accountant can perform an analysis to determine whether change in beneficial
ownership occurred (a wash trading analysis).
• Accounting evidence may be instrumental in identifying payments or receipts of secret
commissions, if any.
• Accounting evidence can be used to establish the percentage of the public’s participation
in buying and selling shares when compared to the total transactions in the stock by the
control group.
• Accounting evidence may assist in establishing that the perpetrators have benefited from
the sale of the stock.
However, accounting evidence may not be as significant as viva voce evidence in initially
identifying the control group, establishing the secret commission structure, and identifying
who was paying and receiving these commissions.

Possible Preventive Measures. Perhaps the most significant stock manipulation preventive
measure is to make the investing public aware that a salesperson’s pitch will be persuasive,
will play on the investor’s greed, and will convey a sense of urgency. The following are
questions that an investor should ask a salesperson to answer on the record concerning the
specific representations being made about the investment. The answers given should help
in identifying poor or fraudulent investments.

1. How risky is this stock?
2. What direct costs are paid out of the investors’ funds, such as for commissions, or
advertising, or both?
3. Can I get written documents (the prospectus at a minimum), and can you mail them to
me?
4. What is the specific destination (that is, bank account, brokerage account) of my funds?
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5. How can I sell the stock if I choose to do so, and how long will it take to dispose of the
investment?

6. What are the names of the principal owners and officers of the salesperson’s firm, and
what are the names of the owners and officers of the company in which the investment
is being made?

Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. Case Study
In early 1998, Jack Smith started to promote a company called Acme Mines Co., a
shell company listed on the Westville Stock Exchange. Smith had effective control
of the outstanding shares. In order to promote public interest and buying, Smith
made announcements—through investor bulletins and statutory statements to
regulatory bodies—to the effect that Acme was about to diversify into the movie
production business and other ventures. The announcement touted:

• An investment of $175,000 in the production of a movie, which would return 25
percent of the profits to Acme
• A purchase yielding 58 percent control of a movie theater business called
Everytown Theaters Ltd.
• An acquisition of distribution rights to Krazy Kandy, a confection that would be
sold from automatic vending machines across the country
On February 4, 1998, Smith changed the name of the company from Acme Mines Co.
to Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. (GPY-Movies) to reflect its new objectives.

Smith’s next step was to stimulate trading activity in GPY-Movies’ stock on the
Westville Stock Exchange. To accomplish this, offices were maintained in Bigtown
and Westville and were operated by Mike Jones, a securities desk-trader, and the
controller, Dave Brown. Their objectives appear to have been to maintain the
market with effective control, match orders to create activity (wash trading), and
systematically sell off the stock for profit.
Smith would tell Jones when to buy or sell. Jones would follow through via a series
of controlled nominee accounts. Brown’s job was to keep track of all the accounts,
meet corporate requirements, and generally manage the money and the office in
Bigtown. The nominee accounts were all in corporate names and could be traded
by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones or Mr. Brown.

The office in Bigtown was in the name of Anyco Investment Corp. The accounts at
brokerage firms in both Westville and Bigtown were in the following names:
1.
2.
3.
4.
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At this time Smith was either an officer or director of each company and effectively
controlled them. Stock positions in GPY-Movies were established through
numerous Bigtown and Westville brokerage firms.

The eventual objective was to sell off or distribute the stock for a profit without
causing an obvious decrease in the market price. To achieve this goal, Smith hired
Robert Green who started to work out of the Bigtown Office around April 2, 1998.
Smith instructed Green to sell stock through the accounts of Anyco and Metro
Trading and to limit the price to $1.26 until an underwriting was effected, which
was to occur on April 18, 1998.
Green’s procedure was to prearrange all the buy orders so that they could be
matched with any one of Smith’s selling accounts. Whenever Green learned of a
buy order, he would notify Jones of its size, price and the name of the brokerage
firm. This meant that Green had to be in contact with sales reps or their distributors
who would notify him of forthcoming buy orders. In order to secure their
cooperation, Smith specifically authorized Green to pay sales reps a 15 percent
commission over and above the amount sales reps would normally receive. In
addition, Green, with the assistance of Smith and Brown, arranged for Wally
Chang, a brokerage house manager, to use his sales force to distribute 300,000
shares of GPY-Movies throughout the United States for a 12½ percent commission.

On occasion, Smith arranged to provide cash to Green in order to make payments
to sales reps. Brown made the checks payable to cash and drew them on one of the
companies’ accounts. Green made his own arrangements as to where and when to
pay the sales reps.
Smith convinced two sales reps, Black and White, to set up an account in their firm.
Whenever Black and White were able to persuade one of their clients to buy GPYMovies shares, the offset would come out of Smith’s account in the name of Metro
Trading. In this way, Smith was able to sell off his position and pay Black and
White with shares that they in turn sold through nominee accounts. Paul Wilson, an
analyst, provided Smith with inside information on who was bidding or offering, as
he was indebted to Smith for a substantial loan.

Thus, Smith and Jones, in an effort to generate personal gain, created a misleading
appearance of active public trading in shares of GPY-Movies, both by wash trading
and by the use of secret commissions. The result was a loss to the investing public.

7. 2.9 Environmental Abuse
Generally there are two main kinds of environmental abuse that a company can commit:
1. Pollution
2. Misuse of natural resources
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Pollution
While a certain level of pollution is tolerated by today’s society, media attention has
recently focused on companies that have gone too far. Society is, as a whole, becoming less
tolerant of all forms of pollution, and this is reflected all the way down to the consumer—
for instance, aerosol spray cans and cigarette smoking in restaurants are no longer tolerated
in many jurisdictions. Laws have been passed to limit the levels of pollution, but not all
companies comply with the laws, usually because of the added costs incurred.
Amount ofPollution. The amount of pollution and how it is determined depend on the
nature and source of the pollution. For example, a perpetrator may have dumped garbage
at an authorized site but in quantities greater than the dumping license permits. Or, a
perpetrator may have dumped garbage at an unauthorized site. Or, a perpetrator may have
polluted the environment in some other way, for example, dumping toxic substances into a
river, or exceeding the specificed limits of emission of certain substances into the
atmosphere.
Regardless of the nature and source of the pollution, the alleged offender’s accounting and
administrative records are likely to yield pertinent information about the physical quantities
of substances that are themselves pollutants or that result in pollution. Financial records can
also provide useful evidence as to the alleged offender’s knowledge and intent. For
example, an accounts receivable listing would reveal the names of the company’s
customers, but additional documents would be needed to assess the extent of the polluting
activities. These documents might include invoices, bills of lading, weigh tickets, contracts,
production reports, and so on.

Depending on the nature of the abuse, the financial records may help to put a dollar value
on the cost of the damage done. For example, if you can establish that a company dumped
in excess of the 5,000-ton-garbage limit permitted by its license, the courts can calculate the
cost of the excess from the company’s accounting records. This cost provides the judiciary
with a yardstick against which to determine damages.

Dumping Unlimited Case Study

Dumping Unlimited was a carting company that had a license to dump waste
material at a landfill site near Anytown. The company’s license permitted dumping
a maximum of 150 tons of material per day at the landfill.
Dumping Unlimited maintained a fleet of garbage trucks, which dumped the
company’s waste at the landfill site, and they also accepted waste material from
other haulers on a daily basis.

Based on an analysis of weigh tickets, it was clear that the company was dumping
quantities in excess of the permitted amount. To determine the value of these
quantities, the excess tonnage was priced at the highest and the lowest price charged
by the company, giving a range of values attributable to this offence.
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Financial Capacity. Companies that are fined for noncompliance with antipollution laws
often claim that they cannot afford either the costs of compliance at the time when the
pollution was generated or the costs associated with cleaning up the after effects of the
pollution.
Both of these issues are best examined by a CPA and involve examining financial
statements and budgets.
There are relationships between various components in the financial statements, which help
to identify historical issues relating to both profitability and viability. A review of the
financial statements for a number of accounting periods will be helpful in determining
trends that would enable a CPA to compare the company’s financial results with the costs
required to comply with antipollution laws.
In order to assess whether a company can afford the costs of cleanup (particularly when
that company claims it cannot), a CPA would need a crystal ball. In the absence of a crystal
ball, the CPA should examine the company’s budgets.

Management predicts the future by way of the budgeting process. Most enterprises that take
the time to prepare budgets use them as tools for making financial and operating decisions.
The range of budgets include operating budgets, capital budgets and cash flow budgets. A
comprehensive operating and cash flow budget enables management to plan future
operations and to decide how the company will pay for them. Access to past budgets,
together with the corresponding historical results, allows the forensic accountant to interpret
the proficiency of the company’s budgeting process and to determine whether a company
can or cannot afford the cleanup costs.

Mine Cleanup Case Study

In the 1990s the federal government filed suit against Mine Cleanup, a uranium
mining company, for failure to clean up a former site. The mining company
claimed it would be put out of business if it was required to pay the $30 million
required to clean up the site. Mine Cleanup management was attempting to set
aside the clean-up order.

A thorough review of the company’s financial statements, operating budgets, long
term forecasts, and cash flow budgets revealed that the company was unable to pay
the costs in the short term, but that it was possible for the company to comply with
the cleanup order over an extended period. A negotiated agreement was reached
between the federal government and the company wherein the government
essentially provided the long-term financing for the cleanup so that the cleanup
operations could commence immediately.

Natural Resource Abuse
Laws with respect to natural resource abuse (over-fishing, hunting, logging, mining, and so
on, as well as neglecting the endangered-species legislation) vary from jurisdiction to
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jurisdiction and generally apply to both noncommercial and commercial harvesting of
animals, marine life, and endangered species. Accounting evidence has little relevance to
noncommercial activities; thus the focus in this section is primarily on commercial activities
involving the following three areas:

1. Fur trapping and fur dealers
2. Commercial fishing

3. Endangered species

Note that companies that are involved in these commercial activities need to be aware that
conservation officers appear to have a much broader right of access to business premises
than that available to law enforcement officers. Generally, the legislation allows the officers
to search any aircraft, vehicle, vessel, camp, or office, without the requirement of a search
warrant, if they believe that any fish or game has been killed or taken in contravention of
the applicable state laws.
Fur Trapping and Fur Dealers. Fur trappers must be licensed to practice their trade in each
state in which they operate. They are assigned maximum quotas for different kinds of wild
life. They are generally required to have each pelt examined and registered, at which time a
stamp is affixed to the inside of the pelt. The trapper is not required to submit written
reports to the state; the next level in the distribution system does that.
The fur dealer obtains a license to purchase, receive, sell, or otherwise dispose of fur pelts.
With a few limited exceptions (domestic animals, road kill, and so on) the fur dealer must
ensure that the pelts being purchased have been examined and suitably stamped. Monthly
reports are generally required from the fur dealer specifying:

1. The pelts purchased or received, including the name of the trapper or hunter from
whom the fur dealer purchased or received the furs; the date on which such pelts were
obtained; and the number and the kinds of animals, for example, beaver, mink, lynx,
and otter.
2. The pelts sold or disposed of, including who the pelts were sold to by name, address,
and license number; the date on which the pelts were sold, tanned or disposed of; and
the number and kinds of animals.

The most common form of abuse is the handling of unauthorized pelts, which are
purchased from a trapper or hunter, that are typically excluded from both of the monthly
fur dealers’ reports—that is, they are excluded from the report of pelts purchased, and from
the report of pelts sold. These pelts typically bear no authorized stamp. The transactions
often involve some financial consideration to the purchaser, for example, lower prices or
secret commissions, which could be ascertained upon a review of the fur dealer’s books and
records. The unauthorized pelts are typically disposed of by being included in bundles of
authorized fur pelts submitted to a fur auction outlet, or by being directly supplied to a
tanning operation owned by the fur dealer.

Commercial Fishing. Commercial fishermen are generally licensed to work in designated
regions within the United States and its waters, and are assigned maximum quotas by fish
species and poundage. These fishermen are generally required to submit a monthly report
that accumulates information on the port where the fish were landed, the weight of the
catch by species, and the average price of fish sold.
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Unlike the far dealer, the commercial fisherman is not required to submit a report stating to
whom the fish were sold.

The most common form of abuse involves the fisherman exceeding his quotas and failing to
report the excesses in his monthly reporting. A review of the cash receipts, disbursements,
and sales journals of the commercial fisherman should detect the abuse even though many
purchases and sales are cash transactions that take place off the company’s books. Because
the reporting required is done by weight rather than by supplier or number of fish, it is
necessary to reconcile the weight of fish caught to the weight of fish purchased by
customers after allowing for wastage.
Endangered Species. In most jurisdictions, endangered species of fauna and flora are
protected by laws that prohibit the killing, injuring, interfering with, taking, or attempting to
do any of the above to any of the identified species of fauna or flora or their natural
habitats.
Currently one of the major abuses is the exporting of certain endangered species of wild
birds, particularly falcons, to other countries at an exorbitant profit to the perpetrators.

7.2.10 Economic Extortion
Economic extortion is a crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained through
intimidation or persistent demands.
Some of the forms of crime described in this section of the Handbook could involve an
element of economic extortion. For instance, bribes could be required in order to obtain a
lucrative contract; an owner of a company could be squeezed out by one or more of its
creditors for reasons other than insolvency; an employee could be forced to divulge an
employer’s trade secrets; or a company could be forced to pay a contractor to keep quiet
about its environmental pollution problem. The common element in each of these
situations is that the likely outcome of noncompliance with the extortionist’s demands is
perceived to be worse than the actual outcome of compliance.

Often, an extortionist’s methods involve threats of physical violence, public disclosure of
something that the victim would rather keep private, or financial ruin.

A Piece of the Action (Sport Megaplace) Case Study
In early 1994, Sport Megaplace was established as a state-approved organization to
control the sale of lottery tickets in Megaplace and to apply the net proceeds from
these sales to the development of amateur sports within Megaplace.

At that time the sale of lottery tickets included the sale of Tinylotto tickets, which was
under the control of Mr. Johnson, and the sale of Biglotto tickets, which was under
the control of Mr. Williams. These men were responsible for dividing Megaplace
into wholesale distributorships so that both kinds of tickets could be sold regularly
through wholesalers to retailers and then to the public.
However, Johnson and Williams only allowed others to obtain wholesale
distributorships if they secretly agreed to pay 50 percent of the future profits to a
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holding company under the control of Johnson and Williams. The silent-ownership
payments were structured as payments for management, consulting services and for
office space.
The new distributors were led to believe that this arrangement was legitimate by the
existence of a wholesale distributor agreement with Johnson and Williams’
company, a reporting letter from a lawyer’s office, a declaration of trust agreement,
a power of attorney agreement, working papers from an accountant, banking
resolutions and signature cards.

7.2.11 Customs Duty Fraud
Although customs laws vary from nation to nation, there are common threads and patterns
of fraud that are inherent in transborder transactions. The following material describes
typical customs fraud scenarios in Anyland.
The Customs Act applies to goods imported into Anyland. The Act categorizes imported
goods by tariff schedules and prescribes rates of duty applicable to each item depending on
its nature, the country of origin, and international treaty arrangements.

The duty payable to Anyland’s Customs Service is a percentage (the duty rate) of the
imported item’s Value for Duty. Prior to January 1, 1998, the Customs Act based its
determination of the Value for Duty amount on the fair market value of the goods at the
time of export in the exporting country. In practice, this fair market value was usually the
amount indicated on the commercial invoice. Customs officers did, however, have the
option of disregarding the commercial invoice amount and determining a fair market value
to be used for Value for Duty purposes using other information sources.
This fair market value determination for applying duty rates to imported goods did not
comply with international trade agreements to which Anyland was a party. Thus, effective
January 1, 1998, a revised procedure for determining the Value for Duty amount was
introduced. The new basis, called the Transaction Value Method, specified the Value for
Duty amount to be the price paid or payable to the exporter where the exporter and
importer are dealing at arm’s length. For imports between related parties, the onus is on the
importer to prove that there was no influence on the commercial invoice price. In these
situations, Value for Duty is determined on the following sequential bases:
1. Transaction value of identical goods
2. Transaction value of similar goods
3. Deductive value based on a gross profit reduction of the importer’s selling price

4. Computed value
The abuse generally arises when the importer causes the Value for Duty of the imported
product to be falsely understated, thereby reducing the amount of customs duty paid.
Importers abusing the customs regulations may vary in size of operation, ranging from
small sole proprietors to large national distributors. The benefits from understating Value
for Duty amounts can be enormous. In one case, the fine paid totaled $25,000,000, arising
from a conviction of evading customs duties over a fifteen-year period. There was also a
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civil court claim for $105.2 million against the same company for unpaid duties on goods
imported over a period of years. Even on a small scale, with duty rates ranging up to 30
percent or more, understating the Value for Duty amount may provide the importer with a
10-to-15 percent cost saving and a trade advantage over its competitors.
Because the Value for Duty amount generally is supported by both a commercial invoice
and customs invoice prepared by the exporter, the duty and sales calculations rely on the
integrity of the exporter’s documentation. Many customs investigations have determined
that the documents prepared by exporters understate the actual value at which the goods
were sold.

Current customs practices continue to be conducive to fraud. Importers of legally
importable goods are aware of the enormous volume of imports, the emphasis placed on
illegal drug shipments, the shortage of customs officers, and the officers’ inability to fully
inspect all entries that provide a perceived window of opportunity to perpetrate fraud.

Investigation Issues
Red Flags. Customs investigations have uncovered various schemes to falsely reduce
collectible duties. The presence of one or more of the following red flags may assist in
identifying a customs under valuation.

1, Apparent excess insurance: Insurance coverage for the in-transit goods substantially exceeds the
declared Value for Duty of the same goods.
2. Competitor’s complaints: Competitor’s complaints to customs or any other agency
governing fair trade that it cannot match the importer’s wholesale or retail prices.
3. Poor quality documents: The integrity of the exporter’s documents may be suspect if any
invoice is: printed on tissue paper, hand typed, not preprinted, or not prenumbered.

4. Letters ofcredit or bank drafts: Payments for the imported goods exceed the declared
Value for Duty amount.
5. Presence ofblank invoices: If Anyland customs invoices or export declarations, or the
exporter’s supplier invoices are known to exist at the importer’s place of business and
are found to be blank except for the exporter’s authorization signature, the importer
may be preparing such forms for presentation to Anyland’s customs.
6. Related exporter. The importer and exporter are related parties and, therefore, do not deal
at arm’s length; there could be price collusion.
7. A andB Commercial Invoices:. Total costs for the imported goods may be apportioned
between two separate invoices (often having consecutive invoice numbers, or having the
same invoice number with A and B suffixes), only one of which is submitted to customs
for purpose of Value for Duty determination.
8. Unreasonably high values allocated to nondutiable export costs: The dutiable cost of product is
artificially understated and the nondutiable cost of freight, for example, is overstated on
the commercial and Anyland customs invoices.
Significance of the Accounting Evidence. After performing an overview, the forensic accountant
can provide details for each entry and a summary schedule for all entries. This schedule
quantifies the apparent Value for Duty shortage and calculates the apparent duty shortages,
thereby determining the amount withheld.
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In preparing this quantification, the forensic accountant assumes that documentation other
than that used in the customs declaration in fact provides the true Value for Duty. The
forensic accountant may need to obtain expert-witness evidence to substantiate this basis for
valuation—perhaps a specialist from the Customs Service or from a lawyer.
In addition, in reviewing the importer’s accounting books and records, the forensic
accountant may be able to provide further support for the alleged undervaluation and may
be helpful in refuting possible defense claims.
Testimony: Viva Voce Evidence. The forensic accountant may seek evidence from various
other sources. Employees of the importer may be interviewed to provide evidence as to the
inner workings of the importer and to settle issues of ownership or control of the importing
company. A customs’ broker may provide testimony that, if presented with the documents
on which the forensic accountant’s calculations were based, a higher Value for Duty would
have been declared.

7.2.12 Health Care Fraud
There are a wide variety of health care frauds that have recently been the subject of media
attention. Many such cases are outside the scope of this section—that is, they relate to fraud
committed by individuals rather than by corporations. Health care fraud committed by
corporations typically involves one of the following:

1. Violations of occupational health and safety laws (OSHA).

2. Marketing of drugs that have not been adequately tested or for which the test results
have been falsified.

7.2.13 Possession of Property Obtained by Crime
This offence refers to either the actual possession of property obtained by a crime, or to the
possession of proceeds from the disposal of property obtained by a crime.

When a business is suspected to be in possession of stolen inventory, an examination of the
financial records should be able to establish whether this inventory had been legitimately
purchased.
A reconciliation of the inventory purchased and sold needs to be performed and compared
to the inventory on hand at both the beginning and end of the period in question: the end
date is usually set shortly after the date that the stolen inventory was allegedly obtained.
The purchases and sales should be ascertained from the company’s purchases and sales
records, and also from updated accounts payable and accounts receivable listings. If there is
a positive variance, it could result from an accounting discrepancy, which would need to be
examined further, or it could result from the possession of property obtained by crime.
If the purchases, on the accounting records, appear to be legitimate, then the integrity of the
supplier invoices must be assessed. Often, stolen inventory can be made to appear
legitimate through overstatements on supplier invoices.
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Don’t Fence Me In Case Study
Acme Industries was acting as a fence for stolen car parts. These parts were stolen
by third parties and were sold by Acme to authorized car dealerships at prices
considerably lower than normal wholesale prices. When Acme’s premises were
searched on December 8, 1998, parts valued at approximately $667,900 were
seized.
Forensic accountants were retained to determine, by means of the available books
of account and supporting documents, whether these parts were purchased legally
or otherwise. Here are the steps followed to make the requested determination.

1. The accountant began by performing a period examination. The disbursement
journal disclosed that a payment had been made to a firm of CPAs for services
rendered to Acme. An interview with this firm revealed the existence of a draft
set of financial statements for Acme, dated February 28, 1998. These financial
statements, which were never issued in final form, disclosed inventory valued at
$16,500, with a note stating, “no physical inventory taken; inventory estimated
for accounts.” The draft financial statements established the opening date of the
time period. The closing date was determined by the date of search and seizure,
December 8, 1998. The period March 1, 1998, to December 8, 1998, was,
therefore, the period examined.
2. The accountant then updated the financial records of Acme to the date of search
and seizure. This step disclosed purchases from various suppliers totaling
$886,167. A similar updating of the sales of Acme resulted in a sales figure of
$1,007,815.
3. To calculate the book value of inventory, the accountant created a schedule,
identified as Apparent Inventory of Acme as of December 8, 1998. It set out the total
value of the goods available for sale of $902,667 (opening inventory of $16,500
plus the purchases made, during the period, of $886,167).
The schedule set out the updated sales figure and a gross profit margin (sales
minus cost of sales divided by sales) ranging from 10-to-30 percent. By deducting
the gross profit margin, an apparent cost of goods sold was calculated, ranging
from a high of $907,000 at the 10 percent level to a low of $705,470 at the 30
percent level. A comparison of the apparent cost of goods sold to the value of
goods available for sale showed that there should have been no inventory as of
December 8, 1998 at a 10 percent gross margin. At a 30 percent gross margin,
the value of inventory at December 8 would have been $197,197.
4. To perform a valuation of the parts seized, the accountant compared the goods
seized to the inventory on hand calculated at the 10 percent gross margin level,
indicating an excess quantity of physical parts on hand of approximately
$672,200. When a gross profit margin of 30 percent was applied, the excess on
hand was approximately $470,000. Based on the above procedures, Acme had
in its possession an excess quantity of parts ranging in value from $470,000 to
$672,200.

Interviews with three suppliers indicated that the invoices used in the calculation of
purchases between March 1 and December 8, 1998 had been inflated or padded so
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that the invoiced value of goods purchased by Acme was greater than the actual
value of the goods received. The padded portion of the payments Acme made to its
suppliers were paid to the wife of Acme’s owner in cash.

Padding the supplier’s invoices made the stolen goods on hand harder to detect or
easier to explain away, or both. The inflated purchase prices also allowed cash to be
removed from Acme, tax free, under the guise of an expense. The payments to
suppliers were converted into cash with the excess (padded) portion of the invoiced
price being returned to the owner’s wife as cash.
This disclosure made it necessary to revise the calculated value of inventory as of
December 8, 1998, to reflect the alleged nonpurchases in Acme’s dealings with the
three suppliers who were padding their invoices. These alleged nonpurchases
totaled some $263,000, thereby increasing the value of the excess quantity of parts
in the possession of Acme to a figure between $735,000 and $935,000. These
findings not only placed the onus on the owner of Acme to explain the source of the
excess quantity of parts seized but also disclosed the existence of a fraudulent
scheme involving the three suppliers.

7.2.14 Coupon Redemption Fraud
Coupon redemption fraud involves the fraudulent collection and conversion of coupons
designed to promote various kinds of merchandise. For example, a newspaper coupon for a
box of cereal may require the purchaser to present it at a supermarket to receive twenty-five
cents off the purchase price of the cereal. Normally, the manufacturer reimburses the
supermarket for the discount it paid plus a token fee, perhaps several cents, to cover the
cost of processing the coupon and returning it to the manufacturer.

Unscrupulous grocery and supermarket owners will collect coupons, in some cases from an
intermediary, and redeem them as though merchandise has been purchased from them,
when in fact, it has not been. Although the individual amounts can be small, the volume in
most consumables can make it profitable for stores to engage in these schemes.
7.3 Prevention of Commercial Crime

Four forces can operate to reduce commercial crime:
1. Increased awareness—that is, decreasing the likelihood that a victim will be “taken.”
2. Formal deterrence—that is, the fear of formal, officially imposed sanctions (conviction
and punishment by the government).
3. Informal deterrence—that is, the fear of informally imposed sanctions, such as the loss of
respectability or a career.
4. Ethics—that is, the internalization of values that discourage violations of legal codes.
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7.3.1 Increased Awareness
Increased awareness is achieved through education and by experience. However,
experience can be a costly way to increase awareness. With increased awareness, the
investor, customer, competitor, and general public are more likely to closely scrutinize a
situation and ask questions that would raise alarm bells and prevent them from suffering a
loss. For instance:
• Investors should be wary of schemes pitching high rates of return in a short time.

• Investors also should be wary of schemes with foreign intrigue.
• Investors should thoroughly examine franchise opportunities before any funds are
invested. Brochures and marketing pitches should be viewed with skepticism,
particularly in the case of new or unconventional franchisers. Detailed financial
information, including costs and profit margins of the franchiser for any goods and
services they are contracting to provide, should be reviewed to determine the motives of
the franchiser.
• Investors should ask stock promoters a series of questions about the stock the promoter
is pushing to determine the extent to which that promoter is tied to the stock.

7.3.2 Formal Deterrence
A crime control strategy has little chance of success unless offenders are punished.
However, formal levels of current enforcement are, by all measures, extremely low. One
novel approach is enforced self-regulation. Under this idea, the government would compel
each company to write unique rules for itself or its employees. A governmental agency
would monitor compliance. Two examples of successes in the noncriminal area are the
Federal Aviation Administration, which monitors self-regulation for the U.S. airline
industry, and the Federal Trade Commission, which monitors rules that the U.S.
advertising industry has largely set for itself.

However, there are problems with self-regulation, and the industries that attempt to
regulate themselves have spotty records at best. In one study of the 320,000 physicians in
the United States, an average of only seventy-two medical licenses per year were revoked.

It may be that increased enforcement can only come at the expense of a complete and total
revision of the criminal justice system. Many commercial criminals have little fear of
detection because of the constant barrage of information that demonstrates the police and
courts simply cannot keep up with the pace of criminal offenses. Until potential offenders
have the perception that they will be caught and punished, we should not expect a reversal
of this crime trend.
However, many researchers believe there are better deterrents to commercial crime than
incarceration of the individuals who are directly involved. They argue that the most
effective deterrents are:

• Monetary penalties
• Adverse publicity
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The following remedial steps could be adopted to deal with commercial crime:

1. Strengthen consent agreements and decrees (under which companies do not admit that
what they were doing was wrong, but agree to stop doing it) to provide substantial
remedies for violations of the agreement and to include systematic follow-ups.
2. Increase fine ceilings, assessing fines according to the nature of the violation and in
proportion to the company’s annual sales.

3. Enact stiff criminal penalties for violations of health and safety or environmental
regulations that recklessly endanger the public or employees.
4. Introduce stronger statutes to prohibit companies that previously had violated federal
laws from receiving federal contracts.
5. Promote mandatory publicity for corporate civil and criminal violations.
6. Increase more extensive use of imprisonment with longer sentences. Replace
community service with incarceration, except for unusual circumstances.
7. Prevent convicted corporate offenders from being indemnified by their companies.
8. Prohibit for three years management officials convicted of criminally violating
corporate responsibilities from assuming similar management positions in their
company or others.
9. Make directors liable, but not criminally, for being derelict in their duty to prevent
illegal corporate actions.
10. Enact a new commercial bribery statute to help prosecute corporate executives who
receive kickbacks from their customers or suppliers.

7.3.3 Informal Deterrence
Most commercial criminals, compared to more traditional offenders, perceive the informal
sanctions of the loss of career and prestige to be a greater deterrent. They are, therefore,
theoretically more deterred from misbehaving by those consequences than by
incarceration.
For example, a bank president, who was told he was about to be indicted, spent most of his
time asking whether the charges were going to be made public. When told that indeed the
charges would be public, the banker, promptly committed suicide.

Informal sanctions often exist without formal sanctions. The imposition of formal sanctions,
however, will usually lead to additional informal sanctions.

7.3.4 Ethics
Behaviorists generally conclude that one of the single most important factors influencing
group behavior is the attitude of management, who—in many reported instances—have
been claimed by employees to have exerted pressure on them to engage in unethical
behavior.

One prime example is the famous Equity Funding Case, which occurred in the early 1970s.
It was uncovered when a disgruntled former employee went to the authorities. For nearly
ten years, the Equity Funding Corporation falsified more than 56,000 life insurance policies
and overstated their assets by $120 million. It was estimated that fifty to 75 employees, who
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managed to keep the scheme a secret for several years, were involved. The trustee
appointed to sort out the massive fraud, Robert Loeffler, said, “Of almost equal importance
was the surprising ability of the originators of the fraud to recruit new participants over the
years.”

Teaching people that certain behaviors are illegal and therefore inappropriate is
uncomplicated and extremely effective in reducing crime. Moral education that discourages
illegal behavior, from the top to the bottom of an organization, must be continuous. Simply
put, people must be informed as to what behavior is acceptable and what is not so that they
can alter their actions appropriately.
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CHAPTER 8:
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8.1

Overview
The advent of the computer has made certain kinds of crimes easier to commit, harder to
detect and very difficult to prosecute. The commission of computer crimes has also been
facilitated by the spread of the Internet and the creation of global Intranets in transnational
corporations that permit access to computers anywhere in the world from points anywhere
in the world.
A computer-related crime is simply one in which a computer is used either to commit or
assist with the commission of a crime, or is itself the target of a crime. Traditional crimes
committed using computers may include: embezzlement, larceny (theft of property and
proprietary information), fraud, forgery and counterfeiting. Traditional crimes committed
targeting computers may include sabotage, vandalism, electronic burglary, wiretapping, and
the gaining of illegal access either by impersonating an authorized user or by exceeding
one’s authority. In addition, the U.S. federal and state governments as well as the
governments of many countries around the world have defined a new class of computer
crimes that specifically criminalize a growing variety of behaviors ranging from deliberate
distribution of viruses to theft of information from computers. Other recent laws, such as
the Economic Espionage Act, have also provided additional grounds for prosecuting
computer-related crimes. Prison sentences for conviction on a charge of computer crime
are now substantial.

Until recently, a person committing a computer crime was assumed to be a computer
scientist, information technology specialist, or programming genius. Today, nothing could
be further from the truth. In fact, anyone with access to a computer managing assets or
confidential information is in a position to commit a crime. The proliferation of computers
and their ready accessibility has made them a target of opportunity for professional and
amateur thieves alike. The result has been billions of dollars in losses from computer
crimes, according to surveys by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other bodies.

The high valuation the investment community places on companies providing computer
security solutions is testimony to the significance of computer security to the modern
organization. In light of the threat of cyber-attacks by terrorists or others that has been
recognized since the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11,
2001, there is an increasing awareness of the importance that must be given to computer
and information security.
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8.1.1 Security
Assuring security for a computer system is no different than having appropriate protection
for manual accounting files. Because of the disparity in technologies, each system requires
its own particular security tools and methods. The objective, however, is the same: to
achieve reasonable and cost-effective controls by which an unauthorized act is likely to be
detected. Although each organization must ultimately decide for itself how much security is
enough to meet its particular needs, standards, such as ISO 17799, are emerging that can
serve as baselines against which to measure the state of information security in the
organization.

Of course, technology has changed radically over the last decade as companies have
moved from large central systems (mainframes) to interconnected local and wide area
networks (LANs and WANs). Many companies are looking into emerging technologies,
such as wireless networks and biometric authentication. Of course, each of these
technologies brings new security concerns. The Internet, for example, has made global
email instant point-to-point messaging a part of almost everyone’s daily life. There was a
time when security meant locking the door to the room housing the mainframe. That is not
enough any more. One central machine has been replaced by hundreds or even thousands
of PCs (each probably exceeding the power of that old mainframe in many ways)
connected into internal networks and most likely connected to the outside world as well.

Terms such as firewalls (programs and devices designed to prevent invasion of a system by
an outsider), and intrusion detection systems (software and hardware designed to detect
unauthorized activity within a network) had no real applicability to the world of computers
as little as five years ago but are now essential requirements for any reasonably managed
corporate or government computer operation.

8.1.2 Evolution of Computer Crime
In looking at computer crime, it is important to remember that computers are just
machines that carry out programmed instructions. When a crime involves a computer, the
computer is not the criminal; the person manipulating the program or using the computer
to perpetrate an illegal act is the criminal. Computers are an instrument of crime in the same
sense that a phone or fax machine can facilitate the commission of an insider trading
offense. Although certain kinds of crime, such as planting a computer virus, would not be
possible without a computer, others are simply new versions of old crimes that are now
facilitated by modern computer technology. As that technology advances, criminal minds
will inevitably continue to look for new ways to exploit the computer.

For example, consider the theft of a new computer chip design. Printed out, the details of
the design might require a dozen thick notebooks and a large roll of detailed circuit
diagrams. That same information in computer form would easily fit on a tape cassette
smaller than the common audiocassettes used for music. The information could also be
transmitted in minutes via the Internet, as a file, as an attachment to one or more email
messages, or even hidden invisibly within a photograph.
Most experts agree that computer crime is a growing problem and that the tools to prevent
it are evolving; but so are new ways of committing those crimes. Feeling confident that
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your systems are 100 percent secure is never a good idea; given the speed of evolution of
both computers and the methods for committing computer crime, such complacency has
become downright dangerous!

This chapter should provide you with a basic understanding of computer crime, how it has
evolved, and the ways that computer criminals are likely to attack organizations like yours.

8.2

Computer-Related Crimes
In today’s organizations, virtually every asset from money to proprietary and confidential
information is likely to be recorded on some computer’s hard drive, on a computer tape or
on a disk. Every day trillions of dollars are transferred between bank accounts relying on
computerized records. Millions of individuals rarely see the inside of a bank. Their pay is
deposited directly into their accounts and when they need cash they head for the nearest
automatic teller machine (ATM). Even many bills can be paid by direct transfers of money
from their accounts to those of their creditors. Yet money may not be the most valuable
commodity on the computer.

8.2.1 Intellectual Property
Intellectual property such as business plans and trade secrets can have immense value.
There are unique differences between stealing information and stealing almost anything
else. If $100 is stolen from you, the thief has deprived you of your money. Similarly, if your
car is stolen, the thief has it and you do not. A thief can steal information, however,
particularly information stored on a computer, and you can still have it. If the thief is really
good, your information can be stolen without you ever knowing that an incident has taken
place. Computers can thus be used to facilitate the theft of money by manipulating banking
or accounting records, and goods by manipulating inventory, shipping records, or
receivables records. Information is usually stolen by copying. Intellectual property theft is
usually a combination of computer-assisted traditional crimes such as simple theft, insider
trading, and so on, and of newly defined crimes such as economic espionage (theft of
company secrets for the benefit of another organization) or computer intrusion
(criminalization of unauthorized access into another organization’s computers).

8.2.2 Computer Hardware
Another class of computer crime attempts to target computers themselves. The intentional
infection of your computer by a virus can cause a huge disruption of your business when it
is triggered to destroy data, particularly if that data has not been backed up. In some cases,
criminals may take more direct action to damage your computer. These attack profiles are
sometimes referred to as denial ofservice attacks, because they are designed to deprive the
rightful users of access to their systems.

8.2.3 Computer Crimes and the Law
Whether a target of an attack is the computer itself or the information residing in the
computer, the attempt may well be a crime. But what if it isn’t?
To be a crime, there has to be a law that declares a particular course of action to be a
criminal act. Until the passage of specific computer crime laws over the past twenty years,
Fraud Supp. 2—3/02
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prosecutors had to find ways to apply traditional laws such as those governing wire or mail
fraud to high-tech crimes. And it is important to remember that laws only apply within the
state or country in which they are promulgated. Because the Internet can be accessed from
anywhere in the world, perpetrators can carry out crimes from anywhere, especially from
countries that have weak computer crime laws or from which extradition is unlikely. Some
laws specifically require the victims to show that they had safeguarded the information
stolen or provided notification that the information was not in the public domain.
Unfortunately, in our society, there are far too few law enforcement and prosecution
personnel who are specialists in computer crime investigation. There are very specific
procedures known as computer forensics that must be followed in handling and analyzing
computer files and equipment if the evidence of the offense is to be admissible in a court of
law. Failure to do so may cause a prosecution to fail. Corporations should be aware that
attempts of their in-house technical or investigative personnel to examine computers
involved in an offense, however well intentioned, might result in evidence being rendered
inadmissible. Once a crime occurs, a court is going to apply the rules of evidence to
determine whether any actions taken could have modified the evidence or otherwise
damaged its credibility.

8.3

A Brief History Of Computer Crime
No one knows who the first computer criminal was. However, computer-related crimes
have certainly been around since the early 1970s. Throughout the rest of that decade,
computer crimes tended to focus on the manipulation of computer records to obtain
money. In the 1980s, we began to see cases in which the target of the crime was the
information on the computer. Insider trading was facilitated by the relative anonymity with
which information could be accessed in many systems.
In one of the largest early cases, an insurance company took advantage of its accounting
firm’s computer naiveté to perpetrate a huge fraud. The insurer created thousands of bogus
policies, which it could identify through special policy numbers. When the auditors, as part
of random checks, wanted to see some of these nonexistent policies, they were told the
policies would be available the next day. That evening, the perpetrators busily created the
appropriate documentation to prove the validity of the policies. Millions of dollars were
funneled out of the company through this scheme. This case marked the period when
auditors learned that it was vital to include computer systems in their audit plans.
In another noteworthy case, the chief teller of a bank located in Brooklyn, New York,
devised a plan to manipulate dormant accounts using the bank’s new computer system. He
discovered that he could move money in and out of those inactive accounts simply by
using his supervisor’s key. Because he was highly trusted, his supervisor would give him the
key whenever he asked for it without determining why he needed it. The planned
control—that use of the supervisor key required that the supervisor approve what was
being done—was subverted and rendered ineffective. The chief teller withdrew several
hundred thousand dollars. Even though the manipulations all showed up on accounting
reports, there were so many thousands of irregularities as a result of the complex new
systems that the internal auditors were not able to keep up with the volume and ignored
what they considered low-priority items, like dormant account transactions. Unfortunately
for the perpetrator, he was a dedicated but spectacularly unsuccessful horseplayer. When
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the Attorney General of New York State conducted a raid on his bookmaker, the volume
of his gambling was discovered and the source of his funds uncovered. He was convicted of
theft and imprisoned.

In another case, a young man in California discovered that the phone company had
installed a system that permitted its employees to order equipment to be delivered to job
sites using a push-button phone. He obtained the requisite code numbers from manuals
recovered from the phone company’s trash. Using the codes, he ordered the computer to
arrange the delivery of equipment to downtown manholes. He then collected the valuable
materials with his own truck (bought at auction from the phone company and repainted in
phone company colors) and eventually sold the valuable equipment to foreign phone
companies. His scheme was discovered when he refused to give his truck driver a raise and
the driver turned him in. It was shown that he had stolen about $1.1 million in equipment.
He was tried, convicted, and after a short 90-day stay in jail, promptly established a
business as a consultant to attorneys who defended computer criminals. His ads proudly
proclaimed that he had actual courtroom experience.

Today, computer crime has progressed from crimes committed by individuals against
individuals and companies to a topic of great concern to governments: information warfare
has emerged as a real threat to national infrastructures.
8.4 Computer Crime Today

Computer crime is in the news. Whether it is the arrest of the creator of a damaging
computer virus or a person using computers to sell child pornography, the media have
realized that our society has become worried about technology failures. This media
attention has had an unintended effect that can be a problem.
If you were to believe the media, hackers are the number one cause of computer crime
problems. In fact, however, the major problem is computer-facilitated crime committed by
employees and others who have been granted access to a system. Because the public
perception of threats is often a key factor in deciding how to spend security dollars, what is
actually a misperception may lead to an inappropriate allocation of resources with the result
that the expensive new security measures do not address the real risk. Today, many
companies are realizing that this may well be the case.

The problem of preventing computer crime is no different from that of preventing any
other crime against a business. Accountants used to work to discourage crime by requiring
separation of duties between people handling cash or other assets and those making the
entries in the books of the company concerning the assets. By separating access to assets
from access to the records of those assets, the theory was that two or more people would
have to conspire to carry out a fraud and thus increase the likelihood of detection.
Along with separation of duties, accountants have traditionally depended on the paper trail
of records that document transactions. This paper trail required that all transactions be
entered into journals that would be backed up by source documents such as invoices,
purchase orders, receiving reports, canceled checks, sales receipts and vendor invoices.

Of course, in spite of the best efforts of the accountants, fraud did, does, and will continue
to occur. Accounting systems are neither foolproof nor fraud proof. Determined criminals
can still find ways to circumvent or override controls.
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Computers haven’t really changed anything. A crook is still a crook. Fraud, theft and
embezzlement are still possible in the age of computers. Indeed, some argue that crime has
become more likely as traditional paper trails are replaced by electronic trails, which are
not as easily verified by traditional methods. The speed of processing took precedence over
effective control, according to some writers. CPAs should determine how and what to do to
validate the information stored in computer systems. And that has become more difficult as
computer architectures have evolved from central mainframe computers to networks of
hundreds or even thousands of PCs and file servers distributed throughout the company,
and sometimes even throughout the world.
As stated earlier, surveys, including those conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Computer Security Institute, and the American Society for Industrial
Security, show that computer crime is responsible for billions of dollars of loss each year.
Many of these surveys indicate that the average loss in a computer crime is higher than in
other crimes. It is often more difficult to prosecute a computer crime than a traditional
crime. Evidence on a computer is very difficult to connect to an individual because
computer data can be manipulated; therefore, providing proof not only that the crime
occurred but also how it occurred and who committed it can be a complex process. Part of
the problem is that there are a limited number of police and prosecutors who are trained in
the investigation and prosecution of computer crime.

In fact, new opportunities for theft, fraud and embezzlement have been created by
computer technology. Accounting records once kept under lock and key in the accounting
department are now stored on computers that can be accessed remotely. Not only are the
systems available to authorized users (employees who have a job-related requirement to
access and use the accounting system) but also by data entry clerks, computer operators,
systems analysts and programmers. If the computer’s access control security system is not
set correctly, unauthorized employees or even outsiders can gain access to the system. With
the proper skills and a criminal inclination, systems can be manipulated and programs
changed to eliminate records of the fraud.

8.4.1 Classification of Computer Fraud
Generally, there is no accepted chart-of-accounts for computer fraud. If there were, it would
constantly be changing. But certain computer-fraud activities that could affect a business’s
chart-of-accounts should be recognized: manipulating computer inputs, manipulating
programs and tampering with outputs.
Manipulating Computer Inputs

One of the most frequent bases of computer crime involves the falsification of computer
inputs. Those inputs may involve putting false transactions into the system, modifying
actual transactions or, in some schemes, not putting information into the system.
From an accounting standpoint, the main reasons for manipulating inputs are to overstate
or understate revenues, assets, expenses and liabilities. The objective of the perpetrator
determines the manipulation necessary. Sometimes the objective is to provide false data to
managers, stockholders, creditors or government agencies. Sometimes the manipulation is
part of an embezzlement scheme, such as entering false invoices into an accounts payable
system. There can be little question that the manipulation of data is the most common form
of computer-related fraud.
8
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Input fraud should be among the easiest to detect and prevent with effective supervision
and controls. These include:

• Separation of duties
• Audit trails
• Control totals and access controls (both those that limit access to data entry screens and
those that place limits on values that can be entered)
• Appropriate testing of samples transactions

Manipulating Programs
Another major class of computer crime involves altering the instructions computers use to
manipulate input files and databases. These can range from schemes in which programs are
designed to process fraudulent entries without making audit trail entries to those featuring
deliberate miscalculations to shortchange depositors of a bank of fractions of a cent of
interest, which can be accumulated and stolen.

Tampering with Outputs
Yet another category of computer fraud involves tampering with the results of computer
activity: reports and files. This category includes theft of confidential or proprietary
information such as customer lists, research and development results, company business
plans, employee information, secret formulas, and so on. According to the previously
mentioned surveys these intellectual property thefts are apparently escalating as global
competition increases. Computers have undoubtedly facilitated the thefts because they
have provided the capability for fast copying of huge databases and at the same time
provided the capability for moving the copied data globally at tremendous speeds through
data communications networks. Intellectual property theft by computer is a unique crime
since nothing is physically removed and there may be no record that the crime even took
place.

8.4.2 The Most Common Computer Crimes
Regardless of the evolution of computer technology, the manipulation of inputs and
outputs is still the most common form of computer crime. (For a detailed discussion of
financial statement fraud, please refer to Chapter 10: Reducing the Risk ofFinancial Statement
Fraud.)

Computers are frequently manipulated to get to assets, of which the most popular are either
cash, information that can be converted to cash or both. To steal cash, input is frequently
manipulated through submission of falsified documents such as invoices from vendors,
suppliers or contractors, claims for government benefits, refund or credit claims, payroll or
expense accounts. The phony claims can involve anyone from clerks to senior executives,
although employees in either the claims approval or accounting functions are most often
involved. From an accounting viewpoint, the false claim is a fake debit to an expense so
that a corresponding credit can be posted to the cash account to cover the issuance of a
check or funds transfer.
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Executive Computer Crimes
In the higher levels of an organization, the nature of fraud changes. Rather than simply
grabbing cash, account manipulation may be designed to exaggerate profits by overstating
sales or booking them before the transaction is completed. A similar effect on profits can be
created by understating expenses either through simple reduction of the numbers or
improper deferral to a later accounting period. The playing of the nearly infinite range of
variations on these themes depends only on the ingenuity of the perpetrators. For example,
profits may be overstated by increasing ending inventory of manufactured goods or
merchandise held for sale. That results in understatement of the cost of goods sold and
raises the net profits.

Manipulation of operating results is probably more highly motivated today than ever
before. With increasing stock market volatility as well as an insistence on continuous
growth and on beating analyst expectations every quarter, managers may turn to
manipulation to borrow time in order to turn around what they believe to be temporary
problems. With so much of their personal wealth tied up in company stock, there is a
tremendous motivation to keep the numbers where the market perceives they should be.
Or it may be done to make the company a more attractive merger or acquisition target on
the assumption that in the course of the merger the falsification will be overlooked or
attributed to some undefined error. Or it may be done for personal greed; in many
companies, the executive compensation plan is directly tied to reported results.
8.5

Fraud And The Internet
Some have called the Internet the best thing ever to happen to technologically minded
fraudsters. The global Internet was, of course, never consciously designed to serve illicit
purposes, but substantial evidence shows that it has turned out to be a facilitator of fraud.
In this section, we will look at the characteristics of the Internet that make it “fraud
friendly,” the kinds of frauds that we are seeing occur on a global basis and some of the
steps you can take to avoid becoming the next victim of an Internet fraud.

8.5.1 Fraud-Friendly Internet Characteristics
How Secure is the Internet?
The Internet was never designed to be a vehicle for secure communication. Because the
Internet evolved in a somewhat haphazard way and because no one really “owns” it, there
is no central “systems administrator,” to ensure that the Internet is a secure means of
communications or to even guarantee its reliability. The Internet is run, to the extent that
such a huge system can be said to be “run,” by a volunteer group called “The Internet
Society.” The standards that let systems all over the world communicate through the Web,
email, instant messaging, and so on, are orchestrated by another volunteer group called the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
The IETF operates through a system known as Request for Comment (RFC). Proposals are
written in documents called RFCs, and anyone is welcome to comment on them. Once the
comment period has expired, the IETF looks at the comments and may decide to modify
the RFC or to issue it. The collection of all RFCs constitutes the operating rules of the
global Internet. Nowhere will you find a guarantee that the Internet is secure, that
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communications cannot or will not be intercepted, that any message or data sent via the
Internet will arrive on a timely basis or, in fact, that it will arrive at all. There is nothing in
the RFCs that provides for positive authentication. As long as the Internet is provided with
an Internet Protocol (IP) address that it can process, the messages go there.

So the would-be Internet fraudster starts out with the advantage that there is nothing in the
underlying infrastructure that would stand in the way of carrying out almost any scheme
that can be imagined. Added to this inherent openness is the weakness of procedures that
have in the past characterized some of the companies that sell and register Web addresses.
Consider all this, and you can begin to understand how fraudsters have been able to hijack
Web sites and transfer message traffic intended for elsewhere to servers under their control.
The bottom line is this: The basic structure of the Internet does not require any particular
security. That being the case, only someone who is very naive would believe that the
Internet is a secure vehicle where content should automatically be regarded as credible.
How Truthful is the Internet?

Truth on the Internet is optional. You can say anything you want on the Internet, true or
false, reasonable or unreasonable, for any purpose or for no purpose at all. There is a
famous cartoon of a dog sitting in front of a computer typing away on the keyboard. The
caption reads: “On the Internet, no one knows you’re a dog.” The ability to tell lies
combined with the gullibility of a portion of the population has made some fraudsters very
rich very quickly. You can create a Web site at no cost at any of a number of services in
various countries and you can make the Web site look like anything you want.
Recently, a fraud was perpetrated in just that way. A posting on a financial bulletin board
indicated that a company was about to be purchased by a foreign corporation. As evidence
of the accuracy of this posting, the person provided a link to what appeared to be a page of
the Bloomberg news service running a story on the takeover. The price of the stock jumped
almost instantly. The only problem was that there was no Bloomberg story. The takeover
was made up and the Bloomberg page was a forgery. The perpetrator of this fraud was
caught and prosecuted. There have been a lot of cases like this. False stories posted on
message boards. During the Internet “bubble” of the late 1990s, even vague rumors could
trigger massive buying or selling sprees in technology stocks and a number of people
decided that this was a good way to get rich quick. Some were caught, others were not.

One other aspect of lies on the Internet involves the use of false identities. If you want to
make a posting seem real, you can have 40 or 50 different “people” posting supportive
information. Of course, all of them can easily be the same actual person using 40 or 50
email addresses set up on various (usually free) services. The identities may be of real
people whose names have been “borrowed” or just made up.
Anonymity on the Internet

There are readily available tools that anyone can use to hide their identity and location on
the Internet. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation recently released a warning that
people were receiving emails purportedly from the FBI asking for personal information. It
is very simple to change the return address that appears on an email. Anyone who knows
where their email system or browser stores their name and return address can change
them. Further, there are services like Anonymizer and Freedom that will send your emails
through a series of servers that will cause your location to be untraceable.
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They can also provide you with the ability to browse the World Wide Web without having
your actual location traceable. On a simple level, anyone can go to an email service like
Hotmail or Yahoo and have a working email account within 5 minutes in any name; there
is no verification process to determine whether any information provided by the account
holder is accurate. Similarly, free services like NetZero or Juno will provide free dial-up
Internet access to anyone who asks for it. And terminals connected to the Internet are
available at little or no cost at public libraries, Internet cafes, and even in some airport
concourses.

Physical Jurisdiction of the Internet
The Internet is global. It exists in cyberspace, which is unbounded. Just because a message
seems to come from a given location is no proof that it is from where it purports to be
from. We recently had a case in which a Web address indicated that the server was in
Venezuela. We were able to determine that it was actually in northern New Jersey. How
was this done? Remember that every URL—for example www.aicpa.org—must be
translated to what is called an IP (Internet Protocol) address.
An IP address consists of four numbers from 0 to 255, separated by dots; for example,
123.67.209.41. It is the IP address that is used by the Internet to route your message to its
destination. The translation between the name that you type and the IP address is handled
by the Domain Naming System (DNS). When you register a URL, you have to provide the
IP address of the Domain Name Server that will know the IP address to which traffic
bound for that URL should be sent. It can be changed at any time.

There is nothing in the technical underpinnings of the Internet that prevents you from
having a URL indicating that you are in Uruguay (for example, www.xyz.uy, where uy is
the code for Uruguay) associated with an IP address of a server in a completely different
part of the world. This is something we often see in the .com domain. People and businesses
all over the world have internet domain names that end in .com. But both they and their
servers can be located anywhere.
For the fraudster, it becomes a relatively easy matter to have their servers located in some
jurisdiction that has weak computer crime laws even though they will appear to the
Internet visitor to be local. Internet service providers (ISP) are the businesses that provide
the connection between you or your company and the Internet. As with any other industry,
they vary greatly in size, experience, and security. In the majority of cases, you can
establish an account on an ISP quickly and easily without ever physically showing up at the
ISP’s premises. It is all done through the Internet. So, a fraudster could easily set up a
server through an ISP in a country with weak computer crime laws or one in a country
unlikely to cooperate with countries likely to be on his or her trail.

8.5.2 Computer Crime Laws
The Limitations of Computer Crime Laws
Computer crime laws are not universal. Many countries have either not promulgated
strong computer crime laws or need to update them.
Other countries have no laws concerning computer crime. In addition, we are now seeing
the rise of artificially created jurisdictions. For example, the Principality of Sealand exists
on a former World War II anti-aircraft artillery platform off the coast of England. An
12
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entrepreneur has declared it to be sovereign territory, appointed himself Prince (and his
wife Princess), and is converting the platform into a computer-server farm where people
can install servers that will exist outside any normal jurisdiction. The Prince has said that
you may “reside” on his territory as long as you do not break his laws: he does not favor
child pornography, sending large volumes of junk e-mails or, according to a recent press
release, terrorism. He will not recognize any other jurisdiction as having power over
Sealand. No subpoenas will be accepted.

Even if computer crime laws have been enacted and cover a given jurisdiction, they may
not be strong enough or current enough to be effective. There is a saying that computer
technology advances at the speed of light, but computer crime laws advance at the speed of
government. A good example of a law that needed updating can be found in the case of the
person identified as creator of the “I Love You” computer virus. As the result of an
international investigation by government computer-crime investigators from around the
world working together in a model of cooperation, a suspect was arrested in the
Philippines. He was almost immediately released, however, after it was determined that the
deliberate transmission of a worm or virus program was not a specific violation of thenenforceable Philippine law. Their statutes have since been revised.
There is another problem in bringing identified computer criminals to justice. If a victim
country wishes to extradite a suspect for trial, several hurdles have to be overcome. First,
both countries involved, that is, the country of residence of the crime victim and the one
where the alleged perpetrator is arrested, must be signatories to an extradition treaty.
Second, the national government of the victim has to want the suspect badly enough to go
through the considerable paperwork and costs that are associated with an extradition
proceeding. At the same time, the country holding the suspect has to have an interest in
extraditing him or her. There are all sorts of political reasons why that might not be the
case. And finally, treaties typically have provisions stating that extradition can occur only if
the alleged offense is, in fact, a crime in both countries. As a result, if the act is not a crime
where the suspect is being held, extradition may not even be a possibility.

8.5.3 The Tools of Fraud on the Internet
Availability of Internet Tools of Fraud
The tools of fraud are easily available on the Internet. If you want to set up a Web site that
appears to be that of an investment news service, nothing could be simpler. Just use utility
programs to copy the page of the legitimate business, apply the right tools, and you can
build pages that can convincingly spoof almost any other site. Need a logo? Unless a site
has taken the right precautions, stealing a perfect digital copy of a logo or photo requires
only a couple of mouse clicks.

Fraud-Friendly Tools
The tools to hide what you are doing are easily available. Programs like PGP (Pretty Good
Privacy), which is free for personal use, can provide the encryption of messages or
documents that are so strong that most governments around the world cannot break them.
Worse, perhaps, are tools that involve what is called steganogrophy. This permits a large
document to be hidden within a picture without making perceptible changes in the image.
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Record-keeping Limitations
Internet sites keep limited records. People who run Internet sites are not required by law or
regulation (with very few exceptions) to maintain logs of access. Even if logs are
maintained, the volumes of information involved are so large that the logs are not
maintained for long. The result is that where a computer fraud occurs, there may be little
evidence for investigators to follow to prove a case.

Policing the Internet
There are not enough qualified investigators to cover Internet fraud cases. The reality is
that qualified computer crime investigators can make substantially higher salaries in the
private sector than they can in government. Given the increased importance placed on
security by corporations following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on
September 11, 2001, however, the demand for those skills is rising. As a result, it is
anticipated that government law enforcement bodies will find it harder to retain top cyber
cops. Governments will not, therefore, be able to investigate all cases. That will be good
news for the fraudsters. However, it must be said that the government’s overworked
computer investigative resources do a great job and, when combined with private-sector
corporate resources, the picture for the fraudster is not as rosy as it otherwise might be.

8.5.4 Internet Frauds: The Top Ten and Beyond
Many characteristics of the Internet make it a more fraud-friendly environment than we
might wish. Given these characteristics, what frauds can we see? Fortunately, the National
Consumers League, in cooperation with the National Association of Attorneys General, the
Federal Trade Commission, and Project Phonebusters in Canada operates the Internet
Fraud Watch, and keeps statistics on frauds. Although it is clear that they do not receive
reports of all frauds and their focus is consumer frauds, they are a good place to start. We
will then look at important frauds that are not on their Top Ten list.

The Internet Fraud Watch Top Ten
1. Online auctions (78 percent ofcomplaints). These include receipt of counterfeit or shoddy
products, payments sent without delivery of any products, and abuse of credit cards
used for purchase payments. With the tremendous popularity of sites like e-bay (which
tries hard to control the fraud problem), fraudsters have found this to be a very effective
way to get people to part with their money.
2. General Merchandise Sales (10percent). People who have been scammed on direct sales
are amazed to find that the diamond-encrusted Rolex watch they purchased for $99
from some Web site is not completely genuine. In one instance, the victim was told that
the “bargain” was only possible because it was part of a batch of watches on which
Movado had misspelled their own name. This category of fraud also includes all other
merchandise complaints.
3. Internet Access Services (3 percent). These complaints involve Internet access providers
who fail to deliver. Often billing themselves as bargain basement ISPs, they cannot
survive by providing unlimited access for $2.95 per month.
4. Work at Home (3 percent). This scam is as old as time; it boils down to taking the same
old scheme and putting it on the Internet.
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5. Advance Fee Loans (2 percent.). This is another familiar fraud taken into cyberspace. The
availability of “marketing” CDs containing millions of email addresses combined with
the essentially zero-cost of sending out large volumes of email messages allow these
schemes to be profitable even when a very low percentage of people fall for the scheme
such as paying an up-front fee for a loan.
6. Computer Hardware and Software (1 percent). This fraud preys on Internet users who
always seem to be interested in more hardware or software. Someone who wants
Microsoft’s Windows XP for less than Microsoft can sell it for may not care that the
product they are buying is counterfeit. But the victims show real chutzpah when they
complain that the illegal copy is not accurate or when the blue-surfaced CD-ROM
• carrying a paper sticker with the program name contains computer viruses or worms.
7. Nigerian Money Offers (1 percent). This has quickly replaced the mailed letter as the
preferred way of advertising for new victims in this classic fraud. This involves sending
out emails informing you that the sender is the widow of the late dictator of the country
and that he socked away some number like $80 million for a rainy day. Or, that the
author is an executive of the Nigerian National Oil Company and that he and his
associates have been receiving kickbacks of 1, 2, or 3 percent of oil revenues. In all
cases, they have chosen you to assist them in laundering their dirty money. In return
for supplying your bank account information, letterhead, and so on, you will be in for
20 or 33 or 40 or 50 percent of all those millions. Sometimes you have to kick in a
couple of thousand dollars to show that you are committed to the scheme.
8. Adult Services (1 percent). Pornography is one of the few consistent moneymakers on the
Internet. Therefore, it is easy to see why entrepreneurial fraudsters have jumped on the
bandwagon. The schemes range from the simple failure to deliver the smut promised to
outright threats of cyber-blackmail.
9. Credit Card Offers. You do not need to be a bank to offer credit card numbers. You just
have to come up with the right pitch. These rip-offs range from up-front fees paid by
people who are unable to get a credit card because they are not creditworthy to those
who have completed detailed on-line applications only to find that their identities have
been stolen and that someone has apparently been busy racking up huge debts in their
name.
10. Travel and Vacation Services. A typical scam involves a “free” hotel room but you have to
buy overpriced air tickets and other services to qualify. The “luxury” hotel room you
have been promised turns out to be of inferior category. In all of these cases, the fraud
perpetrators count on the characteristics of the Internet discussed above, both to get
wide circulation of their offers, and to avoid being identified and prosecuted.

Beyond the Top Ten
Internet Fraud Watch also lists some additional popular frauds against consumers, which
include the following:

•
•
•
•
•

Franchise opportunities
Buyers clubs
Credit card protection plans
Credit repair services
Magazine solicitations

Fraud Supp. 2—3/02

15

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

• Pyramid schemes and illegitimate multi-level marketing
• Scholarship scams
• Sweepstakes and prize offers

In the area of frauds against businesses, the Internet has also proved to be a great facilitator.
The schemes are as broad as the human mind can imagine; here are a few examples:

• Sending out fake electronic invoices for goods or services never provided.
• Selling stolen or false intellectual property. For example, “Hello. You don’t know me
but I am a research scientist with XYZ Pharmaceuticals. I have the formula for our new
Ultracillin drug and feel that the company has treated me badly, so I want to sell the
formula to you....”
• Schemes designed to involve a company in money laundering. Money launderers need
legitimate companies with whom they can engage in falsified buy and sell transactions
to carry out their illicit purposes.

Avoiding Victimization
What can you do to avoid becoming the next victim of an Internet-facilitated fraud? Here
are some tips.

• Offers that are too good to be true are too good to be true. Unless there is a rational
explanation, people are not looking to give away products and services at a loss. This is
not to say that there are not real bargains to be had. Quite the contrary, there are real
deals out there, but you have to be wary. We recently saw a case in which a computer
peripheral was offered at a substantial discount ($ 17.99 for a $99.99 item.) Investigation
showed that the vendor had decided to rename the product and was dumping inventory
with the discontinued logo. Another case (brand-new and reduced from $100 to $7)
involved a device made by a manufacturer who had gone out of business. The
liquidator was glad to get anything for the products. But for the most part, impossible
deals are impossible. Why, do you think, did the widow of that Nigerian dictator
happen to select you from all the other people in the world to offer you $ 17 million for
helping her to get her late husband’s ill-gotten gains out of the country?
• Most reputable manufacturing and sales organizations do not use free email services like
Yahoo or Hotmail as their primary cyber-communications vehicle.
• Giving your credit card information in an email is essentially always a bad idea.
• Similarly, sending confidential personal information such as credit card application data
in email is a bad idea.
• Read the URL. If you are looking at a site that purports to be operated by a major
corporation, it should be located at that company’s Web site. It should not be at a
source of free or very low cost Web site hosting such as Tripod, Geocities or
Homestead. Be careful of Web site redirection in which, through the use of frame
technology, actual Web addresses are hidden. Also remember that it is easy to set up a
Web site that contains some company’s name. An offer that has you respond to a Web
site at http://www.microsoft.joeshouseoffraud.com is not the same as one that sends you
to http://www.microsoft.com. There are also ways to disguise a URL in the form of a
numeric address.
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• Check out the vendors before sending them a check. Due diligence operates in the
cyber-world just as it does elsewhere. Check out those you plan to do business with. If
they do not want to provide the information you need to do this, think twice about
doing the deal.
• If you are the victim of a fraud, report it. Fraudsters depend on their victims not
reporting their crimes. Even if it is impossible to prosecute them for what they did to
you, your report may fit into a pattern that can lead to prosecution, to their being
denied service by their ISP, filtering by ISPs, or other outcomes.
8.6

Computer Criminal Profiles
Who commits computer crime? It would be useful to have a profile of the offender so that
we could perhaps predict who might commit the crimes.

8.6.1 Predictions
In the 1980s, criminologists who focused their attention on white-collar crime argued that
the perpetrators tended to be trusted employees with unresolvable personal problems,
usually financial in nature. These included indebtedness as a result of illness in the family
or problems with alcohol, narcotics, gambling, expensive tastes, or sexual pursuits
(according to the police, the three Bs: booze, babes and bets).

At about the same time, various studies provided a profile of the computer criminal. In this
profile the culprit:

1. Is male, white, and between 19 and 30 years of age.
2. Has no prior criminal record.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Identifies with technology more than with the employer’s business.
Is bright, creative, energetic, willing to accept challenges, and highly motivated.
Is employed in the field of either information processing or accounting.
Feels a desperate need for money because of personal problems.

Feels exploited by his or her employer and wants to get even. The culprit feels that
promotions, salary increases, bonuses, stock options, and so on, are not fairly
distributed. Others have gotten more than they deserve through various forms of
favoritism.

8. Does not intend to hurt people, just the employer, who is perceived as cold, indifferent,
uncaring, and exploitive.
9. Does not have a self-image as a criminal.
10. Believes that actions against the establishment are justified for political or social reasons.
11. Perceives beating the system as a challenge worthy of his or her efforts.
In addition, there are four frequently cited characteristics that are symptoms of trouble:

1. High living. Not too long ago, eyebrows were raised at the programmer who showed up
in the company parking lot in a new Mercedes convertible. However, in the turn of the
century marketplace, programmers who have been through one or two initial public
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offerings (IPOs) can easily afford any car they want. Nonetheless, a discrepancy
between lifestyle and income must be regarded as suspicious.

2. Ultradedication to the job. The bookkeeper or computer programmer who never takes a
vacation is either very dedicated (increasingly less likely in today’s business
environment) or afraid that some scheme would come to light if he or she were not
around to control things.

3. Aging. As some people age, they grow increasingly resentful of perceived wrongs; for
example, the awarding of increased salaries and stock to younger employees. Therefore,
they may feel justified in stealing if they think they can get away with it.

4. Chronic Lateness. The common wisdom held that people who were constantly late with
their work were late because they were trying to fabricate or cover up something they
were doing.
In today’s environment, how valid are these assumptions? We do know that most
perpetrators who are caught committing computer crimes are male. They also tend to be
young. Suggestive as the above lists might be there are few indicators, however, that
actually have any kind of predictive power. Does this mean that the perpetration of
computer manipulations is unpredictable?

Certainly, there is no simple test that will detect whether a person who has never
committed a crime in the past will or will not commit one in the future given the proper
circumstances and motivations. However, a review of cases over the past few years reveals
one interesting phenomenon: those who committed these offenses often had problems with former
employers who were glad to be rid of them. Companies that do not perform background checks
that include contacting former employers and checking for falsification on employment
applications are the fraudster’s friend. The perpetrators can ignore their pasts and start
anew at a company that appears to have weak security. Certainly, former employers can lie
about an employee or refuse to give any reference beyond confirmation of employment A
good background check should pick up at least some potential problem employees. We
recently had a case in which a company hired a woman and decided to save the cost of a
background investigation because she was coming to work for them directly from another
company known to conduct thorough investigations. After she sabotaged company
systems, we determined that she never worked for that other company. That lie was
accepted and, as a result, her true background was never discovered.
Three other things about perpetrators are important. First, an offender does not have to be
a computer genius to pull off a major fraud. Anyone who can gain access to a system, either
because he or she is authorized to use it or because the security controls are weak can
potentially manipulate that system for personal advantage even if they cannot directly
access the computer. If they can fake the data, they can manipulate it.

Second, it is easy—but dangerous—to limit consideration of risk to employees. Many
companies today, particularly in high-tech industries, make considerable use of temporary
employees and independent contractors. All too often, because they are not carried on the
books as employees, they are not subject to the same background checks and security
measures. It should be clear that computers do not care whether they are manipulated by
employees or independent contractors. Anyone who has access should be subject to the
same controls as regular employees.
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Finally, there are offenders you will never meet, who will never meet you, but who may
cause you great difficulties. These are the virus writers and virus distributors who develop
and spread them simply because they can.

8.6.2 Reasons for Committing Computer Crimes
Criminologists investigating why crimes are committed often use a four-element model,
sometimes called MOMM: Motivation, Opportunity, Means, and Methods.

Motivation represents the reason why one is willing to commit a crime. Motivation can be
related to both personal or internal conditions and external conditions. Personal motivators
include the following:

• Economic. Economically motivated perpetrators act to fulfill the need or desire for
financial gain, money, or other assets or information that can be turned into money.
• Egocentric. Egocentric perpetrators have a need to show off their talents in committing
what may be perceived by others as a complex crime. Money or other assets are
sometimes part of the crime but frequently they are not the underlying motivation.
Certainly, assets symbolize a measure of the success of the venture, which is important
in demonstrating the prowess and ingenuity of the criminal. Many hackers fall into this
category. But for many others, their downfall is the need to brag about their exploits
and thus gain favor in the eyes of their peer group.
• Ideological. Ideologically motivated perpetrators feel compelled to seek revenge against
someone or something they perceive as oppressing or exploiting either them personally
or even other individuals unknown to them. Terrorist bombings of computer centers are
an extreme example of this kind of action. The sabotage of systems by disgruntled
employees or ex-employees is frequently observed. Experts in terrorism have expressed
significant concern that in a highly technological society, attacks targeting computer
systems are likely. For example, an attack that disables ATMs in a region will cause
disruption because banks have sharply reduced the number of tellers available for
transactions. The lines in front of that limited number of tellers during the hours that
banks are open would cause disruptions as banks try to figure out how to handle the
crowds. If the computerized traffic lights used in some cities were attacked, massive
traffic jams could occur.
• Psychotic. Psychotic perpetrators are people suffering from delusional types of mental
disease that distort reality by validating feelings of grandeur or persecution, or
exaggerates hatred or fear of the organization or of particular people in the organization
(often direct superiors). These feelings can be so strong that they may take extreme
actions against their perceived enemies to relieve their anxieties. One way of acting out
these feelings is exemplified by the person who shows up at the office with a gun and
kills those he or she believes are “out to get them.” Another way this kind of troubled
individual may lash out at these imaginary adversaries is to attack the computer systems
that may be perceived as facilitating the work of supposed enemies. The subject of
workplace violence is an important one, but is outside the scope of this handbook.

Environmental Motivators
A number of crimes may be attributed to environmental motivators that are conditions in
the corporate culture or even in society in general. But no external motivator forces anyone
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to commit a crime. It would be accurate to say, instead, that environmental motivators may
aggravate personal motives. These include the work environment, reward systems, levels of
interpersonal trust, corporate ethics, and stress and weaknesses in internal controls or
security systems that may lead a person to believe that they can get away with a crime.
It was indicated earlier that there are no guaranteed ways of spotting a computer criminal
any more than any other kind of criminal and that people commit offenses for many
different reasons. Does this mean that there is nothing we can do to prevent computer
crime? Nothing could be further from the truth. We may not know specifically who will
commit a crime but we know that given the right circumstances someone is likely to try. In
the next section, we will look at the things a business can do to reduce the chance that it
will be victimized by a computer criminal.

8.7 Controls for Preventing and Detecting Computer Crime
It would be nice to assume that everyone associated with a business is honest. That
assumption would certainly eliminate the need for crime prevention, but, of course, it is not
viable. People will commit crimes for many reasons, some of which are rational, others of
which may make no sense to the observer. The larger the organization, the more likely it is
that someone is out to commit a crime. Managers who subscribe to this belief are not
necessarily paranoid. In fact, most managers can name their disgruntled employees.

There are those who will steal under the best of employment circumstances. Others would
not steal even if they were unfavored employees of Ebenezer Scrooge in A Christmas Carol
(before his conversion, of course.)

8.7.1 Internal Control and Security Systems
Internal control and security systems are designed on the basis of past experience, both in
the company in which they are installed and in other companies. The challenge here is to
build in enough controls to discourage and catch criminal behavior without breaking the
bank in costs or going overboard on security. Companies that have been victimized often
react by increasing controls to the point at which the controls can become oppressive and
actually interfere with company operations. Although it is rational for companies to set up
rules to define acceptable and unacceptable behavior, too many constraints make people
feel oppressed, distrusted, and under constant surveillance.

Since its very founding, our society has been based on freedoms and rights. We highly
value our freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly but these freedoms are not absolute.
We can speak our minds but we cannot freely slander or libel another individual. We
cannot, as one famous jurist put it, feel free to yell “Fire!” in a crowded theatre. We cannot
trade on inside information or release secret company information without expecting to
suffer legal consequences.

Well-designed controls should provide similar checks and balances. We need to consider
the risks, threats, and other vulnerabilities in today’s marketplace and technological
environment while simultaneously taking into account our responsibilities to employees,
the value of their contributions, and their need for satisfaction in the workplace. This
includes the provision of a work environment that encourages outstanding performance,
profitability and efficiency.
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A competent systems analyst or information security specialist can design layer upon layer
of controls. Controls in excess of those required by the nature of the risks are not costeffective, however, and can place undue burdens both on those who must work under
them and those who must monitor and control them. A company’s requirement for
effective internal-controls does not represent a justification for a siege mentality or the
construction of an impregnable fortress. Done effectively, the development of internal
controls is a matter of proper balance and equilibrium and should not create paranoia.
Looking at the potential for theft and fraud and the actions available to prevent crime
brings forth several conclusions:

• Most prevention efforts focus on building more accounting, access or physical security
controls.
• It is vital to recognize that there are limits to technological and procedural controls.
Given the speed with which computer and data communications technology evolves
and the complexity of modern systems, it is difficult for improvements in protection and
detection mechanisms to keep pace.
• It is also important for companies to recognize that improvements in the working
environment, including a positive ethical climate and strong interpersonal trust, help to
discourage criminal thinking and behavior and, as a result, are a part of the control
environment. Some factors in the business environment are likely to encourage
computer crime while others discourage crime. Clearly, we want to minimize the
criminal behavioral motivators and maximize the noncriminal motivators.

8.7.2 Factors That Encourage Computer Crime
The factors that enhance the probability that a company will be the target of theft, fraud,
embezzlement and corruption, including computer crime, can be either motivational
(related to the corporate reward system and company policies) or personal (related to the
character of a particular perpetrator).
The following are motivational factors that encourage computer crime:
• Inadequate rewards, including pay, fringe benefits, stock and stock options, bonuses,
incentives, perquisites, job security, meaningful work and promotional opportunities
• Inadequate management controls, including failure to communicate expected standards
of job-related performance or on-the-job behavior, ambiguity in work roles,
relationships, responsibilities and areas of accountability
• Inadequate reinforcement and performance feedback mechanisms, including lack of
recognition for good work, loyalty, longevity and effort; lack of meaningful recognition
for outstanding performance; delayed or nonexistent feedback on performance
inadequacies or unacceptable on-the-job behavior
• Failure to offer counseling when performance or behavior falls below acceptable levels
• Acceptance of mediocre performance as the standard
• Inadequate support and lack of resources to meet standards by, for example, not
providing authority to hire sufficient personnel to meet requirements for quality,
quantity, and timeliness of work produced
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• Inadequate operational reviews, audits, inspections, and follow throughs to assure
compliance with company policies, priorities, procedures, and government regulations
• Condoning inappropriate ethical norms or inappropriate behavior
• Failure to control hostility generated by promotion or destructive competitiveness
among departments, offices, or personnel

• Failure to control bias or unfairness in selection, promotion, compensation, and
appraisal
• An uncertain future (Where a company faces merger, acquisition or failure, people may
feel justified in “watching out for themselves.”)
The following are personal or personnel-based encouragements of computer crime:

• Inadequate standards of recruitment and selection
• Inadequate orientation and training on security matters and on sanctions for violating
security rules
• Unresolved personal financial problems
• Unresolved problems relating to personal status

• Failure to screen and background check personnel before appointing to sensitive
positions (This includes verification of prior employment, verification of educational
qualifications, verification of financial stability and examination of character.)
• Inadequate control of the level of job-related stress and anxiety
• Inadequate employee communication programs to control, to the extent possible,
uncertainty and anxiety among employees

8.7.3 Factors That Discourage Computer Crime
Computer crime can be discouraged through measures designed not only to prevent crime
but also to detect attempts to engage in computer crimes. The recommended prevention
measures are the following:

1. Internal accounting controls. These are the traditional measures that discourage crime, and
they are as important in an automated environment as in a manual-processing
environment. These include the following:
• Separation and rotation of duties (Remember that as personnel change jobs, it is vital
to update the list of computer applications that they can access so that their access at
any given time matches their current job requirements.)
• Periodic internal audits, surprise inspections and computer security reviews
• Absolute insistence that control policies and procedures be documented in writing
• Establishment of dual signature authorities, dollar authorization limits, expiration
dates for signature authorizations and check amount limits (These authorities also
should be examined on both a routine and surprise basis.)
• Offline controls and limits, including batch controls and hash totals
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2. Computer access controls. These controls may include the following:
• Authentication and identification controls, including keys or smartcards, passwords,
biometrics, callback systems, one-time passwords, time and day constrained access
and periodic code and password changes
• Compartmentalization, also known as “need to know”
• Use of encryption to protect data while stored or in transit

3. Firewalls. The use of firewalls and similar safeguards prevents unauthorized access
through the Internet.
The measures to detect attempts to commit computer crime include the following:
1. A system of logging and follow-up of exceptions should be designed and implemented
to log unusual activities; procedures should be in place to follow up on reported
exceptions, such as the following:
• Transactions that are out of sequence, out of priority, or otherwise out-of-standard

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.

• Aborted runs and entries, including repeated unsuccessful attempts to enter the
system
• Attempts to access applications or functions beyond a person’s authorization
Logging and following up on variances should be able to indicate a problem may have
occurred or is occurring.
General logging should be in place because, if problems are uncovered, logs of access,
web activity, etc., may be vital evidence in tracking down the person involved. Logs
should be maintained for at least a few months before being erased.
Develop and maintain awareness of employee attitudes and satisfaction levels.
Develop and maintain sensitivity to reports that particular individuals are having
problems, living beyond their means, or talking about “getting even,” for perceived
slights.
Use newly developed intrusion detection systems that use artificial intelligence capabilities
to detect unusual transactions flowing through a system. These are evolving and have
the prospect of being an order-of-magnitude improvement in crime detection
technology.

8.7.4 Security Countermeasures to Computer Crime
The focus of chapter 4 of this handbook is computer security in general. The focus of this
section is the specific measures that are often used to prevent computer crimes by those
either inside or outside an organization. Although some measures are applicable to almost
all situations, it is vital that each organization considers those controls that are appropriate
to its particular circumstances.

Security Holes
One of the unpleasant realities of today’s systems environment is that the systems we use,
including operating systems, firewalls, and security packages, as well as application systems,
are not perfect when they are released by the manufacturers to their customers. Security
problems are discovered regularly. Information about ways to exploit security holes is
quickly reported worldwide by independent bulletin board systems, government-funded
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sites such as the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon
University, and the manufacturers themselves. Sometimes the problem and the ways to
exploit it are reported before a repair patch can be developed. It has become absolutely
vital, therefore, that every organization monitor these information sources to be certain that
all relevant holes in security are understood and closed as soon as possible.
If the hole is not closed, and experience indicates that this is often the case, a company can
continue to operate with known holes in its security. It is also vital that the internal auditors
understand the importance of monitoring and closing software holes and that this is
included in the review plan.

Not all updates recommended by vendors are critical security issues. Some are for
efficiency, some are to provide new features, some correct functionality problems. Each
company must evaluate which updates are critical. There is a substantial cost involved in
constantly updating systems, and each update could introduce new problems.

Computer Access Control
Controls that allow only authorized people access to sensitive systems include the
following:

• Passwords. Use passwords that are long enough to be difficult to guess. Passwords should
not be comprised of simple words, names of relatives, and so on, and should be
changed regularly. Some organizations have had good results by requiring every
password to combine upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters.
• Compartmentalization. Restrict users to the specific files and programs that they have a
job-related need to access. This requires updates as necessary to conform access to
needs of people moving from assignment to assignment within the organization.
• Use of biometrics. Use fingerprints, iris recognition, hand geometry, and other new
technologies for added measures of control.
• Use of one-time passwords. Use hardware or software that generates a new password for
each access. This may be generated through the passage of time or using a calculator
like device to enter a randomly generated “challenge” number and get a response
number that is then entered into the computer to validate identity.
• Automatic log off. Use this measure to prevent unauthorized access to the system when
authorized users fail to log off.
• Time-day controls. Restrict personnel access to those times when they are supposed to be
on duty. An extension of this concept for companies using automated timeclock systems
is to deny access and report a violation if access is attempted when an employee is not
shown in the time clock system as being present.
• Dial-back systems. Use these systems when access is through a dial-up system. On
accepting a user ID and password, the system hangs up and dials an established number
at which the approved user is standing by. This is very helpful when a person works at a
predictable location, for example, the home office of a telecommuting employee.
• Random personal information checks. Implement this means of identifying unauthorized
log-in attempts. The system randomly transmits a question that only the authorized
individual could answer and denies access unless the right answer is received. If several
dozen personal questions are on file, this technique can be very effective.

24

Fraud Supp. 2—3/02

Chapter Eight: Computer Crime and Computer Criminals

• Internet authentication. Use this control for telecommuting employees. With
telecommuting on the rise, many companies are taking advantage of low-cost, highbandwidth Internet connections such as Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Lines, which
offer download speeds of up to 1.5MB per second and uploads of 400KB per second for
nominal monthly charges, and include continuous access, twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week. This technology, which identifies a specific Internet user and sends
information across the Internet securely is rapidly evolving as is cable-television-based
broadband Internet access.

8.7.5 Solutions
When investigating computer crimes, investigators and forensic accountants often discover
what could have been done to prevent the crimes. The following are some of the most
frequently found items. The organizations failed to:

• Have written policies and security rules for the use of computers and systems.

• Have temporary employees and independent contractors follow the same security rules
as regular employees.

• Adjust access as people changed responsibilities internally.
• Keep up with and close security holes in applications, firewalls, and operating systems.
• Maintain virus protection on a fully updated basis.
Some of the suggestions to improve computer security include implementing the following:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

More effective policies for security over proprietary information
Better interaction between the human relations, systems, and security functions

Better internal accounting controls
Better supervision of those with sensitive access to systems
Better employee instruction in security issues
Better computer audit software
Better software security
Better physical security in the workplace

8.8 Selected Computer Crimes
8.8.1 Brief Case Synopses
It is useful to look at actual cases of computer crime to see the challenges businesses face if
targeted by an offender. In each of these brief case studies, consider how your
organization’s existing security system would have faired, how your own organization
would have reacted, and how likely it is that your current system of internal controls would
have identified the problem and traced it back to the guilty parties.
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ER Fraud Case Study
A computer operator at a hospital was charged with embezzling $40,000 by
submitting false invoices that were processed through the hospital’s computer
system. At the same time, the hospital’s assistant data processing manager accepted
a $41,000 bribe from a consultant who stole an additional $150,000 by submitting
false invoices for computer services. Both the operator and the assistant manager
had prior convictions for computer-related crimes. Because computer personnel
were not directly involved in patient care, hospital policy did not require a
background check. An inexpensive reference check with previous employers could
have possibly prevented the crime because the offenders would probably not have
been hired when it was revealed that they had falsified their employment
applications.

Even Experts Have Bad Days Case Study
A partner at a major international consulting firm received an anonymous call
suggesting that one of the firm’s senior information systems managers was
defrauding the firm through a scheme involving false invoicing for supplies such as
laser toner cartridges and backup tape cartridges. A confidential internal
investigation was carried out and no problems were revealed. Every invoice could
be shown to tie directly to the actual material that had been delivered. The report
seemed to be false but a member of the firm’s management committee decided that
someone independent of the company should take a second look. Investigators
were hired and they discovered that the material had been delivered, but they
could find no record of the firm that supplied the materials. A simple background
check on the vendor showed that it was just a shell formed by the senior
information systems manager. He had developed a scheme in which he would
place orders with the shell company (actually, with himself) and then order the
same material from a reputable supplier who sent it to his home overnight. He
would open the boxes, remove the original vendor’s invoices, insert his own
invoices (which were exactly 15 percent higher than what he had paid) and then
reship them. This simple scam resulted in a loss to the company of more than
$300,000.
As shown in this case, vendor fraud can occur even in situations where all the
materials are actually received. No employees had questioned why so many orders
were being placed with a company no one had ever heard of when major vendors
could provide the same material in less time and at a lower cost.

The Invoice Looked Good Case Study
The scam was brilliant. The accounting manager had found a way to get his
employing company to pay for his gambling losses in Las Vegas. Every time he
needed to send a payment, he simply created an invoice for services at some distant
26
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office. The invoices were always from different companies but on all of them he put
a stamp on which he wrote their vendor number in the company’s system. Of
course, the vendor number was one the accounting manager had assigned to the
holding company that owned the casino. Of course, the casino was always glad to
see him on his quarterly visits; it didn’t care whether the check was made out to it
or to its parent company. Because the computer system would not reject the invoice
as long as the vendor number was valid, the computer generated the check in the
weekly check run; it was signed by another machine and mailed out with thousands
of other checks.

The scheme worked for years, until the outside auditors decided to conduct an
internal control review. They discovered there was no match between vendor
names on invoices and vendor numbers. In checking a vendor list, one of the
auditors recognized the name of the casino’s parent company and wondered why
this unlikely organization would be a vendor. The manager told the auditor that the
company held meetings at the casinos owned by the company. Unfortunately for
the manager, the auditors checked his story, and the scheme was revealed.

Breaking the Bank Case Study
A European bank sustained losses estimated at $65 million over a two-year period
when the head of the foreign currency transfer department and her assistant, who
had broken the bank’s computer transfer codes, were able to move money into
outside accounts. The fraud was discovered through an audit and the two
perpetrators were arrested. Afterwards, everyone questioned how it was possible for
such a large amount of money to be stolen with no one noticing and raising the
alarm. Further investigation showed that the bank was involved in complex money
laundering and tax evasion activities. Apparently, the two managers believed that
with all the manipulation going on no one would notice their independent scheme.
They were almost right.

A New Form of Fraud Case Study
An employee of an insurance company in Florida had the dubious honor of being
one of the first people convicted under that state’s computer crime law. The
employee was a benefits clerk with the company and used her expertise in the
company’s systems and procedures to steal more than $200,000 in two years. She
filled in the forms that benefits examiners used to approve claims and entered them
into her computer terminal. She used a variety of names and policy numbers—all
real—and created the paperwork to back up the claims. Her mistake was always
using only three mailing addresses for the checks: her own, her father’s, or her
boyfriend’s. The security department of the company discovered the fraud by
looking for unusual patterns of payment addresses.
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Welfare? It Was for Our Own Welfare! Case Study
It may be impossible to discover exactly how much they stole but a state
Department of Social Services learned that one of its supervisors worked in
collusion with a clerk to steal $300,000. This was a simple matter of input
falsification. The clerk and supervisor submitted dozens of false claims for benefits
and collected the payments. The fraud was discovered when a data input clerk
noticed that the authorization data on one of the forms she was entering was
incomplete. She called the eligibility worker whose signature had been forged by
the supervisor to check on the incomplete form. When that person denied
authorizing the claim or signing the form, an investigation was performed and the
fraud was discovered.

When Time Stood Still Case Study
Wouldn’t it be great to get the results of horse races before they ran? Imagine
always betting on long shots when you know the winner. Just a dream? Not for the
computer operator at a government-run betting agency in Australia. He figured a
way to reverse time. Just before certain races, he reset the system clock to read
three minutes earlier than it actually was. As soon as the race was run, he called his
girlfriend, who was an off-track telephone-betting clerk. She immediately entered
bets on the winner. Because the computer believed that the race had not yet started,
the bets were accepted. Then, the operator would reset the clock. Unfortunately, we
cannot report that the scheme was uncovered by brilliant work by internal auditors,
external auditors, corporate security personnel or even brilliant police work. The
operator’s girlfriend turned him in when she discovered he was seeing another
woman.

8.8.2 Case Study: A Closer Look
There are thousands of cases of serious computer crimes on the books. Some were
presented in the previous section. To provide a closer look at the way these cases
are investigated, one full-length case study is included. This case involves deliberate
actions by an insider who disrupted the email capabilities of an organization.

The Case of the Suicidal Computers Case Study
It happened, as do so many unpleasant things, in the dark of night. A dozen
computers—each dedicated as an email router for a major financial services firm—
apparently made a mutual decision, precisely at 5:00 A.M. one morning, to commit
suicide. At that time, each of the computers suddenly and without warning,
proceeded to completely reformat each of their hard disk drives. From that
moment on, email within the huge global organization stopped. Any message that
went outside of the local office was not going to be delivered.
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Within an hour, the problem was noticed. Within two, it was apparent that the
problem was not small and was not going to be easy to fix. Because many of the
important daily operating communications of the company went through email, it
was clear that a back-up plan would be needed to replace the damaged
communications links. While one group of managers developed a plan to keep the
organization functioning, the Chief Information Officer passed the word to the
company’s communications manager to fix the problem. The data communications
manager immediately contacted the manufacturer. Because the organization was a
large and valued customer, the manufacturer put two systems engineers on the next
available flight.

At the same time, the Director of Corporate Security recognized that, while it was
possibly an accident—perhaps a programming bug—that caused this crisis, it was
probably a deliberate act of sabotage. If it were, he knew he would need proof to
determine who had caused it. The Director of Corporate Security also understood
that proof requires evidence that could be admitted in a court of law.
Unfortunately, the director had previous experience in computer fraud cases in
which evidence that might have existed was destroyed in the attempt to fix software
problems. Therefore, two calls were made: The first was to the CEO of the
company, who gave him authority to investigate the incident and, if it were shown
to be deliberate, to identify and punish the perpetrator. The second call was to a
private investigations firm that specialized in high-technology incidents.

The investigators understood that they could not interfere with the repair efforts;
nevertheless, they immediately went to the data center. They briefed the repair
team, and made a simple request: Please, do not destroy or change anything that
might be the cause of the incident without checking with us first; and keep detailed
notes of your findings.
Over the two days it took to identify the problem and complete repairs, the
investigators collected evidence, both in the form of software and in written
statements from the software engineers.

During the investigation, it was discovered that one email server had not
reformatted itself. Because of a hardware problem, it had been shut down when the
incident occurred. When the engineers discovered this, they examined the unit.
One of the company’s technicians noticed that the program that controls the
processing of daily backups indicated it had been modified a few weeks earlier.
The technician who was responsible for backup knew that she had not changed the
program in months. Nevertheless, the program had been changed. It still
performed its normal backup but there was a new routine that checked the date
every time the program ran. On a specific date, the program had just two lines of
code to be executed and those two lines instructed the computer to reformat its
hard drives immediately without warning and without any report being generated.
The investigators took possession of the server since it was now apparent that the
act was deliberate.
Over a forty-eight-hour period, the problem was solved and all systems were
checked for the existence of the deadly software. Before the engineers from the
computer manufacturer left, the investigators assigned them one additional task.
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Using the notes they made during the previous forty-eight hours, each of the
engineers wrote a memo documenting his or her findings in the context of what
was now a potential criminal investigation. These statements were quickly
reviewed, and then signed and sworn to before a notary. This action converted a
memo into a sworn affidavit, which could have great value in any future court
action.
With the email system back in operation, the data center management worked with
the investigative team to determine who could have inserted the killer code into the
dozen servers. Because of security measures built into the system, very few people
had the authority to make those changes. In fact, the investigators were told, only
four employees had that authority and all were exemplary employees, so far
beyond suspicion that no one could conceive of any of them having done this. Yet
it had to be one of them. Who else could it be?

That was the question put to the head of the email management group, where the
four suspects worked. She was convinced that none of the four employees were
responsible; however, she had another candidate under consideration. He had
resigned some weeks earlier, but, as a member of the group, he would have had the
authority. Why had he left? Because he felt that he was misunderstood and
insufficiently appreciated. He believed he knew far more than the others in the
group did, including the group head, about email technology. He had publicly
gone to senior data center management to request a promotion to group head.
When his managers decided that they would keep the present manager, this
disgruntled employee had given notice and told others that the company did not
deserve him.
An examination of the former employee’s computer revealed evidence of the
destructive code that had caused the shutdown. Several versions of the code were
found, including the key line that delayed the destruction until several weeks after
he left the company. On the evidence presented by the investigators, the case was
referred to law enforcement. The police accepted the case and reviewed the
evidence. The case was brought to the county prosecutor, who determined the
actions to modify the computer’s program were a violation of the state’s computer
crime laws and that he would prosecute.

8.9 Conclusion
One of the peculiar things about the field of computer crime is that one can say almost
anything and go unchallenged. The only thing people seem to agree on is that most
computer crime is probably never reported either because it is never discovered or because
the company is embarrassed and chooses to handle it administratively. Often, the company
will forego prosecution if the offender resigns and agrees never to discuss the incident. This
is why people who commit computer crimes can, in effect, get away with it and go on to
another company with their reputations apparently intact.
In this chapter, we have tried to show that it does not require tremendous computer skills
to commit a computer crime. Any employee, temporary worker, or independent contractor
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with authorized access, as well as anyone with unauthorized access can do it. Since most
computer crimes involve input or output manipulations, the individuals most able to
commit these crimes are not developers but employees in departments that use the
systems. This is not to say that systems people do not commit computer crimes; they do,
but they are not typically likely to do so.

We have also tried to show that the commonly held belief that most computer crime is
committed by outside hackers who gain access to systems through almost mystical abilities
is also a myth. Most of the incidents involve actions by insiders. Again, enough occurrences
do involve those outside the organization to make defensive systems such as firewalls
absolutely necessary.
A third myth is that computer-related thefts including fraud and embezzlement are not
detected by audit but by accident. If that were true, and it is not, it would imply that the
criminals are somehow more intelligent or more skillful or perhaps more cunning than the
noncriminals. This is also not the case. Good internal security, accounting and audit
systems are very effective and do catch the bad guys. It is when these controls are not in
place or when they are not implemented with sufficient resources that the criminals get the
upper hand.

As computer security becomes an increasingly important aspect of technology, it is likely
that better mechanisms to prevent and detect computer crimes will evolve. But to gain the
needed protection, it will be necessary for companies to adopt the technology and to
implement it properly. Again, those who fail to assign sufficient resources to prevent
problems are doomed to have them.
Finally, remember that once a security weakness is identified in a system, whether by
hackers or security experts, and the knowledge of the hole becomes public, it is important
that it be closed quickly. There is nothing more discouraging than having to tell a victim
company that it was hit by a perpetrator who used a well-known hole to enter its system
and that all along there had been an easy-to-install, free patch out there but that it was
never installed.
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CHAPTER 9:
Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud

9.1

Overview

9.1.1 Purpose and Scope
The primary focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention, not fraud investigation. Likewise,
this Handbook is intended primarily for the CPA, whether in public practice or in industry,
who is responsible for fraud prevention, rather than the full-time fraud investigator.
However, professional fraud investigators will also find this Handbook useful in many ways,
and occasionally there may be some crossover between the two functions; nevertheless, the
distinction between the two is an important one. Prevention cannot come without an
understanding of how fraud is perpetrated and the means by which it is concealed. To
reach this understanding, it is necessary to have a firm foundation in fraud investigation
techniques.
The experienced fraud investigators achieve their status through professional training and,
most important, extensive experience in the investigation of fraud. It is well beyond the
scope of this Handbook—indeed, it would be a virtually unachievable goal for any text—to
synthesize the knowledge and expertise gained by an experienced forensic and
investigative CPA over many years. There is simply no substitute for experience.
Nevertheless, virtually all CPAs should be concerned with fraud prevention, investigation
and reporting, whether internally to an employing company, to a client, or to a court.
Occasionally and despite the best fraud prevention efforts, a known or suspected fraud
situation may surface. It is important in such circumstances that the CPA—

1. Be capable of acting competently: that is, perform the acts that should be performed and
avoid or not perform those acts that should not be performed.
2. Understand the role of the forensic accountant and others who may be called in as part
of the fraud investigation.

This chapter should serve to introduce the CPA to fraud investigation and reporting. It is
not intended as a substitute for professional expertise in fraud investigation. Until the
requisite experience is gained, in all cases involving fraud or suspected fraud, the
inexperienced CPA should seek the assistance of a lawyer knowledgeable about fraud and a
CPA experienced in forensic accounting.
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9.1.2 Forensics and Forensic Accounting
The term forensic can be defined as, “belonging to, used in, or suitable to courts of law.”
This term describes the standards that are applicable to the discipline in question—that is, a
forensic medical examiner would conduct autopsies to a standard required for court
purposes, and a forensic accountant would conduct financial analyses to a standard
required for court purposes. Thus, a forensic accountant may also be involved in civil
litigation cases, which do not necessarily involve fraud.
But what is that standard? Generally, the forensic standard involves considering all the
relevant evidence that could affect the professional’s opinion and yet withstand rigorous
cross-examination from counsel who is keen to undermine or disprove the professional’s
opinion so that the professional can properly assist the court reach its decision. It also
involves a strong understanding of the legal system.

It follows then, that forensic accounting is a discipline involving accounting to a standard
required by the court—the criminal and civil courts, as well as arbitration, mediation, and
other forms of business dispute resolution that require expert evidence to a similar
standard. It involves the application of financial skills and an investigative mentality to
unresolved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of evidence. As a discipline, it
encompasses financial acumen and a strong knowledge and understanding of business
reality and the workings of the legal system. In the context of a fraud case, extensive fraud
investigation expertise is essential. Its development has been primarily achieved through
on-the-job training, as well as experience with investigating officers (in fraud cases), legal
counsel and in the courts.
Accounting practitioners who concentrate their professional practice on matters requiring
them to testify in court as to the findings from an investigation of accounting and financial
evidence are termed forensic accountants. The ultimate test for the forensic accountant is
acceptance by the courts of law—both criminal and civil—of him or her as an expert
witness providing testimony in the area of accounting and financial matters.

While the American Institute of CPAs and the state Boards of Accountancy currently do
not prescribe any standard specifically related to forensic accounting, it is clear that the
standards for this practice are determined in the first instance by the courts of law. At the
same time, a CPA is required to meet the general standards of professional practice as
stipulated by the governing State Board of Accountancy and American Institute of CPAs.

9.2 The Five-Step Investigative Approach
Typically, there are five major steps in the forensic accounting and fraud investigation
process:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Planning.
Gathering evidence.
Analyzing and testing.
Reporting and testifying.
Case Resolution.

For a more detailed checklist, see the table at the end of this chapter.
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9. 2.1 Planning
As with almost all endeavors, planning is critical. A well-planned investigation maximizes
the chances of success; poor planning can lead to disaster. In the early stages of a forensic
accounting or investigative engagement, it’s especially important to (1) establish the
scenario, (2) identify areas of concern and uncertainty, and (3) define the nature and scope
of the investigation.

Establishing the Scenario
The amount of information available during the earliest phase of an engagement will vary
from case to case. Establishing what is known is of special importance. This is true because
it has a direct impact on the nature and scope of the investigation.

A known or suspected fraud almost always comes to light through one of the following
three broad scenarios:
1. Accounting irregularities. One of the most common irregularities is a discrepancy between
the book value of an asset and its value as determined through physical counts or
confirmations. For example, a physical inventory count may reveal a major shortage
compared to the perpetual inventory records, or accounts receivable confirmations may
reveal much lower values than the accounts receivable subledger. Other common
examples include bank reconciliations that do not balance, and complaints from
customers that their statements are incorrect. Any irregularity that comes to light during
an internal or external examination would also fall into this category. The common
theme in all of these examples is that the company’s records—its information system—
have raised a red flag that signals the possibility of fraud.
2. Immediate physical evidence. Physical evidence may be readily apparent or uncovered
upon inspection. Obvious examples include the aftermath of sabotage or arson. Human
or electronic surveillance techniques might also yield immediate evidence (for example,
with respect to employee theft or the diversion of inventory).
3. After-the-fact incriminating information. Incriminating information is a grab-bag category
that comes in various incarnations: outright confessions brought on by guilt, anonymous
tips, memos in brown envelopes, whistle-blowing employees, irate spouses looking to
get back at their fraud-perpetrating husband or wife, honest citizens just trying to do the
right thing, and so on.
In any fraud investigation the first step is to establish which of these three scenarios exists,
and the nature and scope of the related evidence.

Identifying Areas of Concern and Uncertainty
The next step in the planning phase is a blending of the Boy Scout motto: be prepared and
Murphy’s Law: whatever can go wrong, will Immediate areas of concern depend on the
scenario identified in the previous step. Dealing with sabotage requires the immediate
beefing up of security at other likely targets to prevent further damage. Dealing with a
specific employee who is suspected of fraud—such as an accounts receivable clerk who
might be perpetrating a lapping scheme, or a shipping department employee
misappropriating inventory—you would want to secure all possible evidence and remove
the suspect employee from the scene. Removing the employee from the scene need not be
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done in a direct, accusatory way. For example, if the fraud red flag is not common
knowledge among the work force, the employee could be sent on a week’s training course.
Beyond the immediate concerns of asset protection and evidence preservation, it’s
important, to the extent possible, to identify the uncertainties in the investigation—any
pieces of the puzzle that are missing, so to speak. What are the major strengths and
weaknesses of the existing evidence and supporting material? What additional evidence is
likely to be available? What additional research, investigation and analysis are likely to be
required to obtain any needed additional evidence and make it useful? Without at least a
rough idea of where you’re going, you most likely will not arrive at any valid conclusions.

Perhaps most important, you should think of any constraints, obstacles and pitfalls you are
likely to encounter along the way. Obviously, forensic accountants and investigators need
to be concerned about legal constraints in conducting their investigation. For example, as a
general rule, only law enforcement authorities in possession of a valid search warrant can
legally search a residence or a vehicle. (There are several exceptions, but for practical
purposes none of them would apply to a fraud investigation.)
Less clear may be situations such as searching employee lockers. Judicial authorities have
established that if employees have been put on notice all along that their lockers are subject
to inspection, they probably can be searched. If this notice is lacking, legal counsel should
be consulted, which should be the rule followed in all cases. Other concerns of investigators
include lawsuits for false accusations or wrongful dismissal, and constraints imposed by
collective bargaining agreements. The point is that a fraud investigation can be a legal
minefield that must be navigated very carefully and deliberately, not haphazardly. To keep
from hitting a mine, the safest course to set is early consultation with appropriate legal
counsel and an experienced forensic CPA.

In addition to legal constraints, factors such as the company’s reputation and relationship
with its employees must be considered. For example, you would not want to alienate all
your employees through hasty implementation of draconian investigative or security
measures, just because of one bad apple.

Defining the Nature and Scope of the Investigation
The last step in the planning phase is to define the nature and scope of the investigation.
This should be a fairly simple and straightforward process if the first two steps—establishing
the scenario and identifying areas of concern and uncertainty—were properly thought out.
The nature and scope of the investigation are defined by several interrelated attributes
including—

• The nature of the main objective—for example, prevention of further incidents,
dismissal of the perpetrator, proving the case for criminal prosecution, establishing a loss
claim, and so on—and the ranking of the objectives when there is more than one.
• If a criminal prosecution is envisaged, the point at which to involve the police.
• The level of secrecy or cover required in conducting the investigation.
For example, if the scenario involves an anonymous but seemingly credible tip implicating
a purchasing employee in a kickback scheme, the objective may be to prove the case for
criminal prosecution. The nature of the investigation will be fairly secret, because the
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parties involved are unlikely to confess and you would not want to alert them to the
investigation. Because kickback (that is, secret commission) cases can be difficult to
establish, the scope of the investigation could become extensive, including background
investigations of both the bribe giver and bribe taker, surveillance, and possibly even
setting up a sting operation.

9.2.2 Evidence Gathering
Once the planning phase is complete, the general objectives of the investigation must be
translated into specifics, for example, identifying the documents and other information to
analyze, conducting interviews, and obtaining third-party information required for
corroboration.

Throughout the process, two important questions to keep in mind are what logical
alternative interpretations exist for the evidence, and what eventual use will be made of the
evidence. In particular, the forensic accountant must be able to understand the difference
between relevant and irrelevant information, and must be willing to apply the standards of
evidence required by the court.

Information Gathering Techniques
The forensic and investigative accountant is not a police officer. He or she does not have
the resources of a police officer and, even when working to assist the police, must work
within his or her own expertise, and within the rules governing professional conduct.
Among the most important investigative tools are those that enable the forensic accountant
to gather and analyze information available in the public domain in conjunction with other
information gathered during the investigation.

For example, in investigating an individual, it may be possible to gather background
information concerning certain aspects of an individual’s financial circumstances (for
example, mortgages and other secured debts, old court judgments, and so on), educational
and employment references, professional qualifications, and other details such as whether
he or she has taken his or her annual vacation. Also worth exploring is corporate
information such as jurisdiction of incorporation, authorized share capital, and the identity
of all officers and directors since incorporation can often be obtained from the appropriate
state office, usually the Secretary of State of the jurisdiction where the incorporation took
place. In some jurisdictions, shareholder identities can be obtained. In many instances,
private offshore corporations have less information available than publicly traded North
American companies.

Public domain information may also provide critical clues or evidence. For example,
comparison of a company’s statistics and trends to others in its industry, that is,
benchmarking, may identify unexplained variances that alert the forensic accountant to
possible questionable activities or that warrant further investigation. At the very least, the
background data will provide context for the detailed findings from the examination of
nonpublic data.
There are many sources of public information about organizations, industries, and
institutions. Very often a university reference library or a government resource center can
provide access to documents, reference textbooks, computerized databases, and other
sources of information that can assist in understanding and analyzing a case.
7
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Documentary Evidence
At the beginning of any case involving documentary evidence, there are two key questions.
What documents should be obtained? And where will they come from? These questions are
usually resolved after discussions with available witnesses and an initial assessment of the
findings to date. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary to involve the
authorities to obtain a search warrant or begin legal proceedings so that a court could order
the seizing of documents.

The main goal is to gather all documents that might be useful, bearing in mind that
irrelevant documents can always be returned to their proper place. It is necessary to decide,
in consultation with legal counsel, whether to be selective (that is, review all documents but
take only those deemed necessary), or whether to remove or secure all of the documents
from the premises by taking the filing cabinets, and so on. It is difficult to lay down hard
and fast rules, but clearly the primary purpose is to obtain all documents that might be
relevant without resorting to a fishing expedition.
The minimum requirements for financial documentation, for the period under
investigation, are likely to be the following:
• Books and records, management reports, and statistical analyses pertaining either to the
management of the company or to an individual.
• Documentation pertaining to the movement of assets into and out of a company.

• Relevant correspondence.
• Personal documentation, such as bank-account records.
Documents, including seized documents, should be properly identified and catalogued.
Documents must be handled carefully. They should not be written upon, altered, stapled or
unstapled during the course of the investigation. The investigating accountants, in
particular, should bear this in mind.

Documents should be examined in detail and categorized as follows:
1. Documents required for evidence.
2. Documents required for rebuttal of the defense arguments.
3. Documents required for other reasons.

4. Documents that can be returned.
Once the documents have been sorted into these groups, photocopies can be made to
provide working copies for the investigating accountant to use when preparing schedules,
and in general for the working paper files.

Documents will subsequently be selected, from among those photocopied, for use in the
presentation of evidence in a court of law. They should be compiled and assembled into a
document brief.

Admissibility of Accounting Evidence
It is important during the evidence gathering stage to consider the two forms of
documentary accounting evidence that may be presented in a court of law:
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1. Primary, that is, the original, individual accounting documents obtained from the parties
concerned or other sources.
2. Secondary, that is, summaries and schedules based on the original documents, which are
produced by an accountant after examining the primary evidence.
The issue of whether secondary accounting evidence should be admissible has been argued
in the courts for many years. Two opinions that allowed secondary accounting evidence,
are described below.

In the first case, the court ruled, and was upheld on appeal, that a summary of
documentary evidence was admissible. The court said, however, that the summary was in
itself not evidence of the underlying facts; rather, it was strictly an aid to understanding
primary evidence that had already been established. The judge made the following
observations about the use of secondary evidence:
1. No more reliance could be placed on the survey than was placed on the primary
evidence it was intended to summarize.
2. The summary did not prove the veracity and content of the primary evidence.
3. Any summary of primary evidence must show every weakness previously determined as
existing within the primary evidence.

In the second case, the court ruled that an exhibit prepared by an accountant, based on the
documentation before the court, be introduced into evidence because it helped to simplify
and trace the many transactions previously discussed in the court. The defense was
concerned that the exhibit expressed the independent opinions of the accountant who
prepared the material and, therefore, was not objective. However, the judge ruled that any
opinions reflected in the exhibit were opinions that were readily ascertainable from the
documents themselves—the primary evidence.

Interview Techniques
One of the more important tools for the forensic accountant is the interview process—this
is a complex subject area on which several books have been written, and which takes years
of experience for forensic accountants to master.

For the purposes of this Handbook, rather than attempt to explain the entire process, this
section provides highlights of a few of the skills involved:

• The interview process should yield evidence that is as clear, unambiguous and concise
as possible.
• Each interview, in order to be effective, should be carefully planned regarding the issues
to be examined. All supporting documentation relating to the issues in question should
be readily available to the interviewer in the event that the documentation is needed for
reference purposes during the interview.
• The forensic accountant should consider the timing of the interview in relation to the
extent of evidence gathered to date. Usually, it is best to gather as much documentary
and other evidence as possible before either confronting the suspect or suspects directly
or alerting those suspects by interviewing a parade of witnesses in a highly visible
manner.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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• The forensic accountant should consider all the physical aspects relating to the venue of
the interview—including the size, temperature and lighting of the room; the size and
positioning of the furniture within the room; and the seats to be occupied by those
attending the interview.
• The forensic accountant should be skilled at asking both open-ended and closed
questions, and should be able to distinguish when these kinds of questions would be
most effective.
• The forensic accountant must be able to differentiate between an inarticulate
explanation by a nervous individual and the evasive explanation offered by an
individual who does not want to have his or her actions or motives identified and
examined more closely.
• Discourse analysis, which involves the analysis of a person’s written and spoken words,
is an increasingly used technique in addressing suspected fraudsters. The theory of
discourse analysis is that every word, pause, and gesture is important. There are no slips
of the tongue. Thus, changing tense from present to past or person from first singular to
first plural could be a significant cue. Therefore, when taking a statement, whether
written or oral, it is important to have every last quirk—ums and pauses—recorded.
Discourse analysis, however, is not the end all: it is one of the tools available to the
investigator.
• The forensic accountant must be able to control and direct the interview process to
draw out further evidence, often from hostile or adversarial interviewees. Effectively, the
forensic accountant applies his or her own knowledge of the human element to assist in
this process.
• The forensic accountant must be expert at taking good notes.

Private Investigators
It may also be necessary to engage private investigators to conduct surveillance of
suspected perpetrators, for example, to observe their activity and record their presence at
various locations and times, including meetings with certain individuals.

Forensic accountants who regularly work with private investigators as part of their team
should be consulted for a recommendation regarding how to use investigators effectively,
and whom to use.

Search and Seizure Mechanisms
In criminal matters, law enforcement agencies often obtain a search warrant to obtain
documentary evidence. The forensic accountant may assist them in specifying on the
search warrant those accounting, banking and other records that are to be seized as
evidence of fraudulent activity. Depending on the jurisdiction, the forensic accountant may
also be named on the warrant to attend its execution at the premises to be searched, in
order to help identify those documents that are to be seized as evidence.
In civil matters, depending on the jurisdiction, different search and seizure mechanisms
may also be available. The forensic accountant could provide assistance in obtaining
evidence through the use of a seizure order, granted pursuant to a court application. Under
the court’s supervision, an order would permit counsel to recover documentary evidence
from the other party. This evidence could otherwise have been destroyed or concealed.
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Similarly if there is a concern that the assets of an individual under investigation may be
dissipated, an injunction may be obtained from a court. This injunction would prohibit the
individual under investigation from conducting his or her affairs in a manner that would
financially prejudice the other party in a case prior to the court rendering its decision.

The rules governing civil suits in most jurisdictions allow discovery proceedings, which
include answering either orally or in writing questions under oath and the production of
documents, or some equivalent process. During discovery, the forensic accountant can

(Text continued on page 11)
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assist counsel in requesting documents to be produced by the other party and in
determining questions to be put to the witnesses for the other party.

The Role of Computers
Over the years, the role of computers in investigations has increased exponentially; for
example, the use of the Internet as a research tool and the development of faster, more
efficient software to assist in the investigative process.

Investigative software now includes many packages that are designed to assist the forensic
accountant, investigator or lawyer with his or her work. For instance, scanners can be used
to scan in huge volumes of paper evidence that can then be searched via keywords or
phrases and organized using a database for quick reference later in the case. Queries can be
generated in a matter of minutes, which search through databases of millions of
transactions, to identify the proverbial needles in the haystack. Similarly, specialized
software is now readily available for procurement fraud investigation and to recover file
fragments from personal computers.

The work product of the forensic accountant is also generated by computers and generally
includes a written report accompanied by various supporting information—for example,
document briefs, chronologies of events, accounting schedules (either summaries or
analytical schedules), graphs and charts.

9.2.3 Analyzing and Testing
During the analysis stage, the financial issues being investigated are evaluated in detail.
Appropriate conclusions are drawn, either in terms of a finding of fact (for example,
whether a particular transaction or event took place) or the resulting quantification of the
alleged fraud. If the investigation has been properly planned and appropriate evidence is
available and has been gathered, this step should go fairly smoothly.

The ultimate test of the evidence may come when the perpetrator is confronted with it. A
trained interviewer in possession of all the facts can often elicit an immediate confession
from an unprepared suspect. In many cases, the suspect is relieved that the matter is finally
over because he or she no longer has to endure the stress of covering up the fraud.
Of course, there are many cases that are not resolved as quickly, proceeding instead to
lengthy civil or criminal court challenges. The planning, evidence gathering, and analyzing
and testing phases of the investigation must yield a product that, in the end, can withstand
the court challenges.

9.2.4 Reporting and Testifying
The forensic accountant must be able to present his or her findings in a way that is
understandable, and must do so in an appropriate format. The American Institute of CPA
Practice Aids should be referred to when preparing the final report. In general, however, the
appropriate format might be one of the following:

• A reporting letter, for example, a communication to counsel outlining the scope of the
review and findings.
• An affidavit or deposition, that is, a sworn statement of findings with supporting
documentation.
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• A formal communication to the court, such as a report that sets out the forensic
accountant’s opinions and underlying findings, and that provides details as to how those
findings are substantiated.

Often the findings must be communicated through oral testimony in court. Once again, that
is why every phase of the investigation up to this point must be conducted with the legal
evidence standards in mind. Forensic accountants must be prepared for examination under
oath about all their activities. This examination can come at any time and in any form, for
example, as an affidavit, a deposition, or oral testimony at the actual trial. They must be
able to qualify as an expert witness based on their education, experience and knowledge.
Finally, they must be prepared to respond to cross-examination and to the submission of
different financial evidence and alternatives by the other side.
Keep in mind that conventional accounting evidence is only one part of a much larger pool
of evidentiary material, which includes one or more of the following:

• Testimony of witnesses.
• Police witness interview notes.

• Statements of claim.
• Statements of defense and counterclaim.
• Examinations or production of documents relating to a civil matter or search warrants.
Additionally, the forensic accountant may carry out research to identify any precedents that
may assist in reporting and presenting evidence.

Preparing and Presenting Accounting Evidence
Certain guidelines should be considered when preparing and presenting accounting
evidence. Although set out primarily from the point of view of the investigator or legal
counsel, forensic accountants (especially those who act as expert witnesses) should also be
aware of these guidelines, which include:
1. Make yourself fully aware of the evidence, or lack of it, from an accounting standpoint:
a. Be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the case based on the available
documents.
b. Be aware of any investigation that may be needed to complete the accounting
picture.
2. Thoroughly familiarize yourself with the final accounting picture as set out in the
accountant’s report, schedules, and document brief.
3. Decide what accounting evidence to call, if any.
4. Prepare evidence for the court:
a. Request that the accountant prepare the appropriate report, schedules, and document
brief.
b. Request that the accountant prepare appropriate visual or other aids.
c. Make available, as required by the rules of procedure, to the other side accounting
material including the report, schedules, and document brief.
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d. Accomplish the following at the meeting with the other side.

• Explain the accounting material.
• Ensure that there is an opportunity for explanation and production of documents
by the other side.
• Consider the admissibility of accounting material without formal proof.

5. Conduct a final pretrial witness interview of the accountant:

a. Ensure that all documentation is introduced as exhibits.
b. Confirm that the accounting schedules are properly cross-referenced to the document
brief.
c. Review the format of the examination of expert witnesses, including:
• Areas to be covered.
• Sequence of examination.
• Exact nature of opinion evidence, if any.
• Use of visual aids.
6. Make final preparations for tendering the accountant’s evidence in court:
a. Place exhibits in proper numerical order.
b. Index the accountant’s document brief with exhibit numbers.

c. Confirm the logistics of using visual aids.
d. Confirm the availability and legibility of copies of accounting schedules and visual
aids.
Qualifying as an Expert Witness
The simulated testimony reproduced below shows how a CPA’s qualifications as an expert
witness can be established.

Examination—of Mr. I.M. Sleuth, CPA by Jim Jones, Esq. (Prosecutor)

Q. Mr. Sleuth, where do you reside, sir?
A. I live in Bigtown, Megaplace.
Q. And what is your occupation?

A. I am a CPA and a Certified Fraud Examiner.
Q. And do you practice on your own or with someone else?

A. I practice in partnership with other CPAs under the firm name of Sleuth &
Company.
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Q. And how long have you been operating the accounting partnership?
A. Close to twenty-two years now.

Q. And prior to that were you associated with any other firm?
A. Yes, prior to that I worked for a period of six years with a national firm
following my graduation from school.

Q. And in what year did you qualify as a CPA?
A. In 1972.

Q. And since that date have you had occasion to testify in court with respect to
accounting matters?
A. I have.
Q. And approximately how many occasions would that have occurred on?

A. An estimate of some fifty occasions.
Mr. Jones:

Your Honor, I offer Mr. Sleuth as an expert witness on the basis of his
qualifications that I have elicited.

Mr. Green (Defense Counsel): No objection, Your Honor.

His Honor: Thank you.

Q. Mr. Sleuth, I understand that you have prepared a number of documents
relating to various transactions dealing with Acme Manufacturing?
A. Yes, I have.

Q. Mr. Sleuth, I show you a document, a rather large document, marked Exhibit A.
I would ask you to look at that document and tell me if you recognize it?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. And did you prepare that document yourself?
A. Yes, I did, with the assistance of staff under my direct supervision.

Q. And I wonder if you would hold it in such a way that the jury will be able to see
the structure of that document itself. It appears to consist of a number of
columns, vertical columns, am I correct?
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A. That’s correct.
Q. And the document is headed what?

A. It’s headed, Analysis ofSales for the Period August 1, 1998 to October 5, 1998.

Observing the Accountant Witness: A Positive Approach
The following list presents the ideal a CPA should, under the direction of legal counsel,
strive for when giving oral testimony.

• The answers given should be responsive to the questions and as brief as possible,
without losing sense.
• The statement of qualifications as an expert witness should be well outlined, factual, and
not overly laudatory.
• There should be no show of bias when describing the scope and purpose of the services.
• The accountant should indicate the source of all documentation and acknowledge that
all documents used to support his or her findings are currently before the court.
• The accountant should be prepared to consider new evidence provided it is relevant to
the case.
• The accountant should be specific about the time period covered and the dollar amount
of his or her findings.
• The accountant should be able to articulate the basis for his or her opinion in an
organized and logical fashion that is easy for the judge (and if it is a jury case, a lay jury),
to follow.
• The accountant should make good use of visual aids.
• The accountant should speak slowly and deliberately, leaving sufficient time for the
judge (and jury) to absorb his or her evidence.
• The accountant should periodically check that the judge (and jury) is following his or her
evidence.
• The accountant should direct his or her answers to the judge (and jury) rather than to the
lawyer conducting the examination or cross-examination.
• The accountant should make a clear presentation.
• The accountant should be certain that the terms of the engagement are well organized
and clearly set forth.
• The accountant should see to it that the accounting schedules are well referenced,
including the visual aids, and can easily be tied to the supporting documents.
• The accountant should be calm and collected.
• The accountant should demonstrate knowledge of the documents and the case, and an
understanding of the testimony of the other witnesses preceding him or her; that is, there
should be a positive demonstration and total commitment and understanding of the
matter before the court.
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The Accountant Witness—A Negative Approach: What Not to Do
The following list presents the negatives an accountant can exhibit when giving testimony:
• Confusion.
• Lack of preparation.
• Self-described expert (that is, self importance: impressed with himself or herself and his
or her credentials).
• The accountant demonstrates bias in the presentation and explanation of the scope and
purpose of his or her services.

• Failure to present findings or conclusions.
• Lack ready notes in his or her file.
• Findings convey no definite time period.
• Findings convey no definite dollar amount.
• Poor visual image.
• Poor posture.

• Incomplete supporting documents.
• Argumentative and belligerent.

• Openly nervous.
• Off-hand answers to questions.

9.2.5 Case Resolution
Fraud is a crisis for an organization and its employees. Good crisis management demands
that the investigative process not end with the reporting of findings or the giving of
testimony. Briefly, this means the victim organization should—

1. Seek or enforce restitution from the perpetrator (for example, seize any assets pursuant
to a court order).
2. Learn and adjust from the experience—in particular, ensure that controls are
implemented to prevent a recurrence.
3. Keep channels of communication open between the crisis survivors—that is, the
organization and its employees—to ensure the crisis does not damage their relationship
or impair the organization’s ability to function effectively and efficiently.

4. Implement regular, diligent monitoring and follow-up on the above points.
9.3 Forensic Accountants

Forensic accountants must possess a range of skills in order to carry out their investigations
in a professional manner. These skills include not only thorough accounting knowledge but
also knowledge of business and an awareness of the legal process. With these skills, the
forensic accountant can investigate, analyze, document, report on, and testify as to the
financial aspects of an investigation into a fraud or other so-called white-collar crimes.
In many instances, the forensic accountant may be requested to quantify the amount of a
fraud loss in a criminal matter or the financial damages in a civil matter. While a criminal
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matter must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a civil matter must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. Both require a demonstration of similar techniques and
skills from the forensic accountant.

9.3.1 Professional Skills and Attributes
The seven major categories of a forensic accountant’s professional skills and attributes are:

1. Accounting and audit knowledge, including good business knowledge.
2. Fraud knowledge.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Law and rules of evidence knowledge.
Investigative mentality and critical skepticism.

Psychology and motivation awareness.
Communication skills.
Computers and information technology comprehension.

A closer inspection of each category follows.

Accounting and Audit Knowledge
Professional training in accounting and auditing provides not only accounting and audit
knowledge but also a practical understanding of business operations, business finance,
corporate structure, industry practices, and standards of conduct.

The majority of those who identify themselves as forensic accountants are CPAs. These
individuals have sought and found careers for themselves in an area that allows them to use
their skills as CPAs, together with other personal attributes that are necessary in
investigating business fraud and commercial crimes.

Audit skills are an important foundation for a forensic accountant. Due to the sensitivity of
the work involved, forensic accountants must be able to focus on the need for a 100 percent
substantive examination of all documentation related to a particular matter.
The accountant with good audit skills must have the ability to prepare and use complete
and accurate documentation; thus the accountant must know how to catalog the available
information. He or she must also be able to determine the other existing information
sources, which initially may not be available but which can, with research and diligence, be
uncovered, obtained, and utilized. With his or her accounting and audit skills, the
accountant can inquire about, locate and identify investigation-related documents—whether
they are present initially or obtained during the course of the investigation.
For most CPAs, audit experience includes both audit and nonaudit engagements covering a
wide cross-section of business enterprises and their operations, from small sole
proprietorships to large multinational corporations, both public and private. This familiarity
with business enterprise is an important element in the forensic accountant’s investigation
of business frauds and similar matters.

Fraud Knowledge
In addition to professional training in accounting and auditing, the most important aspect of
the forensic accountant skills mix is exposure to and knowledge of many different kinds of
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fraudulent transactions. This will allow the forensic accountant to identify red flags and to
piece together patterns and theories that may otherwise elude an accountant who has not
had the same degree of exposure to fraud.

Forensic accountants do not merely compute, they analyze. The analytical process is not an
easy one, as each case is unique and therefore calls upon the forensic accountant’s
experience, formal training, and other important attributes. Specifically, he or she must be
able to identify accounting problem areas, prioritize these problem areas or issues as
required, and refine or change the focus of the investigation as new information is obtained
and assessed. Often, an original theory may be only the beginning of an investigation, or it
may be refined to a specific issue warranting further review. In providing assistance to the
courts, this ability to properly focus the investigation is important.
The importance of experience cannot be overemphasized. The forensic accountant must
also be able to look beyond the form of the documentation, to understand its substance and
foundations, and to assess whether it is consistent with other business realities. The forensic
accountant must understand the nature of the documents that he or she is reviewing and
question their business reality. More than anything, a forensic accountant is distinguished
by having “been there before.” Knowledge of many different kinds of fraud, based on first
hand investigative experience, means a more effective plan of investigation, knowing when,
how, and who to interview as well as the format for communicating findings in reports to
clients and if necessary to the court.
Law and Rules of Evidence Knowledge
It is important for the forensic accountant to be knowledgeable about both criminal and
civil laws, since these laws have a direct impact on matters involving the forensic
accountant. Specifically, a forensic accountant must be able to understand both criminal
and other statutes that may have been contravened, in order to identify possible issues.
There is also a need to understand the rules of evidence to ensure that all findings are
admissible in court, if necessary. Specifically, investigative accountants must have an
understanding of the rules of evidence—for both civil and criminal matters—which consist
of:
•
•
•
•
•

What evidence is.
How it is obtained.
How it is preserved.
How it is presented before the courts.
How the forensic accountant’s own work can become part of the evidence brought
before the courts or before some other tribunal responsible for determining what has
occurred.

To provide accounting assistance in a matter involving fraud, the forensic accountant must
possess a general understanding of the issues by which the courts can judge an act to be
fraudulent. He or she must be knowledgeable as to the court’s tests for fraud—for example,
the presence of dishonest intent as seen in the perpetrator’s actions, or more particularly,
the mens rea or criminal intent of the perpetrator at the time the act occurred. He or she
must review and analyze accounting, banking, financial and other business records, and
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identify both specific acts and patterns of conduct that are suggestive of dishonest intent to
deprive a victim of an asset.

Investigative Mentality and Critical Skepticism
The forensic accountant must possess an investigative outlook, tenacity, and the ability to
identify indicators of fraud. Collectively, these attributes could be termed as the
investigative mentality. This mentality encourages the forensic accountant to seek substance
over form—to identify and analyze data and to conduct interviews to determine what has
actually occurred in a business transaction, rather than what simply appears to have
happened.

The investigative mentality is sometimes manifested by the smell test—the ability to assess
relevant transactions or events to determine their reasonableness and to the extent possible,
their veracity. In other words, in light of all the known facts, does a particular action appear
reasonable and logical? Is the action or pattern of behavior plausible in the circumstances,
or is there an odor that begs for further investigation?
The investigative mentality can also be thought of as professional, critical skepticism. It is
not a shotgun approach; rather, it is a specific and precise set of judgmental procedures
suitable for the circumstances that allows the forensic accountant to identify and assess all
relevant facts and develop hypotheses. These hypotheses can then be researched further
and tested more extensively as the investigation proceeds. The forensic accountant never
discounts any aspect of an investigation on face value: Only after examining all available
evidence and weighing its totality will he or she determine an item to be irrelevant to the
issues at hand.

Another analogy—that of the watchdog-bloodhound—further illustrates the forensic
accountant’s investigative mentality attribute. A CPA is more akin to a watchdog—he or
she looks for material misstatements in financial statements caused by error or fraud, but
will respond affirmatively if warning signs of fraud appear through audit procedures. The
forensic accountant, however, is more of a bloodhound—actively seeking out the presence
of evidence, all of which when viewed together may indicate the occurrence of a fraudulent
act.
While the investigative mentality requires a disciplined approach and a methodology, it
also requires creativity in being able to identify and seek out further sources of evidence
and to analyze this new information. Attention to detail is critical as the success or failure of
the case may depend on the identification of evidence that, on initial review, may appear
insignificant or irrelevant. The issues of materiality or sampling relevant in an audit
assignment do not restrict a forensic investigation. Those restrictions may cause fraudulent
acts to be overlooked, and they are inadequate in establishing evidence.

Psychology and Motivation Awareness
Another attribute of the forensic accountant is an understanding of the human element.
Documents do not commit fraud; computers do not commit fraud; rather, people commit
fraud. In assessing information, documentation and accounting records, one of the
seasonings that the forensic accountant can apply to the mix is his or her understanding of
individuals, including what motivates an individual to commit fraud and the attributes of an
individual who commits fraud. This understanding, together with the ability of the forensic
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accountant to examine information not just from an accounting viewpoint, but also within
the context of the overall picture or business reality, is important
In general, it can be said that individuals react to satisfy needs. The forensic accountant
must recognize the presence of such needs during his or her investigation, whether it is the
need of an employee for greater income to maintain an extravagant lifestyle or the need of
a sales manager to maintain sales volumes in a declining market so as to ensure his or her
continued employment. Such needs often provide the motivation for acts that an employee
may label differently but which are, in essence, fraud.
In a situation where an individual has both the need and the opportunity, a fraudulent act
may be the result.

Communication Skills

Forensic accountants, as expert witnesses to the court in findings of fact, must be able to
clearly and effectively communicate information. This means that they must be able to
communicate without bias in written form, including the use of accounting schedules,
charts, and exhibits. They must also be able to communicate to others the nature and extent
of the work undertaken and the findings that have evolved from that work so that it can be
understood both in a court of law and in other forums.

When the forensic accountant testifies as an expert witness in court, he or she must be able
to explain the procedures, analyses, and findings of the investigation in such a way that the
basis for his or her expert testimony—both facts and, if necessary, opinion—is understood
by the judge and, if there is one, the jury. The forensic accountant’s knowledge of the
available evidence and possible alternate explanations of the events must be as complete as
possible, to ensure that the findings are not compromised on cross-examination.
Understanding Computers and Information Technology

Today’s computers have replaced yesterday’s ledgers, and in fraud investigation it is
important to be as up-to-date as the alleged perpetrators of fraud. Thus, the skills of a
forensic accountant should include the ability to understand the opportunities computers
provide to potential perpetrators of fraud as well as the ability to use computers in analysis
and documentation of an alleged fraud.
Because succinct presentation to the judge and jury is so critical, knowledge of computer
graphics is also helpful. The forensic accountant’s findings often include quantitative
analyses that are conducive to presentation in the form of graphs and charts that depict and
summarize the information. Typical graphs and charts include summaries of the source and
use of funds, as well as flow charts showing the movement of assets at various times.

9.3.2 Ethics
Independence and Objectivity
Independence and objectivity are integral concepts in the ethical training of CPAs. While
the need for these attributes is well established in the audit area, they are extremely
important in investigative work. The forensic and investigative accountant is not an
advocate; rather, he or she provides the skills and input of an independent expert. Even a
bias with respect to a single, small matter—whether actual or perceived—may call into
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question in the eyes of the court other unbiased evidence presented by the forensic
accountant. He or she must therefore report objectively at all times.
Respect for Access to Information and Privacy Laws
One factor that must not be overlooked in the role of investigator is that the information
that is gathered must be collected in an ethical and legal manner. One cannot misrepresent
one’s self when gathering information, nor can the process of collecting information be
abused.
Most important, the rights of an individual whose activities are being reviewed must not be
abused.

9.3.3 Kinds of Services Offered
Proactive versus Reactive Services
Forensic accounting services can be proactive or reactive. Proactive services include
training on fraud awareness and fraud prevention measures, presented elsewhere in this
Handbook. Reactive services are investigative and analytical in nature and are rendered
after the event. Much of the information in this chapter addresses reactive services.
Civil versus Criminal Services
Another way to identify the kinds of services that a forensic accountant renders is to
consider the forum in which a dispute is finally resolved. For example:

• A criminal forum must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• A civil case has a less onerous burden of proof than a criminal case. The trier of the facts
must reach his or her conclusion based on the preponderance of the evidence.
• A nonjudicial tribunal, for instance, an alternative dispute resolution proceeding
(arbitration) can differ from a court of law by being either stricter or more lenient.
• Finally, if the circumstances are such that no reference is made to an outside tribunal,
but rather two parties are to resolve a matter on their own, then the level of proof
required is only what the other side will accept.

Other Categorizations
Services of a forensic accountant can also be categorized in other ways, for example by the
type of procedures performed. These procedures can include—
• Performing an initial review of documentation to determine whether further research or
investigation is required or necessary.
• Providing an affidavit or deposition outlining the results of a review of documentation.
• Providing a report identifying the scope of the work performed and findings.
• Assisting counsel in obtaining a search warrant (that is, in a criminal case).
• Providing expert testimony in court.

The nature of the industry in which a forensic accountant is performing an investigation can
be another method of classification. For example:
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• Service industries could include transportation, banking, securities brokerage, retail, real
estate, construction, professional services (such as services of CPAs and lawyers),
mortgage brokerage, and telecommunications.
• Manufacturing industries could include construction, farming, food processing, all forms
of manufacturing, mining, petroleum, and publishing.

The above classifications could then be further refined, and others added. For example,
government and nonprofit sectors are other areas where forensic accountants are called
upon to provide their services.

9.4 Checklist: Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud
CPAs can use the following checklist when dealing with a known or suspected fraud in their
organizations or in those of their clients. No answers may require investigation and follow-up,
the results of which should be documented. Use the
column to cross-reference the
checklist to the appropriate work papers.

The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If fraud is of vital
concern to an organization or if serious fraud is suspected, seek the advice of legal counsel and
a CPA experienced in fraud investigation.
Table 9.1 Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud Checklist
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

1. Planning

a. Has the main scenario of the fraud been established, including
the sources of information pointing to fraud (that is,
accounting irregularities, physical evidence, or incriminating
information)?

b. Have immediate areas of concern been identified, such as the
need to protect assets from further damage (for example, by
boosting security) and to preserve key evidence for further
investigation (e.g., by removing the key suspect from the
scene, through a leave of absence or other appropriate
means)?
c. Have legal and other constraints been identified, (that is, the
provisions of any collective bargaining agreement) and has
legal counsel been consulted?
d. Has a preliminary assessment been made to determine:

• The quality of the information currently available
• Additional information that is needed

• How to obtain the information
e. Have the nature and scope of the investigation been defined,
including:
___________________
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• The main objective(s)
• Whether (and when) to pursue criminal charges

• The level of secrecy required

• Administrative matters (for example, engagement letters; or
if external forensic accountants are used, budgets)
2. Evidence Gathering

a. Has a detailed list been prepared of the evidence that is to be
obtained or seized?
b. Have all sources of evidence been considered (for example,
books and records, documents, correspondence, public
domain information, background financial information and
personnel history, etc.)?

c. When evidence is obtained, is it assessed for:

• Relevance
• Alternative interpretations (for example, simple error)
• Eventual use and admissibility (for example, as court
evidence)

d. Are proper evidence-handling procedures in effect, (for
example, taking photocopies; not writing on, altering, stapling
or unstapling originals)?

e. Especially for larger investigations, has evidence been
categorized in a way that will facilitate its future retrieval and
use?
f. Has the nature, timing and scope of any interviews (especially
of suspects) been carefully considered?

g. Are interviews conducted by or with trained and experienced
interviewers, with appropriate safeguards to prevent bogus
harassment or other charges (for example, safeguards could
include leaving the door ajar during interviews and having
assistants interrupt at predetermined times)?
h. When appropriate, has the use of reputable private
investigators been considered?

i. For any evidence to be seized, does the search warrant or
court order have the proper scope so that all of the required
evidence falls within its reach?
(continued)
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

j. Especially for larger investigations, have computer databases
and other appropriate tools been used to store and cross
reference evidentiary materials?
k. Has security over all evidence been established, including, if
appropriate, off-site storage of copies (electronic, paper, or
both) for key evidence and documents?

3. Analyzing and Testing
a. Has all evidence been systematically analyzed?

b. Were appropriate conclusions drawn?
c. Has the evidence been thoroughly checked and tested and
reviewed with legal counsel to ensure it is up to court
standards?

4. Reporting and Testifying
a. Has a forensic accountant prepared a well-organized,
unambiguous report, summarizing the findings of the
investigation?
b. Has the report undergone a quality-control review?
c. Has adequate preparation been done for testifying in court,
including a full run-through?
d. Is the person giving the testimony experienced, and if
necessary, has he or she previously qualified as an expert?

e. For expert witnesses, have fairness and impartiality, and the
appearance of such, been present throughout the process (for
example availability to both sides)?
5. Case Resolution

a. Has a plan and process been put into effect to seek and
enforce restitution from perpetrators?

b. Have controls and procedures been put into place to prevent a
recurrence?
c. Have channels of communication been kept open and other
appropriate steps taken to maintain good employee relations
and mitigate any other adverse effects of the crisis?
d. Has a program been established to monitor the results of the
above on an ongoing basis? __________________________
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CHAPTER 10:
Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud
10.1

The Pervasive Nature of Financial Statement Fraud

10.1.1 Introduction
Allegations of financial statement fraud have dominated the headlines for the past year.
Once prominent companies such as Enron, Xerox, Rite Aid, Adelphia, Tyco, and
WorldCom now symbolize corporate disgrace. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), federal law enforcement agencies as well as Congress have been investigating
financial statement fraud throughout corporate America. Fear that financial statements
might be concealing rather than revealing information has driven frightened investors from
the public marketplace. In this atmosphere, it is more important than ever for financial
professionals to understand financial statement fraud and how it might be used to deceive
boards of directors, senior management, auditors, and investors alike.

10.1.2 Overview
Financial statement fraud involves the alteration of financial statement data, usually by a
firm’s management, to achieve a fraudulent result. These altered financial statements are
the tools then used by a company’s managers to obtain some reward. The reward may
consist of direct compensation such as receiving a bonus that otherwise would not be paid
without using altered, incorrect financial data to embellish management’s operating
performance. On the other hand, the compensation may be direct in that managers avoid
being fired for failing to achieve promised results. Compensation may also be indirect; for
example, management may use fraudulent financial statements to raise additional capital
that in turn allows a firm to expand and presumably enhance the value of shares held by
management.

10.1.3 What Constitutes Financial Statement Fraud?
What constitutes financial statement fraud has been the subject of much debate because the
line between fraud and discretion is not always clear. It is easy to define fraud as a
conscious effort by management to produce financial statements with materially wrong
account data. It is almost as easy to identify as fraud misleading accounting entries that
management cannot justify under any applicable accounting standards. Fraudulent acts
become less obvious, however, when cloaked in the mantle of accounting standards that
are incorrectly applied. For example, the applicable accounting standard in the United
States is generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), principles that may allow
management some discretion as to when to recognize revenue or expenses.

Honorable people can debate the most appropriate use of a principle when looking at the
gray or more broadly permissive areas of GAAP. Less-than-honorable people, however,
might make use of these gray areas to produce financial statements that mislead. This
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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practice is found most often in concert with other misleading applications of GAAP.
Fraudsters almost always fail to discuss this choice of GAAP principles in the notes to
financial statements.1 Without knowledge of the impact of GAAP gray-area judgments on
the financial statements, unsuspecting readers may mistakenly assume that revenues and
expenses were accrued in a manner consistent with prior financial statements when, in fact,
they were not. The end result may be that continuing operations appear to be profitable
while, in reality, there may be serious problems that the misuse of GAAP gray areas can
cover up for a short period of time. Thus, when accounting decisions purportedly in
conformity with GAAP produce financial statements intentionally1
2 designed to mislead the
reader, those decisions cross the line into fraud.

10.1.4 SEC Definition of Fraud
These concepts are codified in the United States securities laws, especially SEC Rule 10b53, which states the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,

(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.

Publicly traded companies must conform to GAAP and to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the SEC under United States securities laws. The SEC drew heavily on
accounting literature when it recently addressed the issue of accounting gray areas. SEC
standards (discussed below) that have their origin in GAAP will provide substantial
guidance to determine financial statement fraud not only for publicly traded companies but
also for all firms issuing financial statements in conformity with GAAP.

1 In this chapter, the term company refers to any legal or business entity that prepares financial statements,
including partnerships, limited liability companies, and corporations.
2 Failure to disclose is probably a GAAP violation; therefore, while the accounting for a certain transaction
may appear to be supported by GAAP, failure to disclose so as not to make the financial statements
misleading takes the company out of GAAP compliance. As with proving any type of fraud, one must show
that the fraudster was scienter or knowingly aware that his or her actions were designed to mislead.
3 Promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
4
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10.1.5 Common Methods of Committing Financial Statement Fraud
Research carried out for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission4 (the COSO Report), a voluntary private sector organization dedicated to
improving the quality of financial reporting, found the most common kinds of fraud were:

1. Overstatement of earnings
2. Fictitious earnings
3. Understatement of expenses
4. Overstatement of assets
5. Understatement of allowances for receivables
6. Overstatement of the value of inventories by not writing down the value of obsolete
goods
7. Overstatement of property values and creation of fictitious assets

The following sections will discuss the various kinds of financial statement fraud and the
corresponding motives for each kind, the early indicators of financial statement fraud (both
quantitative and qualitative) and the means to detect some of the most difficult-to-find
kinds of fraud. At the end of this chapter, there is a checklist that addresses internal control
issues designed to provide early detection of financial statement fraud.

10.2 Kinds of and Motives for Financial Statement Fraud
We will approach financial statement fraud looking at three broad areas:
1. Earnings manipulation
2. Earnings management

3. Balance-sheet manipulation
Financial statement fraud generally falls into one or more of the above categories.

10 .2.1 Earnings Manipulation
Earnings manipulation is the direct alteration of accounting data for the purpose of
fraudulently changing reported net income. For example, booking a sale that clearly does
not meet the requirements for revenue recognition increases revenues. Conversely,
capitalizing marketing costs as an asset, contrary to guidance in GAAP, decreases current
period expenses. Notice also that both examples affect the balance sheet as well:
Recognizing fictitious sales probably inflates accounts receivable; deferring marketing
expenses creates some type of amortizable asset. Since the primary intent of these
manipulations is, however, to increase earnings rather than create assets, these practices are
classified as “Earnings Manipulation.”

4 Mark S. Beasley, Joseph V. Carcello, and Dana R. Hermanson. Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987-1997:
An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies. COSO, 1999.
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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Motives for Earnings Manipulation
The motives for earnings manipulation usually stem from the need to report higher net
income. Management compensation agreements, for instance, may require the
achievement of some absolute level of net income or an increase in net income over some
benchmark in order to trigger bonus payments. Pressure to increase “shareholder value”
may provide another motive to create earnings increases. Because stocks are valued at
some multiple of price to earnings, an increase in earnings usually increases share price
even if the multiple stays constant. When earnings are growing rapidly, the multiple is
more likely to expand.

Earnings manipulation may also help support the share price of a publicly traded company
while management and insiders sell their holdings. Such a reprieve may be important if
time restrictions prevented the granting or sale of those shares at an earlier date. Examples
of stock granting or sale restrictions include:
1. Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans that postpone ownership
2. Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers from acquiring shares until
specified dates or the occurrence of specific events
3. SEC Rule 144A restrictions that limit the number of shares that can be sold on United
States securities exchanges on a given trading day
4. Income tax provisions that afford more favorable treatment to capital gains in shares
held for a sufficient period of time to qualify as long-term capital gains (the restriction
being that the government would receive more of the sale proceeds if the share sales
were classified as short-term capital gains)
5. Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding significant blocks of stock past
some event such as an annual shareholders meeting before they can be sold

Finally, earnings manipulation may help a company obtain or retain its listing on a stock
exchange. The initial and continued listing requirements of many exchanges provide for
some type of net income test. Although companies failing this test may qualify for initial or
continued listing under other tests such as overall market capitalization, companies whose
share prices have declined sharply in a weak market may find net income manipulation to
be their only hope. Losing an exchange listing may relegate the company to the over-thecounter market where there are no requirements for the presence of a minimum number of
market makers, that is, the securities firms that stand ready to buy or sell shares to maintain
an orderly market in the company’s stock. Without a minimum number of market makers,
investors face the prospect of greatly reduced liquidity. A shareholder wishing to sell his
shares risks having to wait a long time for a buyer to come into the market. Therefore, a
listing on a recognized exchange that mandates a minimum number of market makers is an
important benefit to a publicly traded company, a benefit that unscrupulous management
may implement earnings manipulation to retain.

10.2.2 Earnings Management
A subtler variant of earnings manipulation is earnings management. Although both involve
the orchestration of accounting data, the latter attempts to exploit the interpretive
opportunities inherent in GAAP to produce reported earnings that conform to outside
expectations. Earnings management stops just short of outright fraud while earnings
manipulation crosses the line.
6
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Corporate managements are under more pressure today than ever before to increase
“shareholder value,” that is, the price of the stock. Superstar analysts raise performance
expectations by generating earnings estimates that strongly influence stock prices.
Management may believe that if the company does not “massage” the numbers to meet
analysts’ expectations, the stock price may decline and decline precipitously if analysts feel
compelled to scale back their growth estimates.
In this environment, the moral issue of reporting earnings that truly measure the
company’s economic activity is a matter of management intent. The very nature of accrual
accounting leaves open the possibility that management judgment, even within GAAP,
may be colored by the intent to show the company in the best possible light. Accrual,
deferral, and allocation procedures designed to permit the relation of revenues and
expenses, and gains and losses across periods also allow management considerable leeway
as to when to declare any monies are earned. When within this process does discretion
become the intent to deceive? Within what limits should management be acting to permit
investors to price the company’s securities in the market? How much earnings “smoothing”
actually misrepresents the trend of economic performance as opposed to the irregularities
of cash flows? Earnings management is fraudulent when it uses improper accounting to
hide true company performance. Arthur Levitt, chairman of the SEC, expressed the
Commission’s concern about this subject in a speech given in 1998:
Flexibility in accounting allows it to keep pace with business innovations. Abuses
such as earnings management occur when people exploit this pliancy. Trickery is
employed to obscure actual financial volatility. This, in turn, masks the true
consequences of management’s decisions.56

He expressed his concern about where this could lead:
As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings, and
therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing may be giving way to
manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion.

In Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99, Materiality the SEC reviewed the United States
accounting literature and presented the staffs findings on earnings management.

Failure to Perform Punishes the Stock Price
Within this range of discretion, managements of publicly traded companies, especially
growth and high-tech companies, have been under tremendous pressure to perform, from
both analysts and investors. Failure to report continued profit growth can result in dramatic
punishment to the stock price even when the shortfall is by only a few cents per share.
Even performances that are good by historical standards can cause a price decline when
they are below analysts’ expectations. This kind of market reaction has been an incentive
for companies that are just meeting analysts’ forecasts or even falling slightly below to show
a modest increase in reported profit.

5 Arthur Levitt, “The ‘Numbers Game,’” a speech presented to the New York University Center for Law and
Business, Sept. 28, 1998. Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
6 SAB No. 99 Materiality is available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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Companies reporting consistently rising earnings are rewarded with high price/eamings
(P/E) multiples. As the chain of good quarters extends, the multiple tends to increase and
vice versa. P/E multiples are effectively inverted capitalization rates that have built-in
assumptions for future discount rates applied to expected future cash flows. If earnings
grow steadily from period to period, analysts are better able to predict future earnings. The
market tends to reward a company having such a record with a lower discount rate that
reflects a lower level of uncertainty about future earnings. This lower discount rate then
increases the present value of future earnings and thus makes the stock or claim on those
earnings more valuable.

Managements Regularly Meet Analysts' Forecasts
Recent academic studies have shown the regularity with which managements meet
analysts’ forecasts quarter after quarter and the small number of shortfalls. Managements
themselves can influence analysts’ estimates through meetings and other contacts with the
result that the whole earnings estimation process seems to be manipulated. It has also been
observed that analysts with underwriting houses tend to make higher growth forecasts than
independent analysts.
It is hard to resist the conclusion that managements are often driven to rework the earnings
components. Their bonuses are tied to operational performance and their stock options are
tied to stock price performance. In addition, their overall performance will determine
accessibility of capital for their companies. A good earnings report can improve the terms
of a security offering to the benefit of both the firm and its management. The fact that
shares of firms making seasoned equity offerings underperform during the years
immediately following the offering suggests that accruals were maximized in the year of the
offering and earnings were allowed to deteriorate immediately thereafter.

Discovery of earnings manipulation can lead to the dismissal of senior executives, lawsuits
by shareholders, and sharp declines in the price of the company’s stock. There is also a
decline in the number of analysts following the company and an increase in the number of
short sellers.7

Four Main Kinds of Earnings Management
SEC Chairman Levitt focused on four main fraudulent practices used to enhance earnings:

1. “Big-Bath” restructuring charges

2. Writeoffs
3. “Cookiejar” reserves
4. Materiality

7 For an excellent survey, discussion, and bibliography of the academic and practitioner literature on this
broad topic, see Patricia M. Dechow and Douglas J. Skinner, “Earnings Management: Reconciling the
Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners and Regulators,” Accounting Horizons, June 2000, pages 235250.
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Big-Bath Restructuring Charges
These are large one-time charges associated with a restructuring. Management may take a
big-bath charge on the assumption that the company stock price will get pummeled
whether the restructuring charge is large or small. Using that logic (which may actually be
correct), management opts for the big charge by establishing large reserves for shutting
down operations or shifting operations to other areas. If the reserve estimates are too big
and actual expenses do not consume all the reserves, management can later reverse the
unused portion back into income. As an added bonus, the reversal back to income may
occur at a time when earnings need a boost because of disappointing current operating
results. Hence, Chairman Levitt observed that overestimation can leave charges that are
“miraculously reborn as income when estimates change or future earnings fall short.”

Sunbeam Case Study
At the end of fiscal 1996, the Sunbeam Corporation took a $338 million
restructuring charge that included various operating costs actually chargeable to
future periods. In October 1998, the SEC required Sunbeam to reduce the
restructuring charge to $239 million. As a result, the company’s 1996 earnings were
restated upward, while its 1997 earnings were restated downward by 65 percent to
$38 million from $109. New management who had joined the company in 1996
took the big-bath restructuring charge to create the appearance of a turnaround.
When the big-bath charges had been washed out, however, the so-called
turnaround was largely nonexistent.

In May 2001, the SEC brought fraud charges against five former executive officers
of Sunbeam as well as Sunbeam’s former engagement partner.

Writeoffs
After one company acquires another, research and development (R&D) work performed in
one or both of the companies may be redundant because of a change in corporate direction
under the new management. For that reason, companies may write off some in-process
R&D projects that have yet to be expensed because they do not fit into the new corporate
plans. Some companies, however, have taken advantage of the opportunity to write off
substantial amounts of in-process R&D, by applying a principle similar to the big-bath
restructuring charge. Management believes that the company can take a large, one-time hit
to earnings without further hurting its stock price when the financial community is already
expecting some writeoffs because of the acquisition. By taking the writeoff at the time of the
acquisition, these R&D expenses will not weigh on future earnings.

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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MCI WorldCom Case Study

In August 1998, WorldCom disclosed an expected in-process R&D charge of $7
billion in connection with its acquisition of MCI. In September 1998, after the
transaction closed and following discussions with the SEC, the charge was reduced
to $3.1 billion. When such charges were no longer available, WorldCom used
reserves in 1999-2000 and the improper capitalization of current period expenses
in 2001-2002, to manage its reported financial results.

3Com Acquisition of US Robotics Case Study
During the first quarter of fiscal 1998, 3Com recorded an accounting combination
and merger restructuring charge of $426 million for the June 1997 merger of 3Com
and U.S. Robotics. Shortly thereafter, the SEC required 3Com to reduce the charge
to $270 million. In its Form 8-K disclosing the reduction, 3Com indicated that the
adjustments were intended to reflect three factors: a change in the timing and costs
associated with product swaps, a more accurate reporting of costs associated with
the elimination of duplicate facilities, and a revision of goodwill writeoffs relating to
premerger acquisitions. These changes were made in deference to the SEC’s
position that the cost of replacing discontinued products should be reflected not at
the time of the merger but at the time the cost is actually incurred.

Cookie-Jar Reserves
Fraudulent managers like to cloak their deception in an accounting rule, although in reality
the accounting rule is not properly applied or other accounting rules are broken. The use of
loss reserves is a good example of the abuse of a GAAP principle in order to manage the
final earnings figure.

Cookie-jar reserves are reserves set aside during periods of strong financial performance
and used to increase earnings or make up revenue shortfalls in periods of weak financial
performance. They may take a variety of forms such as sales returns, loan losses, warranty
costs, tax cushions, or inventory adjustments.
When financial performance is strong, earnings may be reduced by overstating reserves,
overaccruing expenses, or taking excessive one-time writeoffs. In later periods of weak
financial performance, reversing the accruals and reserves to reduce current-period
expenses increases earnings. In a calendar quarter in which a company expects to
outperform market expectations, it might create a reserve for future losses on such items as
long-term contracts to create the effect of lowering earnings closer to the market consensus
forecast. Then, in a future quarter, after the company has predicted that it will not make
enough income to meet market expectations, management can reverse out some of the
reserves on the grounds that future contract losses no longer appear probable.

10

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

Chapter Ten: Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud

On the surface and viewed in isolation, the creation and reversal of the loss reserves may
appear unrelated to earnings expectations. GAAP provides for the booking of loss
contingencies in Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 5, Accountingfor Contingencies, if the loss contingencies are both
quantifiable and probable. In reality, however, the possibility of losses on future contracts
most likely existed prior to the establishment of the reserve and continued to exist after the
reserve was reversed into income. The reserves then become an accounting artifice used by
management to manage earnings to meet market expectations. Moreover, management
violated GAAP, in this example, either by creating the reserve without justification or
reversing the reserve without any change in the degree of likelihood that the loss would in
fact occur. Such reserves are known as cookie-jar reserves because management can reach
into the cookie jar and pull them into income whenever the need arises.

W.R. Grace Case Study
In June 1999, the SEC accused W. R. Grace of manipulating the reported earnings
of its primary health care subsidiary National Medical Care, Inc. Management had
established reserves for unanticipated health care reimbursements and used them in
subsequent periods to reduce expenses and show a steady growth rate in its health
care subsidiary. But, contrary to GAAP, there were no liabilities to justify the
reserves. When the SEC uncovered the scheme, the agency sued the company, its
management, and auditors. The Commission also required Grace to establish a $1million education fund for earnings management training.

Materiality

Underlying the discussion of financial statement fraud to this point is the assumption that
the accounting manipulations cited are all material in that the manipulations significantly
change the information presented in the financial statements. Much of the accounting
literature contains provisions that except immaterial amounts from a given accounting
standard. However, the evolution of the definition of materiality has introduced another
element of judgment into determining whether or not there is fraud.

Fortunately, the SEC decided to weigh in on this matter when it issued SAB No. 99, which
helped clarify some of the key materiality concepts. One of the issues addressed head-on
by the SEC was the use of quantitative materiality to waive accounting violations. A blind
application of quantitative materiality essentially looks at the monetary amount of an
accounting entry (or series of entries) that was indefensibly improper. If the amount was
less than some arbitrary standard such as five percent of net income, neither management
nor company auditors would insist on changing that entry even though it blatantly violated
accounting standards. The SEC said that although quantitative standards may serve as a
starting point for investigating potential accounting irregularities, relying exclusively on an
arbitrary percentage to avoid application of appropriate accounting standards has no basis
in accounting literature (or in U.S. securities laws).

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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The FASB in 1980 issued Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative
Characteristics ofAccounting Information, which addressed materiality as follows:
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the
light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is
probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would
have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.

In other words, materiality is viewed from the standpoint of the reader of financial
statements. If the correction of an erroneous accounting item would probably cause the
reader to come to a conclusion different from the conclusion reached upon reading the
uncorrected statement, then the item is material. Prior to the release of FASB Concepts
Statement No. 2, the United States Supreme Court, in reviewing a securities case involving
materiality issues, ruled that a fact is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the . . .
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
‘total mix’ of information made available.”8 Therefore, both accounting literature and the
Supreme Court look to the reader or user of the financial statements and ask whether it is
probable or substantially likely that the reader would have come to a different conclusion.
If the answer is yes, then the item in question is material.

ABS Industries Case Study
In October 1999, the SEC brought an action against ABS and four of its former
officers and employees for engaging in a scheme to manage earnings. ABS’
financial results overstated sales by 3.21 percent and overstated income before taxes
by 2.48 percent. The SEC determined that although these amounts were not
quantitatively material, they were, however, qualitatively material given
management’s intent.

10.2.3 Balance-Sheet Manipulation
In addition to the creation of fictitious accounts receivable and improperly capitalized
expenses as discussed above, management can also manipulate assets. By recording as
purchases certain transactions for which title has not passed, by using improperly extended
depreciation of useful lives, and by failing to write down or write off useless assets, the
value of a company can be misrepresented. Management may inflate inventory by failing
to bring the correct amount into the cost of sales, a practice that has the added fraudulent
benefit of inflating gross profit and earnings as well. Finally, management may manipulate
capitalized acquisition costs through improper purchase price accounting.

Management manipulates liabilities by failing to record amounts owed to others or by
keeping debts off the books. Management can also attempt to classify liabilities, especially
loans to shareholders, as equity.

8 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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The motives for balance-sheet manipulation usually relate to reporting requirements
established by lenders and regulators who tend to focus more heavily on balance-sheet
items. A bank loan covenant, for example, may require a certain amount of shareholders’
equity, a maximum debt-to-equity ratio, and/or a minimum current ratio. If the borrowing
company’s balance-sheet accounts violate the loan covenants, the company may be in
default under the terms of the loan and be subject to accelerated repayment of the loan or
be precluded from any future loan advances. To make matters worse, a publicly traded
company probably would have to report to securities regulators that it was in default under
its loan covenants and, as a consequence, suffer a decline in its stock price. Similarly,
companies in regulated industries such as insurance and banking must maintain certain
amounts of capital to meet regulatory requirements. Failure to do so may result in sanctions
or even closure by the regulators. Therefore, motives for balance-sheet manipulation, while
perhaps being more case-specific than those discussed previously for earnings fraud,
nonetheless pose a real threat to accounting integrity.

Comparator Systems Case Study
In May 1996, the SEC suspended trading in the securities of Comparator Systems,
a Southern California company that claimed to be in the business of producing
fingerprint identification technology. The SEC was concerned about the adequacy
and accuracy of publicly disseminated information as well as about the valuation of
certain assets reported in Comparator’s financial statements. Shortly thereafter, the
SEC obtained a permanent injunction against the company and its principal
executive officers on evidence that Comparator’s assets provided no future
economic benefit, had been recorded improperly, or simply did not exist.
Comparator’s purported assets included patents and licenses, investments, accounts
receivable, and prepaid fees. The patents, however, had expired or passed into the
public domain, the investments represented interests in private companies not
engaged in business activities, the accounts receivable balance reflected the
company’s claim for stock allegedly stolen by a former employee, and the prepaid
fees consisted of stock issued to Comparator’s officers and consultants. These bogus
assets were substantially overstated but allowed Comparator to maintain its listing
on the National Association of Securities Dealers automated quotation system
(NASDAQ) SmallCap exchange and sell its worthless stock to unwitting investors.

10.2.4 Falsification of the Income Statement
Falsification of the income statement may be accomplished by overstating revenue,
understating expenses, or some combination of the two, during a specified time period.
Using either method, the effect will be to overstate net income on the income statement,
overstate owners’ equity on the balance sheet, and thereby increase reported earnings per
share; or to overstate expenses and understate results of operations during one period with
the intent of artificially overstating net income in future periods.

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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Overstatement of Revenue
Under GAAP, revenue should not be recognized until it is both realized (or realizable) and
earned. FASB Concepts Statement No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements
ofBusiness Enterprises, states that revenue is realizable when a product is “exchanged for
cash or claims to cash” and revenue is earned “when the entity has substantially
accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the revenue.”

If revenue has not been realized and earned, revenue recognition is improper. Examples of
improper revenue recognition include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Fictitious revenues
Premature revenue recognition
Sales of development stage products
Conditional sales
Sales with a right of return

Consignment sales
Channel stuffing
Vendor rebates
Barter transactions
Reciprocal exchange transactions (swaps)

Fictitious Revenues
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)
Report found that the most common method of revenue recognition fraud resulted from
recording fictitious revenues. Fictitious revenues are revenues recorded on the sales of
goods or services that never took place. Fictitious revenues may involve fictional or
legitimate customers. In either case, transactions may be recorded in the sales journal and
inventory records without adequate documentation. In some cases, false invoices and
shipping documents are prepared to conceal the fraud and product may be sequestered in
the warehouse, shipped off-site, or stored with freight forwarders.

Kurzweil Applied Intelligence Case Study

From 1992 to 1994, Kurzweil Applied Intelligence engaged in a fraudulent revenue
recognition scheme that inflated Kurzweil’s revenues and earnings reported in
financial statements accompanying its initial public offering (IPO), as well as its
annual and periodic reports filed with the SEC. Among other things, Kurzweil
senior executives forged signatures on sales quotes, executed side letters that
negated its customer’s obligation to purchase product, and recognized revenue from
distributorship agreements where the distributor did not have the intent or ability to
pay without resale. To perpetuate the fraud, goods were shipped to and stored at an
off-site independent warehouse to create the false appearance that products had
been sold and shipped to customers, and invoices were held for fraudulent sales
where the customer would not expect to receive an invoice
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As a result of this fraudulent scheme, Kurzweil’s CEO and senior vice president of
sales were able to sell securities in the IPO at prices they knew to be artificially
inflated and received annual bonuses based upon overstated sales. Given their
personal stake in the scheme, Kurzweil’s executives went to great lengths to conceal
the fraud from its independent auditors.

In July 1995, the SEC filed civil charges against the company and its officers for
overstating revenue and earnings. Those charges were settled in administrative
proceedings against the company, four executive officers, and three mid-level
employees in Kurzweil’s accounting function. In December 1996, Kurzweil’s CEO
and senior vice president of sales were sentenced to federal prison terms of 33 and
18 months, respectively, based upon convictions for conspiracy, securities fraud,
and falsification of corporate books and records.

Premature Revenue Recognition
The COSO Report found that the second most common technique to inflate revenue
involves premature recognition. Unlike fictitious revenues, for which there is no evidence
to support a sale, premature revenues are recorded on sales expected to occur but are not
yet completed. Revenue is recognized prematurely on incomplete sales in which title has
not yet passed from the seller to the buyer. Since the transfer of ownership completes the
sale, it is not final until all the obligations associated with the sale have been completed. A
classic example of premature revenue recognition results when revenue is recorded on a
sale expected to close in the next quarter.
Historically, premature revenue recognition cases involved new public companies. The
reason is that when a company goes public, analysts from a number of Wall Street firms
will initiate coverage and begin to track the company’s performance relative to
management’s projections for the year. That coverage creates considerable pressure on
financial management to meet the expectations of Wall Street. This pressure is what gets a
lot of companies into trouble. In order to meet analysts’ expectations, some companies
apply aggressive accounting techniques in order to increase the bottom line. If those
techniques fall short of the target, the sales function is directed to “do whatever it takes” to
enable the company to make its numbers.

Today, revenue recognition improprieties occur in well-established companies. However,
the motive is often the same: Financial management may inflate reported revenue in order
to meet analysts’ consensus earnings estimates.

Financial management is not always aware of schemes within the company to inflate
revenue, often because documents are fabricated and the conduct is concealed from the
accounting function, which may not have adequate internal controls in place to detect the
fraud. In other cases, internal controls may not keep up with the company’s growth. In still
other cases, the internal controls that do exist are circumvented by the individuals directing
the fraud.
Most of the time, schemes to inflate revenue are intended to be short-term fixes. For
companies seeking to establish credibility in the market, it may begin by holding the
quarter open a few days to enable the sales function to close just a few more additional
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sales, or, sales that are expected to close the following quarter may be pulled ahead into the
current quarter. In these types of cases, the rationalization is, “It’s just a few, we’ll make it
up next quarter.” The same rationalization is used to justify earnings management in wellestablished companies.
The problem is the shortfall is not easily recouped. As companies pull in potential sales that
are further and further out into the future, it becomes less and less likely that the company
will be able to make up the shortfall. As one sales manager involved in this type of
predicament described it, “it’s like robbing Peter to pay Paul.” As time goes on, there is no
way out—other than devising new schemes to prop up the numbers.

California Micro Devices Case Study

One example of a revenue recognition case that spiraled out of control involved
California Micro Devices. Cal Micro made semiconductor components, which it
sold to a number of blue-chip companies, including IBM, Motorola, and Kodak.
The company went public in 1986. Within two years of its public offering, its
auditors at the time detected revenue and expense cutoff errors and proposed $2
million in adjustments. The company listened to its auditors and restated its
earnings—only to do the same thing all over again the next year.
There were several motives to manipulate reported earnings. For example, the
company was under pressure to meet analyst expectations, attract strategic partners,
and increase the value of a secondary stock offering. To accomplish these goals, the
company engaged in nearly a dozen revenue recognition schemes. For example,
the company recorded revenue on sales that shipped in later quarters, on shipments
before the customer agreed to accept delivery and on shipments held at the freight
forwarder or in sales representative’s houses until customers agreed to accept
delivery.
To conceal this scheme, senior executive officers altered the company’s books and
records and lied to its auditors. For example, the company prepared two accounts
receivable reports. One was a real report that listed actual receivables, and the
other was for its board of directors and the marketplace. In addition, management
told the board that the high number of receivables resulted from the high number
of shipments at quarter-end—a phenomenon known as a “hockey stick” sales
pattern. Management also told the board that many of the receivables resulted from
arrangements with distributors who had 180 days to pay. Of course, management
neglected to mention that the customers had unconditional rights of return.

By the time of the fiscal 1994 year-end audit, more than $8 million of those
receivables were uncollectible, but Cal Micro managed to get a clean bill of health
from its auditors, a then Big Six accounting firm. Just under $1 million was written
off as bad debt, and the remainder (around $7 million) was written off as a
nonproductive technology acquisition.
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In October 1994, the company disclosed the accounting irregularities and shortly
thereafter terminated its CEO and CFO. In January 1995, forensic auditors
determined Cal Micro had recorded $38 million in bogus revenue. In September
1997, the CEO and CFO were indicted on criminal charges for their knowledge of
the fraud and for their sales of substantial amounts of Cal Micro stock while
revenue was artificially inflated. In July 1998, they were convicted of securities
fraud.

Sales ofDevelopment Stage Products
Revenue may also be overstated through the recognition of sales on development stage
products that require further development or product refinement. Even if products are
accepted by customers who agree to serve as a “beta-test” site for the new product, such
arrangements are typically made on a trial or evaluation basis. Therefore, revenue
recognition is inappropriate. Likewise, revenue recognition is inappropriate if a vendor
delivers an incomplete or dysfunctional product that will require repair or maintenance
after delivery to the customer.
The premature recognition of revenue on development stage products often occurs in the
software industry. Revenue recognition on software licenses is governed by AICPA
Statement of Position (SOP) 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition. Under SOP 97-2, revenue
may be recognized from software sales only if persuasive evidence of an agreement exists,
delivery has occurred, the vendor’s fee is fixed or determinable, and collectibility is
probable. If the software sale contains other elements, such as software upgrades or other
enhancements that are integral to the functionality of the software license, then revenue
must be recognized in accordance with contract accounting, which delays revenue
recognition.

MicroStrategy Case study
In December 2000, the SEC filed charges against three senior executive officers of
MicroStrategy Inc., its CEO, CFO, and COO, for materially overstating revenue
and earnings on sales of software and information services during the period 1998
through 2000. The Commission alleged that, among other things, MicroStrategy
improperly recognized material amounts of revenue, up front, on certain multiple
element deals in which MicroStrategy had a continuing obligation to provide
significant services or future products which were not separable from the sale of a
license to the Company’s existing software products. Several of these deals had a
development component that required MicroStrategy to develop additional or
customized applications of the product. Despite its continuing obligation to provide
additional software, licenses, and services, MicroStrategy improperly recognized the
revenue up front by mischaracterizing the transactions as the sale of software
product, contrary to SOP 97-2. As a result of these and other errors, MicroStrategy
overstated revenues by approximately $66 million. In the settlement of the ensuing
civil action, the defendants received substantial sanctions, including an order to pay
$10 million in disgorgement and $1 million in penalties. In a separate settled order,
MicroStrategy’s corporate controller and accounting manager were also sanctioned
for their roles in the fraudulent scheme.

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

17

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Conditional Sales
Conditional sales are sales with terms that have not yet been completed. As in the case of
premature sales, recognizing revenue from conditional sales is improper because the risks
and rewards of ownership have not passed from the seller to the buyer. Examples of
conditional sales include sales subject to funding contingencies or performance conditions.
Even if delivery has occurred, and the customer has physically accepted delivery, the sale is
not complete until the contingencies have been removed.

Kendall Square Case Study
In the mid 1990s, Kendall Square Research Corporation, a Cambridge,
Massachusetts, manufacturer of specialized computer systems for research
applications, overstated approximately 50 percent of its reported revenues over an
eighteen-month period by improperly recognizing revenue on conditional sales to
universities and research institutions. Because these organizations were dependent
upon grants from the government and from private foundations to support their
activities, Kendall Square routinely sold its computer systems subject to funding
contingencies, pursuant to which the customers were not obligated to pay until they
received funding. Recognition of revenue on these sales violated GAAP because
the revenue was not realizable until the funding contingency expired and because
payment was not reasonably assured, as required by FASB Concepts Statement No.
5 and Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 43, Restatement and Revision of
Accounting Research Bulletins.

Sales With a Right ofReturn
In the ordinary course of business, there is nothing wrong with giving purchasers a right of
return, as long as an appropriate reserve has been established. However, return rights are
not always properly reserved, and may be concealed in side letters with other
contingencies to create the false appearance that revenue has been realized and earned.

Under GAAP, it is improper to recognize sales with a right of return unless the seller has
estimated the likelihood of returns and booked an appropriate reserve. More specifically,
FASB Statement No. 48, Revenue Recognition when a Right ofReturn Exists, provides that to
recognize revenue when a right of return exists, “the amount of future returns [must] be
reasonably estimated.” Based upon this estimate, sales must be offset by expected returns to
report revenues accurately. The recognition of sales that do not meet the requirements of
FASB Statement No. 48 results in the overstatement of revenue.

Consignment Sales
A consignment sale is a type of contingent sale that is subject to acceptance by a third
party. A distributor, for example, may take product on consignment and agree to pay for
the product when it is resold to a third-party customer. Revenue may not be recognized on
consignment sales until the third-party customer accepts the product. Consignment sales
are fraudulent if material terms are not reflected in the consignment contract and instead
appear in side letters or oral communications reflecting the true nature of the sale.
18
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Channel Stuffing
Channel stuffing occurs when a distributor agrees to accept more product than is needed,
typically in exchange for substantial discounts or other inducements. Although the practice
is not improper, per se, material terms are often concealed in side letters or oral agreements
that provide significant discounts and/or the right to exchange or return unsold product. If
this occurs, the distributor is, in effect, accepting product on consignment without accepting
the risks of ownership. Revenue recognition under these circumstances violates GAAP.

Vendor Rebates
The two primary types of vendor rebates are transaction rebates and incentive rebates. A
transaction rebate is a discount or refund from the manufacturer on each product purchased.
Transaction rebates are normally recorded immediately as a reduction to cost of goods sold
because the rebate is earned at the time the product is purchased from the manufacturer.
Incentive rebates, by contrast, usually require the purchaser to meet specified purchase levels.
Under FASB Statement No. 5, incentive rebate income may not be recognized until the
required purchase levels have been met. The recognition of incentive rebates before
meeting the requisite purchase levels overstates income.
Barter Transactions
Most commercial transactions involve the exchange of monetary assets or liabilities for
goods or services. The amount of the monetary asset or liability exchanged typically
provides the basis for measuring the value of the transaction.

Barter transactions involve the exchange of noncash assets or liabilities. There are two
types of barter transactions. One involves an exchange of nonmonetary assets or liabilities
with another entity (reciprocal exchanges), and the other involves a transfer to another
entity of a nonmonetary asset for which for which no assets are received or relinquished
(nonreciprocal transfer).9
Reciprocal Exchange Transactions (Swaps)
Revenue may be recorded in reciprocal exchange transactions if certain requirements are
met. There must, however, be economic substance to the transaction. So-called “round
trip” deals, which typically involve a swap of assets or services without any real gains, lack
economic substance.
The SEC is currently investigating whether telecommunications and energy companies
conducted swaps of network capacity to improperly inflate reported revenue. For example,
Global Crossing agreed to buy $18 million in services from Enron to be paid over a period
of eight years, and simultaneously agreed to sell $18 million in services to Enron and be
paid immediately. Although Global Crossing recorded the liability on its balance sheet, it
recorded the entire revenue amount in its income statement. The accounting for these
transactions is under scrutiny. The SEC and the Justice Department are conducting similar
investigations into the restatement of $ 1.1 billion in revenue by Qwest Communications
resulting from its improper accounting of capacity swaps in 1999, 2000, and 2001.

9 APB Opinion No. 29, Accountingfor Nonmonetary Transactions.
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Understatement of Expenses
Another method used to falsify the income statement involves the understatement of
expenses. Under GAAP, the matching principle requires that revenue and its related
expenses be recorded in the same accounting period. If the costs associated with revenues
recorded in one period are deferred to a later period, net income is overstated for the
period the revenue is recognized and understated for the period the expenses are recorded.
Examples of the understatement of expenses to artificially inflate net income include the
following:

1. Deferral of operating expenses
2. Understatement or omission of sales discounts and allowances
3. Improper capitalization of current period expenses

Deferral of Operating Expenses
Expenses may be improperly deferred in order to meet budget projections or consensus
earnings estimates. If costs are expensed during periods subsequent to the period in which
the cost was incurred, the expenses are not properly matched against the income they
helped produce. The recording of expenses in the wrong period often signals a lack of
internal accounting controls.

Livent, Inc. Case Study
Livent, Inc. was a Canadian theater company that produced a number of successful
Broadway Shows, including Phantom of the Opera, Showboat, and Ragtime. In January
1999, the SEC brought enforcement proceedings against nine former employees of
Livent, for their involvement in a scheme to inflate income by falsifying expenses,
among other things. This scheme operated for a period of eight years, from 1990
through 1998. The Commission’s complaint also alleged kickbacks from customers
and a revenue recognition component. This discussion will focus on the expense
items.

Livent manipulated reported expenses by:
1. Transferring preproduction costs for the shows to fixed assets such as the
construction of theaters
2. Simply removing certain expenses and related liabilities from the general ledger
3. Transferring costs from shows currently running to other shows that had not yet
opened

The scheme was pervasive. It involved the CEO, president, CFO, senior vice
president of finance, COO, and three controllers. Five of these individuals traded in
Livent securities while earnings were artificially inflated. In 1998, the company
restated its financial results.
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Of the nine individuals the SEC charged with civil fraud, two were indicted in a
parallel criminal proceeding, and two others pled guilty to violations of federal
securities laws. In addition, in a civil injunctive action, the Commission charged
Livent’s general counsel, who had been aware of the scheme and participated in
drafting revenue generating contracts subject to side letters, which were concealed
from the outside auditors.

Understatement or Omission ofSales Discounts and Allowances
The easiest way to understate expenses is to simply omit them altogether. The omission of
expenses artificially inflates net income and owners’ equity. For example, the omission of
sales discounts and allowances will overstate revenue and net income on the income
statement, and understate liabilities and overstate owners’ equity on the balance sheet.

Aurora Foods, Inc. Case Study

In January 2001, the SEC brought charges against three former senior officers and
five employees of Aurora Foods, Inc., a producer and marketer of branded food
products, for underreporting trade marketing expenses and thereby inflating
reported earnings in 1998 and 1999. Specifically, Aurora was found to have
underreported more than $43 million in trade marketing expenses, the expenses
incurred to induce grocery stores to purchase its products. Examples include case
discounts and similar incentives. Rather than properly recording these expenses,
Aurora’s senior management attempted to conceal them from the company’s
auditors by directing subordinates to make false entries in various accounts on
Aurora’s books. For example, Aurora employees were directed to move trade
promotion expenses into accounts receivable through false entries in the accounts
receivable ledger and subsidiary ledgers and through manual adjustments in the
trade promotion accrual. Although one division manager objected to these
practices, she, too, was sanctioned for following the inappropriate instructions of
her superiors.

Improper Capitalization of Current-Period Expenses
Capital expenditures are costs that benefit the company over more than one accounting
period. Accordingly, capital expenses are amortized over a period of years. Cost of goods
sold or cost of sales, by contrast, directly correspond to the generation of current revenue
and only provide benefits during the current accounting period. As a result, these costs are
expensed immediately. If period expenses are improperly capitalized, net income is
improperly overstated.
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WorldCom, Inc. Case Study

In June 2002, the SEC brought charges against WorldCom, Inc., the second biggest
U.S. long-distance telephone and data services provider, for fraudulently
overstating income before taxes and minority interests by $3.8 billion during fiscal
2001 and the first quarter of fiscal 2002. The SEC’s complaint alleges that
WorldCom falsely portrayed its financial condition through the improper
capitalization of “line costs,” which were WorldCom’s costs of leasing space on
competitors’ telephone lines. Under GAAP, these costs must be expensed in the
period incurred and may not be capitalized. In contravention of GAAP,
WorldCom’s senior management is alleged to have directed the transfer of line
costs to capital accounts in amounts sufficient to enable the company to meet Wall
Street analysts’ consensus earnings estimates. Among other things, this fraudulent
scheme allowed the company to avoid reporting losses in 2001 and 2002.
Investigations by the SEC, the Department of Justice and various Congressional
committees are continuing.

10.2.5 Reducing the Risk of Fraud in Closely Held Companies
Much of this chapter focuses on publicly traded companies both because information about
frauds committed by these entities is readily available and because regulators have been in
the forefront of fraud detection and prevention. Nevertheless, every type of fraud discussed
here can occur in closely held private companies; only the motives and timing are slightly
different. Although the managements of closely held companies might not have to worry
about securities analysts’ expectations, there may be outside shareholders demanding better
earnings performance. These demands might lead management to employ any of the
earnings manipulation schemes discussed above. Of course, if management bonuses are a
function of increased earnings, there is a motive for earnings manipulation regardless of
whether the company is publicly traded or not. If the outside investors are passive, the
moment of performance assessment will most likely be the end of the fiscal year.
Management of public companies, on the other hand, may feel pressure to hit targets
quarterly if they have to report to regulators.

The need to value shares in a closely held company may also give rise to earnings
management. If shares are being valued for sale or any other purpose such as collateral for
a bank loan to a major shareholder, earnings management may be employed to achieve
the appearance of a steady rise in earnings. This misleading rise in earnings could induce
an appraiser or stock valuations specialist to assign a higher growth rate to projected
earnings. It is just as likely, however, that the appearance of consistently rising earnings
could suggest the use a lower firm-specific risk premium to calculate the present value of
that projected earnings stream since earnings would appear to be less volatile. The end
result of earnings management in a closely held company is thus similar to the effect of
earnings management on the P/E multiple of publicly traded companies.
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For a closely held company, the prevention of fraud in the financial statements starts with
requiring that financials presented to the board of directors and to outsiders be in
conformity with GAAP. The timing of cash flows in cash-basis accounting can lead to the
manipulation of financial statements.1011
Accrual-basis accounting looks to economic events
to determine whether a debt is incurred or whether revenue is earned; the time of the
occurrence of those events may be quite different from that at which cash is paid or
received. What limits the possibility for fraud in accrual-basis accounting is the reduced
opportunity to hide a debt or record unearned revenue since the standards of recognition
are more explicit than those for cash-basis accounting.
Although GAAP is not required for private companies, it is difficult for those companies to
communicate with outsiders such as lenders and investors without producing GAAP-based
financial statements. In a sense, GAAP is the common financial language of the United
States because it contains a set of rules and standards developed and tested over many
years that are known to readers of financial statements. Certain foreign firms whose shares
are not traded on U.S. exchanges may use local accounting standards or International
Accounting Standards (IAS) for domestic reporting but would find raising capital in the
United States problematical without translating those statements into GAAP.

Additional fraud prevention measures include implementation of the internal controls
discussed in Section 1.3, Internal Controls and “Fraudproofing”, in Chapter 1 of this
Handbook and promoting an ethical environment, as covered in Chapter 2, “Promoting an
Ethical Environment.” For middle-market firms,11 i.e., those with annual revenues of $10
million or more, the findings of the COSO Report are especially applicable since research
concluded that smaller companies are more susceptible to fraud.
The importance of financial statement fraud prevention measures increases directly with
company size. For a very small company, fraudulent financial statements that slightly
inflate earnings or assets could be used to secure a bank loan or small investment but little
else. Steps taken to prevent fraud at that level should reflect the potential for damages
resulting from such misstatement. For larger, middle-market companies or small companies
fraudulently representing themselves as larger companies, potential damages are more
serious; steps taken to prevent fraud should therefore be more visible and systematic. For
example, a middle-market company should implement reviews of internal controls at least
once a year by outside auditors and more frequently by internal accounting staff. If budgets
allow, a significant fraud-prevention measure should include hiring an internal auditor to
assess the effectiveness of the controls of each business unit for a year. Assessments of the
adequacy of internal controls would help significantly with early fraud detection.

The reporting of irregularities to independent board members is one of the most important
fraud-prevention measures available to closely held companies. The opening of such a
formal reporting channel increases the likelihood that corrective action will be taken.
Without such a reporting channel, management, even if not directly involved in a fraud,
might be inclined to sweep the problem under the rug for fear of reprisal or
embarrassment. If the closely-held firm has no outside directors, a significant fraud
prevention step would be the appointment of such director(s).
10 For that reason, U.S. tax law generally requires corporations to report on an accrual basis when gross
receipts exceed an average of $5 million per year over the prior three tax years.
11 Middle market is a term used by bankers to segment their lending markets. The term is used here because
closely held firms frequently interact with banks on matters involving their financial statements.
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10.3 Special Areas of Financial Statement Fraud
Certain items on a firm’s financial statements appear to be especially vulnerable to fraud.
The following discussion will highlight major fraud-prone areas and the steps that can lead
to early detection. The seven areas identified are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Failure to record loss contingencies and asset writeoffs
Manipulation of acquisition reserves
Cost shifting to improve current operating results
Recognizing fictitious revenues
Improper disclosures and material omissions
Special purpose entities; the Enron Case
Methods to conceal financial statement fraud from auditors

The common thread running through all these areas is that detection requires the auditor to
look for something not present in the financial statements. Auditors are accustomed to beginning
with a trial balance listing of all accounts and determining the procedures necessary to
complete the audit. An item that does not show up on that trial balance at all, however,
may never come to the attention of the auditor. For instance, in order to detect a failure to
book a loss reserve for a contingent liability, one must first discover the existence of the
contingency. From an auditing perspective, in the case of a failure to record a loss
contingency, there is no loss contingency balance to audit; the accounting entry simply
does not exist. Similarly, using acquisition reserves to hide current-period expenses means
that the expense item or category is absent from the income statement and is buried in
some balance-sheet account relating to a prior business combination.

Cost shifting, that is, the movement of expenses from one entity or period to another, is
equally hard to find. When the auditor looks at the accounts for the one business as of a
given date, he or she does not see expenses shunted over to another affiliate or to another
time period. In the case of fictitious revenue, although the auditor at least has income
statement revenue accounts to examine, the existence of side letters with customers which,
for example, grant those customers the right to return product, does not show up as a
contingency or in the footnotes. In practice, an auditor is not likely to be told that side
letters exist.
Clearly, these are the toughest kinds of financial statement fraud to detect. Nevertheless, for
each fraud discussed above, the auditor should look for warning signs. Those red flags may
be small in dollar amounts but may nevertheless point to significant irregularities. The
following discussion assumes that a certain subset12 of management has attempted to
manipulate financial data and looks at these issues in the context of audit planning and
execution to determine what additional steps an auditor could take that might lead to
detection of the fraud.

12 If financial statement fraud is traceable to a significant number of senior managers, the auditor should
consider taking additional steps. For internal auditors, those steps would include discussions with legal
counsel. Outside auditors should consider issuing a qualified opinion or, more likely, resigning from the
audit engagement altogether.
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10 .3.1 Failure to Record Loss Contingencies and Asset Writeoffs
Loss Contingencies
A loss contingency is defined in FASB Statement No. 5 as “an existing condition, situation,
or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible .. . loss ... to an enterprise that
will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to occur.”13 FASB
Statement No. 5 continues to state that the “[r]esolution of the uncertainty may confirm . . .
the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence of a liability.”1415
FASB Statement No. 5 lists examples of loss contingencies that include:

• Collectability of receivables
• Obligations related to product warranties and product defects

•
•
•
•
•
•

Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property
Threat of expropriation of assets
Pending or threatened litigation
Actual or possible claims and assessments
Guarantees of indebtedness of others
Agreements to repurchase receivables (or repurchase related property) that have been
sold15

A firm is required to accrue a loss contingency when that contingency is both probable and
able to be estimated. FASB Statement No. 5 states:
An estimated loss from a loss contingency ... shall be accrued by a charge to
income if both of the following conditions are met:

a.

Information available prior to issuance of the financial statements indicates that
it is probable that an asset had been impaired or a liability had been incurred at
the date of the financial statements. It is implicit in this condition that it must be
probable that one or more future events will occur confirming the fact of the
loss.

b.

The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.16

A future event is probable if it is “likely to occur.”17

13 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, paragraph 1.
14 Ibid., paragraph 1.
15 Ibid., paragraph 4.
16 Ibid., paragraph 8.
17 Ibid., paragraph 3. Footnote disclosure of the loss contingency may be required if the future event is less
than probable but is “reasonably possible;” if the chance of a future event is more than remote but less than
likely, FASB Statement No. 5, paragraph 10, requires disclosure in the financial statements of the nature of
the contingency and an estimate of the potential loss.
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Having set the ground rules, we can examine some specific examples in the following
sections:
1. Warranty and product claims reserves
2. Asset writeoffs

Warranty and Product Claims Reserves
If a manufacturer experiences postproduction problems with a certain product, it may
begin to experience higher-than-expected returns or, more likely, claims for reimbursement
or repair. Those claims may arise under a specific warranty, under product tort law or
under consumer protection laws and regulations. At this point, the manufacturer must
assess its overall cost exposure. It might be possible to estimate the extent of future claims
as a percentage of production based on past experience with other products subject to
similar problems. It might also be possible to estimate the cost of each claim, i.e., the cost
of replacement or repair for each defective unit of product. If both an estimate of future
claims and the cost of each claim are available, then the amount of loss can be reasonably
estimated. FASB Statement No. 5 requires the booking of a loss contingency if the future
claims are likely to occur. If, however, the manufacturer is already seeing large numbers of
claims prior to or soon after the close of its financial reporting period,18 it is reasonable to
assume that the likelihood of future claims is high and that a FASB Statement No. 5 reserve
should be accrued with a charge to current earnings.
However, a manufacturer under pressure to achieve increased earnings may be very
reluctant to accrue a warranty or product claims reserve. Management may take the
position that the problem does not exist or cannot be quantified. But, an alert auditor may
detect certain red flags that indicate a problem does, indeed, exist and that its extent can be
estimated. The red flags that indicate the existence of a contingency include:

1. The incidence of claims prior to the issuance of financial statements (discussed above)
2. Discussions with (and bills from) outside legal counsel
3. Internal correspondence within production and research staffs as to the need to
address a critical problem with a product already on the market

4. Internal correspondence among department heads of production, R&D, general
counsel, and senior management about postproduction problems and product claims
5. External correspondence between the manufacturer and its customers about a given
product concerning special price concessions or special return privileges
6. The incidence of special or overbudget freight charges to accommodate returns
and/or the shipment of replacement product
7. Shifting of production schedules to manufacture replacement product

18 Actually, FASB Statement No. 5 requires the assessment of contingencies arising from “information
available prior to issuance of the financial statements” (emphasis added). Therefore, if claims relating to a
prior period come to the attention of management during the preparation of financial statements for that
prior period, management should consider booking a contingency as of the end of that period.
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8. Halting manufacture of the product in question
9. Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research projects to applications engineering
relating to redesign of existing products
10. Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts to customers on a regular basis
over a period of weeks or months that indicate some arrangement to compensate for
product defects
Once it has been established that a loss contingency exists or is likely to occur,1920
the next
step is to determine whether the potential loss can be quantified. In this case, if the firm
itself does not have actual experience with product claims or if that experience is not
relevant to the product in question, the auditor should look outside the firm. Industry
statistics on product liability and the incidence of claims are generally available from trade
associations, government regulators, or independent research organizations. In the course
of examining internal correspondence between department heads and within departments,
however, the auditor will likely find some internal estimates of the extent of the problem.
This becomes especially obvious if the correspondents are attempting to justify the
allocation of additional staff and financial resources to combat the problem or to explain
why production was shifted or halted. In short, the members of management not directly
involved in manipulating the financial statements may speak quite frankly about the loss
contingency.

Asset Writeoffs
An asset is not always worth its balance-sheet carrying value. Even if an appropriate
depreciation schedule is established when the asset is acquired, over time the needs of the
business enterprise may change. Because of rapid changes in engineering and materials
applications, for example, manufacturing processes may need to be updated to remain
economically competitive. The machinery used in the old processes may become obsolete
well before the machines themselves actually wear out and are depreciated down to salvage
value. Similarly, changes in customer demand may force a manufacturer to discontinue a
certain product line and render useless equipment specially designed to build that product.
Firms operating in highly competitive markets may lose business to a low-cost competitor
and be forced to idle production lines. Occasionally, in order to obtain or retain a customer
relationship, a firm may even deliberately quote a price for its products that does not cover
the cost of acquiring and operating the equipment used to produce those products. In all
these cases, management should assess whether the equipment carrying value is impaired,
especially if there are no reasonable prospects of finding an alternative use for the
equipment. In the event an impairment loss should be taken, however, management may
fraudulently postpone that charge if it causes earnings to fall below a managed earnings
target. 20

19 For purposes of this discussion, we focus on failure to accrue a probable loss contingency. However,
violations of GAAP (and securities laws if the company files with the SEC) may occur if the firm has a
reasonably possible loss contingency, according to FASB Statement No. 5, paragraph 10, but fails to make
the required disclosure of that contingency in its financial statements.
20 In this section, we are discussing asset writeoffs in the course of operations. Acquisition-related writeoffs are
discussed in the preceding section entitled “Big-Bath Restructuring Changes.”
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To detect this fraud, the auditor must be particularly adept at seeing through management’s
pretensions to get to the facts. The best place to begin is to review fixed assets with
divisional or production personnel. FASB Statement No. 121, Accountingfor the Impairment
ofLong-Lived Assets andfor Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of provides a list of possible
events that may give rise to an impairment:

1. A significant decrease in the market value of an asset
2. A significant change in the extent or manner in which an asset is used or a significant
physical change in an asset
3. A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the business climate that could affect
the value of an asset or an adverse action or assessment by a regulator
4. An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the amount originally expected to
acquire or construct an asset
5. A current-period operating or cash flow loss combined with a history of operating or
cash flow losses or a projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses
associated with an asset used for the purpose of producing revenue21
The auditor may wish to draw questions for firm personnel from this list and look for
evidence of changes in production and product demand to determine whether an asset is
impaired.

Clearly, if equipment has been moved off the shop floor into storage and there are no plans
for future use of that equipment, an impairment loss is highly likely. The more difficult
issues arise if equipment is still in use but profitability is less certain. Profitability is at issue
when assets may be impaired because FASB Statement No. 121 states that “[i]f the sum of
expected future cash flows (undiscounted and without interest charges) is less than the
carrying amount of the asset, the entity shall recognize an impairment loss. . . ,”22 Since
most management reporting systems, however, measure profitability by product line or by
customer, it is hard to imagine how a business could survive in today’s competitive
environment without this information. Indeed, the activity-based costing initiatives begun
in the 1980s were a direct result of the need for management to understand a product’s
contribution to overall firm profitability. Although auditors may not be accustomed to
reviewing product line profitability reports, these reports source revenues to the costs to
produce them and can answer directly whether a given production process has been
historically profitable.

Historical data are the basis of management plans and profitability forecasts. If the auditor
can obtain such forecasts directly from the personnel with line responsibility for
production, those personnel might be inclined to render a more accurate forecast since
they are unaware of management’s earnings target. One should keep in mind that line
managers may have an incentive to show as positive a picture as possible to avoid
production shutdowns. Also, line managers may also receive hints or outright requests from
management to produce an overly favorable forecast. In either case, however, if the
forecasts are accompanied by written narratives, the narratives will generally list all the

21 FASB Statement No. 121, paragraph 5.
22 Ibid., paragraph 6.
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downside possibilities in order to provide political cover for the line manager should events
not turn out as planned.23 The auditor may be able to assess the reasonableness of the
forecast, given the known conditions at the time and the likelihood of those downside
possibilities.

Proving fraud in a forecast is difficult because a forecast is by its very nature a best-guess.24
If that forecast, however, was based on facts known to be incorrect, such as a major
customer’s known unwillingness to buy the product, then the forecast was fraudulently
constructed. A forecast may also become fraudulent if it is used at a later time to justify a
management decision even though the management knows that significant facts have
changed. For example, a forecast may accurately reflect that, at the time of preparation,
there was a possibility that a certain major customer wanted to buy the product. If,
however, by the balance-sheet date, management knows that the customer is not interested
and there are no alternative buyers, it would be fraudulent to assert that the forecast is still
accurate and then use it to justify not writing down the value of assets used to produce that
product.
Another area of asset writeoff that can fall victim to fraud involves investments in securities
of private companies. Such securities are difficult to value because transaction prices are
not publicly available. If the security held is stock and there have been substantial historical
operating losses with little hope of future profitability (i.e., the decline in value is other than
temporary), that stock may be impaired according to FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting
for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities. Likewise, FASB Statement No. 115 states
that for debt,
... if it is possible that the investor will be unable to collect all amounts due
according to the contractual terms of a debt security not impaired at acquisition, an
other-than-temporary impairment shall be considered to have occurred. If the
decline in fair value [of any security] is judged to be other than temporary, the cost
basis of the individual security shall be written down to fair value as a new cost basis
and the amount of the write-down shall be included in earnings (that is, accounted
for as a realized loss).25

Without recent prices for the sale of stock and debt in a private company, the auditor might
have to look at financial information from the investee company. The investor, if it holds a
significant position in the investee, should have financial information on file (if not, this
should be a red flag that something may be amiss). Those data would likely include results
of operations that would give historical profitability. For future profit estimates, one should
look to company forecasts and assess the validity of those forecasts based upon the known
relationships, if any, between management of the investor and investee. If common
representation within management or on the boards of both companies exists, further
inquiry may be necessary to determine the validity of any forecast. Losses over several past
years may be sufficient to establish impairment, as the following case study taken from a
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release demonstrates.

23 If there are no narratives, the auditor can probably obtain a list of potential downside possibilities simply by
asking the line managers.
24 For a definition of financial forecast, see the AICPA Guide for Prospective Financial Statements, Section 200.04.
25 FASB Statement 115, paragraph 16.
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Windpower, Inc. Case Study

Windpower, Inc., a small private company, began doing research in windmill
production and technology in 1978 with a view to later commercial development.
The following year, the same group of investors established Breezy Valley Energy,
Inc. and transferred Windpower’s R&D work to Breezy Valley in 1980. Breezy
Valley reimbursed Windpower $31,308 for work done to date and from then on
Windpower lent Breezy Valley money for R&D. In fact, these loans formed the
primary source of funds for Breezy Valley.

According to Windpower’s financial statements for the nine months ended March
31, 1981, loans outstanding to Breezy Valley at that date amounted to $108,434. By
the end of the following fiscal year, the aggregate loans totaled $208,146 and by
March 31, 1983, they reached $321,725. In Windpower’s financial statements for
1981 and 1982, the loans are accounted for as a receivable; during fiscal 1983, this
receivable was exchanged for Breezy Valley preferred stock.

In September 1983, Windpower filed a Form S-1 in connection with a proposed $4million IPO. In this filing, Windpower’s investment in Breezy Valley was carried as
an asset valued at historical cost rather than written down as Breezy Valley’s
prospects dimmed. Windpower’s investment as reported in its various forms,
represented 62 percent, 77 percent, and 80 percent of the total assets at the end of
fiscal 1981, 1982, and 1983 respectively while cumulative operating losses increased
at Breezy Valley from $118,420 in fiscal 1981 to $265,542 in 1982, and reached
$437,092 by the end of fiscal 1983. Revenues for Breezy Valley had declined such
that it was bringing in only $1 for every $7 going out in expenses; future earnings
prospects were unattractive because Breezy Valley seemed unable to market its
products.

Conclusion and Analysis
On the grounds of its failure to write down its investment in Breezy Valley to net
realizable value in accordance with GAAP, the SEC suspended the effectiveness of
Windpower’s registration statement for the $4-million public offering. Since this
case predated the issuance of FASB Statement No. 115, the SEC looked to FASB
Statement No. 5 and found that Windpower should have applied the provisions of
FASB Statement No. 5 which states in paragraph 8 that:
An estimated loss from a loss contingency . . . shall be accrued by a charge to
income if both the following conditions are met:
a)

Information available prior to issuance of the financial statements indicates that
it is probable that an asset has been impaired or a liability has been incurred at
the date of the financial statements. It is implicit in this condition that it must be
probable that one or more future events will occur confirming the fact of the
loss.

b) The amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated.

Windpower’s financial condition met the requirements of paragraph a) since the
investment in Breezy Valley was impaired and recovery was unlikely because of the
growing losses and limited prospects of generating sales. The requirements of
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paragraph b) were also met since the amount of the loss was exactly equal to the
known aggregate amount of the loans. Clearly, the impairment requirements of
FASB Statement No. 115, if it had been in effect, were also met.

On the basis of this failure to take account of the reduced value of Windpower’s
investment and the slim prospects of recovery, the SEC instituted proceedings
against Windpower’s auditor and two of its partners for improperly certifying that
Windpower’s financial statements had been prepared according to GAAP and
audited according to GAAS. The SEC accepted Offers of Settlement and
Undertakings from the auditor and its two partners.

10.3.2 Manipulation of Acquisition Reserves
When one company acquires another using the purchase method of accounting for the
transaction under Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16, Business Combinations, the
purchase price paid is allocated to the assets of the acquired company using the fair value
of those assets. Any excess of purchase price over the fair value of assets acquired is booked
as goodwill. Liabilities can also be transferred or accrued; those liabilities assumed by the
purchaser effectively increase the amount paid. If, as is usually the case, the cash portion of
the purchase price covers the fair value of assets acquired, then liabilities assumed over and
above the cash paid will increase goodwill.
One type of liability managers of an acquiring company may wish to set up are loss
contingencies as provided under FASB Statement No. 5,26 presumably for potential
problems inherited or created when the target company was acquired. These loss
contingencies or reserves, as they are more commonly known, typically increase the
goodwill paid for the acquired company, i.e., the entry establishing the loss contingency is
a credit to a reserve liability and a debit to goodwill. That goodwill is then amortized into
income, usually over a forty-year period. Examples would include reserves for warranties
on discontinued products or reserves for bad debts that would no longer be serviced as the
acquiring company consolidates operations of the target, and closes or sells off unwanted
segments. Management may also wish to set up severance reserves for employee layoffs. If
those contingencies later materialize, the expense (debit) of performing the warranty work,
writing off the debt or paying severance is then taken to the reserve as a credit balance on
the liability section of the balance sheet.

Most important, the expense of a reserved item does not run through the income
statement. Instead, since setting up the reserve itself created or increased goodwill from the
purchase transaction, amortization of the goodwill attributable to the reserve comes into
the income statement but only a small portion, perhaps as little as one-fortieth, is expensed

26 Other accounting literature discussing when and how contingencies can be incurred in connection with a
business combination includes SEC SAB No. 100, Restructuring and Impairment Charges and Emerging Issues
Task Force (EITF) Issues No. 94-3, Liability Recognition for Certain Employee Termination Benefits and Other
Costs to Exit an Activity (Including Certain Costs Incurred in a Restructuring), and No. 95-3, Recognition of
Liabilities in Connection with a Purchase Business Combination.
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in a given year. Therefore, establishing the reserve allows management to avoid taking the
entire expense into income in the current period and, by the amortization of goodwill, to
spread that expense over a much longer future time.

From this discussion, one can readily see that management has an incentive to reserve as
much as possible when making acquisitions. Moreover, management does not need to
attempt to set up all necessary reserves by the date of the acquisition; FASB Statement No.
38, Accountingfor Preacquisition Contingencies ofPurchased Enterprises, provides for a twelve
month period after the acquisition date to adjust the purchase price. It is here that
management actions need to be carefully reviewed. Without restrictions on the booking of
reserves after an acquisition, the current management of the acquiring company could
constantly (and conveniently) create reserves to absorb current losses from acquired
businesses.
At some point, however, current management must take responsibility for current period
results. The twelve-month cutoff provided in FASB Statement No. 38 is the outside limit;
the period for adjusting the purchase price should end when management “is no longer
waiting for information that it has arranged to obtain and that is known to be available or
obtainable”27 at the time of the acquisition. Management crosses the line and commits fraud
when it creates material purchase reserves for losses that were not foreseeable at the time of
purchase, especially if management creates those reserves and adjusts the purchase price
more than twelve months after the purchase date. Likewise, management also commits
fraud when it uses reserves to absorb losses unrelated to the reasons for which the reserves
were established.

Fabulous Deals, Inc. Case Study
As the divisional controller was about to go into a budget meeting, the Deal Club
corporate CFO and corporate controller handed him new numbers inflating his
revenue estimates by $200 million. He was already staying up past midnight
designing fictitious accounts under the corporate controller’s instructions to create
numbers that met analysts’ estimates.

But this scene was not to be enacted until 20 years after Bill Battler, a wealthy
Harvard MBA, had taken over Deal Club, a small discount-shopping club, in 1976
and went public with it in 1983 at 25 times sales despite losing $2.5 million on only
$4 million in revenues the previous year. By 1997, Battler had built it into a
business reporting $2.3 billion in annual revenues. Battler had grown the business
by persuading large credit card companies to promote the club to their cardholders.
He also founded or acquired more than a dozen similar clubs in the travel and
other industries and brought them under Deal Club’s umbrella. Proud of a reported
70-percent membership renewal rate that provided what Battler called an “annuity
like” stream of predictable earnings, he saw the stock move to the $25 area with a
P/E of about 30.

27 FASB Statement No. 38, paragraph 4.b.
32

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

Chapter Ten: Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud

Enter Carl Charise. A former tax lawyer, Charise founded Fabulous Franchises,
Inc. in 1990 and went public with it in 1992 at $4 a share. The company had the
franchise rights to a number of hotel chains with a total of 500,000 rooms, real
estate brokerages, rental cars, vacation time-sharing, and other businesses. Fabulous
Franchises made money by charging a franchise fee and taking a percentage of
earnings from its operators. Earnings were growing at an annual rate in excess of 60
percent because of Charisma’s good management and aggressive acquisition policy.
The stock price hit a record $79 in 1996 creating a return of 2,000 percent since
going public. In addition to an office at company headquarters in North Carolina,
he kept an office in Manhattan from which he constantly wooed Wall Street
analysts with the Fabulous Franchises story.
As each company grew bigger, growth opportunities became fewer. Battler and
Charise began telling the analysts to lower expectations since both companies
needed bigger and bigger acquisitions which were becoming harder and harder to
find. In January 1997, Battler approached Charise proposing that Deal Club take
over Fabulous Franchises. In the following months, discussions turned from
acquisition by Deal Club to a merger of equals.

Superficially, the two companies seemed to make likely merger partners. The
millions of well-to-do customers passing through Fabulous Franchises’ operations
were a natural market for Deal Club memberships and would create a new profit
center. The merger would utilize the synergy of Fabulous Franchises’ strong
earnings and Deal Club’s high multiple to add billions to market capitalization.
Trouble in Paradise began, however, when the two conflicting corporate cultures
started to take a closer look at each other. Bill Battler proved to be an absentee
visionary and the company ran itself in a casual manner that sometimes slipped
into carelessness. Divisions were left to run things their own way; accounting
systems were unsophisticated; financial reporting was slack and there seemed to be
no long-term planning. These practices were defended as “entrepreneurial” and
had, indeed, unarguably produced a business with $2-billion-a-year in sales.
Carl Charise, on the other hand, was not only extremely charming to Wall Street,
but also a very competent CEO who ran a tight ship. When his people demanded
detailed nonpublic information including hard numbers, Deal Club executives
backed off. In fact, instead of producing numbers for the new management team,
the Deal Club President produced one for himself, namely, a $25-million
negotiated payout, to be paid in the event that he was not made COO of the
merged company after two years. The whole situation made Fabulous Franchises
nervous but Deal Club’s outside auditors, Fiddle & Fakit, gave assurances that the
books were in excellent condition. Nevertheless, in the midst of all this prickliness,
Deal Club kept delivering spectacular quarterly earnings. Fabulous Franchises
executives could not confirm any information, however, and therefore remained
apprehensive.

After the two companies closed the merger under the name Fabulous Deals, Inc. in
late 1997, more unusual behavior began to surface at Deal Club. Bill Battler insisted
that the old Deal Club remain financially autonomous and that CFO Haggis
McFudge and controller Patricia Candel remain in place. Deal Club’s divisional
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controllers would not report to the merged company’s chief accounting officer but
to McFudge and Candel, who would consolidate results before passing them on.
This arrangement was reluctantly agreed to, but the financial reports continued to
come in slowly and, meanwhile, Fabulous Deals risked missing the 10-K filing
deadline with the SEC. In the face of this problem and Charise’s threats to take the
matter to the board, Battler agreed to remove McFudge and Candel from the
process.

More peculiar matters began to come to light when the new chief accounting officer
had a meeting with McFudge, Candel, and others about the new reporting system.
The former president of Deal Club asked him how to move $165 million from
merger reserves into income “creatively” for fiscal 1998. It was also revealed that
earnings had actually been increased by $100 million using the same trick in 1997.
When Charise heard this news, he began to fear he would have to restate earnings
with all that implied for the stock price which he had so assiduously worked to
support through his good relations with Wall Street. Former Deal Club executives
tried to explain the matter away, and Fiddle & Fakit assured Charise that the
restatement would not be necessary.
The biggest bombshell, however, exploded a few weeks later at a routine budget
meeting when two mid-level Deal Club executives revealed that Deal Club’s
growth story was a complete fiction and that all the numbers had been fabricated.
The story, as it came out that day and over the next few weeks, showed that under
instructions from McFudge and Candel, more than 20 controllers at 17 of Deal
Club’s 22 divisions had committed fraud by creating $511 million in phony pretax
income that translated into a one-third increase in earnings for the three years
ended fiscal 1997. The fraud had grown each year until 1997 net income was 61
percent fiction. As the former Deal Club executives told the story, McFudge and
Candel had said the bogus numbers were necessary to meet analysts’ forecasts.

When Charise publicly announced that Deal Club’s 1997 earnings were being
restated downward by $115 million, Fabulous Deals’ stock price plunged to $19
from $36 to reduce market capitalization by $14 billion. At 108 million shares
traded, the volume was the largest one-day turnover for any stock in the history of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) up to that time. Three shareholder lawsuits
had been filed by the end of the day and about 70 more followed. By the time the
stock price finally bottomed at $7.50, more than $29 billion in market capitalization
had been vaporized.
Conclusion and Analysis

The scandal seems to have been driven by the perception by McFudge, Candel,
and others that meeting analysts’ expectations and maintaining the upward
momentum of the P/E and stock price were more important than accepting the ups
and downs, the good years and bad, of business and the impact such developments
implied for the stock price. Externally perceived performance became more
important than reality. The extent of Bill Battler’s involvement remains an open
question.
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The scandal was only able to go on as long as it did because of the failure of Fiddle
& Fakit to detect accounting irregularities of this magnitude. In the first three
quarters of 1995, 1996, and 1997, the unaudited financial statements were doctored
by adjusting revenues upward and expenses downward at the largest Deal Club
subsidiary. These adjustments were $31 million, $87 million, and $176 million,
respectively. If the auditors had looked at these interim statements, they would
have seen a pattern of unsubstantiated changes to income and expense items. At
year-end, before Fiddle & Fakit arrived to do the audit, these irregularities were
reversed and the fictitious earnings replaced by earnings converted from cookie-jar
reserves. Fiddle & Fakit were so lax in their work that they failed to question this
use of reserves. They even allowed a $25-million transfer from reserves to be
classified as “immaterial.” Acquisition reserves were even used to pay for $597,000
in expenses requested by Bill Battler for the operation of his private plane in years
prior to the acquisition. These expenses, assuming they were properly reimbursable,
should have been classified as operating costs.
This failure is even more troubling since Fiddle & Fakit had had the Deal Club
account for years and McFudge, Candel, and others were former Fiddle & Fakit
employees. Bill Battler had even fought to retain Fiddle & Fakit as auditors after the
merger. Fiddle & Fakit paid $335 million to settle a shareholder class action suit
and is embroiled in other suits involving Fabulous Deals and Bill Battler. Fabulous
Deals has agreed to pay $2.85 billion in class action settlements.

10.3.3 Cost Shifting to Improve Current Operating Results
If management desires to improve earnings fraudulently, it can remove expenses from the
current-period income statement to make operations appear more profitable. There are two
way in which expenses incurred by a firm can be shifted; they can be moved to the:

1. Balance sheet to be brought onto the income statement at a future period
2. Income statement of another related entity to remove the cost altogether

Shift to the Balance Sheet
The matching principle, which states that the timing of expenses should be related to the
timing of revenues,28 restricts the first shifting method. Under this principle, if the cost was
incurred to earn revenue in the current period, as a general rule, the cost should be charged
to that revenue in the current period. There are some expenses that offer the prospect of
providing benefits to future periods, and management may attempt to justify capitalizing,
and then amortizing them into income over future periods. This practice, however, may
run afoul of specific accounting guidance and, if management intentionally ignores this
guidance, it will create fraudulent financial statements. For example, to meet earnings
projections, management may begin capitalizing the salaries of marketing personnel on the
argument that the work performed by those personnel will benefit future-period sales.

28 See FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements ofFinancial Statements, paragraphs 145-149 for a summary of
the issues regarding expense recognition.
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Although there may be some conceptual merit to the argument, capitalizing sales personnel
salaries runs directly counter to an example contained in FASB Concepts Statement No. 6,
Elements ofFinancial Statements, paragraph 148, because it is difficult to determine the
amount and length of time of future benefits.29 Implementing the principle of conservatism,
FASB Concepts Statement No. 6 states that such expenditures are “recognized as expenses
in the period in which they are incurred because the period to which they otherwise relate
is indeterminable or not worth the effort to determine.”30 Finally, even if capitalization is
justified, the manipulation of financial statements may also occur when management
switches from currently expensing costs to capitalizing them without proper disclosure.
Failure to disclose may cause readers of financial statements to believe that profits have
improved in the year of the policy change compared to previous periods when, in reality,
the improved operating results may be solely attributable to shifting expenses to the
balance sheet.

The Asset Quality Index, described in the discussion entitled “Quantitative Predictors,”
below in section 10.4.1, is one of the early warning signs of this type of manipulation. This
index looks at the percentage of noncurrent assets to total assets for the current year over
the previous year. If the index is greater than one, management has increased the
percentage of noncurrent to total assets. This type of behavior is frequently associated with
the sale of stock, especially during the period leading up to seasoned equity offerings for a
company whose stock is already publicly traded. (A seasoned equity offering consists of the
sale of new, additional shares by a public company). A survey of academic research also
found that management frequently got away with this type of manipulation.

Two recent studies provide evidence that managers manage earnings at the time of
seasoned equity offerings (Rangan, 1998; Teoh, et al. 1998). It is well known that shares of
firms that make seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) underperform the market in the years
following the offering. These two papers show that:
1. The reported earnings of firms that make SEOs are unusually high at the time of the
SEO.
2. These high reported earnings are attributable to unusually high accruals (including
“discretionary” accruals).
3. These firms’ earnings performance is unusually poor in the years following the SEO.

4. There is a strong association between the extent of earnings management and
subsequent stock price performance. Shares of firms with the highest accruals at the
time of the SEO tend to perform worse in the years after the SEO than shares of other
firms.

29 There is an exception that allows the capitalization of sales commissions paid to agents selling insurance
policies under FASB Statement No. 60, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, paragraph 28 et seq.
In the case of insurance sales, though, actuaries are able to establish estimates of how long those policies will
remain in force and thereby generate premium income to the insurance carrier. Those estimates then
provide a reasonable basis for amortizing the commissions and other acquisition costs over future periods.
30 FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, paragraph 148.
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This evidence is consistent with the view that investors do not “see through” earnings
management at the time of the SEO. Rather, as time passes after the SEO and the earnings
management becomes apparent through subsequent earnings disappointments, the
overpricing reverses and these stocks underperform the market.31

Clearly, the incentive is to create a short-term illusion of higher profits to sell stock at an
inflated price.

Shift to Related Entity
Sometimes fraudsters can deceive by moving costs from one entity to another under
common control. This is useful to the fraudsters in situations in which investors or analysts
are looking intently at the performance of a certain business segment, and management
wants to show rising earnings in that segment to give the illusion of significant future
growth. Events similar to this played out in the W.R. Grace case,32 although that
management also used reserves as the tool to shift expenses. As outlined above, in June
1999, the SEC brought a managed earnings case against Grace for manipulating the
reported earnings of its primary health care subsidiary, National Medical Care, Inc.
Management had established reserves for unanticipated health care reimbursements and
used those reserves in subsequent periods to reduce expenses and show a steady growth
rate in its health care subsidiary. However, there were no liabilities to justify the reserves,
which consequently were not in conformity with GAAP. Fraudsters may also want to
improve a subsidiary’s earnings in order to enhance it for sale by shifting costs to the parent
or to affiliates and by using reserves, as illustrated in the example of Grace.
Another example of cost shifting was the previously discussed Livent case.33 This scheme
operated from 1990 through 1998. There were three areas of expense manipulation:
1. Livent transferred preproduction costs for the shows to fixed assets, such as set
construction.
2. Livent removed certain expenses and related liabilities from the general ledger.
3. Livent transferred costs from one show currently running to another show that had not
yet opened.

Livent shows that this type of cost shifting is especially hard to detect. Business downturns
usually bring these schemes to the surface because, if the company overall is suffering,
there is no place to hide the additional costs. To try to detect cost shifting before a
downturn, auditors would be well served to look for credits appearing in expense accounts.
Such credits may indicate that the entity incurring the cost accrued the expenses on its
books as debits, and then transferred the expenses out with offsetting credits. It is not safe,
however, to assume that the subsidiary incurring the expense initially recorded it as such.
There may be a special reserve or liability account on the balance sheet set up to record the
31 Dechow and Skinner, op. cit.
32 In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1140 (June 30,
1999). This case also raised materiality issues in that the manipulation of subsidiary earnings was less than a
rule-of-thumb threshold of 5 percent of consolidated Grace earnings. But since the SEC found that
management placed increased importance on the subsidiary’s earnings, the SEC determined that the
manipulation was material.
33 In the matter of Livent, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1095, January 13, 1999.
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initial debits with the transfer credits appearing later. As the expenses are being booked,
significant debit balances in the liability account will grow until the transfer is made. Such
debit balances in a liability account should stand out. Also, if the transfers take place over
time, there is likely to be some correspondence spelling out the procedures, especially if the
initial debit is to an unusual account such as a liability reserve.

10.3.4 Recognizing Fictitious Revenues
The COSO Report found that more than half the financial reporting frauds in the period
from 1987 to 1997 were attributable to overstating revenue. Revenue recognition issues
have occupied the accounting profession for many years as well. In 1984, the FASB issued
FAS Concepts Statement No. 5. That statement set out two basic requirements for
recognizing revenue:
a.

Realized or realizable. Revenues and gains generally are not recognized until

realized or realizable. Revenues and gains are realized when products (goods or
services), merchandise or other assets are exchanged for cash or claims to cash.
Revenues and gains are realizable when related assets received or held are
readily convertible to known amounts of cash or claims to cash. Readily
convertible assets have (i) interchangeable (fungible) units and (ii) quoted prices
available in an active market that can rapidly absorb the quantity held by the
entity without significantly affecting the price.

b.

Earned. Revenues are not recognized until earned. An entity’s revenue-earning

activities involve delivering or producing goods, rendering services or other
activities that constitute its ongoing major or central operations, and revenues
are considered to have been earned when the entity has substantially
accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the
34
revenues. ...

The staff of the SEC identified a long list of additional accounting pronouncements dealing
with revenue recognition, including:

13, Accounting for Leases
45, Accounting for Franchise Fee Revenue
48, Revenue Recognition When Right ofReturn Exists
49, Accounting for Product Financing Arrangements

•
•
•
•

FASB Statement No.
FASB Statement No.
FASB Statement No.
FASB Statement No.

•
•
•
•
•
•

FASB Statement No. 50, Financial Reporting in the Record and Music Industry

FASB Statement No. 51, Financial Reporting by Cable Television Companies
FASB Statement No. 66, Accounting for Sales ofReal Estate
APB Opinion No. 10, Omnibus Opinion— 1966
ARBs No. 43 and No. 45, Long-Term Construction-Type Contracts
SOP No. 81-1, Accountingfor Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type
Contracts
• SOP No. 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition
• Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue No. 88-18, Sales ofFuture Revenues*

34 FASB Concepts Statement No. 5, paragraph 83 (footnotes omitted).
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• EITF Issue No. 91-9, Revenue and Expense Recognition for Freight Services in Process
• EITF Issue No. 95-1, Revenue Recognition on Sales with a Guaranteed Minimum Resale Value
• EITF Issue No. 95-4, Revenue Recognition on Equipment Sold and Subsequently Repurchased
Subject to an Operating Lease35

In SAB No. 101, the SEC set out its interpretation of the above literature and concluded
that:
The staff believes that revenue generally is realized or realizable and earned when
all of the following criteria are met:
a.

Persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists

b.

Delivery has occurred or services have been rendered

c.

The seller’s price to the buyer is fixed or determinable

d.

Collectibility is reasonably assured.36

With regard to a fixed or determinable selling price, the SEC staff amplified its position by
looking to SOP 97-2 which defines a fixedfee as a “fee required to be paid at a set amount
that is not subject to refund or adjustment.”37 Even though SOP 97-2 deals with software
revenue recognition, the staff believed that the requirement of not being subject to refund
or adjustment was applicable to all transactions. If the buyer retains a right to a refund of
the purchase price, then collectibility cannot be assured. Indeed, it would be difficult to
meet the FASB Concepts Statement No. 5 realization test if the cash or other payment
tendered was subject to refund at the buyer’s discretion. Yet, refund arrangements are a
common area for revenue recognition fraud.
If company management wishes to inflate revenues by booking fictitious sales, in all
likelihood one or more of the SEC’s conditions will have been violated:

1. Lack of an agreement
2. Nondelivery
3. No fixed price

4. Receivables are not collectible

Lack of an Agreement
As the reporting quarter draws to an end, companies straining to achieve a revenue target
face pressure to close sales by the last day. That pressure may lead to the fraudulent
booking of premature or nonexistent sales. In the rush to close transactions by a certain
date, sales personnel may represent to management that there is an oral agreement with a
customer when, in fact, there is none. For this reason, the SEC standard requires
“persuasive evidence,” which generally means some written documentation from either the
buyer or a third party such as a purchasing agent. If a company requires a written
agreement in order to credit a salesperson with a sale, the agreement might be held up,
perhaps under review in the buyer’s legal department, at the end of the quarter. The
35 SEC SAB No. 101, Topic 13, A.1.
36 Ibid. (footnotes omitted).
37 SOP 97-2, paragraph 8.
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salesperson may then represent (perhaps accurately) that the buyer has signed off on the
sale; without a signed contract, however, recognition of the sale violates the company
policy. Such a policy is put in place to assure the company conforms to GAAP. Violating
that policy causes a GAAP violation if, in footnotes to the financial statements or elsewhere,
management represents that sales are not recognized without a written agreement.38 Such a
violation might also point to an internal control issue for the auditors to consider.
Good sales cutoff procedures can generally detect lack of proper agreements. If written
agreements are fabricated, detection is much more difficult. The random sampling of
orders booked as revenue near the end of a quarter should provide a list of customers to
call to verify that documents are authentic. For a document fabrication scheme to succeed
over several quarters or years, however, the fabricated agreements must be replaced by
authentic agreements and real sales or there will be significant reversals of prior period
sales. Therefore, auditors can compare, perhaps on a random basis, contracts on file at the
end of a given reporting period with contracts on file for the same transaction at later
period. If the original (fake) contract has been switched, there probably was an attempt at
fabrication. Conversely, if the authentic document does not appear, the sale may never
have been completed, in which case there would be a reversal in the subsequent period.
Numerous such reversals would point to revenue recognition problems.

Nondelivery
What constitutes delivery varies from industry to industry but generally occurs when title
and risk of loss pass to the buyer. Delivery of some products require shipping documents
that provide an auditable paper trail. Delivery of products such as software, though, may
occur over the Internet at near instantaneous speed. But even here there should be some
documentation or electronic receipt verification.

Attempts at achieving fraudulent deliveries usually involve some person or entity willing to
hold the product until such time as its sale can be arranged. As part of the fraud scheme,
the recipient executes documents or emails that appear to confirm delivery. This recipient
is sometimes part of the scheme or can be a customer who inadvertently accepts delivery
before completing the sale. The latter may be easier to detect because customers receiving
products before they are wanted tend to complain to company management. The thirdparty recipients who park goods temporarily may be harder to detect but usually require
some payment for their services. Payment may come in the form of above-average
discounts if the third parties resell the products over future periods or there may be special
terms allowing for product returns. An analysis of average product selling prices may point
to one customer who stands out from the rest by receiving better deals. If returns from a
given customer are abnormally high, that fact, too, may indicate special arrangements,
especially if the returns occur in a later reporting period. If one customer receives such
favorable treatment, the auditor should make additional inquiries as to why. In addition,
delivery schemes involving resellers typically become more apparent when other resellers

38 See SAB No. 101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, Question 1. The hypothetical situation posed in
the SAB actually stated the normal and customary business practice was to obtain written agreements and
did not mention the existence of a company policy to obtain written agreements. The staff's position was
that companies could not book as revenue sales lacking written agreements when the normal and
customary business practice for the industry was to obtain written agreements.
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cannot sell the product as expected because of a change in market conditions. If a reseller
is still taking substantial deliveries of product while many others are experiencing sales
declines, the auditor should attempt to understand why that reseller’s channels of
distribution are clear when others are blocked.

No Fixed Price
Sometimes prices are difficult to determine, particularly if the product is to be combined
with other products before being sold to an end user. Such sales may involve a royalty
payment that is a function of the selling price. It would be inappropriate to book
anticipated future royalties as current revenues until the amount of those royalties becomes
fixed upon ultimate sale. Minimum royalties, however, may be booked when they become
due. Fraud occurs when royalties are recognized on fictitious or anticipated ultimate sales.
Such royalty arrangements, however, typically require the royalty payor to report to the
royalty recipient the quantity of ultimate sales on a periodic (usually quarterly) basis. This
permits an accounting of the final sales that can be used to verify reported royalty income.

The more deceptive form of fraud used to circumvent the fixed price requirement is the
clandestine use of side letters or arrangements that allow for refunds or discounts at the
buyer’s option or in certain circumstances. Under tight market conditions or perhaps
because the product is new and untested, it may be necessary to use these side letters to
make a sale. The most likely candidates for this type of fraud are sales personnel with some
discretion and authority such as divisional managers and above. Implementation of such a
scheme requires their authority to alter records or invent excuses should the buyer exercise
his rights under the side agreement. As a general rule, side letters are the result of some
type of internal control failure when the divisional manager is able to effect economic
outcomes and alter accounting records. These side letters are quite hard to detect because
the buyer usually realizes he is receiving a special deal and does not want to publicize it. Of
course, the fraudsters in the selling company will attempt to keep such agreements secret.

These schemes must come to the surface when the buyer exercises his rights under the
agreement. A more senior member of management is usually involved to cover up the
refund with a fabricated reason or another transaction. Nevertheless, there is usually some
documentation of the refund if corporate controls are in place. The auditor who suspects
the existence of side letters can certainly look for refunds and discounts that are out of the
ordinary. Keep in mind that the customer probably demanded the right to obtain a refund
or discount in the course of negotiations for the sale. To catch the existence of side letters
before refund demands are made, a suspicious auditor may review sales files for
correspondence, notes, or other evidence of such demands from the prospective customer.
If installing the product requires personnel such as engineers, those personnel not reporting
to the fraudsters may know details of the side agreement but innocently believe there is no
issue to report to senior management. It is also likely that if fraudsters used side letters with
one customer, there might be side letters with other customers as well.

Receivables Are Not Collectible
Financially weak firms may not pay their bills. To prevent sales to firms in poor financial
condition, some type of customer approval process independent of the sales function needs
to be in place to assess customer health, especially if the customer is placing large orders.
This review function should be integrated with the approval process for customer refunds

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

41

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

and discounts to prevent the implementation of side letters, which also affect collectiblity,
as discussed above. From an auditor’s point of view, an unusual concentration of orders
from small or distressed customers, particularly near the end of a reporting period or a sales
campaign, should raise concerns.

Buffalo Chips, Inc. Case Study
When the accounts receivable accountant tripped over a box on the Buffalo Chips
loading dock in October 1993, she knew something was wrong at the company.
From the packing slip, she recognized a $250,000 order she had invoiced in the
previous quarter. As it turned out, booking revenues before products were shipped
was only one of the fraudulent accounting practices used at Buffalo Chips to
deceive its auditors and investors.
In 1979, Buffalo Chips was a small Silicon Valley startup with a promising patent
for semiconductor chips but had burned through its venture capital without
bringing a product to market. Soon after Jim Johnson, a former engineer with
defense and electronic-component firms, took over the company for no salary but
20 percent of the stock, the company became cash positive and had sales of nearly
$2 million. Jim soon acquired the rest of the company. Mel Leeds was brought
aboard in the accounting department and quickly became CFO. Johnson and
Leeds had different personalities but shared a taste for expensive homes, cars and
golf clubs.

Johnson had built up sales in specialty resistors and capacitors assembled on silicon
chips by trading on his old connections in defense and electronics. Now he was
successful in winning contracts to supply components to major American
companies. Production capacity was increased by taking the company public and
purchasing a microchip manufacturing facility from another producer. By 1987,
revenues topped $30 million and 215 people were on the payroll. As the company
grew, management was under relentless pressure from analysts to expand the P/E
multiple and raise the stock price with a string of quarterly earnings increases.
Johnson was an overbearing manager insisting on making decisions down to the
level of $25 purchases of office equipment. The turnover of senior management was
high with the result that the average level of executive experience declined. As
early as 1987, product ordered for subsequent quarters was being shipped to meet
current revenue objectives. Phony packing documents were created and product
was stored onsite in empty offices and offsite in garages and elsewhere. The
external auditors forced the company to restate 1989 earnings to correct “revenue
and expense cutoff errors” and recommended Leeds be fired. Johnson kept him on,
however, but changed his title and some of his responsibilities, then raised his
salary. In 1992, a new president tried to correct the situation but without success.
He resigned after five months. The new CFO, Mario Innocente, who had been
unemployed for nearly a year before joining Buffalo, did not.
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Johnson told the executive in 1993 he wanted to see double-digit revenue growth
every quarter because he wanted to attract new capital from a prospective partner
and could raise another $40 million through a secondary offering if the stock price
rose from its current $11 to $20. In 1994, Banzai Alloys bought 10 percent of
Buffalo, promised an infusion of $24 million, and agreed to sell Buffalo’s products
overseas. The stock price jumped to $21.25 per share and the value of Johnson’s
holdings increased to $40 million. Leeds sold some of his holdings and netted more
than $500,000. In the meantime, company executives booked bogus sales to both
real and fictitious companies, treated product returns as sales, and produced false
financial reports to deceive auditors, bankers and their own board of directors.
False annual reports and 10-Q and 10-K filings were signed off and misleading
information was given to analysts.

Accounts receivable was now bursting with phony sales. To cover up, Innocente
prepared two accounts receivable reports, one for internal use and the other for the
board and investment bankers. The internal report showed that 51 percent of
receivables were actually current; the outside report showed 82.4 percent. Even
when a board member questioned the peculiar fact that receivables exceeded
quarterly revenues, he was fobbed off with the answer that the Asian distributors
had 180 days to pay and thus their receivable could be booked as current. He did
not know that Asian sales were booked to distributors who had an unconditional
right of return, that is, the products were, in effect, shipped on consignment. Cash
collections fell to 25 percent of the quarterly target.
With the books in such bad shape, a secondary offering was now out of the
question since the financial statements for the first nine months of fiscal 1994 could
not survive an audit. It was initially suggested that $3 million in uncollectable
receivables be written off but, toward the end of the fourth quarter, the amount had
ballooned to $8.3 million. In consultation with Leeds, the new CFO decided to
allocate the write-downs to product returns and bad debts. The writeoff would be
offset by recognizing revenues of $7 million from Banzai as nonproduct technology
sales.
When the figures were published, analysts became suspicious of the $8.3 million
and $7 million figures and began to ask questions about the accounting for
receivables. The stock price dropped to $13 from $22 in one day and several
shareholders filed lawsuits. A press release from the board of directors explained
the accounting irregularities and the stock continued its downward path to $6.
Johnson, Leeds, and Innocente departed and new auditors restated a $7.7-million
profit as a $16.6-million loss. Johnson and Leeds were indicted on the criminal
charges of fraud and insider trading and received sentences of 36 and 32 months
respectively and had to pay a fine of $100,000 each. Johnson had to surrender his
1.5 million shares of Buffalo Chips valued at about $2.5 million in restitution to
shareholders.

Conclusion and Analysis
How did this happen? First of all, the company was led by Jim Johnson, an
ambitious and overbearing CEO, who found a compliant CFO in Mel Leeds. This
proved to be a potent mix of personalities. Johnson had indeed shown great drive
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and competence in turning the struggling start-up company into a profitable
concern under his leadership. But as the company grew and went public in order to
expand, it came under the scrutiny of Wall Street analysts. Management was now
under pressure to meet analysts’ earnings expectations. It was also necessary to
keep revenues and earnings up in order to attract a new partner and raise additional
capital through a secondary offering. Unfortunately, real revenues and earnings
could not support these ambitions.
As revealed in court, the company concocted nearly a dozen revenue recognition
schemes. These included recording revenue on:

• Sales shipped in subsequent quarters
• Sales shipped before the customer agreed to accept delivery

• Sales shipped to customers without receiving an order. These sales were not
reversed when the goods were returned
• Shipments held at the freight forwarder or stored offsite, sometimes at the homes
of employees (Company shipping staff had deals with the forwarders to sign off
on the paperwork as if real deliveries had been made.)
• Sales shipped to fictitious customers
• Sales shipped to customers with unconditional rights of return, that is, goods
were shipped on consignment and recorded as sales
This scheme was concealed by the creation of a false accounts receivable report for
the board of directors and investment bankers. The bankers and the board were
deceived by the explanation that the high levels of receivables reflected large
shipments made at the end of a quarter. They were not told that some sales were to
customers with unconditional rights of return. After the whole scheme collapsed,
forensic auditors discovered that Buffalo Chips had recorded $38 million in phony
revenue.
The SEC later alleged the auditors had recklessly failed to comply with generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and had exercised improper professional
conduct in the audit of accounts receivable, inventory, and property. Accounts
receivable were overstated by $10.6 million or 162 percent; inventory was
overstated by $10.2 million or 197 percent; property was overstated by $3.0 million
or 40 percent. When restated, accounts receivable reduced net income by $9.7
million, inventory reduced net income by $9.3 million and property and
equipment reduced net income by $2.7 million. The SEC alleged that the auditors
had failed to exercise appropriate professional skepticism, obtain competent
evidential matter or properly supervise audit personnel. For example, the auditors
did not examine the writeoff of one-third of the accounts receivable balance, an act
that should have signaled to the auditors that a material misstatement was possible.
The SEC eventually brought Rule 102(e) proceedings against the engagement
partner and manager on Buffalo Chips’ 1994 audit.
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Datatronix Inc. Case Study
Datatronix is a multinational database software company with shares traded over
the counter. The company described itself in its press releases and advertising
literature as the fastest growing company in the database software industry. In
reality, the company was showing increased revenues and earnings by using a wide
range of fraudulent accounting practices to produce the numbers on its own
financial statements as well as those filed with the SEC. For the fiscal years 1994 to
1996 and for the first quarter of fiscal 1997, Datatronix salespeople, managers, and
others fraudulently inflated quarterly and annual revenues and earnings in violation
of GAAP. The violations included:

1. Backdating license sale agreements
2. Entering into side agreements granting rights to refunds and other concessions to
customers
3. Recognizing revenue on transactions with reseller customers that were not
creditworthy
4. Recognizing amounts due under software maintenance agreements as software
license revenues
5. Recognizing revenue on disputed claims against customers
Managers later explained that the frauds occurred when the performance numbers
failed to meet the internal revenue and earnings objectives which in turn had been
established in order to meet analysts’ forecasts. As the quarterly cutoff dates
approached, the sales department tried to close as many sales as possible to meet
the quarterly objectives. If license agreements could not be signed before the end of
the quarter, they were frequently signed later and backdated to the quarter in
violation of both GAAP for revenue recognition and written internal policy. This
practice was possible because of slack internal controls. Salespersons, the very
people under pressure to produce good revenue figures, were responsible for
overseeing the dating of signatures on agreements. In one known case, an
agreement was accepted a month after the end of the quarter.
Written and oral side agreements were also common means of juggling revenues
and earnings. The agreements had a wide variety of provisions:

1. Allowing resellers to return and to receive a refund or credit for unsold licenses
2. Committing the company to use its own sales force to find customers for
resellers
3. Offering to assign future end-user orders to resellers
4. Extending payment dates beyond twelve months

5. Committing the company to purchase computer hardware or services from
customers under terms that effectively refunded all or a substantial portion of the
license fees paid by the customer
6. Diverting the company’s own future service revenues to customers as a means of
refunding their license fees
7. Paying fictitious consulting or other fees to customers to be repaid to the
company as license fees
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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These side letters allowed the sales staff to “park” software licenses with resellers
and bring them into revenue without actually having sold anything to an end user,
indeed, without having even found an end user. The most notorious reseller
involved in this scheme was known as the “bank” and the “virtual warehouse.” This
reseller was, however, not very effective at moving Datatronix products.
Nevertheless, it entered into purchase agreements for $9.5 million in software
licenses in fiscal 1995 but sold only $2.8 million in that year. In the first half of
fiscal 1996, it entered into purchase agreements for an additional $5.9 million.
During the whole of 1996, it sold only $6.2 million of the remaining $6.7 million in
licenses purchased in 1995 and none of the $5.9 million in licenses purchased in the
first two quarters of 1996.

Datatronix created these sales through a series of side letters inducing this reseller to
enter into quarter-end purchase agreements. The Datatronix sales staff offered the
bait of allowing the reseller to book a sale they were negotiating with an end user.
The same arrangement with the same end user was offered to two other resellers.
The result allowed Datatronix to book the same end-user sale three times through
the three resellers.

Other side letters allowed resellers to cancel purchase agreements while Datatronix
continued to recognize the original sales as revenue. One agreement allowed a
reseller to cancel $6 million in licensing agreements in the third quarter of 1996.
This figure represented 14 percent of pretax income for that quarter. Another side
letter permitted a different reseller to cancel $6.4 million or 11 percent of pretax
income in the fourth quarter.
Additional GAAP violations occurred when service agreements were recognized as
license sales and taken fully into revenue in a single quarter instead of being taken
in ratably over the life of the contract. In the 1996 fourth quarter, three service
agreement renewals totaling $ 11.2 million or 25 percent of pretax income for the
period were treated as license sales and taken into revenue.
In the last quarter of 1995, Datatronix invoiced a customer for $5.4 million
claiming the customer had used more copies of Datatronix software than had been
permitted under its license agreement. Finance staff thought the claim would be
settled at a discount to the list price; the customer was told the $5.4 million could
be applied against future purchases. The claim was settled in the first quarter of
1996 for $3.8 million but Datatronix improperly recognized the claim as fourth
quarter 1995 revenue and increased pretax income for the period by 13 percent.
The remaining $1.8 million should have been written off in first-quarter 1996 but
was instead improperly characterized as an unbilled maintenance fee receivable
that was eventually written off over the last three quarters of fiscal 1996.

Revenue was recognized from end users with whom no contract had been signed
and from whom no formal acceptance had been received. Policies for recognizing
creditworthiness were disregarded and revenues were booked from
undercapitalized and new customers. Both these actions are in clear violation of the
GAAP that clearly states that “until persuasive evidence of the agreement exists and
an assessment of the customer’s creditworthiness has been made,” no revenues can
be recognized. Such improperly recognized revenues amounted to $3.3 million in
the 1996 first quarter, $9.1 million in the second, and $8.2 million in the third.
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At the end of the fourth quarter of fiscal 1996, Datatronix sold $9.2 million worth of
software to a computer manufacturer for resale installed on its computers.
Datatronix, however, failed to deliver the software code before the end of the fiscal
year. Early in fiscal 1997, Datatronix delivered a so-called “beta” version that did
not work on the purchaser’s hardware. Usable software was not, in fact, delivered
until more than half way through 1997. Revenue from the sale was improperly
recognized, however, in the fourth quarter of 1996 and increased pretax income for
the period by 13 percent.
In 1996, Datatronix decided to open so-called Megastores where it would team up
with hardware providers to sell hardware-software solutions. So-called
“partnerships” were formed with hardware providers whereby Datatronix would
buy computers for the stores while the hardware providers would buy licensing
agreements of equal or greater value than the hardware purchases. The hardware
purchasers were also asked to buy licenses for the software installed in the
demonstration computers in the Megastores. The hardware purchases and license
sales were in cash and structured so the hardware purchase would give the
providers cash flow at about the time the license agreement payments were due. All
these transactions were premised on the expectation that Datatronix would absorb
the costs of setting up new stores and that the Datatronix sales force would be
involved in selling the solution as the hardware providers’ salespeople were not
familiar with the Datatronix software. Because of the high cost of opening and
operating the Megastores, the costs of reselling licensing agreements were going to
be high for Datatronix. To cover these costs, Datatronix offered its sales force
higher commissions if sales were closed through the hardware providers rather than
by Datatronix. Objectives were established for end-user sales to be applied against
the hardware providers’ outstanding commitments.
Datatronix recognized revenue when the hardware providers agreed to the
purchase commitments even though Datatronix itself was paying the costs and
expenses of setting up and operating the Megastores and its own sales force was
going to do most of the reselling. This arrangement was in clear violation of the
GAAP that if “other vendor obligations remaining after delivery are significant,
revenue should not be recognized, because the earnings process is not substantially
complete.”

Datatronix committed these violations of GAAP and included this false information
in its interim and annual financial statements. Information was also omitted or
misrepresented in these statements and those filed with the SEC. As a result, the
company’s reports and filings were thus false and misleading.

At the end of March 1997, when the company announced a revenue shortfall, the
stock price dropped 34.5 percent to $9 29/32 from $15 1/8 and reduced the
Datatronix market capitalization to $1.5 billion from $2.3 billion. About two weeks
after this collapse, auditors began to hear about accounting irregularities in 1995
and 1996. Management realized that if the truth came out there would have to be a
restatement and they resisted further investigation by indulging in additional
fraudulent behavior for the purpose of limiting the scope of the audit. Over the
next few months, nevertheless, more of the story began to emerge and by early
September 1997, more than $100 million in various irregularities had been
identified on the previously issued financial statements. On the basis of these
revelations, amended 10-Ks and 10-Qs were filed with the SEC.
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In the face of the SEC’s intention to institute administrative proceedings against
Datatronix, the company submitted an Offer of Settlement which the SEC
accepted.

Conclusion and Analysis
The root of the problem seems to have been a lack of internal controls strong
enough to permit the preparation of financial statements within GAAP. The effect
of this lack of controls was magnified by an organizational structure that had
important financial people responsible for revenue recognition reporting directly to
sales personnel rather than to senior financial management. Salespeople under
pressure to produce revenues to support analysts’ forecasts were thus able to put
pressure on their immediate financial inferiors to recognize revenues not generated
in accordance with GAAP.

10.3.5 Improper Disclosures and Material Omissions
Accounting principles require that financial statements and notes include all information
necessary to ensure that the financial statements are not misleading. Although management
is responsible for disclosure of all material information, the auditor has a responsibility to
ensure that management meets its disclosure obligations.
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 32, Adequacy ofDisclosure in Financial Statements
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 431), provides general information about
informative disclosures. If an auditor believes management’s disclosures are inadequate,
appropriate disclosures must be made in the auditor’s report, as provided by Statement of
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements, (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 508), as amended.

Improper disclosures usually result from the failure to disclose or inadequate disclosure of
the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Liability omissions
Significant events
Related-party transactions
Changes in accounting principle

Liability Omissions
GAAP requires the disclosure of all material liabilities. Typical omissions include the
failure to disclose loan covenants or contingent liabilities, such as pending lawsuits. Under
FASB Statement No. 5, contingent liabilities must be disclosed if they are reasonably
probable and capable of estimation.

Significant Events
Examples of significant events include the introduction of new products and technology, as
well as the obsolescence of existing products in inventory. Under GAAP, any significant
event that could have a material effect on the financial statements must be disclosed.
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Related-Party Transactions
Related-party transactions are transactions made with entities that are controlled by the
company or have control over the company and may include other businesses, vendors,
customers, creditors, or shareholders. Although management is responsible for the
disclosure of related-party transactions, the auditor has a specific responsibility to
understand the client’s business including its relationships with related parties, to evaluate
whether management’s disclosures are appropriate. FASB Statement No. 57, Related Party
Transactions, sets forth the disclosure requirements for related-party transactions and
provides guidance for the identification and evaluation of such transactions.39 In the
aftermath of Enron, Tyco, and Adelphia, related-party disclosures will receive increased
scrutiny.

Significant Accounting Changes
To ensure that financial statements are comparable from one period to the next, any
changes to an issuer’s accounting policies or procedures must be disclosed. APB Opinion
No. 20 describes three significant accounting changes that must be disclosed:

1. Estimates, such as useful lives used to calculate depreciation, bad debt expense,
amortization estimates, warranty liability, and earned revenue estimates
2. Accounting principles, such as depreciation, capitalization, or tax methods
3. The accounting entity resulting from mergers, acquisitions, and spinoffs

10.3.6 Special Purpose Entities: The Enron Case
The dramatic collapse of Enron Corp. in October 2001 has brought to light the potential
for fraud in “off-balance-sheet” financing vehicles known as special purpose entities or SPEs.
Enron investors were deceived because some SPEs were not consolidated even after they
had ceased to qualify for off-balance-sheet treatment. Employees connected to the
management of the SPEs improperly received nearly $50 million in total from partnerships
designed not to meet some legitimate economic objective or to transfer risk but to create
financial statements for Enron that would be viewed favorably by Wall Street analysts and
the rating agencies and thus support the stock price and lower financing costs. Some
transactions were even designed in such a way that GAAP rules that would have permitted
keeping assets and debt off the balance sheet but were broken in order to create other
illusions of financial health. In the end, the autopsy on the bankrupt showed it had died of
poorly thought-out solutions, self-interested employees, inadequate controls, and poor
oversight of a business model that tried to push the envelope.

The SPE is a financing method that has been around since the 1980s and is widely used
especially in the energy and financial services industries, yet has received no official
definition beyond the recognition that it is a class of asset whose members have a number
of things in common. In fact, it really does not meet the definition of a business at all in

39 Beyond the disclosure issues, related-party transactions may also trigger revenue recognition problems. For
example, at Leamout & Hauspie, the Belgian maker of speech recognition software, an internal audit
revealed that about a quarter of the company’s revenues was comprised of revenue recorded from about 30
start-up customers funded with seed money from a venture capital firm linked to the company’s founders.
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that it is not self-sustaining with a revenue source of its own. An SPE has no independent
management or employees; a trustee usually performs the administrative functions required
by its creators and primary beneficiaries. It usually takes the legal form of a business trust
but can be a limited partnership or even a corporation.

The company that creates the SPE can treat it as an independent external entity for
accounting purposes only if an outside investor owns a minimum 3 percent of the equity
(the FASB has now changed this to 10 percent) and exercises control. Control here is,
obviously, not defined by majority equity ownership but by rights stated in the covenant
somewhat on the model of control rights in partnerships. The rest of the capital comes from
debt. The company records gains and losses in transactions with the SPE on its income
statement but the SPE’s assets and liabilities are not entered on its balance sheet.
As its name indicates, an SPE is set up for some special purpose laid out in its trust
agreement, charter or articles of formation. This purpose is usually to finance specific assets
transferred to the SPE such as trade receivables, loans or securities against which the SPE
issues debt. The creator of the SPE thus gains access to low-cost funds because the lenders’
risk is limited by the narrowly defined activities set forth in the trust agreement and the fact
that the SPE cannot take on any additional debt. For example, an SPE could be the lessor
of a pulp mill through a so-called “synthetic lease” that provides the lessee with tax
advantages not available through a conventional mortgage loan.

The unconsolidated SPE is in a certain sense an accounting anomaly. It seems to stand
against the long-standing and intuitive presumption that consolidated statements provide a
more accurate picture of the company’s overall financial condition.

The Incredible Collapse of Enron Case Study
How Enron abused these features of the SPE is laid out in the Report of Investigation
by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.
commissioned by the Enron board and headed by William Powers, Jr., dean of the
University of Texas Law School. The committee’s mandate was not to investigate
all the causes of Enron bankruptcy but simply to address “transactions between
Enron and investment partnerships created and managed by Andrew S. Fastow,
Enron’s former Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, and by other
Enron employees who worked with Fastow.” In practice, this meant investigating
the causes of the $544-million after-tax charge and a $1.2-billion reduction in
shareholders’ equity in the third quarter of 2001 related to one of the partnerships.
The inquiry then broadened to include the two dozen or so transactions between
Enron and other partnerships. The result is an unprecedented look at SPEs, and
their use and abuse.

Enron was a product not just of the merger of two gas pipeline companies in the
late 1980s but also of the deregulation of gas and electricity prices carried out
during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Sr. Enron grew by
buying an energy asset such as a pipeline or power plant around which it built a
wholesale or retail business. Deregulation allowed Enron to start packaging this
energy into contracts and trading them like commodities contracts in the futures
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market. The promises to deliver in the future at prices fixed in the past were then
hedged with derivatives. As Enron grew throughout the 1990s, the range of its
commoditized products expanded to include bandwidth on optical fiber networks,
newsprint, and many others. By 1998, some 60 percent of its earnings were from
businesses in which Enron had not been engaged 10 years earlier and some 30 to
40 percent from businesses entered into within the previous five years. The strategy
seemed to be working since $10,000 invested in Enron stock at the end of 1995 was
worth more than $47,000 by the end of 2000.
Since Enron saw itself as a long-term investor, it made large capital investments in
the full realization that earnings and cash flow would not be significant in the short
term. New borrowings to produce this growth would put pressure on Enron’s
already debt-heavy balance sheet that would affect credit ratings and on the cash
flow needed for debt servicing. Reduction of its ratings below investment grade
would punish its expanding energy trading business. Common-share equity
financing at a time when newly acquired businesses were showing only slow
earnings growth would result in significant dilution and downward pressure on the
P/E multiple.

To escape these constraints yet keep growing, Enron management turned to joint
ventures and SPEs in the early 1990s to keep the negative elements off its balance
sheet while taking on risks expected to provide significant rewards. With the
passage of time, Enron also created partnerships designed to hedge against its socalled “merchant investments,” i.e., equity investments in public or private
companies, debt, loans, or interests in limited partnerships.
Almost from the outset, Enron’s SPEs failed to comply with the 3-percent and
control criteria for nonconsolidation. In 1993, Enron formed a joint venture
partnership with the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS)
called Joint Energy Development Investment Limited Partnership (JEDI) in which
Enron was the general partner contributing $250 million in Enron stock, and
CalPERS was the limited partner contributing $250 million in cash. Because Enron
owned a 50 percent interest, it did not have to consolidate JEDI. Gains and losses
were recorded on the income statement and in the footnotes, but JEDI’s debt did
not appear on Enron’s balance sheet.
When Enron wanted to form a $1-billion partnership with CalPERS in 1997 to be
called JEDI II, Enron offered to buy out CalPERS interest in JEDI in the belief that
CalPERS would not want to be invested in both JEDIs simultaneously.
Nevertheless, Enron wanted to keep JEDI as an unconsolidated entity despite the
fact it no longer had a joint partner. To accomplish this, a new limited partner had
to be found. A limited liability company called Chewco Investments (another Star
Wars name derived, this time, from Chewbacca) was formed to take over the now
$383-million CalPERS interest. Michael Kopper, an Enron employee reporting to
the CFO, controlled Chewco through intermediary companies. The $383 million
was redeemed with bank loans guaranteed by Enron. Since no outside party had
taken an equity interest or control, Chewco should have been consolidated at this
time.
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Through a subsequent conversion to a limited partnership and labyrinthine
financial arrangements, Enron tried to give Chewco the appearance of an
unconsolidated SPE without actually finding any outside equity investors to put up
the required 3 percent. Since Chewco failed both the third-party-equity and the
control tests for nonconsolidation and JEDI’s unconsolidated status depended on
Chewco’s independence, JEDI should also have been consolidated from the time of
the breakup of the Enron-CalPERS joint venture.

Two other partnerships, IJM1 and IJM2, were set up for the purpose of
transferring risk away from Enron through hedging transactions. The IJM
partnerships were set up with Enron CFO Andrew Fastow as manager and investor
along with other Enron employees. Enron entered into more than 20 different
transactions with these two entities which resulted in the recognition of significant
income for Enron and the displacement of significant losses onto the books of the
partnership. Once again, questions arise concerning whether these entities met the
criteria for nonconsolidation.

The purpose of LMJ1 (to restrict our discussion to just one of these entities) was to
hedge Enron’s investment in Rhythms NetConnections, Inc., a privately held
Internet service provider. Enron purchased 5.4 million shares at $1.85 per share for
a total investment of $10 million in 1998. Rhythms went public in April 1999 at
$21 and closed at $69 at the end of the first trading day. By May, the stock had
settled back to about $55 per share and Enron’s investment was worth
approximately $300 million but could not be sold until the end of 1999 because of
a lock-up agreement. Since sale of the stock was forbidden and gains and losses in
market value were reflected on Enron’s income statement, Enron wanted to protect
its enormous profits with a hedge. A conventional hedge through a dealer was out
of the question, however, since Enron’s holding was large and illiquid.
At the same time, the gain in market value of Enron stock had increased the value
of forward contracts made through an investment bank to hedge future dilution
from its own stock options obligations to its executives. LMJ1 was created to make
use of the so-called “embedded” appreciated value of the Enron stock in the
forward contracts transferred from Enron to “hedge” the Rhythms holding. The
arrangement was flawed by the fact that Enron was attempting to hedge its Rhythm
holdings with its own stock when both were at risk of decline. The essence of a
hedge is that the price changes of the two assets must be inverse and that a
counterparty assumes the opposite risk and will pay (or receive) the difference on
closing out the position. Rhythms ultimately went bankrupt with enormous as-yetuncalculated losses which Enron kept off its income statement at the time. There
never was any true third party with a three percent equity position in control of
LMJ1.

Conclusion and Analysis
The full story of Enron’s involvement in these and other SPEs has yet to be told.
Nevertheless, the Powers report, Congressional hearings, and media investigations
show patterns of noncompliance not only with GAAP but also with Enron’s own
internal code of conduct. Once again, as we have seen in previous sections of this
chapter, management took the definition of “performance” to mean meeting Wall
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Street expectations. Support the stock price at all costs! Impatience with slow cash
flow and earnings growth in the face of the profitable strategies possible for those
willing to take the risks in the new world of deregulated energy prices necessitated
continuous new financing. The SPE was an obvious alternative as a source of cheap
capital for an aggressive company. Unfortunately, when no third-party equity
investors were willing to put up the required 3 percent and take control, Enron
chose to force the issue and assert its will in a murky area of GAAP interpretation.
Fuzzy notions of what constitutes a third party, control, and even equity permitted
audacious self-serving managers to exploit the SPE for themselves as well as for
Enron.

The role of the auditor in preventing and detecting SPE fraud is difficult to define
since the very purpose of the SPE is to keep certain information from being
recorded in published financial statements. Given the lack of definition of many
issues, the auditor must be prepared to interpret the purpose of accounting practices
associated with SPEs and defend that interpretation. The Enron case has revealed
the need for greater definition not only of the accounting issues involved but of the
related corporate governance issues as well. The auditor should, however, be able
to recognize that equity participation by employees of the beneficiary company is
suspect on the grounds of both third-party definition and compliance with internal
codes of conduct. The presence of hybrid concepts such as equity loans must also be
suspect as possible fudges to give the appearance of compliance with GAAP. Socalled management fees for no obvious work or out of all proportion to normal
billing levels plus returns on investment beyond anything possible given the
economic behavior of the entity should all draw the auditor’s attention to corporate
accounting practices.

10.3.7 Methods to Conceal Financial Statement Fraud From Auditors
Financial statement fraud may be detected through the internal audit function or through
substantive testing performed by independent auditors. But on occasion, the fraud may go
undetected for years. This may result from audit failure or from intentional efforts by
management to conceal the fraud from its independent accountants. (Audit failures are
discussed in Section 10.6, entitled “Audit Deficiencies and Audit Failures,” below.) The
following examples illustrate instances in which financial improprieties were not detected
because of corporate misconduct, as opposed to audit failure.

In the case of Kurzweil Applied Intelligence, discussed above, senior executives directed
subordinates to falsify books and records; to hide, shred, or destroy key documents; forge
customers’ signatures on audit confirmation letters; and transfer goods improperly held at
the off-site warehouse to even more remote locations to avoid detection.
In the matter of Structural Dynamics, the company stored more than $30 million in
product in a warehouse at the Cincinnati airport in order to avoid suspicion by its
independent auditors. Much of this product represented bogus revenues recorded for sales
to distributors in the company’s Far East operations.
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In the MiniScribe case, the company created fictitious inventory in transit, transferred
nonexistent United States inventory from books in the United States to the books of its Far
East subsidiaries, shipped boxes of bricks labeled as disk drives to distributors, repackaged
accumulated scrap previously written off and counted it again as inventory. They also
received raw materials into inventory without recording the accounts payable liability. To
conceal the inventory shortfall, employees broke into auditors’ trunks to obtain copies of
inventory items test-counted by the auditors in order to inflate other high-value inventory
items not sampled by the auditors.
In the Sensormatic matter, the company turned back the computer clock that dated and
recorded shipments in order to prematurely recognize revenue on shipments made past the
end of the quarter. When shipping documents were inspected by the auditors, the ship date
appeared to be before the quarter-end, when in fact, shipment occurred after the quarter
had closed.

In the matter of Sahlen & Associates, the company supplied its auditors with customer
addresses that were, in reality, post office boxes opened by the Company’s employees.
After the accounts receivable confirmations were sent out, the employees flew around the
country to the customer destination, forged the customer signature on the audit
confirmations, and locally mailed the forged confirmation back to the auditors without
exception.

By being alert to the types of methods previously employed to conceal accounting
irregularities, accountants and independent auditors may design appropriate procedures to
avoid being duped by such chicanery.
10.4 Predictors of Financial Statement Fraud

Faced with the apparent pervasiveness of earnings and balance-sheet falsification, the
problem for the auditor is to find any warning signs suggesting the risk of fraud may be
present. A number of recent studies (to be discussed in more detail below) have suggested a
group of indicators which, when taken together, give the generic profile of a company at
risk of fraud.40
The most typical fraud company is not listed on any of the major public stock exchanges. It
has assets below $100 million and is experiencing losses, barely breaking even or reporting
a small profit. The trend of net income is not an indicator since fraud can be committed to
hide losses or preserve profits. Internal audit controls are weak or nonexistent. This can be
attributed in part to the total absence of an audit committee or the presence of a weak one
made up of financially unsophisticated directors meeting as infrequently as only once a
year. More than 50 percent of the board of directors are insiders or “gray” directors, i.e.,
members with a large equity ownership or family, business, or other connections to the
company or its board members. Few directors are on the boards of other companies and
therefore the level of general business experience on the fraud company’s board is often
quite low. Officers frequently hold incompatible positions such as CEO and CFO
simultaneously. Finally, there usually is a change of auditor for the fraud period.

40 This portrait is drawn from Dechow and Skinner, and Levitt and COSO cited above, and important reports
by the NYSE/NASD to be cited and discussed in Section 10.4.2, entitled “Qualitative Predictors, below.
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10.4.1 Quantitative Predictors
Messod D. Beneish, an associate professor at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana
University, has tried to develop quantitative fraud warning signs by analyzing a series of
ratios which might be used as predictors when seen as a pattern of irregularity on the books
of a given company.41 This model would distinguish manipulated from unmanipulated
earnings within the definition of earnings manipulation as a violation of GAAP. Beneish
studied 74 companies identified as earnings manipulators by the SEC or the media for the
period 1982 through 1992.

Characteristics of Sample and Control Companies
The typical manipulator of Beneish’s study was a young, rapidly growing manufacturing
company. As a group, they were smaller in terms of assets or sales, less profitable, more
leveraged, and growing faster than Beneish’s control (presumably nonmanipulating)
companies but with similar market capitalizations. Companies with poor prospects were
more likely to commit financial statement fraud. Earnings manipulation typically occurred
by recording fictitious revenues or inventory, unearned or uncertain revenues or
capitalizing costs improperly.
Table 10.1

Characteristics of Sample and Control Companies Fiscal Year Prior
to Public Disclosure (1982-1992)
Manipulators

Nonmanipulators

Mean

Median

Mean

$467.33

$43.20

$1,140.37

$ 95.84

Sales

469.87

53.56

1,295.22

122.54

Market Value

323.72

74.90

813.35

64.59

Working Capital to Total Assets

0.26

0.28

0.30

0.31

Current Ratio

2.54

1.83

2.54

2.11

Total Debt to Total Assets

0.58

0.58

0.51

0.52

-1%

3%

3%

5%

58

34

13

9

Characteristics

Median

Size (Millions)

Total Assets

Liquidity/Leverage

Profitability/Growth
Return on Assets
Sales Growth

41 Messod D. Beneish, “The Detection of Earnings Manipulation,” Financial AnalystsJournal (24) September/
October 1999, pages 24-36.
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Ratio and Index Analysis
Beneish identified a group of financial statement variables that capture actual earnings
manipulation or indicate the potential for manipulation. Of that group, the following
sections describe the characteristic measures that generate statistically meaningful results.

Days' Sales in Receivables Index
The days’ sales in receivables index (DSRI) shows the year-over-year comparison of the
annual receivables/sales ratio taken as a ratio. This ratio, like all the other ratios in this
study, should be 1:1. If receivables are beginning to become large in relation to sales,
fraudulent sales practices may be in place. After allowing for external factors such as a
more liberal credit policy that could have resulted in increased sales, an exceptionally large
increase in receivables relative to sales might suggest revenue manipulation.

Gross Margin Index
The gross margin index (GMI) shows the year-over-year comparison of gross margins
taken as a ratio. If the GMI is greater than 1, gross margins have weakened. Since the yearover-year deterioration of the gross margin is one of the most important signals of
worsening prospects for the company, a GMI of greater than 1 is a red flag that financial
statement manipulation may be about to occur.
Asset Quality Index
The asset quality index (AQI) shows the ratio of noncurrent assets exclusive of property,
plant, and equipment to total assets in any given year. This ratio measures the proportion
of assets whose power to produce future earnings is less certain. The higher the proportion
of these intangibles to total assets, the greater the risk to future earnings growth. The AQI is
the year-over-year comparison of these annual figures taken as a ratio. An AQI greater than
1 indicates that more costs are being capitalized and thus deferred, and the door has been
left open to earnings manipulation.
Sales Growth Index
The sales growth index (SGI) shows the year-over-year comparison of sales taken as a ratio.
Mere sales growth does not necessarily imply manipulation. But when a young growth
company is under pressure from analysts, underwriters, and banks to show continuing sales
increases to support the stock price, the possibility of manipulation is definitely present.
Any dramatic increase in the SGI should alert the auditor to possible problems.

Total Accruals to Total Assets
The total accruals to total assets (TATA) shows the year-over-year comparison of total
accruals and total assets taken as a ratio with total accruals defined as the change in
working capital accounts other than cash less depreciation. The presence of higher accruals,
that is, less cash, is likely to be associated with earnings manipulation.

Look for the Pattern
Because of the interconnectedness of income and balance-sheet accounts, no single ratio
should be taken in isolation as an indicator of manipulation. It is the pattern that counts,
both among the accounts of one reporting period and over several periods. The broader
the pattern, the greater the likelihood of earnings manipulation. But care should be taken
that unusual ratios cannot be accounted for by acquisitions, shifts in strategy, or changes
such as improving economic conditions and other normal business events.
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Table 10.2

Means Analysis of Manipulators and nonmanipulators in the
Estimation Sample

Characteristic
Measures

Manipulators
Mean

Nonmanipulators
Mean

Difference

Manipulators
Percentage
Increase over
Nonmanipulators

DSRI

1.465

1.031

0.434

42.1%

GMI

1.193

1.014

0.179

17.7%

AQI

1.254

1.039

0.215

20.7%

SGI

1.607

1.134

0.473

41.7%

TATA

0.031

0.018

0.013

72.2%

The findings indicate that manipulators exhibit certain financial-statement characteristics
that are detectable and different from nonmanipulators. The year-over-year change in days’
sales in receivables, for example, was about 3 percent for nonmanipulators but over 46
percent for manipulators. Manipulators showed an increase of about 42 percent in days’
sales in receivables in sales over the average change for the nonmanipulator peer group.
The other indices demonstrate similar though smaller increases for manipulators over
nonmanipulators. The total accruals-to-total-assets measure, however, was markedly
different between the two groups. The TATA measure, which reflects noncash working
capital to total assets, probably picked up the increases in receivables that typically
accompany revenue manipulation.

These characteristic measures provide a quick and easy means of detecting the possibility
of financial statement fraud. They are indicators and do not of themselves prove fraud.
Auditors, however, desiring to implement SAS No. 82, Consideration ofFraud in a
Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 230, 312, and
316),42 may want to include these characteristic measures in their financial statement
analyses. Also, as an internal control, an internal auditor or controller could apply these
measures when reviewing financial information from subsidiaries and divisions. An
increase in any of the characteristic measures in the magnitude indicated in the above
table should trigger additional inquiries. Such inquiries may very well head off an
incipient fraudulent scheme.

10.4.2 Qualitative Predictors
Internal Work Environment and Corporate Governance
The board of directors is a group of persons elected by the shareholders to represent them
at the highest level of corporate decision making and to monitor the work of management.
A report published in 1999 for the NYSE and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees (BRC) states explicitly that “the board must perform active
42 Chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,” of this Handbook discusses the auditor’s duty to detect fraud in
detail.
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

57

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

and independent oversight to be, as the law requires, a fiduciary for those who invest in the
company.”43 The board must be committed to the principles of transparency and full
disclosure and, one might add, to full compliance with GAAP and the regulations of the
appropriate regulatory bodies. If the board understands its independent role, then it is
likely the audit committee, a creature of the board, will also do its duty. Companies proven
to be earnings manipulators tend to be those with no audit committee or a very weak and
compromised one. About a quarter of all companies subject to SEC enforcement action did
not have audit committees.

The report sees the role of the audit committee as follows:
The committee’s job is clearly one of oversight and monitoring, and in carrying out
this job it acts in reliance on senior financial management and the outside auditors.
A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups
responsible for financial reporting—the full board including the audit committee,
financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors—
form a “three-legged stool” that supports responsible financial disclosure and active
and participatory oversight.

Characteristics of a Good Audit Committee
The BRC made numerous recommendations for the effective working of a good audit
committee. Despite the fact that the BRC’s mandate was to make recommendations for the
conduct of audit committees of companies big enough to be listed on the NYSE or
NASDAQ, many of the principles would apply equally well to smaller, private companies.
The foundation of a good audit committee is the independence of its members. Recent
studies have shown a direct correlation between audit committee independence and better
oversight resulting in a lower incidence of financial statement fraud. The BRC defines
independence as follows:
Members of the audit committee shall be considered independent if they have no
relationship to the corporation that may interfere with the exercise of their
independence from management and the corporation. Examples of such
relationships include:
A director being employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the
current year or any of the past five years;
• A director accepting any compensation from the corporation or any of its
affiliates other than compensation for board service or benefits under a taxqualified retirement plan;
• A director being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or
has been in any of the past five years, employed by the corporation or any of its
affiliates as an executive officer;
• A director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or to which the
corporation made, or from which the corporation received, payments that are or
have been significant to the corporation or business organization in any of the
past five years;

•

•

A director being employed as an executive of another company where any of
the corporation’s executives serves on that company’s compensation committee.

43 Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 1999. Available
at http://www.nyse.com/ and http://www.nasdaqnews.com/.
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Building on this foundation of independence, the BRC recommends that for listed
companies with capitalization in excess of $200 million, the audit committee should be
composed of a minimum of three financially literate and entirely independent directors.
The audit committee should have a charter approved by the full board describing its
structure and responsibilities. The outside auditor should be accountable to the whole
board of directors. The audit committee should be responsible for the selection of the
outside auditors. The audit committee should have a formal written statement from the
outside auditor describing all relationships between itself and the company. The audit
committee should discuss with the outside auditor all aspects of the effectiveness or lack
thereof of the company’s accounting practices. Where the board of directors is weak and
the audit committee is weak or nonexistent, internal controls are likely to be deficient or
lacking altogether.

COSO
The COSO Report also sought to identify and examine company and management
characteristics in corporations involved in financial statement fraud.44 The Committee
examined about 200 cases (average assets of $533 million but median assets of only $16
million) from which it drew a number of generalized conclusions about the governance of
fraud companies.
The presence and efficient functioning of internal controls are central to limiting the
opportunities for fraud. Unfortunately, the small size of many companies makes them
unable or unwilling to spend the money for proper controls or to pay for better trained and
more experienced senior executives. These smaller companies are also unlikely to have
strong audit committees capable of monitoring the nebulous but important matter of
pressure on senior executives to report aggressively to meet investment community
expectations or the numbers required to trigger bonuses. The CEO or CFO was involved
in 83 percent of the reported fraud cases.

A strong audit committee is an essential element in fraud prevention. Among the fraud
companies surveyed, 25 percent had no audit committee and among those that did, 65
percent of the directors were not certified in accounting or had held no accounting or
financial positions. At the fraud companies, the committee usually met only once a year. (A
pliable, inexperienced, and inattentive board is often the creation of a domineering CEO.
Given the fact that in 83 percent of the reported fraud cases the CEO or CFO was
involved, the combination of a weak board and aggressive leaders could be an indicator of
financial statement fraud.)
The COSO Report confirmed the findings of the BRC mentioned above concerning the
need for an independent board of directors. At the fraud companies, about 60 percent of
the board members were insiders or “gray” directors, i.e., outsiders with some family,
business, equity, or other tie to the company or its management. About 40 percent of the
boards had no directors serving on the boards of other companies. Directors and officers
owned about one-third of the companies’ stock while the CEO/president owned about 17
percent. In about 40 percent of the companies, there were family relationships among the
directors and/or officers. About 20 percent showed officers holding incompatible positions
such as CEO and CFO.
44 http://www.coso.org/main.htm
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Since the average fraud period was 23.7 months and often started with the misstatement of
interim statements, it is important to review the controls surrounding quarterly statement
preparation. Because misstatements of accounts often occur near the period ends, internal
controls governing the transaction cutoff and asset valuation should be tested.

The Boeing Company adopted recommendations from a previous COSO Report entitled
Internal Control—Integrated Framework and came up with a list of criteria for an unsatisfactory
rating.45 These criteria are the following:

1. Control environment criteria are:
• Hard controls are missing or inadequate.
• There are verified instances of breakdowns or soft controls.
2. Risk assessment criteria are the following:
• Management has not predefined relevant objectives.

3.

4.

5.

6.

• Such objectives are incompatible with broader objectives.
• Management has not identified risks relevant to achieving its objectives.
• Management does not have a basis for determining which risks are most critical.
• Management has not ensured the mitigation of critical operating risks.
• Audit tests detect key risks not previously contemplated by management.
Control activities criteria are the following:
• Key control activities are not functioning as intended.
• Management’s risk mitigation strategy is not adequately reflected within control
activities.
Information and communication criteria are the following:
• Key metrics are not identified, collected, and communicated.
• Employees’ misunderstanding of their control responsibilities is pervasive.
• Customer or supplier complaints and disputes are not resolved or remedial action is
not undertaken in a timely manner.
Monitoring criteria address whether or not management has established a means of
determining the quality of the internal control system over time either through
independent evaluations or ongoing, structured, and independent process checks.
Overall, the ratings of all components should be considered to determine whether
controls provide reasonable assurance that management objectives will be achieved.
Strength in the internal controls of one component may compensate for a control
weakness in another.

10.4.3 A New Fraud Profile (1997-2002)?
The aftermath of the longest bull market in history has revealed that financial statement
management at companies many times larger than the median $16-million company of the

45 Dennis Applegate and Ted Wills, “Struggling to Incorporate the COSO Recommendations into Your Audit
Process? Here’s One Audit Shop’s Winning Strategy,” Internal Auditor, The Institute of Internal Auditors:
December 1999. http://www.coso.org/Articles/audit_shop.htm
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COSO Report. Whether these multibillion-dollar frauds point the way to a new era of
larger and bolder financial statement scandals remains to be seen. The Great Crash of
1929, the end of the Go-Go market of the late 1960s, and the collapse of stock prices in
October 1987 also brought enormous scandals to light. These scandals proved to be the
exception rather than the rule, however, and were not indicators of things to come.

Table 10.3 lists 13 of the major investigations and financial restatements of the past two
years, together with the nature, period, and amount of the estimated or actual restatement.
Table 10.3 Major Investigations and Financial Restatements
Company

Nature of Investigation or Restatement

Restatement
Period

Adelphia
Communications

Under investigation for questionable accounting
practices and related-party transactions

To be
determined

To be
determined

America Online

Improperly capitalized advertising costs instead
of expensing in the period incurred; also may
have recorded $45 million in improper
payments from third parties in 2000-2002

1995-1996

$385 million

Cendant

Inflated annual income through the misuse of
reserves

1995-1997

$300 million

Dynegy

Investigation of “Project Alpha,” a complex
transaction that artificially inflated cash flow
from operations

2001

To be
determined

Enron

Corporate executives under investigation for
creating and approving transactions designed to
improperly keep billions of dollar in losses off
the books

1997-2000

$500 million

Microsoft

Used reserves, accruals, allowances, and
liability accounts to manage earnings

1995-1998

$200 million to
$900 million
per year

MicroStrategy

Restatement resulting from improper
recognition of software revenue in
contravention of SOP 97-2

1998-2000

$66 million

Qwest
Communications

Under investigation for improper recognition of
revenue on sales of fiber-optic capacity

TBD

$1.48 billion

Rite Aid

Overstated income through unsupported
journal entries and fraudulent credits for
damaged goods

1997-1999

$1.6 billion

Sunbeam

Used cookie-jar reserves, big-bath restructuring
charges, and channel stuffing to artificially
inflate revenue

1996-1998

$97 billion

Xerox

Improperly accelerated revenue from long-term
leases of copiers and other office equipment.

1997-2001

$6.4 billion

Waste Management

Improperly eliminated and deferred current
period expenses to inflate earnings

1992-1997

$1.7 billion

WorldCom

Restatement of $7.1 billion in improperly
capitalized operating expenses in 2001-2002;
possible overstatement of profits by $ 1 billion in
1999 and 2000 through the improper use of
reserves

2001-2002
1999-2000

$7.1 billion
$1 billion
estimated
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Although not all of these revelations have resulted in fraud charges, some important
differences from the COSO profile are evident. Deceptive financial statements occur today
in a much wider range of industries than technology, health care, and financial services.
Most interesting of all has been the discovery that many companies restating were actually
profitable. The deception was not perpetrated to cover up losses or a deteriorating break
even position; instead, management managed the financial statements to maintain the
appearance of continued growth in order to support the stock price.

10.5 Regulatory Responses to Financial Statement Fraud

10.5.1 SEC Initiatives and Staff Accounting Bulletins
Commission-Wide Initiatives
In the past four years, the SEC has adopted a number of initiatives to address the problem
of financial fraud and earnings management. Commission-wide initiatives to address
financial fraud include the formation of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (referred to above) set up in 1999 to develop
standards to improve audit committee effectiveness, the promulgation of new rules on audit
committee disclosure, the issuance of new rules governing auditor independence, CEO and
CFO certification of financial statements, and the issuance of accounting guidance in the
form of SABs.
The Rules on Audit Committee Disclosure
Following the BRC’s highly publicized report, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB)
implemented a number of its recommendations including new rules for audit committees.
The rules on audit committee disclosure, effective January 1, 2000, require that:

• Independent auditors review interim financial statements before they are filed on Form
10-Qwith the SEC.
• Issuers must include in their proxy statements certain disclosures under Item 302(a) of
Regulation S-K, which requires reconciliation and description of adjustments to
quarterly financial information.
• Issuers must disclose in their proxy statements whether the audit committee reviewed
and discussed with its auditors matters specified in the accounting literature, that is, SAS
No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 380), as amended, and Independence Standards Board Standard (ISBS) No. 1,
Independence Discussions with Audit Committees. These matters include proposed
adjustments, independence issues, the quality of financial statements such as any unusual
entries or adjustments, and the question of whether the numbers in the financial
statements reflect economic reality.

Interim auditor reviews began the first fiscal quarter ended after March 15, 2000. The other
new requirements went into effect on December 15, 2000. These rules are incorporated
into Section 10.5.2, “New Statements on Auditing Standards,” below.
Independence Rules
During 2001, the SEC adopted a series of rule amendments regarding auditor
independence. The amendments, effective February 5, 2001, provide guidelines for:
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1. Determining whether an auditor is independent in light of investments made by
auditors or their family members in audit clients
2. Employment relationships among auditors, their family members, and audit clients
3. The scope of services provided by audit firms to their audit clients. (Notably, the scope
of services provisions identify certain nonaudit services provided by an auditor to a
public audit client that would impair the auditor’s independence.)

CEO Certification ofFinancial Statements
On June 28, 2002, the Commission issued an order requiring the principal executive and
financial officers of 947 public companies to certify personally, under oath and for
publication, the completeness and accuracy of their most recent financial statements filed
with the SEC. Specifically, corporate officers must certify that covered reports do not
contain any untrue statements of material fact or omit to state material facts necessary to
make the statements in the covered report, under the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.

In a speech delivered to the National Press Club on July 22, 2002, Harvey Pitt, then the
chairman of the SEC, noted that the Division of Enforcement has already filed a record
122 actions for financial reporting and issuer disclosure violations in the first 10 months of
fiscal 2002, and further stated:
In just ten months, we’ve sought to throw unfit officers and directors out of
corporate boardrooms for good in 71 cases, with more on the way—already almost
twice the number we sought in 2000. As the President acknowledged in his Ten
Point Plan, corporate officers and directors, and especially the CEOs and CFOs,
must personally assume responsibility for compliance with our full disclosure laws.
The ouster of unfit officers and directors is a critical tool to ensure that officers and
directors “get it” that their mission is to safeguard the interests of shareholders. It is
also important to prevent any corporate wrongdoers from getting a second chance
to injure investors.

The chairman went on to say that “the heaviest hammer ... is criminal prosecution and
serious jail time.”

On July 30, 2002, the President signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which
imposes additional requirements on corporate officers. Section 906 of the Act, which is
effective immediately, requires periodic reports filed with the Commission to be
accompanied by a written certification by the CEO and CFO that the report fully complies
with Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and that “the
information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.” The Act imposes criminal
penalties of up to $1,000,000 or 10 years in jail for corporate officers who “willfully certify”
while knowing that the periodic reports do not comply with these requirements.
StaffAccounting Bulletins
Other significant Commission-wide initiatives include the issuance by the Office of the
Chief Accountant of Staff Accounting Bulletins (known as SABs) to provide guidance on
materiality, restructuring and impairment charges, revenue recognition, and loan loss
allowances. That guidance was issued in the form of SABs No. 99 Materiality, No. 100
Restructuring and Impairment Charges, No. 101 Revenue Recognition , and No. 102 Loan
Loss Allowance Methodology and Documentation Issues.
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

63

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Staff Accounting Bulletins
SAB No. 99, Materiality
SAB No. 99, published August 12, 1999, outlines the staff's concerns about the misuse of
materiality. SAB No. 99 does not change existing legal or accounting requirements, but
emphasizes that auditors should consider qualitative as well as quantitative benchmarks in
determining whether an item is material to the financial statements. By way of example, it
notes that the following considerations “may well render material a quantitatively small
misstatement of a financial statement item.” A material misstatement occurs if it:
• Arises not from an item capable of precise measurement, but rather from an estimate,
taking into account the degree of imprecision of the estimate.
• Masks a change in earnings or earnings trends.
• Hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations for the enterprise.
• Changes a loss into income or vice versa.
• Concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s business that has been identified
as playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations or profitability.

• Affects the registrant’s compliance with regulatory requirements.
• Affects the registrant’s compliance with loan covenants or other contractual
arrangements.
• Has the effect of increasing management’s compensation, e.g., by meeting income
targets necessary to trigger the award of bonuses or other incentive compensation.
• Involves the concealment of an unlawful transaction.
In these instances, a relatively small item (in quantitative terms) may be considered
material to the financial statements as a whole.46

SAB No. 99 also reminds auditors of their obligations under Section 10A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and existing auditing standards to inform management, in certain
circumstances, the audit committee, and in exceptional circumstances, the SEC, of illegal
acts detected in the course of an audit. Auditor obligations under Section 10A is discussed
in greater detail in Section 10.5.3, “Enforcement of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,” below.

SAB No. WO, Restructuring and Impairment Charges
SAB No. 100, published November 24, 1999, provides guidance on the accounting for and
disclosure of expenses and liabilities currently reported in connection with restructuring
activities and business combinations including detailed guidance on the reporting of exit
costs. It also provides guidelines for the recognition and disclosure of asset impairment
charges.

SAB No. W1, Revenue Recognition
SAB No. 101, published December 3, 1999, provides guidance on the recognition,
presentation, and disclosure of revenue in financial statements including criteria for
46 SAB No. 99 was quoted with approval by the Second Circuit in Gambino v. Citizens Utilities Company (228
F.3d 154).
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revenue recognition. It also includes guidance on recommended disclosures about revenue
recognition policies and the impact of events and trends on revenue. It covers a number of
specific situations where there is some room for judgment in interpreting GAAP. Although
the SAB does not create new GAAP, it is intended to narrow practice to a single preferred
approach.
Because SAB No. 101 addressed specific situations not directly addressed in the accounting
literature, the SEC gave issuers a grace period to comply with the SAB and permitted
issuers to adopt a change in accounting principle to reflect the changes.

Initially, the grace period was scheduled to end the first fiscal period after December 15,
1999 (first-quarter 2000 for most issuers), but many issuers requested additional time to
comply. In response, the SEC issued two amendments (SAB. No. 101A and No. 101B) that
delayed implementation until the fourth quarter of the fiscal year beginning after
December 15, 1999 (fourth quarter 2000 for most companies).
Despite these delays, SAB No. 101 had an impact. A Bear Steams study released the first
quarter after the reporting requirement went into effect, found that at least 32 issuers
changed the way they booked revenue as a result of the SAB and the SEC’s heightened
scrutiny of revenue recognition.
SAB No. 702, Loan Loss Allowance Methodology and Documentation Issues
SAB No. 102, published on July 6, 2001, provides guidance on the development,
documentation, and application of a systematic loan loss methodology. The Commission
previously issued guidance on this topic in December 1986 through Financial Reporting
Release No. 28, Accounting for Loan Losses by Registrants Engaged in Lending Activities.
SAB No. 102 applies to registrants who are creditors in loan transactions that, individually
or in the aggregate, have a material effect on the registrant’s financial statements.

SAB No. 102 covers the following topics:
• A summary of current loan loss allowance guidance under GAAP and Commission
rules and interpretations
• General factors or elements to consider in developing and documenting loan loss
allowance methodologies including in written policies and procedures
• Staff expectations for documenting loan impairment under FASB Statements No. 5 and
No. 114, Accounting by Creditors for the Impairment of a Loan
• Staff expectations related to summary documentation of the results of a systematic loan
loss allowance methodology

• General guidance on validating and documenting the validation of a systematic loan
loss allowance methodology.

Enforcement Initiatives
There have also been a number of important initiatives within the Division of Enforcement
to address the problem of financial statement fraud:
1. In the past four years, the staff has heightened its scrutiny of investigations involving
allegations of financial statement fraud. The staff has expanded its inquiries beyond the
more typical revenue recognition and inventory management cases, to more difficult
and controversial issues involving managed earnings, as in the W.R. Grace case; the
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application of technical accounting bulletins such as SOP 97-2, as in the MicroStrategy
case; and the accounting for complex off-balance sheet financing transactions, as in the
Enron investigation.
2. The Division changed the way it staffs accounting fraud investigations to investigate
more quickly and charge those responsible for such transgressions. Traditionally, the
Division staffed its accounting fraud cases with one staff attorney and one staff
accountant. The turnaround time from the commencement of the case to the
recommendation of charges ranged from an average of two to four years, depending on
the complexity of the case. In 1999, the Division realigned its resources and formed
SWAT teams consisting of two or three staff attorneys and one or two accountants to
enable the staff to ascertain liability and recommend enforcement action in three to six
months. The Livent case is an excellent example of the Commission’s success with this
approach.
3. The Division of Enforcement formed a special branch to focus exclusively on
accounting fraud cases. This new financial fraud SWAT team is headed by Paul Berger,
an associate director in Enforcement and Charles Niemeier, the division’s chief
accountant. This new group focuses on novel and complex financial fraud cases.
4. The Division of Enforcement has leveraged its resources through sweeps. Exactly one
year after former chairman Arthur Levitt’s September 1998 “Numbers Game” speech,
the division announced its first financial fraud sweep by charging 68 individuals and
entities with fraud and/or abuses of the financial reporting process. Just about one year
later, in September 2000, the SEC district office in San Francisco announced another
financial fraud sweep against six companies.
5. The Division has made increasing numbers of criminal referrals in cases involving
egregious misconduct. In August 2000, for example, the SEC and U.S .Attorney’s office
brought civil and criminal charges against former officers of Cendant Corporation and
CUC International. In a press release, Dick Walker, then Director of the Division of
Enforcement, was quoted as stating that the action makes it “crystal clear that the SEC
and U.S. Attorney have ZERO TOLERANCE for fraudulent financial reporting.” That
sentiment was clear in the Commission’s subsequent actions against officers of Sirena
Apparel, McKesson, and Informix. In Sirena Apparel, the SEC charged and the U.S.
Attorney indicted the CEO and CFO for directing employees to reset computer clocks
to backdate invoices. In McKesson, the SEC and U.S. Attorney charged the former
president and CFO for their involvement in a scheme to overstate earnings. In
Informix, the SEC and U.S. Attorney charged a former European sales executive who
issued side letters allowing customers to delay payment for software. Most recently, swift
SEC enforcement action and/or criminal indictments were brought against senior
executive officers of WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia. These criminal referrals convey
the message that financial fraud is a crime that carries both civil and criminal penalties.
6. The Division has also made a concerted effort to identify the individuals responsible for
false financial statements. This effort signifies a rejection of the “innocent soldier”
defense. To avoid delays, the Division may opt to settle with an issuer but continue its
investigation of individuals. The effort to identify individuals responsible for an issuer’s
false financials included increased scrutiny of gatekeepers, in particular, mid-level
accounting personnel and independent auditors who reviewed the false financials.
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7. The Division has used its powers under the Remedies Act more flexibly to encourage
cooperation and appropriately credit issuers and individuals who cooperated in the
staff’s investigations. That effort was formalized in October 2001 by Chairman Pitt in
the highly publicized Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21 (a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation
to Agency Enforcement Decisions. In the Cendant case, despite civil charges against
seven former officers and criminal charges against three, the SEC only charged the
company with violations of the periodic reporting, corporate recordkeeping, and
internal control provisions of the federal securities laws. There were no fraud charge
against Cendant, and in fashioning its order, the Commission specifically recognized
remedial acts promptly undertaken by Cendant as well as its cooperation with the
Commission and other authorities.
Likewise, the SEC filed a settled administrative action, with no fraud charge and no civil
penalties, against Waste Management, because of the company’s remedial action and
change in management. The outcome of Aurora Foods and Microsoft represent other
examples of the staff's commitment to reward early cooperation. By contrast, the staff's
imposition of a $10 million penalty against Xerox represents the consequences of a lack of
cooperation.

10.5.2 New Statements on Auditing Standards
In response to heightened concerns about earnings management, the Auditing Standards
Board (ASB) has issued two new Statements on Auditing Standards that affect the
relationship among the auditor, corporate management, and the audit committee. They are
SAS No. 89, Audit Adjustments (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 310, 333, and
380), which covers audit adjustments, and SAS No. 90, Audit Committee Communications
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 380 and 722), which relates to audit
committee communications.

SAS No. 89, Audit Adjustments
SAS No. 89, Audit Adjustments, governs engagement letters, management representation
letters, and audit committee communications. SAS No. 89 amends existing guidance under
SAS No. 85, Management Representations (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 333)
and AU Section 310, Appointment ofthe Independent Auditor (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 310), to add to the list of items typically included in the engagement letter a
new item relating to management responsibility for adjusting the financial statements to
correct material misstatements. In addition, management is required to affirm to the
auditor in the management representation letter that the effects of any uncorrected
misstatements aggregated by the auditor during the current engagement are immaterial,
both individually and in the aggregate, to the financial statements taken as a whole. In
making the assessment of materiality, the auditor is directed to consider not only
quantitative, but also qualitative materiality, consistent with the requirements of SAB No.
99. SAS No. 89 also amends SAS No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 380), to require the auditor to inform the audit
committee about uncorrected misstatements aggregated by the auditor during the current
audit that management determines to be immaterial, both individually and in the
aggregate.
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SAS No. 90, Audit Committee Communications
Given the auditor’s increased responsibility to report unadjusted differences to the audit
committee under SAS No. 89, the ASB issued SAS No. 90, Audit Committee Communications
to provide additional guidance on audit committee communications. SAS No. 90 further
amends SAS No. 61 to require that the auditor discuss with the audit committee and
corporate management the auditor’s judgments about the quality as well as the
acceptability of the reporting entity’s accounting principles as applied in its financial
reporting. The discussion should include items that have a significant impact on the
representational faithfulness, verifiability, and neutrality of the information included in the
financial statements. These should include but not limited to changes in accounting
policies, estimates, judgment and uncertainties, unusual transactions, and accounting
policies relating to significant financial statement items including the timing of transactions
and the period in which they were recorded.
SAS No. 90 also amends SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 722), to implement the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee. It requires auditors to discuss with audit committees:

1. The matters outlined in SAS No. 61 prior to filing quarterly financial information on
Form 10-Q
2. In performing SAS No. 71 limited review procedures, the issue of whether any of the
matters discussed in SAS No. 61 may bear on the financial statements.
Any matters identified should be communicated to the audit committee.

10.5.3 Enforcement of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934
Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires auditors to take certain actions
upon the discovery of an possible “illegal act.” This requirement is an affirmative obligation
that arises when, in the course of an audit, an auditor detects an illegal act—whether or not
the effect of that act is material to the financial statements as a whole. In other words,
materiality may not be avoided by offsetting improper revenue with other financial
statement items.
These requirements are spelled out in the accounting literature, specifically, in the SASs.
SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317), and
SAS No. 82, Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 110, 230, 312, and 316), require auditors to report evidence of
fraud to management, and if senior management is involved in the fraud, the auditor must
report to the audit committee.
Section 10A goes one step further. It provides that, after the auditor notifies the audit
committee, the auditor must make three determinations. First, the auditor must determine
whether the illegal act has a material effect on the issuer’s financial statements (quantitative
or qualitative). Second, the auditor must determine whether management has failed to take
appropriate remedial action. Third, the auditor must determine whether the failure to take
remedial action will require a departure from the auditor’s standard audit report.

Once all three determinations have been made, the auditor must notify the board of
directors “as soon as practicable.” That time period is not clearly defined, but it is clear that
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once the auditor notified the board of directors, the board has one business day to notify
the SEC Office of the Chief Accountant.
The board may provide a copy of the auditor’s report or a summary. If the auditor does not
receive a copy of that notice by the end of the next business day, the auditor must resign
from the engagement or provide the SEC a copy of its report. Resignation does not relieve
the auditor of its obligation to report to the SEC; it just buys one additional day since, upon
resignation, the auditor must submit its report to the Office of the Chief Accountant the
following business day.

This obligation of auditors to report to the SEC was included in Title III of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which is best known for heightening the
pleading standards for plaintiffs in securities class action litigation and added Section 10A
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The original intent of Section 10A was to provide
an incentive for management to take remedial action. But the number of financial fraud
cases in recent years, and the number of enforcement actions against auditors suggests that
the hammer of Section 10A was not enough.

Solucorp and Rosetti & Yonkers Section 10A Case Studies

On October 31, 1999, the SEC brought its first two cases against auditors for failing
to file Section 10A reports. Those cases were In the Matter of Solucorp and In the
Matter of Pat A. Rosetti and Jeffrey M. Yonkers. In the Solucorp matter, the SEC
charged a chartered accountant with the Canadian accounting firm McKay &
Partners for failing to take appropriate action upon the discovery of possible illegal
conduct during an audit of Solucorp’s financial statements, in violation of Section
10A. Specifically, the auditor failed to follow the procedures outlined in Section
10A, and required by GAAS, upon his review of a backdated license agreement
used to cover up improper revenue recognition. In the Matter of Rosetti and Yonkers,
the SEC determined that two CPA’s employed by the firm Marcum & Kliegman,
LLC, failed to take appropriate action as required by Section 10A upon learning
that the firm’s client was preparing its financial statements using fractions of
numbers from existing financial statements, rather than actual results of operations,
and failed to properly record or require management to record an expense related
to options issued to consultants. In both cases, the auditors were sanctioned under
rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.

10.5.4 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
One of the most significant provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the
establishment of a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee
audits of public companies and to adopt quality control, ethics, independence and other
audit standards, including rules governing the retention of working papers, concurring
partner review of audit reports, and testing and reporting on reporting companies internal
control systems. Beginning 180 days after the appointment of the five-member Board, it
will be illegal for a firm not registered with the Board to audit public companies.
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10.6 Audit Deficiencies and Audit Failures

10.6.1 The Top 10 Audit Deficiencies (1987-1997)
A complementary report by the authors of the COSO Report, entitled Fraud Related SEC
Enforcement Actions Against Auditors: 1987-1997 (the Audit Failure Report), documented the
ten most common audit failures in 45 SEC enforcement actions where sanctions were
imposed against auditors for their association with fraudulent financial statements during
the period 1987 to 1997.

The most common problem, in 80 percent of the cases reviewed, was the auditor’s failure
to gather sufficient audit evidence, most commonly in the areas of asset valuation, asset
ownership, and corroboration of management representations. In about half of the
enforcement actions reviewed, the auditors incorrectly applied or failed to apply GAAP
pronouncements. In 44 percent of the cases, audit program design was cited as a problem.
Specifically, the auditor failed to: address inherent risk properly and adjust the audit
program accordingly, recognize the additional risk associated with nonroutine transactions
or prepare a new audit program for each engagement. Other common audit problems
included the failure to exercise due professional care and appropriate professional
skepticism, overreliance on inquiry as a form of audit evidence, deficiencies in the
confirmation of accounts receivable, failure to recognize related-party transactions, and the
failure to expand testing to compensate for identified weaknesses in internal controls.
Table 10.4 classifies the audit deficiency cited, together with the number and percentage of
cases in which the deficiency occurred.
Table 10.4 Audit Deficiencies
Number of Cases
(45 Total)

Percentage

Gathering sufficient audit evidence

36

80%

Exercising due professional care

32

71%

Demonstrating appropriate professional
skepticism

27

60%

Interpreting or applying GAAP

22

49%

Audit program design and planning

20

44%

Using inquiry as a form of evidence

18

40%

Obtaining adequate evidence to evaluate
significant management estimates

16

36%

Confirming accounts receivable

13

29%

Recognizing related parties

12

27%

Reliance on internal controls

11

24%

Audit Deficiency
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10.6.2 Audit Failures (1997-2002)
Several of the audit deficiencies noted above were also present in SEC enforcement cases
against auditors during the period 1997 to present. Some of the most notable cases during
this period are discussed in the following sections.

Sunbeam Corporation
On May 15, 2001, the SEC brought fraud charges against five former officers of Sunbeam
Corporation, as well as the former engagement partner from Arthur Andersen who
authorized unqualified audit opinions on Sunbeam’s 1996 and 1997 financial statements,
which were determined by the SEC to have been materially misstated. Among the
accounting gimmicks used to artificially inflate reported revenues and earnings were the
use of big-bath restructuring charges to create cookie-jar reserves, the recognition of
revenue on contingent sales, the acceleration of potential sales into the current quarter, and
the improper use of bill-and-hold transactions. Despite these deviations from GAAP,
Andersen issued unqualified audit opinions in contravention of GAAS.

Waste Management, Inc.
On June 19, 2001, the SEC filed settled administrative proceedings against Arthur
Andersen for the firm’s issuance of materially false and misleading audit reports on Waste
Management’s financial statements for the period 1993 through 1996. Specifically, the SEC
alleged that at the time Andersen issued unqualified audit reports certain of its partners
knew or were reckless in not knowing that the company’s financial statements were not
presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with GAAP. The SEC claimed the
Andersen audit engagement team had identified and documented numerous accounting
issues that ultimately led to the company’s restatement of financial results for the period
1992 to 1996 and the first three quarters of 1997. As a result of Andersen’s failure to ensure
that all known misstatements were quantified and all likely misstatements estimated, the
SEC further alleged that Andersen’s audits were not conducted in accordance with GAAS.
Notably, from the time of Waste Management’s IPO in 1971 until 1997, every chief
financial officer and chief accounting officer in Andersen’s history had previously worked
as an auditor at the company. During the 1990s, when the fraud occurred, 14 former
Andersen employees worked for Waste Management, mostly in key financial and
accounting positions.

According to the SEC, Andersen recognized as early as 1988 that Waste Management
employed aggressive accounting tactics including improper adjustments to decrease
depreciation expense, the capitalization of interest on current-period development costs,
the failure to accrue properly for tax and insurance expenses, improper charges of
operating expenses to reserve accounts, and the refusal to write off costs associated with
impaired assets. During each audit performed in the restatement period, the engagement
team proposed adjusting journal entries to account for material current- and prior-period
misstatements. However, management refused to make the entries and Andersen’s audit
partners declined to take appropriate action or modify the firm’s unqualified audit
opinions. The adjustments were not made until a new management team took over in late
1997 and determined to restate the company’s prior-period financial statements.
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Enron Corporation
On June 15, 2002, Arthur Andersen was convicted of obstructing justice by impeding an
investigation by securities regulators into the events leading to Enron’s financial demise.
The conviction represents the first against a major accounting firm, and ultimately led to
the firm ceasing operations in 2002.
In addition to the fraud charges, federal investigators are continuing to examine Andersen’s
audit failures during the firm’s long relationship with Enron management. Although
charges have not yet been brought, the numerous audit deficiencies noted to date include
the failure to identify and require disclosure of significant related-party transactions, the
failure to review off-balance-sheet financing transactions, the failure to exercise appropriate
professional skepticism, the failure to challenge management’s estimates, and the approval
of complex, nonroutine accounting transactions that were not permissible under GAAP,
without the approval of the firm’s technical experts.

California Micro Devices
Following the indictment of Cal Micro’s senior executive officers on fraud charges for
artificially inflating reported revenues and earnings, the SEC in August 1998 brought Rule
102(e) proceedings against the engagement partner and senior manager on Cal Micro’s
1994 audit. These individuals were both members of a then Big Five accounting firm. The
SEC alleged that the auditors were reckless in failing to comply with GAAS during the Cal
Micro audit, and more specifically, that the auditors conducted themselves unprofessionally
in the three critical audit areas of accounts receivable, inventory and property. In each of
these areas, the SEC alleged that the auditors failed to exercise appropriate professional
skepticism, obtain competent evidential matter or properly supervise audit personnel.
Moreover, although Cal Micro had been singled out for “special attention,” the SEC
alleged that the auditors ignored red flags that indicated potential accounting irregularities.

For example, the SEC alleged that in the revenue recognition category, the auditors did not
examine the writeoff of one-third of the Company’s accounts receivable balance—a red
flag that, in the eyes of the SEC, should have alerted the auditors to the possibility of a
material misstatement. The three areas where the auditors were alleged to be lax—accounts
receivable, inventory, and property—directly correspond to the areas where most of the
accounting adjustments occurred when Cal Micro restated its financial results for fiscal
1994.
However, in a surprising turn of events, an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ) on
September 21, 2001, dismissed all 102(e) charges against Cal Micro’s auditors, including
charges that the CPAs had acted recklessly. Key to the ALJ’s opinion was the finding that
despite the alleged violations of technical standards there was no evidence to prove a direct
link between the audit deficiencies and the misstated financial results. Specifically, the AIJ
found that:
1. The auditors were negligent but not reckless in auditing accounts receivable, sales, and
returns.
2. No GASS violations were proven in auditing the values of Cal Micro’s property,
equipment, and obsolete inventory.
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3. The evidence did not support the conclusion that Cal Micro materially misstated its
property, equipment, obsolete inventory, revenues, or accounts receivable in violation
of GAAP.

10.6.3 Lessons Learned
The audit failures noted above provide important lessons in audit planning, execution, and
management. For example, as noted in the Audit Failure Report, the three most common
audit deficiencies, failure to gather sufficient competent evidence, lack of due care, and lack
of professional skepticism, all reflect engagement management problems. The
recommended solution to this problem is the development of a properly designed and
executed quality control system. The emphasis would be on sound audit planning,
supervision, and review as well as adherence to guidelines for the collection of sufficient
audit evidence to perform substantive testing and corroborate management
representations.

In the planning phase, the Audit Failure Report recommended more extensive
participation by engagement partners and concurring partners as well as managers. This
would increase the likelihood that the auditor would correctly assess audit risk; make
appropriate modifications to the nature, extent, and timing of planned tests; and identify
nonroutine transactions that might require additional investigation.
To reduce the incidence of GAAP violations, the Audit Failure Report recommended
consultation with technical partners or industry specialists when certain accounting issues
arise, expanded coverage of technical accounting topics and industry specific requirements
in firm-sponsored training courses, and training on the provisions of SAS No. 69, The
Meaning ofPresent Fairly in Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the
Independent Auditor's Report (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 411).
To confirm accounts receivable effectively, CPA firms must ensure that their audit teams
confirm accounts receivable balances, confirm an adequate selection of the receivables,
maintain control of the confirmation process, and employ alternative procedures when
confirmations are not returned or exceptions are received.
To increase the likelihood of detecting related-party transactions, the auditor should, for
each engagement, prepare a list of related parties, continually update the list throughout the
engagement, and provide the list to all audit team members. The audit team should also
make inquiries of management regarding the existence of related-party transactions. In
addition, it is advisable to confirm with the counterparty the existence and nature of
unusual client transactions.

10.7

Guidance for Auditors
In this regulatory environment, auditors should be mindful of the lessons learned from past
audit failures. It is also prudent to review existing guidance in each of the key phases of the
audit process, namely, initial risk assessment, analytical procedures, substantive testing, and
the issuance of audit opinions.
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10.7.1 Risk Assessment
During the risk assessment phase, auditors should obtain an understanding of the
prospective client’s industry and identify contractual, market, regulatory, and company
specific incentives to manage earnings. Risk assessment is particularly important in
determining whether to accept a new audit client, when interviewing former auditors, and
when drafting the initial audit plan. To minimize risk, auditors should consider each of the
risk factors identified in SASs No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors
and Irregularities, superseded by SAS No. 81, and SAS No. 82, Consideration ofFraud in a
Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), with an eye to
any red flags that might signal a need for further review. Some of the most important risk
factors to consider include the existence of a weak internal control environment, evidence
that management provided untruthful or evasive answers to prior audit inquiries,
indications that management is unduly aggressive or places undue emphasis on meeting
earnings projections, and the existence of nonroutine transactions that may be difficult to
audit.

10.7.2 Analytical Procedures
Analytical procedures are important tools used by auditors to identify problem areas and to
inform substantive testing. Analytical procedures include vertical, horizontal, and ratio
analysis. Vertical analysis is a technique for analyzing the relationships between items on
an income statement, balance sheet, or statement of cash flows by expressing components
as percentages of net sales, total assets, or liabilities and owners’ equity. These relationships
may be used with historical averages to identify anomalies. Horizontal analysis is a
technique for analyzing the percentage change in financial statement items each year. The
first period in the analysis is the base year and changes in subsequent periods are computed
as a percentage of the base. This method may be effective in identifying material
inconsistencies. Ratio analysis is a technique used to identify relationships between two
different financial statement amounts and to compare those relationships to industry
averages. Of the three techniques, ratio analysis is the most useful for detecting red flags.
The most common ratios used to analyze financial statement amounts are the current ratio,
the quick ratio, receivables turnover, inventory turnover, profit margin and asset turnover
ratio.
The current ratio, which compares current assets to current liabilities, measures a company’s
ability to meet its present obligations from its liquid assets. A significant increase in the
current ratio may indicate an understatement of liabilities.
The quick ratio is similar to the current ratio but focuses on assets that may be liquidated
immediately: cash, securities and accounts receivable. These assets are then compared to
current liabilities to measure a company’s ability to meet its immediate cash requirements.
A significant decrease in the quick ratio may indicate an increase in accounts receivable,
which may suggest the improper recognition of revenue to artificially inflate sales.

The receivables turnover ratio compares net sales to average net receivables. As with the quick
ratio, a decrease in receivables turnover resulting from an increase in receivables may
signal the existence of improper revenue recognition.
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The inventory turnover ratio compares cost of goods sold to average inventory and measures
the number of times inventory is sold during a period. Although a high inventory turnover
is generally favorable, an abnormally high inventory rate may indicate inventory theft; an
abnormally low inventory rate may reflect false debits to cost of goods sold to conceal
fictitious sales.

The profit margin ratio compares net income to net sales and measures the amount of profit
in each dollar of sales. An abnormally high profit margin may indicate the overstatement of
net income resulting from inflated revenues or understated expenses.
The asset turnover ratio compares net sales to average operating assets. A decrease in the
ratio may indicate overstatement of assets while an increase in the ratio may indicate
overstatement of revenues or understatement of expenses.

10.7.3 Targeted Substantive Testing
The auditor should carefully design substantive tests based upon the initial audit plan as
modified by the results of analytical procedures. Emphasis should be placed on specific
potential problem areas.

For example, if the initial assessment indicates that management is overly aggressive about
meeting earnings projections, it may be appropriate to increase and vary sample size in the
accounts receivable confirmation process. It may also be advisable to evaluate the nature
and adequacy of reserves through the application of analytical procedures to total accruals
and individual accrual accounts. This analysis should include comparisons of year-to-year
totals in the company and within the industry. This is especially important in companies
with historically consistent earnings trends.

In addition, rather than simply accepting management’s best estimates, auditors should
prepare a schedule of management estimates and estimates suggested by the audit
evidence. If individual estimates suggest a directional effect on earnings and the aggregate
difference is material, the auditor should evaluate the reasonableness of management
estimates. Heightened scrutiny should be applied to unusually large accounting estimates
or accruals that decrease earnings, since the overstatement of expense in one year will
create upward pressure on earnings in subsequent years.

10.7.4 Scope Limitations and Qualified Audit Opinions
Finally, scope limitations and qualified audit opinions should be used where information
cannot be tested or verified. The tendency to waive immaterial discrepancies should be
avoided. As regulators scrutinize the conduct of auditors in financial restatement cases,
conservatism should be applied in all areas where the auditor’s discretion may be
questioned.

10.8 Checklist: Detection of Financial Statement Fraud
This checklist addresses internal controls issues, taken from the discussion in this chapter,
specific to suspected financial statement fraud. The checklist is an addition to Section 1.5,
“Risk Management Checklist,” and Section 2.2, “Ethical Environment Checklist,” of this
Handbook.
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This checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist
does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute
for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital concerns about fraud prevention or who
suspect fraud should seek the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.
Table 10.5

Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

1. Motives
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a greater
likelihood ofpotentialfinancial statement fraud.

a. Is there a perception among management of the company or
of individual operating units that there is extraordinary
pressure (over and above the pressures typically associated
with this industry) to achieve a higher level of reported
earnings?
b. Do management compensation agreements tie compensation
or bonuses to higher levels of reported earnings?

c. Is there extraordinary pressure from outside shareholders or
other outsiders to improve the value of company stock?
d. With regard to shares held by management or major
shareholders, could the existence of any of the following
provide an incentive to maintain or increase reported
earnings, especially in the near term?
• Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans that
postpone ownership.
• Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers
from acquiring shares until specified dates or the
occurrence of specific events.
• Rule 144A restrictions that limit the number of shares that
can be sold on United States securities exchanges on a
given trading day.

• Income tax provisions that afford more favorable
treatment to capital gains in shares held for a sufficient
period of time to qualify as long-term capital gains (the
restriction being that the government would receive more
of the sale proceeds if the share sales were classified as
short-term capital gains).
• Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding
significant blocks of stock past some event such as an
annual shareholders meeting before they can be sold.

e. Is the company in danger of losing its listing on a major stock
exchange, or is it attempting to obtain a new listing?
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

f.

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

If the company is publicly traded, is there extraordinary
pressure to meet analysts’ or market expectations, whether
explicitly stated in published reports, public filings or public
statements by company officials or implicitly perceived by
management?

g. Is there extraordinary pressure, whether explicit or implicit, to
continue to report a rising trend in earnings and/or revenues?
h. Is the company operating close to or in violation of the limits
of financial covenants, such as minimum shareholders’ equity,
maximum debt-to-equity ratios or minimum current ratios,
contained in bank credit facility agreements or other debt
instruments?

i.

For firms doing business in regulated industries, is the
company operating close to or in violation of the financial
restrictions set by regulators or by statute?

2. Quantitative Characteristics
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicate a greater
likelihood ofpotentialfinancial statementfraud.

a. When calculating the following indexes for the previous and
the current year, do any of the indexes show a year-over-year
increase greater than 10 percent (i.e., an index greater than
1.1)?
• Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
• Gross Margin Index
• Asset Quality Index
• Sales Growth Index

b. When calculating the following indexes for the previous and
the current year, do any of the indexes show a year-over-year
increase greater than 10 percent more than increases for
similar indexes of peer (same industry) companies?

• Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
• Gross Margin Index
• Asset Quality Index
• Sales Growth Index

c. Is the change in working capital over the past year (excluding
cash changes) relative to total assets at the end of the period
more than 20 percent greater than similar calculations for peer
companies?
(continued)
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

3. Qualitative Predictors: The Audit Committee
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicate a need to
take action to improve the integrity and effectiveness of the Audit
Committee.

a. Has the board of directors failed to designate an audit
committee or failed to approve a charter for an audit
committee?
b. If there is an audit committee, do any of the following
conditions exist with regard to members of that committee?

• A director being employed by the corporation or any of its
affiliates for the current year or any of the past five years.

• A director accepting any compensation from the
corporation or any of its affiliates other than compensation
for board service or benefits under a tax-qualified
retirement plan.
• A director being a member of the immediate family of an
individual who is, or has been in any of the past five years,
employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates as an
executive officer.
• A director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholder
or to which the corporation made, or from which the
corporation received, payments that are or have been
significant to the corporation or business organization in
any of the past five years.
• A director being employed as an executive of another
company where any of the corporation’s executives serves
on that company’s compensation committee.

c. Are there less than three audit committee members with at
least some financial accounting experience?
d. Is it not clear or not the case that:
• The audit committee should be responsible for selecting
the outside auditors.
• The audit committee has a formal written statement from
the outside auditors describing all relationships between
the auditors and the company.

• The audit committee regularly discusses with the outside
auditors all aspects of the propriety or lack thereof of the
company’s accounting practices.
• The audit committee receives all reports of internal control
deficiencies in a timely manner from both internal and
outside auditors?
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

4. Other Qualitative Predictors
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicate a greater
likelihood ofpotentialfinancial statementfraud.

a. Has the company had a history of internal control problems,
whether those problems resulted in detection of financial
statement or any other type of fraud?
b. Does the company CEO engage in micro-management or
other practices that could unduly influence accounting
decision-makers with regard to financial statement reporting?

c. Are financial statements presented to the board of directors or
to outsiders (banks, minority investors, etc.) prepared on a
basis other than GAAP?

d. Are outside auditors unaware of any interim or quarterly
financial statements, or financial statements prepared for
selected outside parties such as banks or investors?
e. In establishing and reviewing internal controls, has
management failed to establish adequately the key metrics or
guidelines to determine the extent and frequency of internal
auditor review?
f.

Is there a lack of evidence that management has properly
communicated the internal control guidelines and procedures
to appropriate personnel?

g. If there is no audit committee, does the firm lack procedure
for reporting accounting irregularities to the entire board,
either directly or through senior management?
h. Does it appear that management does not assess the quality of
its internal controls over time?

i.

If the firm is not audited annually, has more than one year
elapsed since either outside accountants or internal auditors
have reviewed all internal controls?

j.

Have any audit tests detected significant risks not previously
known to management?

k. Is there a history of using a quantitative standard for
materiality, such as a percentage of earnings or assets, to fail to
correct known accounting errors or irregularities?
5. Special Areas
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section should generate
further inquiry to determine ifspecific internal controls need to be
improved.
(continued)
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

1. Failure to Record Loss Contingencies
a. Given the nature of the company’s business, is it likely that
any of the following issues could be relevant?

• Collectibility of receivables
• Obligations related to product warranties and product
defects
• Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property
• Threat of expropriation of assets
• Pending or threatened litigation

• Actual or possible claims and assessments
• Guarantees of indebtedness of others
• Agreements to repurchase receivables (or repurchase
related property) that have been sold
b. With regard to possible contingencies, does there exist:

• The incidence of claims prior to the date of financial
statements
• Correspondence with (and bills from) outside legal counsel
• Internal correspondence within production and research
staffs as to the need to address a critical problem with a
product already on the market
• Internal correspondence among department heads of
production, R&D, general counsel, and senior
management about postproduction problems and product
claims
• External correspondence between the manufacturer and
its customers about a given product concerning special
price concessions or special return privileges

• The incidence of special or over-budget freight charges to
accommodate returns and/or the shipment of replacement
product
• Shifting of production schedules to manufacture
replacement product
• Halting manufacture of the product in question
• Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research projects
to applications engineering relating to redesign of existing
products
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

• Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts to
customers on a regular basis over a period of weeks or
months that indicate some arrangement to compensate for
product defects

c. If there is a suspected contingency, does correspondence
between departments or within departments indicate a
problem?
d. If a contingency is likely to exist, has management used an
inadequate or inappropriate standard for quantifying the
potential claim?
2. Failure to Record Asset Writeoffs

a. Has the company’s industry experienced rapid changes in
engineering or materials applications that may lead to asset
write-offs?

b. Is the industry in which the company operates very costcompetitive?
c. Has the company experience:
• Significant changes in customer demand
• Significant loss of business to a competitor
• A need to obtain or retain a customer relationship by
bidding below cost

d. When reviewing fixed asset schedules with production or
divisional personnel, have any of the following occurred?
• A significant decrease in the market value of an asset
• A significant change in the extent or manner in which an
asset is used or a significant physical change in an asset
• A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the
business climate that could affect the value of an asset or
an adverse action or assessment by a regulator
• An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the
amount originally expected to acquire or construct an asset
• A current-period operating or cash-flow loss combined
with a history of operating or cash flow losses or a
projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses
associated with an asset used for the purpose of producing
revenue

e. Is there evidence of significant changes in production or
product demand?
(continued)
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

f.

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

From the review of moving expenses and discussion with
production personnel, does it appear that any equipment has
been moved off the shop floor into storage?

g. Does the company not maintain profitability analyses by
product line or by customer?
h. Upon reviewing profitability analyses, does it appear that
certain products have not been historically profitable?

i.

For historically unprofitable product lines, to justify not
writing down assets for impairment, has management used:
• Overly optimistic forecasts of future profitability
• Out-of-date forecasts
• Forecasts not prepared or reviewed by personnel with line
responsibility for production

j.

If written narratives accompany the forecasts, do they discuss
downside possibilities that management has not adequately
taken into account?

k. Are there any facts now known that would invalidate
assumptions contained in the forecast?
1.

For investments in nonpublicly traded securities:
• Does the company have financial data adequate to
determine historical profitability of the investee?

• If the investee has not been historically profitable, has
management failed to write down the investment based
upon an overly optimistic forecast?
• If the investee has not been historically profitable, has
management failed to write down the investment based
upon a forecast prepared by management with business or
family ties to the investor company?

3. Acquisition and Cookie jar Reserves
a. Were reserves established without a clear purpose or
justification?

b. If reserves were established by a current period charge to
income, were earnings prior to the charge in excess of
management or outside expectations?
c. Were reserves established at or near the close of a reporting
period?

d. Were reserves established without adequate review by senior
management?
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

e. Upon review of charges to a given reserve, are there charges
for expenses that are not appropriate to the stated purpose of
the reserve?
f.

Was the timing of the take-down of reserves coincident with
achieving certain financial targets set by management or
outsiders?

g. Was the amount of the take-down of reserves for a given
period necessary to achieve certain financial targets set by
management or outsiders?

h. For acquisition reserves:
• Were reserves established after twelve months from the
date of the acquisition?

• Were reserves set up for items not related to the
acquisition?

• Does the quantity of costs allocated to the reserve in a
given period cause earnings to reach certain financial
targets set by management or outsiders?
4. Cost Shifting

a. Has management made a recent change in policy with regard
to capitalizing previously expensed costs?

b. Has a change in policy with regard to capitalizing previously
expensed costs not been disclosed in company financial
statements?
c. Has management proposed to capitalize a new category of
expenditure that customarily is expensed on peer-group firm
financial statements?
d. Does the timing of changes in policy with regard to
capitalizing expenses coincide with:
• Implementation of a management bonus plan or
calculation of bonuses under that plan
• Commencement of the sale of stock or the search for an
equity partner
• Implementation of a new credit facility or recent problems
in maintaining financial covenants under an existing
facility

e. But for the capitalization of certain expenses:

• Would management not receive certain bonuses or other
benefits under a management compensation plan?
(continued)
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

• In the opinion of securities analysts, appraisers, or
underwriters, would the company’s share price be
significantly lower?
• Would the company be in violation of loan or debt
covenants?

f.

Does the capitalization of expenses cause the firm’s Asset
Quality Index to increase significantly in excess of increases (if
any) for its industry peers?

g. If company management provides segment or subsidiary
financial data, especially if management or outsiders tend to
point to performance of that segment or subsidiary in their
discussions of company performance:
• Have expenses been incurred by the parent that relates to
the segment or subsidiary?

• Have other segments or subsidiaries incurred expenses
that should be allocated to the segment or subsidiary in
question?
h. Has senior management failed to establish proper procedures
for allocating or apportioning costs among affiliates or, if there
is a policy, is there evidence that adherence is lax or that there
have been documented lapses?

i.

Is there correspondence among heads of affiliates concerning
disputes over expense allocations or apportionment that has
not come to the attention of the audit committee?

j.

Were reserves established at the parent company for expenses
anticipated for subsidiaries?

k. Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense or liability
accounts that could reflect cost transfers to the parent or
another subsidiary?

1.

Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense or liability
accounts that could reflect cost transfers to reserves established
at the parent level or in another subsidiary?

m. Is there any correspondence between accounting personnel at
the parent and subsidiary levels that describe special
procedures for certain costs that are incurred by the subsidiary
but not charged to earnings of that subsidiary?
5. Recording Fictitious Revenues
a. If the company requires signed agreements from customers
before revenue is recognized:
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

• Have sales personnel indicated that their managers have
approved as income sales contracts that were not signed as
of the period end?
• Have sales personnel stated that unsigned contracts were
recorded as revenue under the premise that key buyer
personnel had given verbal approvals?
• Have sales personnel stated that unsigned contracts were
recorded as revenue under the premise that key buyer
personnel had signed the contract but the contract was
held up for other reasons?

b. Have there been prior internal control failures with sales
cutoff?

c. If fabricated contracts are suspected, have the sales cutoff tests
performed by internal or outside auditors failed to look for the
fabrication and substitution of contracts?

d. Have sales cutoff tests failed to examine the history of sales
returns and reversals over time?
e. With regard to the requirement for timely delivery:
• Are there lapses in documentation of delivery?
• Have customers complained about receiving deliveries too
early?
• Have returns from a certain customer or reseller been
abnormally high?

f.

Is there evidence that certain customers or resellers are
receiving unusually generous sales terms for returns or
refunds?

g. Is there evidence that certain customers or resellers are
receiving unusually low prices or above-average discounts?
h. Is the price for component products sold by the company
dependent, at least in part, upon the price of the final product
sold by another company?
i.

Have royalties been accrued to income prior to receipt of
confirmation from the payer that royalties are owed?

j.

Do department heads have the authority to both approve sales
and the recognition of related revenue in the financial
statements?

k. Is there a lack of review of sales revenue recognition at the
senior management level?
(continued)
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist
1.

Yes

No

N/A

Ref

Is there a history of revenue being recognized improperly?

m. Have department heads approved significant refunds or
returns that are out of the ordinary or appear to violate
company policies?
n. Have refunds or returns been historically high for a certain
department?

o. Have the reasons for refunds and returns not been
documented or, if documented, have the reasons given been
insufficient?
p. Has senior management failed to review or been lax in
reviewing significant sales refunds and returns?

q. If side letters are suspected:
• Have engineers, technicians, or others involved with the
installation of the products indicated that certain customers
made additional demands before agreeing to buy?

• Are there notes or letters in sales files indicating customer
demands had been made to allow for returns or refunds?
r. Are sales approved before obtaining credit checks for new
customers or for existing customers that are experiencing
financial difficulties?
s. Is there an unusual concentration of orders from small or
distressed customers occurring near the end of a reporting
period or sales contest?
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11.1

Overview
In a world as unpredictable as ours, events are often beyond our control. There are natural
disasters; there are accidents; and there are intentional catastrophes. The September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are a chilling reminder
of the last category. Although certain threats may be totally unforeseen, appropriate
security measures can sometimes prevent losses, and appropriate crisis management
planning can help to minimize the impact when disaster strikes. Whether the threat relates
to fraud committed by an insider or an extremist who has threatened the lives of some of
your employees, there are a variety of security measures that can be undertaken to
minimize your company’s vulnerability.
When the events of September 11 unfolded, certain companies were prepared to handle
the ensuing crisis after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center had caused them to
consider and address their weaknesses. Many companies, however, were not prepared.
A survey conducted by Kroll Associates in October 2001 (included at the end of this
chapter) of business executives in New York, Boston, and Toronto revealed that the
awareness and concern of the business community for security risk management had
increased dramatically since September 11, and many executives now believed their
security risk management systems needed upgrading. Previously, the main security-driven
priorities had been employee integrity and information security, but this list has expanded
to include the physical security of both a company’s assets and its people. Awareness of the
importance of appropriate security measures has also increased. But what is appropriate?
Each company’s circumstances, needs, and risk profiles are different, so the security
measures that are appropriate for one company may not be sufficient for another.

This chapter has been written to assist in defining this what. It identifies the types of threats
that a business faces, and then goes through the primary considerations for an effective
security plan to prevent or detect such threats so that you, as a CPA, can be better
informed of the need for security, and the types of security measures that should be
undertaken. There are certain threats, however, that no plan can prevent but their effects
may be mitigated by a good recovery plan.
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11.2 The Threat

11.2.1 Identifiable Threats
There are a wide variety of threats to a business, ranging from natural threats to those that
are either intentionally or unintentionally caused by people. There are conventional threats
that have existed for hundreds of years, and there are more contemporary threats that arise
from technological advances. Threats associated with civil unrest, war, and terrorism have
become a way of life in some parts of the world, whereas North America and other parts of
the world have enjoyed relative stability in recent years, and these threats are only now
being considered seriously.
In order to set up appropriate security measures, it is necessary to identify all imaginable
threats. The next step in the security process is to assess the likelihood of such threats
becoming reality. What follows is an extensive but not all-inclusive list of the potential
threats:

• Theft and other intrusions include the following:
— Theft
— Armed attacks, for example, bank robbery, and so on
— Vandalism and other malicious acts
— Systems intrusion
• Water damage may result from the following:
— Flood
— Tidal waves or storm surge
— Drought
— Water pollution
• Fire includes the damage from either of the following:
— Fire
— Smoke
• Accidents and mechanical breakdowns can arise from the following:
— Vehicular accidents
— Equipment malfunctioning
• Utility interruption may involve the following:
— Water, power, utility, and communication outages
— Fuel shortages
• Earth movements include the following:
— Earthquakes
— Avalanches and landslides
— Volcanic eruptions
• Weather conditions can be any of the following:
— Extreme cold and extreme heat
— Snow, ice, and hail
4
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— Typhoons, tornadoes, and hurricanes
— Dust and sandstorms
— Lightning storms

— Infestations

• Threats to the safety of a company’s personnel can include the following:
— Kidnap and ransom
— Hostage-taking
— Workplace violence, such as physical assault or assault with lethal weapons
• Bomb threats and explosions can be caused by the following:
— Suicide bombings
— Conventional bombs

• Civil disorder can arise from the following:

— Riots, strikes, and demonstrations
— Warfare, including attacks that could be conventional, biological, chemical, or
nuclear
• Hazardous materials present the following dangers:
— Intentional contamination that could be chemical, biological, or radioactive
— Accidental contamination that could be chemical, biological, or radioactive
• Cyber attacks can include any of the following:

— Theft of information
— Misinformation about your company on the Internet
— Denial of service
• Corruption of the system can involve disruption of any of the following:
— 911 emergency response system
— Electric power grids
— Water supply

— Telecommunications

— Air traffic control
• Terrorist acts, conducted by individuals or groups with an ideological agenda, and can
include any of the above threats, but often include the following:
— Kidnap and ransom or hostage-taking, or both
— Workplace violence
— Bomb threats and explosions
— Hazardous materials contamination

11.2.2 Vulnerabilities
There are four primary aspects of a company that are vulnerable to security threats:
physical assets, including premises and equipment; people; information; and reputation.
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A company’s physical assets include all of its premises, for example, manufacturing locations,
showrooms, head office and warehouse facilities, as well as equipment such as computers
and all the equipment used in the operational processes of the company. Such assets are
vulnerable to access violations, malfunctions, theft or conversion, and destruction.

People are the lifeblood of an organization. Without adequate security measures and
training, the people employed by a company can become victims of a kidnapping, be
injured, or, in certain cases, become a fatality. If an employee is abducted, injured, or dies
because of inadequate security measures, the employer also suffers not only because of the
downtime caused by the loss of that employee, but also because of the impact on the other
employees, and the effect on the company’s reputation. The people in a company who are
the most vulnerable include expatriates in foreign jurisdictions, traveling executives,
employees who deal directly with the public, employees who are operators of sophisticated
equipment or who have critical skill sets and knowledge of company processes and
procedures, and security personnel.
Information that needs to be protected includes information that is stored electronically on
computers, networks, tapes, drives, and disks as well as in paper files and books. Several
companies destroyed in the World Trade Center attacks cited the loss of the company’s
history, often in the form of a commissioned book, as irreplaceable. Electronic information,
however, is only one source of information that is vital to an organization. Other
information that needs to be protected includes intellectual property such as trade secrets,
product development ideas, competitive intelligence, customer lists, processes and
procedures, training manuals, legal contracts, and accounting and tax records.

The reputation of a company represents its credibility and image as seen by its employees,
customers and suppliers, shareholders, the general public, the media and regulatory
authorities. A company’s reputation is created by its actions and communications as well as
the communications of other parties, all of which must be consistent, credible, and positive
in order for that reputation to remain intact. If the security of a company has been
breached, a company’s reputation is vulnerable, particularly if the communications are not
all positive. Effective communication, therefore, is vital to maintaining a company’s
reputation.

11.2.3 Some Risks of Greater Concern
The above-mentioned Kroll survey taken in October 2001 shows that there is a heightened
awareness of the need for appropriate measures to protect against a wide range of threats to
a company’s security of which manmade threats now represent more of a concern than
natural disasters.
The Kroll survey revealed that before September 11, the most important security issues
related to threats from the following:

• Systems intrusion
• Computer and telecommunications failures, or both

• Fire and explosion
After September 11, these three issues continued to represent the greatest area of concern
to executives. However, since the attacks, the degree to which these risks were considered
important increased by at least 25 percentage points. For instance, 86 percent now viewed
6
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systems intrusion as an important security issue compared to 61 percent who viewed
systems intrusion to be important before. This represents an increase of 25 percentage
points. Computer and telecommunications failures were considered to be important issues
to address by 83 percent of respondents subsequent to the attacks, compared to 57 percent
before; and the threat of fire and explosion was considered to be an important issue to be
addressed by 77 percent of the respondents now, compared to 48 percent who considered
it to be important before.
The Kroll survey also revealed that certain other security issues, previously considered to
be less of a threat, have become much more of a concern than they were. Bomb and
hazardous materials threats showed the biggest gain in importance (up 42 and 47
percentage points respectively to 71 percent each). More than half of the respondents
considered the following threats to be important issues to address now, whereas less than a
third of the respondents considered these to be important issues to address before
September 11:

Threat

Important Before
Important After
September 11 (Percentage September 11 (Percentage
of Respondents)
of Respondents)

Bomb Threats

29

71

Hazardous Materials

24

71

Civil Disorder

16

53

Armed Attack

22

52

Hostage-Taking

21

51

Water and Power Outages

44

66

The Kroll survey also shows that bomb threats and hazardous materials were considered to
be more of a concern after the attacks than threats related to water and power outages,
whereas before, water and power outages had been considered to be more of a concern.

11.2.4 Relative Vulnerability
All companies face security risks, some more so than others. The vulnerability of one
company compared to another is a function of several factors, including the extent to
which appropriate security measures have been implemented, the degree of security
preparedness, and the geographic location and the nature of the company’s operations.
Certain regulated industries, such as oil and gas, have mandated security procedures to
mitigate known risks. They can, however, be vulnerable because they have limited security
procedures related to other aspects of their operations. Companies in other industries can
be vulnerable because they have few or no security measures in place.

The companies that face the biggest threat from a terrorist perspective are those whose
activities could impact large numbers of people such as those that:
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• Have large groups of employees at one location.
• Handle precious commodities.

• Handle toxic substances.
• Handle food and other items consumed by the general public.

11.3 Planning and Prevention

11.3.1 Post-September 11 Crisis Management
The Kroll Survey revealed that in the aftermath of September 11, companies are more
aware of the need to identify and assess risks and reduce vulnerability through planning.

For example, 89 percent now view physical security as important, compared to 40 percent
before. Approximately 86 percent identified emergency planning as important, compared
to 34 percent before. About 80 percent cited business resumption planning as important,
compared to 38 percent before.
As a result, more companies are paying attention to their security needs than ever before,
and many are hiring risk consultants to conduct corporate security reviews and make
recommendations to improve their security and emergency preparedness.
This response is not only wise from the perspective of protecting a company’s assets and its
people, but it is also becoming more of a necessity for insurance reasons as more
companies face rising insurance costs. Some companies are finding they cannot get
insurance coverage unless they have adequate security and crisis management plans in
place. Many insurers are looking for evidence that companies are taking all reasonable
steps to mitigate their risks by conducting corporate security reviews and by the
preparation of threat and crisis management plans. Companies that have conducted
security reviews and that have threat and crisis management plans are better able to reduce
their losses through improved security and are, therefore, more likely to get or retain their
insurance coverage.

Certain risks, however, such as terrorist acts and acts of war, are no longer covered by most
insurance companies. In the absence of insurance coverage, the ability of a company to
cope with such acts quickly and effectively is the only way to minimize the losses that
would otherwise be suffered.

11.3.2 Elements of a Corporate Security Review
A comprehensive corporate security review involves the following five steps:
1. Identify all the threats that a business faces (for instance, all the threats identified in the
previous section of this chapter).
2. Conduct a threat assessment to consider the probability of each threat.
3. Conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of each sector of the business and each
location.
4. Identify appropriate security measures to eliminate, avert, or minimize the risk of the
most significant threats; or, if that is not possible, to provide an early detection system
that warns of the existence of such threats.

8
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5. Develop an effective threat and crisis management plan that covers all aspects of the
business to help facilitate management’s response to the threat or crisis, and, more than
likely, to minimize the effects of business interruption.

11.3.3 The Threat Assessment Process
The threat assessment process involves assessing for each location and threat:
• The likelihood of each threat becoming a reality
• The severity of the impact of such a threat

More specifically, the issues to assess relative to each threat must include:

• Identifying whether the threat could affect the particular location under review.
• Identifying the frequency with which this threat is likely to recur (several times per
annum, once every three years, once every ten years, once in a lifetime, once every
hundred years, or highly improbable).
• Identifying whether the threat represents a significant threat to a company’s operations,
facilities, people, information, or reputation. Part of this assessment involves considering
the number of people likely to be affected by the threat, recovery time, insurance
coverage both to repair and replace damaged equipment or premises and to cover
business interruption losses, and the financial impact.
• Identifying whether appropriate security measures are in place to prevent such a threat
from materializing or to mitigate its impact.
• Determining the ease with which security measures could be introduced.
Such an assessment is subjective by nature. It is useful to make the assessment, however, as
the process provides valuable information that can be used to prioritize the areas for
review. This information can then be used to establish the priorities for implementing
appropriate security measures to minimize the risks associated with these threats. This is
particularly important when resources allocated to the implementation of appropriate
security measures are limited.
Threats that would have a negligible impact but which are frequent threats should have a
lower priority than threats that could cause catastrophic damage, even if they are only
remote possibilities. The following table can be used to assist in assigning the relative
priorities for addressing the threats faced by a business. Frequent threats with catastrophic
consequences would be assigned an A priority, whereas improbable threats with negligible
consequences would be assigned a D priority.
Table 11.1 Assessing the Relative Priority for Dealing with Each Threat
Frequency of
Occurrence

Catastrophic

Severity of the Risk
Major
Minor

Negligible

Frequent

A

A

A

C

Occasional

A

B

B

D

Remote

A

B

C

D

Improbable

B

C

C

D
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11.3.4 The Comprehensive Risk Assessment Process
A comprehensive risk assessment is often done with the assistance of external experts and
involves assessing the security-related controls and procedures that need to be in place to
protect four basic areas of the business for each operating site:

• Premises and equipment. Assess the company’s physical controls that prevent and detect
unauthorized access.
• People. Assess the degree to which a company’s personnel are aware of ways to avoid
crises and what to do if they should occur. Risky travel destinations, for example, should
be identified and travel advisories prepared for relevant personnel.
• Information. Assess the company’s hardware and software controls to prevent and detect
unauthorized access to information. The speed of recovery through the use of backup
data should also be part of this assessment.
• Reputation. Assess the communication system that advises employees, customers,
suppliers, shareholders, and the media.

The results of this overall assessment should be documented so that future assessments can
consider whether there have been any changes to the company’s vulnerability.

Premises and Equipment
The assessment of a company’s premises and equipment must concern itself primarily with
access and exit controls. The following is a list of the type of information that should be
assessed for each facility:

1. Type of facility (corporate offices, retail outlets, and factories)
2. Location
3. Number of floors including a basement
4. Number of persons in each building and on each floor
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Type of department on each floor
Type of equipment on each floor
Tenant and visitor access control
Alarms and monitoring in general

Access to loading docks
Access and surveillance of elevators and stairwells

Type of access technology (cards)
Closed circuit TV surveillance
Nature of businesses of other building tenants
History of security breaches and their correction

People
Putting in place an adequate plan to secure a company’s premises and equipment is an
important step in safeguarding a company’s people but it is just a first step. Other aspects to
assess affecting personnel include the following:

10
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1. Educational material should be provided to executives, security personnel, and
employees regarding the following security-related policies and procedures:
• Mail and package handling processes
• Evacuation procedures
• Crisis management procedures
2. Company hiring practices should include screening and background checks. What is the
awareness level of personnel with respect to political risks in the countries to which they
are traveling?
3. Personnel awareness of corporate practices to address a crisis such as a bomb or
biohazard threat and contingency plans in case of an emergency

Information
This section of the plan should concern itself primarily with unauthorized access to
confidential information and the ability to restore or recover such information in the event
that it is destroyed or otherwise corrupted. The following is a list of issues to be addressed
in securing confidential corporate information:
1. Access the controls that exist to protect the company’s computer(s) and the information
stored in them.
2. Protect the company Web site from hackers.
3. Establish the frequency of data and software backups.
4. Provide for the offsite storage and security of backups.
5. Access controls to protect company accounting information, customer lists, manuals and
procedures, patents, and processes.
Other computer security issues such as physical security, logical security and system
recovery are addressed in Chapter 4, “Computer Security and System Recovery,” of this
manual. Also refer to Chapter 8, “Computer Crime and Computer Criminals.”

Reputation
The security of a company’s reputation depends on the effectiveness of control over all
forms of communications affecting the company. The following is a list of how the types of
information should be assessed to protect a company’s reputation:
1. Clearly designate the persons authorized to speak for the company to the media,
analysts, and shareholders.
2. Issue authorized press releases.
3. Train those persons who deal with the media.
4. Monitor the media for reports on the company.
5. Monitor chat rooms.
6. Develop a strategy for countering false information about company products or services
in media or chat rooms.
7. Develop policies that clearly state the consequences of committing an act that is adverse
to the interests of the company, such as fraud or the destruction of property.
8. Require that all personnel sign a statement acknowledging they have read and agreed to
the policies.
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11.3.5 Preventing and Detecting Security Breaches
The overall security plan of a company should be the responsibility of one independent
security department and not fragmented among the functional areas of the business on the
model of the internal audit and designed to protect premises and equipment, people,
information, and reputation.
The following case illustrates what can happen when corporate security is not performed in
this way.

Mining Security in a Global Setting Study

When the events of September 11, 2001, were over, members of the board of
directors of a large multinational mining company started to ask themselves some
hard questions about the security of their own operations. Would their company be
able to handle a crisis that threatened to disrupt production at one of their mine
sites? What security measures were in place to prevent access to the company’s
processing plants? The directors were surprised to find that the answers to these and
other questions were unclear. It had quickly become apparent that the company
needed to strengthen its security overall and to establish a crisis management plan
to address a wide variety of threats to the company’s operations, including threats
associated with terrorist acts.

Management retained the services of an international risk consulting firm to help
them address these questions, to conduct a comprehensive corporate security
review of its worldwide operations, and to develop recommendations to improve
security at each location.
The mining company had rapidly grown from a single-site mining operation in the
United States to a multinational leader in the mining and processing of precious
metals. This growth had been achieved through the acquisition of various
complementary businesses and mine sites.

Security was quite comprehensive at some sites but lax or virtually nonexistent at
others. At certain locations, there were sophisticated plans to protect the health and
safety of the employees while, elsewhere, conditions invited breaches of security
that could result in loss of property and/or harm to employees. This unevenness
occurred because security was considered to be the responsibility of the plant
manager at each location rather than that of a single company-wide security
department. For instance, plant managers sometimes opted to use security
personnel to do maintenance or clerical duties. While such duties were being
performed, the security personnel were unable to perform their security duties. At
these times, employees and others had free access to the site to steal inventory and
supplies without being challenged.
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Although individual plant managers did have an awareness of the need for security
at their respective facilities, security was not their main priority. Costs related to the
security function at their location were considered to be an overhead expense, and
the plant managers’ priority was to reduce overhead and improve earnings. As a
result, recommendations for improved security measures in the past had been
dismissed or shelved.
One of the primary recommendations from the risk consultant was, therefore, to
integrate the security function at a corporate level by hiring an experienced security
manager and having the security personnel at each site report to him. The risk
consultant also recommended that the costs related to security personnel at each
site should be accounted for as a head office cost and should be budgeted in a
separate corporate security budget. This would prevent the plant managers from
making decisions regarding security issues based on the impact on the profitability
of each site.

Other recommendations by the risk consultant included the establishment of
common access controls, the training of security personnel, and the instruction of
all management personnel in the importance of security. Failure to comply with
these policies and procedures would be punished.

The Mining Security case above illustrates several important points:

1. Security should be an integrated function with on-site personnel reporting all security
matters to head office representatives at each location who report to head office.
Administrative matters would be handled locally.

2 Security costs would be a head-office cost rather than local overhead.
Set out below are a number of security measures that are typically recommended for the
protection of a company’s premises and equipment, people, information and reputation.

Premises and Equipment
The effective use of guards is essential.
• Use the services of competent uniformed guards who are actively involved in protecting
the facility rather than doing other jobs such as driving buses and groundskeeping.

• Change the corporate mentality to make each employee consider himself or herself a
guard. Everyone has a responsibility to be on the lookout for possible breaches of
security.
Controls to authenticate and authorize access should include the following:

• Establish access controls through the use of cards and card readers to prevent
unauthorized entry to the facilities. Establish additional access controls to network hubs
and other critical areas within the facilities.
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• Insist that employees wear photo identification badges with security features to be
produced together with their access cards. This not only inexpensively improves
security but by its very nature increases the level of security awareness across all
departments.
• Install an alarm button for the reception area to be monitored continuously whenever
reception is open.
• Use biometric technology such as facial and iris recognition.
• Install entry cameras at all access points.
Exit controls to prevent unauthorized departures should restrict use of:

• Stairwells for emergency exit only. This can be accomplished by installing audible
alarms on each access door and tying these into the building alarm system.
• Freight elevators.
Procedures relating to bomb threats, weapons, and hazardous materials:
•
•
•
•

Install magnetometers and implementing bag checks for all personnel entering the site.
Prevent unattended curbside parking around the building without a permit.
Conduct vehicle inspections of all vehicles entering the loading bay where applicable.
Inspect all storage areas and vehicles carrying hazardous materials for leaks.

People
Screening in the form of employee background checks (also important for preventing
internal fraud as is discussed more fully in Chapter 5) is essential in any security plan. Such
screening should include the following:

• Pre-employment screening of educational, employment, and other information in
resumes
• Reference checking
• Employee integrity and honesty testing

Provide staff training, awareness programs, and general information to ensure the safety of
all personnel regarding the following:

• How to avoid a crisis that could threaten their personal safety
• How to handle suspicious letters and packages
• The dissemination of travel advisory information to executives that provides up-to-date
information on political risks and other local threats to security
Establish policies explaining the consequences of involvement in any activities detrimental
to the interests of the company. For instance, the company should make clear that any
employee involved in fraud will be terminated and subject to criminal prosecution.

Information
Access controls through the use of passwords by all personnel and the requirement that
such passwords be changed regularly.

Use computer logs to monitor unauthorized attempts to obtain access to data or software.
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Electronic countermeasures include the following:
• Sophisticated firewalls and virus alerts to prevent unauthorized access by hackers
• Regular sweeps for any tools installed to obtain unauthorized access to information or
passwords

Reputation
Monitoring the information reported in the press should include the following:

• Monitoring information appearing in chat rooms about the company.
• Take legal action against any parties committing slander or libel against the company
and the company’s reputation.

Security in an Emerging Nation Case Study
A global corporation needed to evaluate conditions for a potential manufacturing
site in an emerging nation. If the project was to proceed, it needed to identify and
deal with the day-to-day risks.

The region was rich in raw materials, and transportation to world markets was
efficient and cost effective. In addition, labor costs were low and the local
government provided strong incentives for the location of manufacturing businesses
in its jurisdiction. In purely economic terms, the decision to build the plant was
straightforward.
Management was concerned, however, about the day-to-day risks created by civil
disorder arising from the country’s economic difficulties. There was also growing
anti-American sentiment because of the alignment of the local government with
international issues and factions critical of United States policies. In addition, there
had been incidents over the years in which company personnel had been exposed
to violence and threats of kidnapping
A risk consulting firm was brought in to assess the situation and devise strategies to
protect the company’s people and facilities in the event that the project was to
proceed. Based on the strength of these strategies, a decision was made to proceed
with developing the site as a new manufacturing facility.

The risk consulting firm devised security strategies for the company’s executives
and management personnel traveling to and from the manufacturing site that took
into consideration safety and security issues as well as political conditions.

These strategies included the provision of a local guard force for both the housing
and office quarters for designated corporate employees. Site access was controlled
and electronic monitoring for key areas was installed. Company officials were
briefed on personal security issues and trained in the security measures taken at the
site. A threat and crisis management plan was devised that specifically addressed
the threat of a kidnapping or hostage-taking incident. The company’s top
executives were then trained on what to do in the event of such an incident.
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Simulation exercises were conducted so that management would be very familiar
with every aspect of the plan and could refine it over time.
For personnel traveling to the site from head office, comprehensive travel advisory
information and personalized instructions and training were provided to make
them aware of the dangers involved and to train them to avoid kidnapping or
hostage taking.

To date, there have been no incidents that have threatened the safety of either the
expatriate personnel or traveling executives.

The Emerging Nation case above illustrates several important points regarding the risk
assessment process:
1. The risks of operating in an emerging nation can be mitigated by the implementation of
appropriate security procedures.

2. The biggest concern in an emerging nation should be for the security of a company’s
personnel.
3. Adequate security for personnel involves more than just guards and locks.

11.4 Crisis Management
11.4.1 Essentials of a Threat and Crisis Management Plan
In overview, an effective threat and crisis management plan should cover at least the
following two topics:

1. Initial response to the emergency should include evacuation procedures, assembly
points before and after the incident, and processes for communicating with employees
and their families, clients, and the media.
2. Business resumption planning after an emergency is also needed.

Ideally, the plan should be written in a way that considers every type of threat that an
organization can face as discussed earlier in this chapter, namely, theft and other intrusions,
water damage, fire, accidents and mechanical breakdowns, utility interruption, earth
movements, weather conditions, threats to the safety of a company’s personnel, bomb
threats and explosions, civil disorder, hazardous materials, and cyber and terrorist attacks.
The plan should be documented in a manual or other form readily accessible to all
employees involved in implementing the plan.
The plan should address each of the four primary areas of the business that need
protection, namely, the company’s premises and equipment, people, information, and
reputation.
It should specifically cover how and where to relocate or maintain the security of each of
these aspects of a company’s business in times of crisis so that critical operations can be
restored as quickly as possible and additional losses prevented or minimized.
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In order for a plan to remain effective, however, it must be reviewed on an annual basis,
and tested and enhanced. This way, the plan will be known by more personnel than just its
authors and can remain current as the company’s circumstances evolve and new personnel
come on board.

Included in the last section of this chapter is a “Threat and Crisis Management Plan”
checklist that identifies many of the issues that need to be addressed in such a plan. This
checklist is not a substitute for obtaining professional advice as part of the threat and crisis
management planning process but is instead provided so CPAs can be aware of the types
of issues to be considered.
The following case study provides an example of an effective threat and crisis management
plan that was put to the test on September 11, 2001, and in the days shortly thereafter.

Fiduciary Trust’s Recovery from Total Destruction Case Study

When the South Tower of the World Trade Center crashed to the ground on
September 11, 2001, the five-floor office of Fiduciary Trust Company International
and the lives of 87 of its 647 employees were destroyed with it. Thanks to a
comprehensive threat and crisis management plan, however, the company was able
to provide its main services the next day and was in full operation in less than a
week.
The plan had been developed in 1987 to address management’s concerns about
business interruption from a power outage and expanded following the bombing of
the WTC in 1993. Since then, it had been reviewed and practiced annually. In the
event, when a disaster beyond the imagination of even the most forward-looking
planner struck the company on September 11, this well-thought-out plan met
almost all expectations. It covered everything from making sure that each employee
had a flashlight with fresh batteries to how and where to relocate the computer
systems to minimize any disruptions in the company’s ability to manage $44 billion
of securities for pension plans, endowments, and wealthy individuals.

The plan included the following:
• Identification of at least two escape routes for each employee
• Assembly points for exiting the building and regrouping outside
• Arrangements for post-trauma counseling services
• Authorization of three key executives to declare a disaster independently
• Arrangements for temporary office space, telecommunications and computer systems at
a site in New Jersey provided by Comdisco, a disaster recovery company
• Daily offsite backups of the company’s transactions and balances
• Arrangements for delivery of the previous day’s backup computer tapes
• Guidelines for booting up the systems
• Establishment of Internet access and an additional backup system
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• Offsite storage for Fiduciary Trust’s client list

• Guidelines for dealing with clients during the crisis
• Briefing manuals with the home and cellphone numbers of crucial staff

Two dozen key people knew how to recover all the electronic records of client
accounts, trades and money transfers, and how to get servers and PCs up and
running. These people were able to work effectively following September 11
because company policy required the plan be tested annually; the most recent
annual test had been completed in late August 2001.
Bear in mind that Fiduciary Trust was in the South Tower. Within minutes of the
North Tower being hit, the company’s crisis management plan was being put in
motion by employees offsite as well as onsite. Within an hour, president Bill Yun
and chief technology officer Stephen Tall were at Comdisco’s disaster recovery site
in New Jersey. (Yun had been at a client meeting in New Jersey at the time of the
attacks and Tall had been driving to work from his home in New Jersey.) As soon
as the two executives reached their new temporary headquarters, they began work
to reestablish their computer systems and contact their key clients. During these
calls, management received overwhelming support as the first thought of each
client was for the safety of Fiduciary Trust’s employees.

Comdisco, one of the three biggest companies in the disaster recovery industry, has
thirteen large facilities across the United States providing logistical support in the
form of temporary office space, telecommunications, and computer systems to
companies forced out of their premises by disasters ranging from earthquakes, fire,
and flood to, in this case, an unprecedented terrorist attack. Comdisco’s new facility
in Carlstadt, New Jersey, for instance, is a 302,000-square-foot site capable of
supporting 1,000 workers and up to sixteen different computer systems. Within
days of September 11, this site was filled to overflowing. Numerous companies
from the World Trade Center as well as others from the surrounding downtown
area called on Comdisco and other similar firms to help them reestablish
operations. By September 13, Fiduciary Trust had issued an announcement to the
media “that operations are up and running at our disaster recovery center in New
Jersey supported by Franklin Templeton Investments’ offices in Short Hills, NJ.”

Although Fiduciary Trust’s threat and crisis management plan was comprehensive
and well thought out, the unprecedented events of September 11 caused more
destruction than anyone could have imagined. Many people had died and
enormous buildings had been completely destroyed. The following were some of
the operational issues that had not been considered as part of Fiduciary Trust’s
crisis management planning process. Instead, as the enormity of the disaster
unfolded, they were addressed by Fiduciary Trust’s management, as follows:
1. Comdisco and other disaster recovery firms found that even their hundreds of
thousands of square feet of available office space proved insufficient for a crisis requiring
the relocation of the entire operations of so many clients simultaneously. Fiduciary Trust
had to act quickly to secure additional premises not just for the long term but for the
short term as well.
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2. Most comprehensive threat and crisis management plans address the need for
temporary office space for its critical personnel but do not consider the need for
permanent office space to house a company’s entire operations. Fiduciary Trust’s plan
was no exception. Its executives immediately realized, however, the need to secure
suitable permanent office space. Finding new offices quickly would be critical to the
whole recovery process not only for company operations but also for the emotional
well-being of its personnel. By September 15, only four days after the disaster,
management of Fiduciary Trust had secured new premises for its New York operations;
within weeks, its personnel started moving into their new location.
3. Established counseling services were insufficient to meet Fiduciary Trust’s needs since
the threat and crisis management plan had not contemplated the loss of so many lives.
Nor had the plan contemplated the gravity of the situation and the extent to which
people felt threatened not only by the terrorist acts themselves but also by the new risks
associated with war. Fiduciary Trust’s parent helped to fill this need by seconding
personnel from its own human resources staff.
4. Communications were disrupted to a greater extent than had been anticipated in the
plan. Additional support was required from the parent.
5. Fiduciary Trust’s Web site had not been backed up to an offsite location. Its parent had
a new Web site up and running the following day.
6. Fiduciary Trust’s management had not anticipated the degree of media interest in the
company and its employees, especially the hounding of employees for personal stories.
The company countered this media pressure by installing a security system on its Web
site that prevented any outsider from obtaining information about its employees.

The events of September 11 showed that even the unimaginable can sometimes happen
and that it is important for companies to have a well-practiced threat and crisis
management plan in place long before disaster strikes. In hindsight, this tragedy proved the
effectiveness of the plan that Fiduciary Trust had developed over the preceding fourteen
years. Despite the tragic loss of life and the complete destruction of its offices, the company
was operational the day following the disaster even though the plan had not covered every
contingency as, indeed, no plan could have. Total chaos was, however, averted and both
Fiduciary Trust and its employees were soon well on their way to a speedy recovery.
The Fiduciary Trust case illustrates several important points regarding threat and crisis
management plans:
1. A comprehensive threat and crisis management plan is critical to the quick restoration
of a company’s business after a crisis strikes. It is an excellent tool to assist in restoring
order to chaos. This is not only because many key operational decisions have already
been made but also because it enables employees to understand their role in the
restoration process.
2. A plan that sits on a shelf is of little value to an organization. It is only of value if it has
been tested and a company’s employees know how to implement it.
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3. An effective threat and crisis management plan addresses how and where to relocate
and restore a company’s premises and equipment in times of crisis; how a company’s
personnel will escape from a crisis and where they are to report; how information will
be protected before a crisis and then restored afterwards; and how to communicate with
its personnel, clients, and the public at large.

4. When a crisis affects many companies simultaneously, companies that provide disaster
support services such as counseling and temporary relocation services may not be able
to fulfill all the needs of their clients. An effective crisis management plan should
identify a contingency plan to provide backup support as needed.
5. Even the most comprehensive plans cannot cover every contingency.
Other aspects of a comprehensive threat and crisis management plan that are not
addressed in the Fiduciary Trust case study described above, but which should be part of
an effective plan, are described below:

Premises
The threat and crisis management plan should cover incidents at all facilities—including
the head office location, storage facilities, data processing facilities, call centers,
manufacturing plants, and sales centers.

People
The threat and crisis management plan should identify who will be in command during the
crisis and who will continue to be involved in running the day-to-day operations of the
business. The plan should identify clear lines of authority for those in central command;
the roles and responsibilities of each person should be defined and understood. Typically,
the crisis team would include at least one representative from each of the critical functional
areas of the business as well as someone from human resources, legal, security,
occupational health, public affairs, the CFO’s office, and a union representative.
The threat and crisis management plan should identify a designated threat assessment team
to assess and respond to the following:
• Bomb threats. The plan should identify the tasks and responsibilities associated with
determining whether the threat is real or not and who should be contacted to defuse
and remove the bomb.
• Hazardous materials contamination. The plan should identify the tasks and responsibilities
necessary to contain the hazardous materials and prevent further contamination.
• Medical emergencies. The plan should identify the paramedics and medical specialists to
treat or decontaminate victims and provide antibiotics/antidotes to hazardous materials
contaminants.
• Fire emergencies. The plan should identify the firemen and medical specialists to contain
the fire and treat victims for bums and smoke inhalation.
The threat and crisis management plan should identify who should be called in to help
from outside the company, including crisis management consultants, insurance companies,
insurance brokers, call center services companies, and other service and professional
resources such as engineers and restoration specialists.
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The threat and crisis management plan should identify who should be responsible for
communicating with employees and their families, clients, suppliers, insurers, and the
media and should also identify the types of communications to be provided.

Information
Whether implemented as part of the threat and crisis management planning process or as a
standard business practice of the information technology (IT) department, it is advisable to
have more than one backup location for a company’s transactional data, client, and staff
lists, and the software used to process such information. Companies using courier services
between offices can include backup disks along with the mail going to outlying offices.

The threat and crisis management plan should include the creation of a manual for
recovering the company’s computer systems. Such a manual should identify all key
software and hardware required by the business and should identify how to recover or
restore each system. This manual should be the basis for regular testing and should be
upgraded as required to keep current with any new technology.

Reputation
A company’s reputation must be considered as part of any comprehensive threat and crisis
management plan. This involves developing appropriate strategies for communicating with
all the people who could be affected by a crisis. It would also involve developing strategies
for communication with those who could have an interest in the handling of the crisis,
including the company’s employees, customers, suppliers, shareholders, the general public,
the media, and regulatory authorities.

The actions of a company in a crisis—how it handles the actual crisis and how quickly it
responds—are critical to maintaining its reputation. The nature and timing of the
communications issued by the company are also important but these are secondary to its
actions. Such communications could take the form of damage control or could be positive
messages regarding how the company is averting or minimizing the impact of the crisis.

11.4.2 Denial of Insurance Coverage for Terrorist Acts
September 11, 2001 convinced many managements that disaster could be just around the
corner for their business and that it was important to have an effective and up-to-date threat
and crisis management plan to minimize the disruption and losses that would otherwise be
suffered from such a disaster.
The actions of insurance companies after September 11 further convinced management of
this need as many insurance companies rewrote their policies to exclude coverage for
terrorist acts.

This prompted many executives to realize how vulnerable they were and prompted them
to establish or upgrade their threat and crisis management plans to minimize the
disruptions and losses to their ongoing operations.
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Campbell Electronics Case Study
Subsequent to September 11, 2001, Campbell Electronics, an electronics
manufacturing company with head offices in California and manufacturing facilities
in several foreign jurisdictions including the Pacific Rim, retained a risk consulting
firm to assess its risks and vulnerabilities. This assessment included examining the
company’s existing response and business continuation plans to determine their
efficacy.
This risk assessment revealed that Campbell Electronics had well-developed
security procedures related to computer security, fire, and theft but was ill-prepared
for catastrophic events such as those of September 11. For example, there were no
plans for dealing with bomb threats or chemical contaminants. The company also
had no contingency or business continuation plans for incidents that might deny
them access to their facilities because of the destruction of their headquarters.
This weakness represented a significant risk to the company since it was critical for
head office staff to be able to coordinate the activities of each of its manufacturing
facilities. This was accomplished through sophisticated communications systems
using their computer and telecommunication systems. These systems were
networked and integrated and allowed for the secure exchange of financial and
strategic information on a real-time basis. Their operations relied heavily on this
communications network to control inventory levels and manufacturing schedules
as well as accounting and human resource functions.

Based on the results of the risk assessment, Campbell Electronics modified its crisis
management plans to address this critical risk by incorporating contingency plans
to provide for business continuation in the event of a denial of access to its
corporate head office facilities near San Francisco. The contingency plan identified
the departments and personnel that were critical to the operations of the business in
the US and internationally and also identified all the computer, telephone and
office equipment necessary for these departments and personnel to function
effectively at the backup site. This evaluation was based on input from several
employees within the company.

The company then made arrangements with a reputable disaster recovery facility to
provide sufficient temporary office space, computer equipment, telephones, and
office equipment to enable the critical operations team to function effectively. The
contingency plan also identified how to mobilize such resources. For personnel who
were not part of the critical operations team, the plan provided guidelines for
supporting the continued operations.
Training programs were integrated into a comprehensive program to prepare the
company’s management team and staff to respond to any crisis. Such training
included the introduction of crisis simulation exercises to ensure that the
contingency plans were understood by the key decision makers involved in
implementing the plan and to provide a forum for the plan to be discussed and
improved upon.
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The Campbell Electronics case illustrates several important points regarding threat and
crisis management plans:

1. Threat and crisis management plans need to include more than just an evacuation plan
and whom to call in the event of fire. They need to consider what to do when an entire
facility is destroyed or otherwise becomes unavailable for use.
2. As part of the threat and crisis management planning process, it is important to consider
what aspects of a business are critical and to tailor the threat and crisis management
plan to enable the critical components of the business to be restored immediately after
the crisis.
3. Employees who are not part of the critical operations team still have an important role
to fill in the event of an emergency. They need to be available for deployment in
whatever roles are considered important by the crisis management team.

4. Crisis simulation exercises are an important part of the preparation of management to
handle a threat or crisis and are also an important part of the process of improving and
refining the threat and crisis management plan.

Sanvista’s Kidnapping Crisis Case Study

Sanvista Consumables, a multinational consumer products company operating in
the Middle East, engaged a risk consulting company to expand its crisis
management plan. It wanted the plan especially to cover the threat to senior
management personnel of kidnapping or hostage taking. Sanvista’s head offices
were in the United States, and it was widely known to be a United States-led
operation. The company had operated in the Middle East for years without any
major incident; the Gulf War in 1991 created uneasiness, however, and raised the
level of apprehension among the company’s executives as to Sanvista’s ability to
deal with a kidnapping or hostage-taking crisis.
The risk consulting company provided training for Sanvista’s senior executives at
home and abroad in crisis management and incident control. Response procedures
were established to make critical decisions and retain organizational control. Such
procedures were documented in the crisis management plan and were the subject
of simulation exercises to prepare management for a kidnapping or hostage-taking
incident.
Several months later, one of Sanvista’s top executives in Dubai left his home for an
early morning walk to a convenience store around the corner. He didn’t return.

Two days after he disappeared, a phone call was received at the company’s head
office in the United States demanding a ransom for the return of the executive. A
call was placed to a risk consulting firm for assistance.
Within twenty-four hours, a risk consultant was on location providing expertise and
support to the Sanvista’s crisis management team. The team followed the crisis
management plan, which enabled them to address the situation effectively:
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1. They established an emergency operations center that operated twenty-four hours a
day.
2. From this location, they worked with local government officials and enforcement
officials to negotiate the executive’s release.
3. They also assigned a liaison to provide information and support for the kidnapped
executive’s family and to deal with the media effectively.

Three days later the executive was returned tired and shaken but otherwise
unharmed.

The Sanvista case illustrates several important points regarding kidnapping and hostage
taking incidents:

1. It is important for all senior personnel to try to avoid becoming the victims of a
kidnapping or hostage taking. If prevention fails, it is important for the safety of the
kidnap victim as well as for the reputation of the company to have a crisis management
plan to effect the safe return of the victim.
2. Training in crisis management and incident control are critical for maintaining calm in
the face of danger.
3. A command center with round-the-clock communications capabilities is essential for
comprehensive management of the crisis.
4. Competent professionals with significant experience with kidnapping and hostage
taking incidents should be brought in to assist with strategy and communications at the
command center.

11.5 Corporate Security Checklists
CPAs can use the checklists in this section to assist them in understanding the security
needs of their organization or their clients. No answers require follow-up, the results of
which should be documented. Use the “Ref" column to cross-reference the checklist to the
appropriate supporting working papers. Some sections in these checklists may not be
applicable and should be identified as such in the “N/A” column. The “Ref’ column can
be used to cross-reference any notes made regarding why such sections are not applicable.

The checklists in this section are intended for general guidance and information only. Use
of these checklists does not guarantee the prevention or detection of security breaches.
Those with vital concerns about security or who have a security-related crisis should seek
the advice of a competent risk advisory services practitioner.

11.5.1 Comprehensive Risk Assessment
Comprehensive risk assessments are best performed by a competent risk advisory services
professional with many years’ experience in not only identifying but in dealing with the
types of risks described earlier in this chapter. Table 11.2, Comprehensive Risk Assessment
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Checklist, is provided to assist CPAs in understanding the types of issues that need to be
considered as part of this process. This checklist collates several of the concepts presented
in this chapter but does purport to present all issues that need to be considered as part of a
comprehensive risk assessment process. Further, this checklist is not intended as a substitute
for engaging a competent risk advisory services professional.
Table 11.2 Comprehensive Risk Assessment Checklist
Comprehensive Risk Assessment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

A no answer to any of the following questions warrants further follow
up:

1. Security Department

a. Does your company have a security department?
b. Does the security department report to head office? And are
the costs related to security part of the head office budget?
c. Does the head of security have at least ten years’ experience?

d. Does the security department have security personnel at each
location?

2. Nature and Location of Operations
a. Do appropriate security procedures exist to protect the
personal safety of employees who handle hazardous materials?
To prevent a contamination?
b. If your organization has facilities that are visited by the public,
or has transportation equipment that the public uses, do
appropriate security procedures exist to protect the public from
danger, and to evacuate the public in the event of danger?

c. If any of your facilities are located in the third world, have any
additional security procedures been implemented there
beyond those that are implemented elsewhere?
3. Emergency Preparedness

a. Has a threat and crisis management plan been developed for
your organization? If so, has it been reviewed and tested in the
last year?
b. Does the threat and crisis management plan cover evacuation
procedures?
c. Does the threat and crisis management plan cover business
resumption planning?

4. Premises and Equipment (Consider the following questions
for each location.)

a. Does this location have locks and alarms to prevent
unauthorized entry? Are they monitored?
(continued)
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Table 11.2 (continued)
Comprehensive Risk Assessment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Is card access technology used?

c. If card access technology is used, are these cards also used for
photo identification purposes?
d. Is closed circuit television (CCTV) used at all access points to
the facility?

e. Does reception have an alarm button that is continuously
monitored whenever reception is open?
f. Do controls exist to prevent unauthorized access from the
loading dock?
g. Do controls exist to prevent unauthorized access via the freight
elevator and stairwells?

h. Have improvements been made to the security system related
to any past security breaches?

i. Have you looked into where to obtain temporary equipment to
keep your business going?
j. Do you know how you would quickly replace your inventories,
if lost?

k. Do you know where you would maintain your inventory if
your storage facility was damaged?
1. Do you know where you would manufacture your product or
operate your business if your primary location was irreparably
damaged or destroyed?
5. People (Consider the following questions for personnel at
each location.)
a. Have evacuation procedures been documented and distributed
to all personnel?
b. Have crisis management procedures been developed and
distributed to all key personnel?

c. Are all new employees screened through a background
checking process?
d. Is travel advisory information provided to traveling executives
that advises on political and other risks in the countries they
are traveling to?
e. Have all key personnel been trained in how to avoid becoming
a victim of a kidnapping?

f. Have procedures been documented and distributed related to
how to handle bomb threats or biohazards?

26
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Table 11.2 (continued)
Comprehensive Risk Assessment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

6. Critical Operations and Personnel
a. Do you know which employees perform functions that are
critical to the survival of your business?
b. If certain employees were unable to work, have you identified
replacements, either within the organization or through the use
of temporary employment agencies?

c. Do at least two other employees know how to perform the
critical functions performed by these people?
d. Do you maintain up-to-date procedure manuals regarding the
performance of the business’s critical functions?
7. Information (Consider the following questions for information
stored electronically and in hard-copy format at each location.)

a. Do access controls exist to protect each computer at this
location and the information stored in them?

b. Are laptops secured at night?

c. Are daily backups taken of all data on servers and mainframes?
And are these backups stored offsite? Is more than one backup
taken?
d. Do you regularly back-up all computer programs?
e. Are current copies of customer lists, employee lists and
procedures manuals maintained offsite?

8. Insurance Coverage
a. Do you periodically review your insurance coverage, know
exactly what your insurance policy covers and keep a copy of
the policy offsite?

b. Have your insurance policies been reviewed within the last
year?

9. Reputation
a. Are press releases controlled?

b. Are newspapers monitored for information about your
company?
c. Are chat rooms monitored, and are there procedures in place
to handle any reputational slurs?
d. Do policies exist related to the consequences of committing an
act that is adverse to the interests of the company such as
committing a fraud, or destroying property? Are all personnel
required to sign a statement acknowledging they have read and
agree to the policies?
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11.5.2 Threat and Crisis Management Planning
The threat and crisis management planning process is best performed by a competent risk
and crisis management professional, with many years’ experience in not only planning for,
but also addressing the types of threats and crises described in this chapter. Table 11.3,
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist, is provided to assist CPAs in understanding the
types of issues that need to be considered as part of this process. This checklist is not
intended as a substitute for engaging a competent risk crisis management professional.
Table 11.3 Threat and Crisis Management Checklist
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

A no answer to any of the following questions warrants further follow
up:

1. Existence of a Crisis Management Plan
a. Is there a Crisis Management Plan?

b. Has it been reviewed within the last year?
c. Has it been tested within the last year?
d. Have all the recommendations for improvement been
implemented since the plan was last tested?

e. Is a copy of the Crisis Management Plan maintained in both
hard copy and electronically?
f. Is the Crisis Management Plan accessible to at least ten key
personnel per location, in both electronic and hard-copy form?
And have two copies of the plan been provided to each
person—one for the office, and a backup copy for their homes?

g. Does the plan accommodate local, regional, and international
incidents?
h. Does the plan accommodate incidents at all types of facilities of
the company (for instance, storage facilities, production plants,
head office, sales offices)?
2. Roles and Responsibilities

a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify who will perform
the following roles in the event of a crisis along with alternates
for each position (if yes, identify names)?
• Crisis Management Chairman
• Incident and Intelligence Coordinators
• Loss Prevention and Risk Manager
• Security Coordinator
• General Counsel
• Finance Coordinator
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Computer Recovery

• Human Resources
• Public Relations and Media Coordinator

• Crisis Management Coordinator
• Recorder

• Floor Warden—Male
• Floor Warden—Female

b. Does the Crisis Management Plan provide a description of the
responsibilities for each of the following personnel?
• Crisis Management Chairman (person with authority to
make decisions on evacuation and related to the allocation
of funds, etc.)

• Incident and Intelligence Coordinators
• Loss Prevention and Risk Manager
• Security Coordinator
• General Counsel
• Finance Coordinator
• Computer Recovery
• Human Resources

• Public Relations and Media Coordinator
• Crisis Management Coordinator (coordinates all activities
of support personnel during the recovery efforts)

• Recorder (records critical information during the recovery
efforts—for instance, who is accounted for and who is
missing)

• Floor Warden—Male
• Floor Warden—Female

c. Does the Crisis Management Plan make it clear who will speak
to employees, the media, victims and families after a crisis?
3. Personnel Evacuation, Identification, and Recall

a. Does the Crisis Management Plan designate evacuation points
that have protection from weather? Are there restroom
facilities?
(continued)
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Do the evacuation points have access to appropriate
communication methods?
c. Does the Crisis Management Plan include accountability lists
per department, or identify where the current version of such
lists are located?
d. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify where employees
are to “call in” to report their whereabouts in the event of a
catastrophe?
e. Does the Crisis Management Plan include emergency contact
numbers for the next of kin of employees in each department,
or identify where the current version of such information is
located?

f. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify a recall method
regarding when it is safe to return to work?
4. Operational Facilities and Personnel

a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify which operations
are critical for the ongoing operations of the business?
b. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify which employees
perform functions that are critical for the ongoing operations of
the business?

c. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify at least two
replacement personnel for each critical employee—either
within the organization or through the use of temporary
employment agencies—in the event that certain of the critical
employees are unable to work?
d. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the location of the
primary Replacement Operational Facility?

e. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the location of the
alternate Replacement Operational Facility?
f. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify how to restore
operations?

g. Are the primary and alternate Replacement Operational
Facilities located off-site?

h. Are the primary and alternate Replacement Operational
Facilities located within two miles of the existing operational
facility?
i. Is the space sufficient in the primary and alternate
Replacement Operational Facilities?
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

5. Crisis Command Center

a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the location of the
primary Crisis Command Center?
b. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the location of the
alternate Crisis Command Center?

c. Are the primary and alternate Crisis Command Centers
located offsite?
d. Are the primary and alternate Crisis Command Centers
located within two miles of the existing facility?

e. Is the space sufficient in the primary and alternate Crisis
Command Centers?
f. Do the primary and alternate Crisis Command Centers have
the following:
• Copies of the Crisis Management Plan Manual
• Telephones, including unlisted outside lines (multiple lines,
multiple phones)

• Answering Machine(s)
• Pagers
• Cellular Phones
• Computer with Printer
• White Paper
• Typewriter
• Copier
• Fax Machine

• Recorder
• Shredder

• Overhead Projector
• Bulletin Boards

• Easels
• Television Sets (at least three)

• VCRs (at least three)
• Video Camera
• Digital Camera
(continued)
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Tape Recorder
• Basic Office Equipment and Supplies (pens, pencils,
erasers, staplers, markers, tape, masking tape, duct tape)

• Flashlights
• Safe or other secure storage facility, which can be secured
when the center is unoccupied for storing sensitive files and
materials

6. Crisis Support Numbers

Does the Crisis Management Plan include phone numbers for the
following services?
• Local Hospitals

• Local Ambulance Services
• Burn Center
• Centers for Disease Control
• Counseling Services
• Local Bomb Squad

• Local Police Department
• FBI Office
• Fire Department

• Red Cross
• FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
• US Embassy or Consulate
• Passport and Visa Office

7. Data Recovery and Replacement Computer Equipment
a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify where a
replacement computer system is located?
b. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify where back-up data
is located?

c. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify how to restore the
computer system with the back-up data?
d. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify how to restore the
company’s Web site in the event that it is no longer available?
8. Equipment Requirements

a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the equipment that
is essential for the operation of the business?
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Does the Crisis Management Plan provide authority for the
procurement of essential equipment?

9. Incident-Specific Crisis Management Plans

Are there individual appendices to deal with each of the following
types of incidents?
• Systems Intrusion

• Building Evacuation
• Cyber-terrorism
• Computer and Telecommunications Failures
• Fire and Explosion
• Bomb Threats and Searches
• Hazardous Materials

• Civil Disorder

• Workplace Violence
• Armed Attack
• Kidnap and Extortion

• Employee Disappearance
• Hostage Taking

• Water and Power Outages
• Flood
• Earthquake

• Tornado
• Hurricane

11.5.3 Financial Issues to Deal With When Disaster Strikes
There are a number of financial issues that arise when disaster strikes. The quicker these
issues are dealt with, the quicker a business will be able to return to normal operations and
prevent further losses from occurring. Table 11.4, Financial Issues to Address When
Disaster Strikes, is provided for general guidance to CPAs to address the financial aspects
of the disaster-recovery effort. This table is not intended as a substitute for engaging a
competent crisis management professional to assist in the event of an actual disaster.
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Table 11.4 Financial Issues to Address When Disaster Strikes
Financial Issues to Address When Disaster Strikes

Yes

No

NA

Ref

A no answer to any of the following questions warrants further follow
up:

1. Cash Flow and Financing

a. Are alternate means of payroll processing and delivery
available? Are all health and disability insurance issues
addressed?
b. Are you still able to obtain payments from your customers? (If
not, make arrangements for alternate postal delivery
services/banking arrangements with customers.)

c. Is your cash position adequate? Can you access the cash? Can
you meet your immediate cash needs? Can you keep up with
your anticipated cash-burn rate?
d. Have you informed your creditors, bankers, suppliers, joint
venture partners, and strategic partners of the recent events?

e. Are you aware of all available financial assistance such as
credit lines, disaster loans and grants? (Make arrangements as
required.)
2. Insurance
a. Have you informed your insurer and insurance broker
regarding the recent events?
b. Do you have a copy of your insurance policies covering, for
example, key individuals, other life, property, business
interruption, and disability?

c. Do you know the deadlines for submissions of an insurance
claim? Have you gathered and submitted the required
information?

3. Business Operations
a. Are you able to operate right now? Determine, for example,
immediate or impending deadlines, due dates, customer and
supplier needs.
b. Are you aware of your company’s current operational risks,
such as work-in-progress, cancellations, no-shows, refunds, lost
revenues, and undeliverable materials?

c. Are you able to meet all the needs of your customers? If not,
consider contacting competitors to outsource production to
them until you are able to meet your customers’ needs.
4. Information Backup
a. Do you know when the last backup of your computer
information took place?
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Table 11.4 (continued)
Financial Issues to Address When Disaster Strikes

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Do you know where your backup data is stored? Has it been
retrieved yet?

c. Do you have a copy of the last available financial statements?
(If not, check with auditors and attorneys.)
d. Have you inquired of your attorneys and auditors to determine
whether they have any other information that could be useful
for ongoing operational purposes (copies of contracts and
agreements)?
5. Business Plan Assessment
a. Is your most recent business plan still valid? Have you
considered what can/cannot be executed?

b. Has your business plan been updated to reflect the current
situation?
c. Have you provided a copy of your updated business plan to
your financiers, creditors or bankers (if required)?
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11.6

The Kroll October 2001 Survey on
Security Risk Management

Kroll

October 2001

The Risk Consulting Company

Survey on Security Risk Management
Post September 11, 2001
September 11, 2001 has prompted businesses to abruptly
re-assess their ability to deal with security threats, accord

ing to a recent survey of executives, conducted by Kroll,

a leading risk consulting company.
In New York, Boston and Toronto, businesspeople
expressed a heightened sense of vulnerability to possible
emergencies, both man-made and natural. Before
September 11, information protection and employee
integrity were the top security priorities. Since then,
concern with emergency planning, business resumption
planning and physical security has increased dramatically.

Although most have formal plans for fire and systems
disasters, many organizations would be forced to impro
vise if confronted by a bomb threat, hazardous material
scare or utility outage. Despite widespread doubt about
the adequacy of controls to manage security risks, almost
everyone has indicated that their organizations will
upgrade security over the next six months. This apparent
commitment to improve security should be welcome
news to employees, customers and shareholders alike.

Methodology
Kroll invited executives and professionals from a broad
range of sectors - including financial services, consumer
goods and services, utilities, energy, and real estate - to
complete a confidential “Security Preparedness” ques
tionnaire at Threat and Crisis Management seminars held
in October 2001 in New York, Boston and Toronto.
Approximately 100 of the participants gave details on
their organizations’ readiness to deter, detect and respond
to security threats. There appears to be a strong consen
sus on most security issues.

Key Findings
The key findings are summarized below under five
headings:
1. Adequacy of security risk management today - and in
six months
2. Security priorities

3. Importance of preparedness

Objectives
This survey was designed to:

4. Incidence of formal emergency plans
5. Incidence of specific security measures

□ Assess whether the security priorities of business have
changed since September 11, 2001 - and if so, how;
□ Measure the extent to which business is ready with
emergency plans and security measures; and

□ Gauge the adequacy of security risk management by
business.
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Adequacy of Security Risk Management
Today - And In Six Months
While many businesspeople question the adequacy of

their organizations’ management of security risks - most

Perception of the adequacy
of company's security risk

Expectation that company's
security risk management will

change in 6 months

believe this security will improve over the next six

months.
□ When asked about their organizations’ “ability to

manage security risks,” only 43% gave positive ratings
(4 or 5, on a 5-point scale). Another 37% were uncer

tain or neutral on the question, while 19% indicated
outright criticism.

□ Most (89%) expect security risks to be better managed
in six months time, suggesting that many businesses
are committed to upgrading their risk management

systems by addressing perceived shortcomings.

Security Priorities
... .........................................................
Priorities have shifted. Before 9/11, information
security and employee integrity led the list of
concerns. Since then, preoccupation with all aspects
of security has intensified dramatically, particularly
with emergency planning, business resumption plan
ning and physical security.

Security Priorities:
% Rating "Important" (4 or 5, on 5-point scale)

□ Most businesspeople (86%) now view emergency
planning as “important” (4 or 5 on a 5-point scale),
whereas only 34% said this was a priority before
September 11.

□ Similarly, 80% say business resumption planning is
“important,” while only 38% held this opinion
before 9/11.
□ Likewise, 89% think physical security is an “impor
tant” priority, up from 40%.
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October 2001

Importance of Preparedness
Emergency Preparedness:
°/o Rating "Important" (4 or 5, on 5-point scale)

The survey confirms a heightened sense of vulnerability to

a wide range of emergencies, both man-made and natural.

□ The importance of “preparedness” has risen since

Systems intrusion

September 11 for all ten types of emergencies covered
by the survey. In addition to increased concern with

terrorist bomb threats, hostage-taking and armed
attacks, businesses are also more worried about coping

Computer/
telecom failure
Fire/explosion

Bomb threat

with fire, utility outages, computer intrusions - and
Hazardous materials

even civil disorder and natural disasters.

Water/power outage

□ Not surprisingly, preparedness to deal with bomb

threats and hazardous materials saw the greatest jump
in importance (i.e., up 43 and 47 percentage points,

respectively) since September 11. Only 24% of respon

Civil disorder

Armed attack

Hostage taking

dents said readiness to deal with hazardous material
was important before the US terrorist attacks,

compared with 71% afterward.

Natural disaster

[+xx%] indicates percentage point difference between ratings before and after Sept 11,2001.

□ System intrusion was rated the most important issue
both before and after September 11.

Incidence of Formal Emergency Plans
Most organizations have formal plans for fire and

Incidence of Formal Emergency Plans

computer disasters, but many would be forced to impro
vise if struck by other types of catastrophe:

□ A majority of (though not all) organizations have docu
mented

emergency

procedures

for

fire

(73%),

telecom/computer outages (75%) and systems intrusions

(71%).
□ Readiness to address other emergencies is less
common, such as the ability to cope with bomb threats

(60%), utility outages (57%) or hazardous materials
(50%).

□ Only 48% currently have formal plans to deal with

any form of natural disaster, although another 18%
say such plans are now being developed.
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Incidence of Specific Security Measures
Incidence of Security Measures

Certain standard security measures are quite prevalent; for
example, most organizations have evacuation procedures

and many hold regular drills. Computer monitoring and off

site storage of vital business records are also widespread, as

is electronic surveillance. On the other hand, there are some
notable shortcomings:
□ Just 59% of organizations have procedures to shut

down utilities in an emergency.
□ Only half (47%) have designated threat assessment
teams.

□ Security policies for traveling company executives are
comparatively rare (31%), despite being relatively

straightforward to implement.

Kroll Inc. is a global leader in providing risk consulting services to corporations,

financial institutions and governments. Drawing on a broad range of profes
sional disciplines and experience - including security, law enforcement, forensic
accounting, information technology and competitive intelligence - Kroll’s
services include:

□ Physical security assessment

□ Country risk assessments

□ Emergency procedure consulting

□ Traveler security advisories

□ Security staff training

□ Kidnap response

□ Surveillance technology consulting

□ Executive protection

□ Business intelligence and investigations □ Systems intrusion detection
□

Employee integrity checks

□

Computer network assessment

For more information regarding Kroll’s services, please visit

www.krollworldwide.com or contact one of Kroll’s offices.

Kroll
The Risk Consulting Company
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12.1

Overview
Some people believe that any attempt to discharge legitimate debts through the bankruptcy
process is, at best, a questionable moral act and, at worst, a crime. The right to remove
one’s debts through a bankruptcy filing has, however, been long established in American
law. Unfortunately, among the huge number of bankruptcies filed annually, some are
based on fudged accounting that may create an outright criminal fraud. Criminal
bankruptcy fraud is often complex and not readily understood by the public or even by
CPAs who are skilled in financial accounting. CPAs who act as auditors of a company that
later goes bankrupt often find themselves embroiled in an audit or negligence action
concerning whether they should have known about the fraudulent transactions that led to
the collapse.

To the CPA untutored in the arcane lore of bankruptcy, the entire process may seem
intended primarily to move the bankruptcy through the system quickly and not necessarily
to uncover and prosecute fraudulent filings. Nevertheless, those associated with the
administration of the bankruptcy system are keenly aware of the possibilities of fraud and
are willing to act promptly on learning of its existence.

12.2 The Bankruptcy Process
To understand bankruptcy fraud, it is necessary to understand the basic elements of the
bankruptcy process. That process is supported by various concepts, most of which seem
relatively simple on the surface, but become increasingly complex for a number of reasons.

12.2.1 Insolvency
Although insolvency is not an absolute requirement, bankruptcy starts with the
presumption that liabilities exceed assets or that existing cash flow is insufficient to service
debts. This simple concept can be agonizingly complex in larger bankruptcies because of
the wide variety of valuation methods. Nevertheless, by and large, most insolvency is
determined by this test. Insolvency does not need to be reached before filing a bankruptcy
petition.

12.2.2 Filing for Bankruptcy
The actual bankruptcy commences with the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Concurrent
with the filing of the petition or shortly thereafter, the debtor, that is, any person or entity
that is the subject of the bankruptcy, is required to file a Schedule of Assets and Liabilities
and a Statement of Financial Affairs. These documents, which are often referred to as
Fraud Supp. 2—3/02
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bankruptcy schedules, are a somewhat tailored set of financial statements containing a list
of the debtor’s assets and liabilities plus specific written intentions regarding the disposition
of assets and the payment of liabilities.

For instance, if a debtor owns a TV or automobile in which a creditor holds a security
interest, the debtor must state his or her intention to surrender that asset or make
arrangements to pay for the asset in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Examples of bankruptcy schedules are included as Exhibit A, Bankruptcy Schedules, on
the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM. These particular forms (in PDF-format, viewable
with Adobe Acrobat) are used by the Central District of California, but may be considered
typical since bankruptcy forms are relatively uniform throughout the United States.

12.2.3 The Bankruptcy Petition
A bankruptcy petition requesting one of two prescribed courses of action must be included
with the filing. Under the first option, the debtor may reorganize his or her financial affairs
under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 (or Chapter 12 for a family farmer) and remain in some
form of control, albeit under strict court supervision.
The second choice is to file a simple liquidation under Chapter 7 and allow a trustee to
liquidate his or her assets and pay the remaining sums to creditors in accordance with the
priorities established under the bankruptcy code. Although some classes of creditors may
receive a higher priority due to a statutory right, that is, taxes versus general unsecured
creditors, creditors cannot be subject to any arbitrary discrimination on the part of the
debtor.

The bankruptcy schedules are filed under a penalty of perjury. Consequently, any
intentional misstatement included in the bankruptcy schedules may subject the debtor to
criminal penalties.
Within a short time following the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a time, date, and place
will be arranged for the debtor to be placed under oath and answer the questions of any
creditors wishing to ask questions. This examination is called a 341a meeting, that is, a First
Meeting of Creditors, as mandated by the bankruptcy code.
If an individual debtor (primarily a person) files his or her schedules and statements in
good faith and complies with all other requirements, he or she will be allowed a discharge of
their debts in accordance with bankruptcy law. A corporation is not allowed a discharge
under the same provisions afforded an individual debtor.

12.3

Fraud in Bankruptcy Filings
Tens of thousands of persons seeking to be relieved of their debts follow the above
referenced procedure every year. There are, however, many who seek to avail themselves
of the protection afforded under the bankruptcy code without complying with all the
applicable bankruptcy code requirements.

Many CPAs can recognize fraud when they encounter it. CPAs who have not had direct
experience with the criminal justice system, however, may find themselves on uncertain
ground as they try to understand the distinction between civil and criminal fraud.

4
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The following sections will provide some limited assistance in this area, but the exact
demarcation between civil and criminal matters in any particular case is best left to legal
counsel or law enforcement. The CPA should develop the facts and underlying supporting
documentation of any alleged fraud and allow the lawyers to make that distinction. CPAs
should keep in mind the following concepts that relate to bankruptcy fraud.

12.3.1 Materiality
Materiality is a concept that CPAs must deal with routinely. CPAs believe that financial
statements must be materially correct and materiality is often defined as an omission or
misstatement within five percent of the correct amount. However, the five-percent
materiality rule does not apply in bankruptcy fraud.

Failure to Disclose Assets
If, for example, a debtor files bankruptcy schedules and knowingly fails to include a onethird interest in a small boat valued at $30,000, with ownership shared by other members
of the family, that oversight may be deemed material in the accounting sense, especially if
the debtor’s total net worth is small. The knowing exclusion of such an amount may
technically qualify as a bankruptcy crime but the act may not rise to the level of
prosecutorial merit in the opinion of the United States Attorney. However, if a debtor
somehow conveniently forgets $ 1 million in a Swiss bank account, that oversight will not
be similarly forgiven, even if such a large sum constitutes only two percent of the debtor’s
total assets.

Geographical Differences
The meaning of materiality may also vary according to location. What may deeply offend
the moral and legal sensibilities in Topeka, Kansas, may be dismissed with a wave of the
hand in Los Angeles or New York.

Providing a Complete Report
The best course of action when faced with the dilemma of whether or not an action will be
deemed material is simply to provide a complete report of the findings and allow others to
make that decision. Of course, that full reporting concept should be tempered with
financial and cost considerations such as the cost required to uncover such omissions fully.

12.3.2 Knowledge and Fraudulent Intent
Knowledge and intent are legal concepts probably best left to be discussed by lawyers.
There are, however, some common-sense elements that may offer assistance to the CPA
when analyzing various elements of bankruptcy fraud.

Debtor Knowledge
The government is not required to demonstrate that the debtor knew his or her acts or
omissions were unlawful, but the government is required to demonstrate that the defendant
acted knowingly and fraudulently. In fact, a debtor should be very careful about the
contents of any documents he or she signs. If those schedules are later found to be
fraudulent, the debtor will probably be unable to assert complete ignorance as a defense.
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The courts have routinely characterized such action as willful blindness and have deemed
them nonexculpatory, although an inadvertent mistake will not support a violation.

Circumstantial Evidence
It is also possible to demonstrate fraudulent intent through circumstantial evidence and
inferences can be drawn through observing a course of conduct. In fact, circumstantial
evidence and inferences from behavior often constitute the bulk of the evidence in
bankruptcy fraud. If a bankruptcy is filed for a retail business and there is a later
determination that the schedules omitted substantial levels of inventory previously listed on
the books and records of the debtor, it would be natural to question such an omission,
especially if there was no visible cash from the sale of the inventory.

In one instance, the president and former owner of the company volunteered that he had
sold the inventory in the ordinary course of business just before the bankruptcy and had
deposited the funds in the bank account of a creditor, pursuant to a prior agreement. Such
action may be unwise but is not in and of itself a criminal act. It would be difficult to assert
that such action was a premeditated attempt to deprive the creditors of funds to enrich the
former owner of the company at their expense since the cash was still available but simply
deposited erroneously into a creditor’s account according to a procedure in place before
the bankruptcy.
If, on the other hand, the former owner of the business had filed a police report alleging
theft of the entire inventory just before the bankruptcy, and it was later determined that the
former owner had secretly removed the inventory with the help of accomplices and
pocketed the proceeds from its sale, such action would clearly have been knowing and
fraudulent. It would be difficult to believe otherwise.

12.3.3 Criminal Prosecution
Judicial Discretion
It is important for any CPA to understand that what may seem a very clear bankruptcy
fraud worthy of incarceration may not necessarily draw a federal prosecutor to the same
conclusion. The decision of a federal prosecutor as to whether or not to prosecute a
bankruptcy fraud may hinge on a number of factors such as those listed below.

Law Enforcement Staffing Limitations
The United States Attorney’s Office and the FBI or other investigative agencies have
staffing limitations similar to those of any organization. For instance, the day after the
World Trade Center attack, it would have been difficult to generate a lot of enthusiasm for
removing FBI agents from the terrorism investigation to pursue a bankruptcy allegation.
Granting that most priorities are not as clearly defined as this, normal personnel-allocation
matters are a daily problem. Prosecution priorities are often established on a national basis
but local offices can decide to pursue any number of violations they deem to be of great
importance to that locale. The issue of materiality or the amount of money involved in the
fraud is clearly a determining factor—the larger the loss, the greater the likelihood of an
investigation. Some offices may choose to emphasize violent crimes they consider more
dangerous to the citizens of their communities than nonviolent bankruptcy crimes.
Bankruptcy cases often require a significant investment of hours before a successful
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indictment can be brought, whereas other cases may require fewer hours and still produce
the desired indictment.

Self-Incrimination Issues
A person subject to a bankruptcy fraud investigation may choose to invoke their rights
under the Fifth Amendment, which gives them the right not to answer any questions on the
premise that they do not want to incriminate themselves.

Even though CPAs usually do not face this issue, should it arise, the following are among
the points that should be remembered:
1. Should you wish to obtain information from the debtor and he or she chooses not to
speak with you, be careful not to compel or threaten him or her. Respect his or her Fifth
Amendment rights. In any accounting investigations of this nature, it is far better to
focus your efforts on the accounting records, at least in the early stages.
2. The issue of self-incrimination may arise during your attempts to obtain the accounting
records. Debtors may assert that privilege to prohibit the CPA from reviewing their
records. The CPA should seek competent legal counsel in such cases. As a general rule,
however, access to debtor records is not necessarily protected under the Fifth
Amendment if the existence of the records is undisputed. The CPA should provide a
reasonable basis for requesting the records and make certain that such a request is both
sensible and within the appropriate realm of inquiry.
3. The Fifth Amendment is a personal right, not a blanket right to be extended to all
associates of the debtor. For instance, a CPA or bookkeeper employed by the debtor
will generally be far more helpful in providing information than even the debtor. Also,
even though the bookkeeper can assert his or her own individual privilege under the
Fifth Amendment, he or she has no power to extend that privilege to his or her
employer, the debtor.
4. The right to seek records in a bankruptcy is rather broad. If the debtor, a bank, or other
party, refuses to provide records voluntarily, an order to compel production of
documents, a Rule 2004 examination request, is filed in the bankruptcy court. The Rule
2004 examination is found in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. It is
somewhat similar to a subpoena but can be broader. The bankruptcy judge will usually
issue a Rule 2004 examination order without a hearing upon application from any party
in interest. If the party to whom the 2004 examination is directed objects, a hearing will
be scheduled. The assertion that the records of the debtor may be incriminating is not
likely to draw a sympathetic response from the court if the existence of those records is
undisputed.
5. Be patient and methodical in your attempts to collect and review documents. The
process is never quite as neat or fast as depicted on television. It is possible to pursue
both a civil and a criminal bankruptcy fraud investigation at the same time. The
existence of a criminal investigation may make the normal review of records somewhat
more difficult. Keep focused on the task and do not be dissuaded from your right to
review them.
6. Finally, in appropriate civil cases, the debtor’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege may support an adverse inference by the bankruptcy court. The court is
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allowed to take note of such an adverse inference if they so choose, and independent
evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to answer.

12.4 Elements of Bankruptcy Fraud
There are a number of possible ways for an individual to engage in bankruptcy fraud. The
list below, while not exhaustive, is an example of the main types of fraud used to
circumvent the bankruptcy code.

12.4.1 Nondisclosure or Concealment of Assets
Asset concealment consists of knowingly concealing the existence of an asset by not
disclosing the asset in the schedules and statements filed in the bankruptcy. The FBI
estimates that approximately 70 percent of all bankruptcy crimes are committed through
asset concealment.

Title 18, Section 152 of the United States Code defines as criminal
a person who—(1) knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian,
trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court charged with the control or
custody of property, or, in connection with a case under title 11, from
creditors or the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of
the debtor [emphasis added].

Kinds of Concealed Assets
The following are examples of commonly concealed assets:

1. Potential gain or loss from a personal injury lawsuit

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Interest held by a debtor in real property
Bank and investment accounts not disclosed on the schedules
Investments in nondebtor entities
Art or other valuable collectibles

Investments in any assets that include both a beneficial or recorded interest in behalf of
the debtor
7. Intentional undervaluation of assets to convince creditors or the Chapter 7 Trustee to
abandon any interest in the property and allow the debtor to retain the asset for use
after the bankruptcy (An example of undervaluation may be to list an asset, such as a
piece of real estate, but to knowingly attach a minimal value to the property by excluding
some element of value such as a valuable right of way or possible mineral rights.)

Uncovering Concealed Assets
The most important fact to remember when trying to uncover concealed assets is that they
were not always concealed. There were probably times during the period preceding the
bankruptcy when those assets were listed in the financial statements and general ledgers of
the debtor, or both. You must backtrack until you reach the period when the asset was
either fully or partially disclosed.
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The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover concealed assets:

1. As a debtor’s financial difficulties begin, it is usual for him or her to seek financing from
traditional financial institutions to ease the problems. When seeking a loan at such a
time, most individuals make extensive disclosure of their assets. In other words, they put
everything possible into their balance sheet to convince the financial institution of their
creditworthiness. Therefore, a good step is to find all banks that may have received such
a financial statement within the last five years and obtain a copy of those loan
applications. Credit reports often identify requests or applications for credit and list the
bank from which the credit was sought. A number of financial institutions may have had
a long history with the debtor and may even be creditors in the bankruptcy. Prior
applications for credit should be sought from those banks. Also, banks often have prior
tax returns of the debtor. Such returns are not privileged in the hands of third parties.
However, always consult legal counsel before attempting to obtain bank, credit, or other
records to avoid violating laws, regulations, and the debtors’ rights.
2. Obtain tax returns for as far back as possible, preferably for at least five years. Review
those tax returns for any hidden income that might be reflected in K-1 forms from
partnership accounts or 1099 forms from either financial institutions or other income
sources.
3. Engage a licensed investigative firm to conduct a background search of property and
business records for the debtor over the last few years. Because so many records are
contained on computerized databases, a significant amount of information can be
obtained from this source, and at a reasonable cost. Such analysis may include credit
report services that generally provide significant information that can be used to
supplement information from other sources.
4. Review various listing agencies such as Network Solution for URLs to determine
whether the debtor is holding any valuable URLs that have not been recorded on the
debtor’s books and records.
5. Ultimately, the most complete analysis for the discovery of concealed assets is a review
of all cash flowing in and out of the debtor’s accounts over the last four years, or longer
if necessary. The decision to undertake such an analysis is not made routinely. In fact, it
is seldom done unless there exists some unexplained loss or another compelling reason
from an accounting viewpoint. The expense of performing a complete cash analysis of a
debtor will need to be justified on a cost basis and will certainly not be feasible except in
larger bankruptcies wherein the financial benefits outweigh the expense. The process to
complete such an analysis is outlined below.
If a cash-flow analysis is contemplated, it is necessary to obtain the debtor’s bank
statements and all related entities for the period being analyzed in order to create a
database of all receipts and disbursements. A materiality level reflecting the number of
bank accounts, the activity in each account, and overall cost-benefit issues should be
established prior to preparing such a database. While analyzing the bank statements, the
CPA should keep the following issues in mind:
• Look for large or unusual receipts and disbursements, or both, and trace those
transactions to supporting documentation within the records of the debtor. It is
entirely possible that these payments may represent the purchase of assets or the
payment of liabilities not recorded by the debtor.
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• Review monthly or periodic payments of equal amounts that could represent regular
loan payments. Make certain that the assets represented by such payments are
included in the records of the debtor.

• Ascertain whether any monthly or periodic payments are being made to related
parties. Such payments may either represent a transfer of assets for little or no
consideration or create a situation in which a related party is able to acquire assets
belonging to the estate for return to the debtor at a later date.
• Review payments made for real and personal property taxes. The information from
invoices and check details may provide supporting documentation regarding assets
not listed in the records of the debtor.
• Analyze payments to insurance companies. The record of these transactions can
reveal information concerning insured assets. The invoices and check details may
provide additional insight into what may be unlisted assets rightfully belonging to the
estate.
• Analyze unusual expense items that might point to assets not included in the debtor’s
records. For example, monthly payments for hangar rental might indicate the
existence of an airplane.

12.4.2 False Information in Filing
The filing of a bankruptcy petition calls for a declaration under penalty of perjury that all
information included therein is true and correct. United States Code (USC) Section 152
and Section 157 prohibit making a “false oath or account” or a “false declaration,
certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury.” Such false information can
include any number of items such as false social security numbers, fictitious addresses, and
even fake names.
The “knowingly and fraudulently” portion of Section 152 is not intended to encompass an
inadvertent transposition of the existing social security numbers or minor misspelling of
names, but contemplates the willful intent usually evident in identity thefts.
It should be noted that the debtor cannot simply assert that he or she failed to pay attention
to the bankruptcy documents when signing, since the debtor is also required to declare
orally and under penalty of perjury at the 341a meeting that all information included in the
schedules and statements is true and correct in every way.

All information included in a bankruptcy filing must be accurate. Any knowing exclusion or
misstatement could be considered a false declaration or statement. Such information includes
understating the level of postpetition income as required in the bankruptcy schedules.
Should income be sufficiently large and debts sufficiently small, a motion may be filed to
set aside the bankruptcy as a bad-faith filing.

One example of false information in filing would be identity theft, a violation of Section
157, wherein a person essentially steals the identity of another, incurs substantial credit card
or other debt, and then files a bankruptcy under the stolen person’s name and social
security number to forestall the actions of creditors. This kind of theft is increasing as the
volume of Internet shopping grows.
The deliberate and intentional misstatement of income is another example of false
information. A well-compensated salesman who knowingly convinces some clients to defer
10
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commissions on sales to be completed before the bankruptcy will necessarily understate
projected income as reported on Schedule J. This understatement would allow the debtor
to receive the deferred income after his discharge from bankruptcy.

Uncovering Concealed False Information
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover concealed false information:
1. Engage a licensed investigative firm to provide a background check on past addresses
and social security numbers.
2. Review information gleaned from investment accounts and credit card accounts to
ascertain spending practices.
3. Review tax returns for inconsistencies including a large variation in income between
present and prior years.

12.4.3 False Claims Filed in a Bankruptcy
Following the filing of a bankruptcy petition, in cases where assets are available, creditors
are generally required to file a proof of claim specifying the nature and amount of their
claim. Exhibit B, Proof Claim Form, used in the Central District of California, is included
on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM.

Knowingly filing a false claim in bankruptcy is a serious matter that can result in criminal
action. The filing of such a claim must generally be exceptional to warrant the imposition
of criminal action. However, the filing of a false proof of claim could be as simple as trying
to hide a small proof of claim among a large number of nondescript claims.
On the other hand, it could be as complex as a creditor and debtor conspiring to cure a
defect in a security interest to allow the creditor a secured priority to which he or she would
not be entitled under normal conditions. Often, this is done because a debtor may have a
personal guarantee and wishes to avoid a call on that guarantee by granting the creditor a
superior access to assets in the bankruptcy.
An example may be an agreement between the debtor and a creditor during the
bankruptcy for the creditor to provide a false invoice for services or assets not delivered.
Under normal conditions, most postpetition bankruptcy invoices would be paid, thereby
granting the creditor payment to which he or she would not be entitled were it not for the
filing of a false invoice. One of the most common false claim methods is to file an inflated
claim. For instance, a $100 valid claim could be filed for $1,000.

Uncovering False Claims
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover false claims:

1. Conduct a review of the accounts payable subsidiary ledgers for intermittent periods
prior to the bankruptcy and compare those ledgers to existing claims to determine
inconsistencies. Many debtors will have open invoice files. It is likely that the accounts
payable subsidiary ledgers have not been updated for all open invoices. Many creditors
will continue to send invoices that can be used for comparative purposes long after the
bankruptcy has been filed.
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2. Analyze the payments made to creditors for the three to six months before the
bankruptcy to determine whether any of the claims filed in the bankruptcy had been
paid previously.
3. Review the payments made during the year before the filing to ensure that the creditors
have applied the payments correctly. For example, a creditor could have both secured
and unsecured claims with a debtor. Payments could be inappropriately applied to the
unsecured claim so that the secured claim could retain its priority status after the filing.
4. Request supporting documentation from any creditor filing a questionable claim and
conduct a detailed review of such documentation.

5. If the information available leads you to believe that a creditor has engaged in the filing
of a false claim, it may be advisable to schedule a Rule 2004 examination, in which the
creditor provides documents relating to the claim and is placed under oath, and
subjected to questioning. When asked to answer questions under oath, especially any
questions concerning the validity of those claims, the creditor will often withdraw the
claim to avoid close scrutiny.

12.4.4 Transfer of Assets Before a Bankruptcy Filing
One of the more common methods of concealing assets in violation of bankruptcy laws is
to transfer assets without consideration before the actual bankruptcy filing. Should this
scheme go undetected, the debtor could retrieve the assets from the conspiring party
following the bankruptcy.
For example, the debtor in contemplation of bankruptcy agrees to sell an interest in a
fledgling company to a friend for an insignificant sum on the basis of an unwritten
agreement whereby the debtor can reacquire the interest in the company for a similarly
insignificant sum.

Uncovering Transfer of Assets Before a Bankruptcy Filing
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover transfer of assets before a
bankruptcy filing:
1. Many of the steps covered in this section are similar to those discussed in the section on
the nondisclosure or concealment of assets. As in that section, it is important to
understand that there was probably a period preceding the bankruptcy during which
those assets were listed in the records of the debtor. Therefore, you should examine the
debtor’s balance sheets at different dates prior to the bankruptcy and make certain you
can account for assets that have been transferred or otherwise disposed of.
2. Locate all banks that may have received a financial statement from the debtor within
the last five years and obtain a copy of the loan applications they supported. Review
those assets listed in the earlier financial statements and make certain they have been
properly accounted for or adequate consideration has been received for them. It may
be appropriate to trace the receipt of cash from the sale of those assets into the bank
statements of the debtor.
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3. Obtain tax returns for as far back as possible, preferably for at least five years. Review
them for any hidden income that might be reflected in the K-1 forms from partnership
accounts or 1099 forms from either financial institutions or other income sources.
Determine whether those assets have been sold in the period just prior to the
bankruptcy and whether adequate consideration was provided.
4. Engage a licensed investigative firm to conduct a background search of property and
business listings for the debtor over the last few years.
5. Review various listing agencies for URLs to determine whether the debtor is holding
any valuable URLs that have not been recorded on the debtor’s books and records.
6. Look for large or unusual receipts and disbursements, or both, and trace those
transactions to supporting documentation within the debtor’s records. It is entirely
possible that these payments may represent the purchase of assets or payment of
liabilities not recorded by the debtor.
7. Review monthly or periodic payments of equal amounts that could represent regular
loan payments. Make certain that the assets represented by such payments are included
in the debtor’s records.
8. Ascertain whether any monthly or periodic payments are being made to related parties.
Such payments may represent a transfer of assets to the related party for little or no
consideration or create a situation in which a related party is able to acquire assets
belonging to the estate that will be made available to the debtor at a later date.
9. Review payments made for real and personal property taxes. The information from
invoices and check detail may provide supporting documentation regarding assets not
listed in the debtor’s records.
10. Analyze payments made to insurance companies to find information concerning any
insured assets. The invoices and check detail might provide additional insight into what
could be unlisted assets rightfully belonging to the estate.
11. Analyze unusual expense items that might indicate assets not included in the debtor’s
records. For example, monthly payments for hangar rental might indicate the existence
of an airplane.

Skimming the Cream Case Study

Cable & Wireless Broadcasters, Inc. (CWB), was a cable and satellite program
distributor whose lenders had reason to question its financial soundness. CWB was
materially late in making payments against its $35-million debt. In fact, it was late
in paying just about everybody. Additional financing from the principals was not
forthcoming. Other creditors were threatening to cease providing essential services
to CWB, including the means of transmitting the programming. The lenders were
expecting CWB to collapse. Under the terms of the loan agreement, CPAs were
called in to stanch the liquidity hemorrhage and discover what had happened to the
$35 million.

CWB’s accounting records, correspondence, contracts, and computers were
effectively controlled and inventoried, and copies immediately made of some of the
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most critical records. These records revealed many instances of suspicious cash
disbursements prior to the collapse:

• Payments to the principals’ families for personal matters. Although the amounts
were small, the fact that they were paid at all suggested that there might be
improprieties in the accounts.
• Loans with no repayment record.
• Transfers without any obvious business purpose to offshore and overseas
accounts.
Further investigation revealed collusion among the principals and the chief
accounting officers. Business records, including cash disbursements and journals,
were incomplete. The chief financial officer and controller were adept at concealing
improper expenditures and describing them as legitimate business expenses.
However, an expert search of the electronic documents contained on the hard
drives of their computers discovered a secret bank account into which commissions
had been deposited.
These commissions were applied against the loans received from the lenders, which
benefited the principals who had established an offshore account in the name of an
apparent charity. Nearly $4 million was deposited into this charity from the CWB’s
main bank account. These findings were presented to the lender’s counsel who then
began negotiations with the principals’ counsel.

To placate the lenders, avoid bad publicity and attacks against reputation, as well as
criminal charges, CWB’s principals quickly and quietly settled by being suddenly
able to find the funds to repay the debts. The lenders were made whole without
protracted and expensive litigation.

The Skimming the Cream case illustrates several important points regarding asset transfers
before a bankruptcy filing:

1. The perpetrators of such a crime are usually desperate and, while they may cover their
recent tracks, they often leave a trail behind that can easily be unraveled if the CPA
starts his or her investigation early enough.
2. Fraudulent transfers or fraudulent conveyances, wherein an asset is converted to another
form, often cash, are often connected to a fraudulent concealment of assets.
3. It is important for CPAs to be alert to the possibility that, in times of financial crisis, the
principals of a company could be tempted to transfer assets in an attempt to protect
themselves, notwithstanding the fact that the company may be doomed to failure.

12.4.5 Transfer of Assets After a Bankruptcy Filing
A debtor in functional control of his or her estate while in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy must
obtain court approval, following notice to interested parties, to dispose or sell any assets
owned by the estate. A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is not applicable in this instance as the
debtor relinquishes control of the estate assets, if any, to an appointed Chapter 7 Trustee.
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Although not as common as the surreptitious concealing of assets before filing a
bankruptcy, certain debtors transfer assets for inadequate or, in some cases, no
consideration, without notice to any parties or bankruptcy court approval. This insidious
practice has the same ultimate goal of depriving creditors of a fair and equitable allocation
of assets.

For example, a debtor conspires to transfer significant amounts of retail inventory to a
noncreditor third party for little or no consideration. The intention is to allow the debtor to
benefit from the third party after the bankruptcy.

Uncovering Transfer of Assets After a Bankruptcy Filing
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover transfers of assets after a
bankruptcy:

1. The best way to discover transfers of inventory for no consideration is to conduct a
physical inventory following the bankruptcy and reconstruct the inventory numbers that
would be expected under historic operating margins.
2. The manner of maintaining control of assets after bankruptcy is not much different from
the way of control prior to bankruptcy. One should employ audit-like controls and
procedures and test their validity.

12.4.6 Bribery or Threats
A creditor might use bribery, threats, or intimidation to secure the promise of the debtor to
pay his or her debts to the exclusion of all others. Such agreement is a violation by both
parties.

There is also the possibility that both the debtor and a creditor could engage in a separate
side-bar agreement wherein the creditor agrees not to take certain action in return for
property, money, or some other improper advantage.
For example, upon hearing of a bankruptcy filing, a creditor threatens the debtor with
physical harm unless arrangements can be made to assure payment of his prepetition
claim. The debtor, fearing for his or her safety, agrees to pay the creditor from postpetition
proceeds and ultimately does so.
In another case, a creditor discovers that the debtor has secreted funds in violation of the
bankruptcy code. Rather than informing the appropriate authorities of that knowledge, the
creditor threatens to expose the action unless the debtor agrees to pay him or her from the
ill-gotten funds. The debtor, sensing the criminal and civil penalties consequent on such a
deviation from ethical behavior, agrees to pay the creditor to the exclusion of all other
creditors.

Uncovering the Existence of Bribery or Threats
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover the existence of bribery or threats:

1. It is difficult to ascertain the existence of bribery or threats solely from the accounting
records. Most of the transactions that occur as a direct result of such behavior tend to be
off-book transactions. In other words, such payments are often completed through cash
or checks from other sources not readily identifiable from the records of the debtor.
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2. It may be advantageous to review the liabilities of the debtor before the bankruptcy and
determine whether any of the creditors failed to file claims or were somehow
disregarded following the bankruptcy. Upon ascertaining the existence of any such
creditors, interviews with both the debtor and creditor should be conducted to
determine whether any threats or bribery were involved.
3. Since the bribery or threat might include an attempt to discourage open bidding on the
sale of assets, special efforts should be made to be certain that the open bidding process
is maintained during the bankruptcy and that all interested parties are allowed to
participate fully. The CPA may wish to review the process to establish procedures for
bidding and conduct a limited inquiry to make certain that fair value was obtained in all
asset sales.

12.4.7 Concealment, Destruction, or Withholding of Documents
The records of the debtor should be available for review by the creditors of the estate as
well as a trustee or any party that can establish a right of review. The retention of such
documents is vitally important to the efficient administration of the estate. It is also a
violation to withhold documents even though the documents have not been destroyed.
Section 152 Para. 8, specifically states, whoever, “after the filing of a case under title 11 or
in contemplation thereof, knowingly and fraudulently conceals, destroys, mutilates, falsifies,
or makes a false entry in any recorded information (including books, documents, records,
and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs of a debtor,” shall be fined under
[18 U.S.C. Section 5371], imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
It would also be a violation to interfere with electronic records by destroying, deleting, or
altering computer files of the debtor.

Even if documents are destroyed in violation of the law, many of the original records, such
as bank statements and canceled checks, can be obtained by subpoena from third parties.
The cost of so doing can, however, be prohibitive, especially in small cases.

Uncovering or Preventing the Destruction or Withholding of Documents
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover or prevent the destruction or
withholding of documents:

1. The retention of adequate accounting records is vital. Therefore, as soon as practicable
after filing the bankruptcy or determining that a review must be made of the records, it
is imperative that an inventory be made of all existing records. Should there be any
possibility of the debtor destroying the records, it may be wise to engage a copy service
to obtain a separate copy of all relevant records.
2. While the inventory of documents is being taken, all electronic evidence, that is, all data
on computer hard drives, should be preserved by a computer forensics expert. This is
an extremely important step. Electronic files might be difficult or impossible to recover
afterwards.
3. It is possible to obtain copies of federal and state tax returns by first obtaining power of
attorney and then submitting the appropriate forms to both the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and the state taxing authorities. A bankruptcy trustee can obtain copies of
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federal and state tax returns by simply making a written request supported by a notice
of the trustee appointment.
4. Upon completion of the inventory analysis, a secure location must be obtained for the
safekeeping of program diskettes and CDs as well as data diskettes, CDs and backup
tapes, or any other storage devices. In more complex cases, it may be important to
create a separate and secure location to store all of the records and control access.
5. An immediate contact should be made with the debtor’s banks, outside CPA firm, and
legal counsel as they often have important records and documents in their possession.
6. If the records have been seized by a government agency pursuant to a subpoena, it is
often very difficult to obtain access because of secrecy provisions inherent in the grand
jury process. However, it still may be possible to obtain copies of certain records,
especially, if the government chooses to rely upon the nongovernment accountant’s
analysis as supporting documentation for their own criminal case.

12.5 Kinds of Bankruptcy Fraud
12.5.1 Bust Out and Bleed Out
The systematic pillaging of assets while increasing the liabilities of a successful company is
often referred to as a bust out. This procedure is used by the more seasoned element of our
criminal population and is usually brazen and easily identified.
The destruction of a company can be accomplished relatively quickly or can drag on for
years as the owners methodically bleed the company of assets while steadily increasing
liabilities. This slower process is generally referred to as a bleed out. Such a blatant and
criminal abuse of the bankruptcy protections can often provoke the draconian penalties
found in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute.
Conducting the necessary accounting analysis to prove that a company was the victim of a
bust out or bleed out scheme to defraud creditors is a very time-consuming and laborious
proposition.
For example, a formerly successful retail clothing business with an excellent credit rating is
in arrears with its clothing suppliers. The usual liquidity ratios suffer drastic reversals as
inventory and other liquid assets inexplicably disappear and bills remain unpaid.
Meanwhile, the operating capital normally retained for paying day-to-day expenses and
purchasing inventory are transferred to a separate account for the personal benefit of the
owner. The company ultimately files bankruptcy and provides a minimal level of assets
while listing an extremely large number of unsecured creditors. The hope of the debtor is
that the bankruptcy will pass quietly through the system with a minimum of scrutiny.

Uncovering a Bust Out or Bleed Out Before a Bankruptcy
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover a bust out or bleed out before a
bankruptcy:

1. Perform a detailed ratio analysis to discover asset or liability accounts for which further
analysis is warranted. These ratios may point the CPA to an inventory or accounts
receivable problem.
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2. Review the salaries and consulting fees paid to owners, family members, and other
related parties. Look closely at bonuses or other types of compensation.
3. Analyze the travel and entertainment expense records to determine whether the
company is paying for significant personal items. An analysis of such expenses may
reveal that large personal expenses are being paid for the benefit of the owners, their
family, or related parties.
4. Analyze the company’s debt to discover whether the proceeds of any issue were actually
received and used in internal operations.
5. Review transfers of assets or liabilities. The determination should be made as to whether
such transfers were made “knowingly and fraudulently.”
6. Analyze rents and lease payments. In circumstances such as these, it is common for
parties to lease physical facilities, equipment, or vehicles to the debtor at inflated rates in
not arms-length transactions.

12.5.2 Embezzlement by a Trustee or Officer
If a trustee or other officer appropriates assets of the estate to a person’s own use, he or she is
violating his or her fiduciary duty. It is important to note that it is also a violation for a
trustee, officer, or similarly situated person to secrete or destroy any document belonging to
the estate.
It is a violation of the law to purchase any property directly or indirectly from the estate of
which he or she is an officer even if adequate consideration is provided
It is improper for the trustee to allow no reasonable opportunity for inspection of
documents and accounts relating to the affairs of estates in his or her charge by parties in
interest when directed to do so by the court.

A CPA should follow the same steps and procedures in uncovering and validating
embezzlement during bankruptcy as he or she would in an embezzlement investigation at
an ongoing business. The principles and methods are similar.

12.5.3 Serial Filings
One of the most pernicious acts in bankruptcy is a procedure intended primarily to take
advantage of the automatic stay to prevent foreclosure on certain assets and collection of
other debts.

For example, an individual in significant financial distress has not made payments on a
house for an extended period of time. After a notice of default and just prior to the actual
foreclosure, the following occur:

• The debtor files a bankruptcy.
• The lienholder files a motion for relief from the automatic stay citing lack of equity and
lack of payments.
• The court grants relief.
• The foreclosure process begins again.
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• Just before completion of the second foreclosure attempt, the debtor’s wife, who is listed
as a co-owner on the property, files a bankruptcy thereby stopping the foreclosure
action once again.
This procedure can continue indefinitely as other parties holding an arguable interest in the
property file a succession of bankruptcies until the judge imposes various restrictions
including sanctions on those parties filing bankruptcies in bad faith.

The same procedure can be used in differing degrees, but under the same concept by those
facing eviction in rental units or management companies operating commercial real
property.

12,5.4 Service Petition Mills
Lawyers represent a significant number of those filing bankruptcy. As such, they are
governed by standards and procedures established by the regulatory bodies of their
profession. Lawyers, by definition, are not included in service petition mills.

Another group assisting in the filing of bankruptcies is the qualified personnel working for
legal aid services who, although not attorneys, are nevertheless competent and provide a
lower cost alternative.
There are, however, a number of unscrupulous services that set themselves up primarily in
low-income areas and engage in heavy advertising offering their services as a solution to
financial problems. They often charge an excessive amount for a very limited service,
namely, typing the petition with minimal assistance. These services often prepare but do
not file the bankruptcy. Since their names are not mentioned as having prepared the
petition, they disappear quickly should problems with the filing ensue. Occasionally, they
step over the line into complicity by filing fraudulent and inaccurate petitions.

The proper response upon uncovering a practice of this nature is to report the findings
promptly to both the United States Attorney and the local Office of the United States
Trustee. The U.S. Trustee usually takes action promptly even making legal filings if
necessary to drive unethical practitioners from the market.

12.5.5 Ponzi Schemes
A Ponzi scheme is conceived as a pyramid (and often referred to as a pyramid scheme). As
the early investors recruit new investors and these investors, in turn, recruit yet others, the
large number of investors forming the base support the small number of scheme organizers
and early investors at the top. Investors are induced to join by the promise of returns
exceeding market rates. These promised returns are actually paid out at the beginning of
the fraud to lure new prospects to invest their money. Payments to previous investors are
made from the funds paid in by later investors. As the number of investors grows
exponentially, soon there is not enough money available to pay all investors the promised
returns. In the end, the majority of investors are left with millions of dollars in claims
against a paltry amount of assets.

As the number of investors grows, the amount of assets declines, and lawsuits commence,
the debtor files for bankruptcy claiming that an economic setback and not the pitiless
mathematics of the pyramid scam itself was the cause of the financial collapse.
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The creation of a Ponzi scheme does not constitute a violation of the bankruptcy law in and
of itself. The filing of a bankruptcy to conceal the existence of a Ponzi scheme does,
however, violate the bankruptcy law.

A review of accounting records to establish the existence of a Ponzi scheme can prove to
be extremely difficult. It is not, however, impossible and in fact has been done many times.

Uncovering a Ponzi Scheme
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover a Ponzi scheme:
1. Ponzi schemes are usually of short duration. The CPA should be aware of the
possibility, however, that a Ponzi scheme could keep operating for many years. It is also
possible that a legitimate business could become a Ponzi scheme as specific financials
deteriorate, government regulations change, or the general economy declines.
2. Because a Ponzi scheme by its very nature is fraudulent, the CPA cannot always use the
financial statements as a guide because of the likelihood they may contain significant
misstatements. The best source of information may actually be the cash receipt and
disbursement activity.
3. An analysis of the balance sheet at various dates in the past can provide meaningful
information regarding the existence of a Ponzi scheme if the difficult problem of
eliminating material misstatements can be overcome. The net equity section of the
balance sheet can reflect a change over time from a positive balance to negative equity.
This is usually the result of growing losses, diminishing assets, and increasing liabilities.
It is even possible that the entity was in a negative equity position for the entire period
of analysis with the result that the insolvency continued to deepen.
4. An historical analysis of the income statement often reflects little or no legitimate
business activity. Once again, material misstatements must be identified and adjusted to
provide meaningful results. Revenues may actually decline while expenses increase
exponentially. A detailed analysis of the cash receipts may demonstrate that the
majority of cash flow is provided by new debt and new investors with very little
emanating from operations.
5. In the typical Ponzi operation, an analysis of cash receipts and disbursements should
reveal a constantly growing need for cash. Cash from new investors or new debt is
never enough to stop the endless need for more and more cash to meet ever-increasing
obligations.
6. A month-by-month analysis of the general and subsidiary ledgers may demonstrate the
replacement of old debt and old investors with new debt and new investors.
7. It is common for the cash receipt and disbursement analysis to show significant amounts
paid to the owners and/or insiders. Because the perpetrators of Ponzi schemes recognize
their entity is doomed to self-destruct, they often engage in an orgy of cash
disbursements in the period just prior to its inevitable collapse. A review of cash receipts
and disbursements during this critical time can lay bare such an illegitimate outflow.
12.6 Punishment Provisions
As discussed in greater detail below, the harshness of punishment for bankruptcy fraud
may vary to a considerable degree for any number of reasons.
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Usually, for each single criminal violation of the bankruptcy code as detailed in most of the
matters and examples listed above, the penalty prescribed shall include a fine and
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

12.7

Referral of Bankruptcy Fraud
If you are a trustee, judge, or receiver, the code requires that you shall report to the United
States Attorney whenever you have reasonable grounds to believe that a criminal violation
has occurred and that an investigation is warranted. That duty is mandatory. If you are not
serving in any of the capacities referred to above, you should seek legal counsel as to your
obligation to report criminal activity.

Once you have determined that a referral is necessary, the fraud should be reported to
both the United States Attorney and the United States Trustee in your jurisdiction. The
referral should be in the form of a written report. An oral report will be insufficient. Exhibit
C, Bankruptcy Referral Letter, is included on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM.
The referral report should contain the following:

1. A short summary of the alleged crime. For example, this referral concerns concealment of
assets in violation of Section 152 or concealment or destruction of records in violation of
Section 152.

2. The name or names of the subjects involved. If there was a corporation or partnership
involved, all owners or partners should be included in the report. If available, you
should include the dates of birth and social security numbers of those involved.
3. A complete and factual presentation of the evidence supporting the assertion of the violation. Keep
in mind that a general statement that a person or entity has filed multiple bankruptcies
may be relevant in establishing intent. The underlying evidence, however, must be
compelling and specific. Generalized allegations will not be sufficient.
4. The estimated total loss or amount of harm caused by the alleged bankruptcy violation.
5. The names of the witnesses or potential witnesses. If available, provide addresses and
telephone numbers.
6. A list of the documentary evidence that is available supporting the allegation and the location of
such evidence.
The referral report need not include every scintilla of information constituting the facts and
the evidence. You can provide additional information to the investigative agency should an
affirmative decision be made to conduct an investigation based on the referral.
It is important to note that a fully prepared referral and subsequent analysis will greatly
increase chances for a successful criminal investigation and indictment. Simply put—the
more complete the report, the better.

As already discussed, investigative agencies are always mindful of the personnel
requirements necessary to complete an investigation. There are never enough people to get
all the jobs done immediately.

Finally, the CPA should not engage in judgmental categorizations that imply that the
United States Attorney is compelled to take action based on the referral.
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12.8 Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist

Table 12.1, Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist, is designed to assist CPAs in addressing
bankruptcy fraud. Generally, all No answers require investigation and follow-up. The results
should be documented. Use the Refcolumn to cross-reference the checklist to any
additional working papers. The checklist is intended for general guidance and information
only.
Table 12.1 Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist
Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist
1.

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Non-Disclosure or Concealment of Assets

A no answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a greater
likelihood ofpotential nondisclosure or concealment of assets.

a.

Have the known assets been fairly valued?

b.

Have the debtor’s bank statements for the last five years been
obtained?

c.

Has a cash-flow analysis of the debtor’s accounts been made
for the last four years at least on the basis of these bank
statements?

d.

Are there any unusual receipts or disbursements?

e.

Are there any regular periodic payments of equal amounts
that cannot be accounted for by an automobile or other asset?

f.

Have income tax returns from previous years been reviewed
for undeclared income sources?

g.

Have property tax returns from previous years been reviewed
for undeclared property ownership?

h.

Are there any unsettled personal injury lawsuits outstanding?

i.

Does the debtor hold any real interest in any real properties
other than his or her residence?

j.

Are there any bank or investment accounts not disclosed on
the schedules?

k.

Are there any works of art or other collectibles?

1.

Are there any investments that include either a beneficial or
recorded interest on the debtor’s behalf?

m. Have insurance premium payments been examined for any
insured but undeclared assets?
n.
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Have the debtor’s financial statements filed with former
lenders been reviewed?
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Table 12.1 (continued)
Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist
o.

there any assets revealed on the balance sheets of previous
fiscal periods that have not been accounted for?

p.

Has a licensed private investigative firm been engaged to
search property and business listings for assets of the debtor
owned over the last few years?

q.

Does the debtor hold any valuable unrecorded URLs?

2.

False Information in Filing

a.

Has there been a background check on the debtor’s past
addresses and social security numbers?

b.

Have investment and credit card accounts been reviewed to
find spending patterns?

3.

False claims filed in bankruptcy

a.

Have the accounts payable subsidiary ledgers for intermittent
periods in the past been examined and compared for
inconsistencies?

b.

Have any payments to creditors already made within the last
six months reappeared in the bankruptcy schedules?

c.

Have payments made within the last year been correctly
applied to secured and unsecured claims so that the priority
of the creditors’ claims has been properly maintained?

d.

Have claims from dubious creditors been thoroughly
examined?

e.

If suspicious claims are being pressed vigorously, has a Rule
2004 examination been scheduled to examine the creditor
under oath?

4.

Transfer of Assets Before a Bankruptcy

a.

Have financial statements for past years been examined for
the ownership or disposition of assets not present in the
current statements?

b.

Have the loan applications supported by these financial
statements been examined?

c.

Have previous tax returns been examined for income in the
K-1 forms from partnerships or the 1099 forms from financial
institutions or elsewhere?

d.

Have any assets revealed on these earlier statements been
sold just prior to the bankruptcy filing?

Yes

No

NA

Ref

(continued)
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Table 12.1 (continued)
Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist
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e.

Have property and business listings of the debtor been
searched?

f.

Is the debtor holding any valuable URLs?

g.

Have there been any recent large receipts or disbursements
recorded by the debtor?

h.

Are there any periodic equal payments unaccounted for by
the recorded assets?

i.

Are there any regular payments to related parties?

j.

Can all invoices and check detail be explained by the
recorded assets?

k.

Are insurance premiums being paid for unrecorded assets?

1.

Are there any unusual expense items unaccounted for?

5.

Transfer of Assets After a Bankruptcy

a.

Was a physical inventory conducted immediately after the
bankruptcy?

b.

Have any assets been transferred for no consideration?

c.

Have effective audit-like accounting controls been applied to
monitor the disposition of financial assets after the
bankruptcy?

6.

Bribery or Threats

a.

Have any creditors failed to file claims against the debtor?

b.

Have any creditors been disregarded following the
bankruptcy?

c.

Has the open bidding process been impaired in any way or
by any person?

d.

Has the open bidding process been reviewed for fairness?

e.

Was fair value received for all goods sold?

7.

Concealment, Destruction, or Withholding of Documents

a.

Has an inventory been made of all records?

b.

Have copies been made of all relevant records?

c.

Have the debtors’ electronic records been preserved by a
qualified computer forensics expert?

d.

Have copies of federal and state tax returns been applied for?

Yes

No

NA

Ref
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Table 12.1 (continued)
Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist
e.

Are program and data diskettes and CDs safely and securely
stored?

f.

Have records at the offices of the debtor’s banks, outside
CPAs, and lawyers been located and identified?

g.

Has application been made to acquire copies of documents
under subpoena in cases of criminal bankruptcy?

8.

Bust Out and Bleed Out

a.

Have detailed ratio analyses been performed on accounts
receivable and inventory?

b.

Have salaries, bonuses, and consulting fees been analyzed for
payments to owners, family members, or other related
parties?

c.

Are travel and entertainment expenses within historic norms?

d.

How have the proceeds from any loans or financings been
used?

e.

Are all asset and liability transfers readily explicable?

f.

Are all rent and lease payments for facilities, equipment, and
vehicles needed directly in the operations of the debtor?

9.

Ponzi Schemes

a.

Have cash receipts and disbursements been analyzed for
unusual trends?

b.

Are there material misstatements in the financials?

c.

Is net equity growing or shrinking?

d.

Does an analysis of the income statement show an
unexpectedly low level of business activity?

e.

Is most cash flow generated from debt and new investment
rather than from operations?

f.

Is there an unusually high rate of turnover among lenders
and investors?

g.

Is an unusually high level of cash disbursements being made to
the owners and insiders?
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CHAPTER 13:
Detecting Procurement Fraud

13.1 Understanding the Procurement Process

13.1.1 Overview
Procurement is the process of contracting to acquire goods and services. Procurement fraud is
the unlawful manipulation of this process to obtain an advantage. This form of fraud is
especially common in government and industries, such as construction, in which
competitive bidding for contracts is in place to ensure that business is assigned fairly.
The first fact that must be recognized about procurement fraud is that it is one of the most
difficult white-collar crimes to detect. The second fact is that all too many companies refuse
to entertain the thought that their team of loyal employees could harbor fraudsters. When
fraud occurs, management is taken by surprise and then, only after the event and after the
insurance company has refused to pay the employee fidelity claim, decides to implement
tighter controls. The sad truth is that much procurement fraud could be prevented by
simple measures such as the separation of responsibilities and surprise audits.
Unfortunately, as corporations downsize in a difficult economy or reconfigure
responsibilities through technological changes, layers of managerial control are often
removed and new opportunities open up for the imaginative fraudster. The remaining staff
is usually overburdened with work and no longer attentive to the subtle indicators of
irregularity in the company’s business practices or the behavior of their fellow workers that
can be the first signs of fraud.

The key to fraud prevention is the creation of an ethical workplace where honesty is
respected. Employees must understand that fraud will not be tolerated; it can cost jobs,
lower profits, eliminate bonuses, and even close businesses. Company policies should be
put in writing and employees made to read them and sign annual compliance agreements.
Fair treatment and competitive compensation also play a role in prevention. Management
must also recognize that the personal problems that often motivate fraud, such as a
gambling, drug or sex addiction, and financial worries, can be handled with understanding
and compassion. It is more economical to treat an alcoholic than to lose the benefit of the
experience of a 20-year employee. Internal controls should be implemented and reviewed
regularly to ensure that the different kinds of signing authorities are not abused. Each
override should be investigated to make sure it was justified by circumstances and not part
of a scam. Surprise audits are an essential control and should be conducted by persons
unconnected to the department under review. Everyone, including senior management,
must be subject to surprise audits.
Above all, staff at all levels must treat controls seriously. Mere lip service is an invitation to
fraud.
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03
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13.1.2 Classification of Procurement Fraud
There are three broad classes of procurement fraud:

1. Collusion between employees and vendors
2. Vendor fraud against the company
3. Collusion among the vendors within an industry or bidding group

Collusion Between Employees and Vendors
Collusion between employees and vendors usually takes the form of secret commissions or
kickbacks of cash, gifts, free trips, dinners at fine restaurants, and other inducements to give
favorable treatment on an upcoming bid or simply to retain existing business. Company
policy must define what gifts are acceptable for employees in sensitive positions. A pair of
courtside NBA tickets now and again or a bottle of single-malt Scotch at Christmas might
be permissible, but a two-week trip to the Bahamas for the director of purchasing and his
wife is inappropriate.

Vendor Fraud Against the Company
Vendor fraud usually involves false billing or substitution of goods or services inferior to
contract specifications.

Collusion Among the Vendors Within an Industry or Bidding Group
Collusion among vendors occurs when vendors work in concert to engineer bids higher
than necessary.

13.1.3 Procurement Contracts Defined
Procurement contracts are defined in three broad ways:
1. Type of goods or services
2. Pricing method
3. Method of award, that is, competitive or noncompetitive

Type of Goods or Services Contract
1. Construction Contract. A construction contract is a contract entered into for construction,
repair, renovation, or the restoration of any property.
2. Goods Contract. A goods contract is an agreement for the purchase of articles,
commodities, equipment, goods, materials, or supplies.
3. Service Contract. A service contract is a contract for consulting services or any other
nonconsulting services that does not contain an agreement designating any person be
employed as an officer, clerk, or employee of the company. Services contracts include
the following:
a. Consulting Services Contract. For the provision of advice
b. Professional Services Contract. For services provided by individuals with significant
training, qualifications and expertise in a professional, scientific, technical, or
managerial field
c. Nonconsulting Services Contract. For the provision of services other than the provision
of advice
4
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4. Lease Contract. An agreement whereby the company acquires a leasehold interest in real
property, including a tenancy agreement or a license in respect of real property

Method of Pricing
There are three main methods of pricing a contract:
1. Fixed Cost. The fee is a fixed lump sum. Both parties agree on the price before the
contract is awarded. Deviations are not allowed regardless of the number of units used
in the contracting process.
2. Cost Per Unit. A firm-price contract specifies the total payable absolutely or one in which
the total payable is calculated by multiplying identical units of work or items delivered
by a fixed unit price. The term unit refers to components such as labor hours, overhead
costs, materials costs, and number of widgets used.
3. Cost Plus. A cost-plus contract has a payment arrangement whereby the contractor pays
actual costs incurred plus either an agreed fee or a percentage of cost.

Competitive Versus Noncompetitive Contracts
Competitive Contract
A contract awarded after at least two valid bids have been received:

• Construction. Bids at firm prices, lowest accepted
• Goods. Lowest accepted
• Consulting services. Lowest or offering the best value accepted

• Professional services. Lowest or offering the best value accepted

• Nonconsulting services. Lowest accepted
• Lease. Lowest or offering the best value accepted
Noncompetitive Contract
Noncompetitive contracts are those for which bids have not been solicited or, if they have
been, the conditions of a competitive contract were not met.

13.1.4 Stages of Procurement Contracts
Every procurement contract has a few key components. The words used to describe the
different methods of procurement contracts may differ, but the activities performed do not.
For the purpose of this Handbook, the procurement contract stages have been summarized
into the following categories (table 13.1) for both competitive contracts and noncompetitive
contracts:
1. Requirements definition
2. Bidding and selection
3. Contract performance and evaluation
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Table 13.1 Competitive and Noncompetitive Contracts
Competitive Contacts

Noncompetitive Contracts

1

Requirements Definition

Requirements Definition

2

Bidding and Selection

Selection

3

Contract Performance and Evaluation

Contract Performance and Evaluation

Requirements Definition
Requirements definition is the most important stage in the contracting process. This is
when the job to be done is defined and the decision made whether to solve the problem in
house or contract it out. If contracting is selected, then the specifications must be
formulated in a way that will attract multiple bidders. The requirements definition requires
planning, budgeting, and decision making to avoid jeopardizing the integrity of the bidding
process. Otherwise, the company may enter into an unnecessary contract or competition
may be compromised by setting specifications that can be met by only one potential
vendor.

The following are some of the subphases of the requirements definition stage of
procurement contracts:

•
•
•
•
•

Identify need.
Specify the requirement.
Assess alternatives to meet the need (including contracting).
Prepare bid information if contracting is the selected means to meet the requirement.
Plan the procurement process.

Key Control Features
• Define the need within the mandated objectives of the department.
• Include a detailed statement of specifications with respect to performance, time, service,
and cost.
• Prepare an assessment of alternative solutions complete with availability information,
and time and cost estimates.
• Properly complete and authorize the user’s request for acquisition.
• Assess the best procurement method and develop a procurement schedule and any
necessary management, production, and logistical plans.

Bidding and Selection
The purchasing or material management staff usually takes the lead role in this phase.
Their responsibilities include identifying sources of supply, developing and issuing a
request for bids, analyzing responses, selecting contractors, defining the terms of the
contract, and ensuring the proper authorization for acquisition of the contractor’s services.
Once again, if this phase is not executed properly, the integrity of the process is in
jeopardy. The ultimate concern is that the bidding and selection process becomes mainly a
technical formality rather than an analytical “value-added” step.

6
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The following are subphases of the bidding and selection process:
• Bid solicitation and evaluation

• Contract approval and award
Key Control Features
• Where it is cost effective to do so, all qualified firms should have an opportunity to
compete for procurement contracts. Firms will be considered to be qualified that:
1. Have the technical, financial, and managerial competence to discharge the contract.
2. Meet criteria established by company policies and objectives. Contracts should be
approved according to the levels of authority set out in the policies and guides
relating to procurement contracts.

Contract Performance and Evaluation
The objective of this stage of the process is to ensure the completion of the contract
according to time, cost, and performance criteria specified in the contract or the
requirements definition.
Management staff with primary responsibility for contract evaluation should ensure the
enforcement of all controls by comparing progress reports on the financial status of the
contract to the technical reports. They may also resolve contract disputes and ensure that
any necessary contract amendments receive as much scrutiny as the original contract. Each
contract should be monitored separately to ensure it meets all policy and procedural
requirements. It should also be evaluated to ensure the supplier met the terms of the
contract and the product fulfilled the program requirements as specified. Line managers
play a key role in monitoring service contracts. They are responsible for the day-to-day
management of the contract and certification that services have been received.

The following are subphases of the contract performance and evaluation stage:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Contract monitoring
Contractor and technical evaluation
Progress reports
Financial controls
Dispute resolution
Amendments

Key Control Features
• Contracts should be administered in accordance with company financial policies,
procedures, and accepted financial control practices.
• The contractor should provide progress reports on the financial and technical status of
the contract.
• Bid protests and contract disputes should be addressed and resolved with a minimum of
delay.
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• Contracts should not be amended unless such amendments are in the best interests of
the company.
• Contractor performance should be evaluated regularly to ensure that the contract
addressed the identified requirement.

13.1.5 Types of Fraud Committed in Procurement Contracts
Of the many types of fraud, there are several that relate specifically to contracts. Some of
the better known kinds of contract fraud are described in the sections below.
Conflict ofInterest
Conflict of interest fraud involves contracts awarded to firms employing company
employees or their families or firms in which such employees or their families have an
undisclosed financial interest. For example, there would be a clear conflict of interest in
contracts awarded to the brother-in-law of a company employee.

Phantom Contractor
If there is a phantom contractor, personnel involved in the purchase process submit an
invoice from an nonexistent company for payment. For example, the company’s personnel
create invoices similar to the actual invoices submitted by legitimate contractors.

Purchases for Personal Use
A company employee may purchase items for personal use or make excess purchases,
which are then diverted to personal use. For example, an employee has a family business
whose advertising materials are printed as part of a large company contract for printing
stationery.
Information Theft
A company employee releases unauthorized information to third parties. For example, a
contractor receives information concerning the amounts bid by competing contractors
before he or she submits his or her bid.

Small Purchase Order Fraud or Split Purchases
The contract calls for the provision of goods or services for an amount that requires a
competitive process. Alternatively, purchases are split into two or more segments to
circumvent the procurement authority limitations. For example, five purchase orders are
issued, each below the authorization limit instead of one large order assessed as one
contract and approved at a higher level or under a different procedure.

Secret Commissions and Kickbacks
The vendor pays the company employee with money or gifts to obtain business or
favorable treatment. For example, a building inspector receives plain envelopes filled with
cash in exchange for the approval of substandard construction work.
Tailored Specifications
Tailored specifications are so restrictive they can be met by only one contractor and thus
exclude competing firms. For example, a contract has to include a specific type of
equipment, and there is only one contractor who can meet this requirement.

8
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Time Limitations
Time limitations can enable fraud if response times for the submission of proposals are so
short that only bidders with inside knowledge have the opportunity to prepare. For
example, the request for proposals is issued on a Monday with the condition that responses
must be tendered by Friday, without any reason for the time constraint.
Unnecessary Purchases
Bids are solicited for unnecessary goods or services or for the duplication of other contracts.
For example, a contract is awarded for a consulting group to study the impact of a tire fire
on the water supply after such a study had already been included as part of a larger review
prepared by other consultants.

Collusive Bidding, Price Fixing, or Bid Rigging
Collusive bidding, price fixing, or bid rigging are similar forms of fraud. In each, a group of
prospective contractors arrange to coordinate their bidding to eliminate or limit
competition. For example, contractors agree in private that one of them will be the low
bidder.
Change Order Abuse
Change orders or changes requiring additional funds are issued during the life of the contract
to more than compensate for the initial low bid. For example, many subsequent phases of
work are required to fulfill original contract specifications.
Commingling of Contracts
Commingling occurs if a contractor bills for the same work in more than one component of
the contract. For example, suppose the same demolition costs are billed four times in
relation to separate contracts for the construction of foundations, walls, ceilings, and floors.

Duplicate Contract Payments
Under duplicate contract payments, the contractor submits more than one original invoice
for the same goods or services. For example, a second invoice is sent by a contractor
without identifying it as a second copy.
Defective Pricing
If there is defective pricing, the contractor submits inflated invoices. For example, an
invoice issued for 1,000 units at $105 each instead of at $102 each.
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False Invoices

By false invoices, the contractor submits invoices for undelivered goods. For example, an
invoice is issued for goods delivered to a different fixed-price contract job and charged on a
cost-plus contract
False Representations
The contractor misrepresents the quality of the products to be supplied or his ability to
perform contracted services. For example, a contractor claims he has equipment to dig a
hole with a 90-degree turn, but charges for the labor required to dig the turn manually.
Front-End Loading or Advance Payment Fraud
Front-end loading or advance payment fraud occurs if the contractor inflates the costs of
the initial stage of the work in order to receive inflated cash flows relative to the actual
work completed when the percentage of completion billing method is applied. The costs of
later contract work thus become understated in the expectation that change orders will be
approved to make up for the shortfall. For example, details relating to labor usage are
embellished so reimbursement on a cost-plus contract is inflated.
Product Substitution
Product substitution refers to supplying goods or services that do not conform to the
procurement contract specifications. For example, a lower grade of lumber and cement is
used in the construction of a building.
Progress Payment Fraud
Progress payment fraud occurs if the contractor requests progress payments based on
falsified information. For example, the invoice details supporting the progress payment
include charges for payroll costs not incurred because of layoffs or the reassignment of
personnel.

Table 13.2 summarizes the stages of the procurement contract process as they relate to the
type of contract fraud.

10
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Table 13.2 Stages of Procurement Contracts

Types of Contract Fraud

Requirements
Definition

Bidding and
Selection

Contract
Performance
and
Evaluation

Conflict of Interest
Phantom Contractor

Purchases for Personal Use

Information Theft
Small Purchase Order Fraud or
Split Purchases
Secret Commissions and
Kickbacks
Tailored Specifications

Time Limitations
Unnecessary Purchases
Collusive Bidding, Price Fixing,
or Bid Rigging
Change Order Abuse

Commingling of Contracts
Duplicate Contract Payments
Defective Pricing

False Invoices
False Representations

Front-End Loading or Advance
Payment Fraud
Product Substitution

Progress Payment Fraud
Legend:

Occurs most often at this stage
X
o

Sometimes occurs at this stage
Rarely occurs at this stage
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13.2

Screening Procurement Contracts
The detection of fraud in procurement contracts can be analyzed in three phases, that is,
screening, scrutinizing, and in-depth examination. This kind of review allows us to see the
numerous “red flags” that help identify potentially fraudulent contracts.
No indicator alone confirms the existence of fraud. Rather, when noticed in the context of
the particular contract, indicators should raise the suspicion of an improper activity.
Appropriate investigative actions should then be taken to ensure the integrity of the
contract process. The issue then, is how to detect these red flags.
The material in this section has been organized in a sequence that reflects the process an
auditor is most likely to follow in the review of the three stages of the procurement
contract. Red flag indicators are provided in tabular form and are further explained after
each table. The numbers used for each red flag are purely for reference purposes as there is
no “proper” order in which to look for these red flag indicators.

The charts are provided as an aid to the thinking process associated with screening
procurement contracts; namely:
• Are there any red flags?
• For each red flag, what type of fraud might have occurred?
• Are there any other red flags, which could further substantiate that a type of fraud has
occurred?
Of course, the more red flag indications, the greater the likelihood that fraud might have
occurred.

Documentation Required
In screening procurement contracts for potential fraud and applying the red flag approach,
the auditor will need to assemble, at least, the files described in the following sections.
Contract Files
Contract files include the following:

• Plans and reports defining the requirement
• Request for proposal or any other bid solicitation records
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

12

Tender packages
Assessment of tender package records
Contract acceptance records
Final approved contract
Progress reports
Invoices charged against the contract
Amendments to the contract
Evaluation reports on the supplier’s performance under the contract

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

Chapter Thirteen: Detecting Procurement Fraud

Audit Files
Audit files include the following:

• Contract matrix report
• Overview fact sheets
• Internal control evaluation questionnaires for the purchases, payables, and payments
system
• Audit program
• Audit data and working papers
• Audit report
• Management report

13.2.1 The Requirements Definition Stage
The acquisition of goods and services usually begins only after the completion of a proper
needs assessment. Although the lack of or an inadequate needs assessment does not in itself
constitute fraud, it often provides an opportunity for fraudulent activity.
Fraudulent schemes predicated on a poor needs analysis usually involve the misuse of
employee discretionary power to define requirements. The type of misuse varies according
to the nature of the scheme. The contracted goods and services may deliberately exceed
those required or, in extreme circumstances, may not be needed at all. An employee may
even decide to dispose of goods that need not be replaced. The level of documentation in
the files for any of these schemes could range from deliberately falsified figures or facts in
an elaborate analysis to a very sketchy outline that leaves the employee with significant
opportunity for fraudulent maneuvering.

For fraud to be established, dishonest intent must be demonstrated. Therefore, an
employee could not be prosecuted for fraud for conducting an inadequate needs analysis
since incompetence is not a criminal offence. If, on the other hand, the employee or a
related party were to receive a benefit as a result of this “incompetence,” dishonest
intention may be provable and fraud may be established.

Red Flags: Requirements Definition Stage
The following are red flags to identify in the requirements definition stage:

1. Excessive Stock Acquired. Excessive stock is acquired either in relation to inventory
requirements or from certain contractors.
2. Marketing Information in Files. Department files include marketing information provided
by the successful contractor prior to the issuance of the tender. The presence of such
material may indicate the department is purchasing goods or services in response to
aggressive marketing efforts by contractors and possible favors, secret commissions, or
benefits, rather than in response to valid requirements. The file should show how the
two parties first made contact.
3. Narrow Requirements Definition. The requirements definition is so narrow as to eliminate
suppliers or there is an unjustified or unreasonable constraint which seems to restrict
eligibility.
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4. Replacement Period Unreasonable. The replacement cycle for goods is shorter than
indicated by manufacturers’ recommendations, departmental standards, or the level of
utilization.

5. Rushed Timing. The time allocated to the requirements definition stage is unreasonably
short in comparison to the size of the project. Rushed timing can indicate someone
trying to circumvent the usual controls in the contracting process.
6. Senior Official Involved in a Process BeyondJob Description. A senior staffer exceeds his
responsibilities by assisting in the preparation of the needs definition.
7. “Surplus” Goods Replaced. Goods originally sold as surplus are subsequently replaced.
8. Thin File Syndrome. Needs assessments are not adequately or accurately documented.
The needs assessment may be nonexistent, or may describe the desired product without
justifying its acquisition or is vague about its performance standards.
The following chart (table 13.3) shows the types of fraud most commonly committed in the
requirements definition stage.

Table 13.3 Red Flags: Screening the Requirement Definition Stage
TYPE OF FRAUD THAT MAY BE INDICATED

Red Flags

Secret
Commissions
and
Kickbacks

Conflict
of
Interest

Tailored
Specifications

Time
Limits

Unnecessary
Purchases

Marketing
Information in
Files
Excessive Stock
Acquired

Replacement
Period
Unreasonable

Surplus Goods
Replaced
Rushed Timing

Thin File
Syndrome
Narrow
Requirements
Definition

Official
Involvement
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13.2.2 The Bidding and Selection Stage
The request for a proposal (RFP) provides contractors with an opportunity to submit bids
for the provision of goods or services that meet the terms of the requirements definition
and bid specifications. This process is intended to maximize the use of competition to
ensure the company obtains the right goods and services at the best possible price.
The documents in a RFP provides prospective bidders with details on the eligibility of
contractors, the specific work to be performed, and the type of goods to be delivered. They
provide bidders with a complete guide on how bids are to be prepared and submitted.
Every interested bidder should be provided with identical tender documents.

After the proposals have been received and the deadline has passed, the award of the
contract is based on many factors including price, responsiveness, and responsibility.

Carelessly written bid specifications and contracts make it easier for a contractor to claim
more money if the company later defines what it really wants. Vague specification can
suggest collusion between a company employee and the contractor. Similarly, an increase
in price immediately after the award of the contract could suggest a possible problem. This
illustrates that intuition is a necessary aspect of red-flag assessment.

Red Flags: Bidding and Selection Stage
The following are the red flags to identify in the bidding and selection stage:

1. Unclear Bid Specifications. Vague or unclear bid specifications:
• Open the door to the exercise of discretion by company employees in selecting a
suitable contractor. This flexibility creates potential fraud opportunities.
• Provide an opportunity for the contractor to recoup otherwise unrecompensable
losses by falsely attributing them to defective.
2. Bid Specifications Unrelated to Requirements Definition. If this red flag appears, bid
specifications are not consistent with the needs determination or requirements
definition.

3. Narrow Bid Specifications. Specifications may:
• Create unnecessary restrictions in soliciting bids for competitive contracts. Narrow
specifications, such as an unusual format for the submission of the proposal or a
requirement that the bidder use only certain types of equipment, should arouse
suspicion.
• Limit or restrict competition by specifying goods or services that fit the products or
capabilities of only certain contractors or exclude contractors or products that
would otherwise qualify under the terms of the requirements definition, which
should also arouse suspicion.
4. Official Involvement. Another red flag occurs if certain senior management, the senior
management of related departments, or employees:
• Take an active interest in whether or not a certain bidder was awarded a contract.
• Request information with respect to the details of a proposed contract.
• Get closely involved in a contracting process outside their job responsibilities.
• Are unusually demonstrative in their support for the successful bidder.
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5. Company Personnel Related to Contractor. A questionable relationship may be signaled by
a company employee or manager who:
• Has close professional or personal ties with a successful bidder or its officials.
• Is related to a contractor.
6. Company/Alumni Involvement With Contractor. Another warning is the involvement of
former employees who:
• Are the owners of a company that is awarded the contract.
• Commence working with the successful bidder subsequent to the contract award
date.
7. Consultant Involvement With Contractor. This kind of fraud may occur is a consultant or
the employee of a consultant:
• Has close professional or personal ties with a successful bidder.
• Is engaged to help develop the requirements, and then accepts the jobs with a
potential bidder or acts as consultant to a potential bidder on the very requirements
definition they helped develop for the company.
8. Release of Confidential Information. Confidentiality can be violated in the following ways:
• Confidential contract information is released in advance or selectively to certain
contractors.
• One or more contractors request to receive the bid package prior to release of the
invitation to tender.
• The successful bid contains specific information contained in company files but was
not supplied in the tender call documents.
• Information is released to competing contractors by consultants or firms engaged
prior to the tendering process
• In situations in which consultants were hired prior to the tendering process, a
nondisclosure agreement is not included in the files relating to sensitive information
in their possession.
9. Contractor Meetings. Competing contractors who regularly socialize or appear to hold
meetings more frequently than regular trade and association meetings should be
viewed with suspicion.
10. Industry Price Lists. The following are practices that may indicate the use of price lists by
competitors:
• Competitors exchange price information among themselves from an “industry price
list” or “price agreement” to which contractors refer in formulating their bids.
• Bidders refer to “association price schedules,” “industry price schedules,” “industry
suggested prices,” “industry-wide prices,” or “market-wide prices.”
11. Competition Restricted. It is questionable for the proposal requests to:
• Be made orally to only a few contractors, rather than being published in a
newspaper.
• Appear in obscure publications, during a holiday period or on a weekend.
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12. Bidding Patterns. Irregular bidding patterns, including the following, should trigger
scrutiny:
• Certain contractors always bid against each other or, conversely, certain contractors
do not bid against one another.
• Bid prices drop because a new or infrequent bidder submits a bid.
• A certain contractor appears to be bidding substantially higher on some bids than
on other bids with no logical cost difference to account for the increase.

• Certain companies within a group of contractors appear to submit the lowest bid.
(This might indicate a market division by class of customer.)
13. Preferred/Unpreferred Contractor Documentation. An unusual amount of derogatory data
on nonpreferred contractors is maintained in the file.
14. Bid Fixing Correspondence. Correspondence may include the following red flags:
• The file contains letters, notes, or memos by employees, former employees, or
competitors that refers to the existence of agreements to fix bids and prices or
otherwise restrain trade.
• A contractor states that he “does not sell in a particular area” or that “only a
particular firm sells in that area.”
• A bidder or contractor states that it is not their turn to receive a contract.
15. Rushed Timing. The following indicate rushed timing:
• The tender call has an unusually short closing date.
• The time allotted to preparing the contract specification document or for the
contractors to prepare and submit a proposal is short for the total estimated dollar
value of the contract or the complexity of the bid specifications. Rushed timing is
often indicative of someone trying to circumvent the usual controls by creating a
situation in which only those with advance information have enough time to
prepare their bid.
16. Dummy Bids. The following may indicate dummy bids:
• A bid is accepted from a contractor unqualified to meet the bid specifications.
• Bids were submitted that do not comply with obvious provisions of the bid
specifications or contract requirements.
• Only one bidder has put forward a complete bid that meets the specifications and
requirements in the tender documents while the others have simply thrown
together corporate material only tangential to the contract.
17. Tender Deadline Exceptions. Suspicious exceptions to deadlines may be indicated by
tenders that are:
• Opened prior to the deadline.
• Received after the closing date are not disqualified.
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18. Tender Changes. Bid documents that appear to have been altered after submission
should be viewed as a red flag.
19. Withdrawals. The following may indicate fraudulent withdrawal from a bidding
process:
• The lowest bidder withdraws after submission.
• A bidder is allowed to withdraw from the contracting process without justification.
• A contractor withdraws from the contracting process without justification and is not
required to forfeit the bid bond.
20. Request for Proposal Mistakes. The tender call or request for proposal has an intentional
mistake which would allow for a tender recall if the “preferred” contractor does not
submit the lowest bid.
21. Rebid Patterns. Rebidding patterns, including the following, may indicate fraud:
• New or supplementary bids are requested as a result of changes in the specifications
after the initial bids have been opened.
• Certain contractors do not rebid when asked.
22. Comparison ofBid Package Details. Comparing the details of bid packages may reveal
fraud if the following are observed:
• Bidders that ship their product a short distance bid more than those who must
spend more to ship their product long distances.
• Identical bid amounts are specified for certain contract line items by two or more
contractors.
• Identical calculations or spelling errors appear in two or more competing bids.
23. Contractor Selection Unjustified. Instances of unjustified contractor selection may be
indicated by:
• Not accepting the lowest bid even though the lowest bidder meets all the
requirements.
• Awarding the contract to a contractor with a history of poor performance.

24. Award Patterns. Questionable awards include the following:
• Certain contractors are consistently successful in one particular territory.
• The same bidder is always successful when contracting with one particular
department but not with others.
25. Changes to Specifications After Award But Prior to Contract Signing. New contract
specifications that create the opportunity for overcharging are developed in
consultation with the successful bidder and incorporated into the final contract.
26. No Audit Terms. The contract does not provide for an inspection or audit of all the
contractor’s records or his family of companies.

18

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

Chapter Thirteen: Detecting Procurement Fraud

27. Contractor/Subcontractor Relationships. A red flag may be:
• A low bidder who withdraws from the contracting process later becomes a
subcontractor of a higher bidder.
• The successful bidder repeatedly subcontracts to companies that submit higher bids
or are qualified to act as prime contractors but do not submit bids.
• One contractor’s tender package includes the bids of subcontractors who are
actually competing for the main contract.
• The successful contractor subsequently uses unsuccessful bidders as subcontractors
on the same project.
28. Split Contract. Contracts have been split into two or more smaller amounts to avoid
approval or authorization that would otherwise be required at a higher level.
29. “Payments”from Contractor to Company Personnel. The successful contractor provides gifts,
parties, meals, or any other benefits to a company employee(s).

13.2.3 Fixed-Cost Contracts
Fixed-cost contracts often tempt the contractor to deviate from his commitment, whereas in
cost-plus and cost-per-unit contracts, the contractor might try to exploit the variable nature
of the contract.

Red Flags: Fixed-Cost Contracts
The following are red flags to identify in fixed-cost contracts:
1. Changes to Contract After Award. Changes are made in the definition of services required
after the awarding of the contract. This provides the contractor with an opportunity to
submit claims for losses based on these changes.
2. Change Order. A change order is issued on the contract, or more particularly, excessive
change orders are issued or individual change orders that cannot be justified.
3. Contract Extension. An emergency extension allows the contractor to complete the
project after the completion date specified in the contract.

4. Cost Overruns. There are significant cost overruns on the contract.
5. Testing Certificates. Irregularities in test results should be considered a red flag if:
• No original test results or reports appear in the contract file (especially if required by
the contract specifications).
• Tests performed by the contractor are not certified by an independent testing
agency.
6. Verification of Contractor Performance. No formal procedures are in place to ensure the
contracted work has actually been performed to specification.
7. Complaints About Quality. Documentation in the file expressing concern over possibly
inferior goods or services.
8. No System for Review of Contractor Invoices. Invoices are not cross-checked to previously
submitted invoices for possible duplication.
The preceding types of fraud most likely to occur in fixed-cost contracts as well as the red
flags that may indicate the presence of fraud are exemplified in Table 13.4.
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Table 13.4 Red Flags: Screening Fixed-Cost Contracts
TYPE OF FRAUD THAT MAY BE INDICATED

Red Flags

Change
Order
Abuse

Duplicate
Contract
Payments

False
Representations

Product
Substitution

1. Changes to Contract
After It Has Been
Awarded
2. Change Order
Issued
3. Contract Extension
4. Cost Overruns
5. Testing Certificates

6. Verification of
Contractor’s
Performance

7. Complaints About
Quality
8. No System for
Review of
Contractor Invoices

13.2.4 Cost-Plus and Cost-Per-Unit Contracts
Contracts involving a cost-plus arrangement typically include cost plus fixed fee, cost plus
incentive fee, cost plus award fee, cost reimbursable, and/or cost sharing. Cost-per-unit
contracts typically include contracts priced per unit of labor, materials, or other measurable
portion.

Red Flags: Cost-Plus and Cost-Per Unit Contracts
The following are red flags to identify in fixed-cost contracts:

1. Inspection Process. There is no inspector on site to confirm that the contracted work is
complete at the appropriate billing stage of the contract.
2. Charges Higher Than Contracted. The following should be viewed with suspicion:
• The rates actually charged by the contractor are higher than the rates quoted in the
contract.
• The contractor submits charges for services not included in the contract or in the
bid specifications.
3. No System for Review of Contractor Invoices. Invoices are not cross-checked to previously
submitted invoices for possible duplication.
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4. Invoice Identification. The following practices are red flags:
• Certain contractor or subcontractor invoices lack telephone numbers and/or have
only a post office box as an address.
• The contractor submits photocopies of invoices as support for charges on a costplus contract.
5. Invoice Details. The following details on invoices should arouse suspicion:
• Whiteout is used on a document or it contains seemingly irrelevant handwritten
details.
• Products listed on the invoice are referenced by a number only.
6. Verification of Contractor Performance. The following are red flags:
• There is no formal program in the department for inspection and quality assurance.
• Goods and materials have not been tested as required by the contract specifications.

7.
8.

9.

10.

• Foreign-made products are provided where domestic products were required.
• Contractor used untrained employees when skilled personnel were required and
represented.
• The contracting department relies entirely on the contractor to ensure goods and
services meet specifications.
• Employees rely completely on the contractor to carry out testing and assure the
tests have met requirements.
Invoices Not Certified as Paid. The contractor does not certify that the subcontractors’
invoices submitted on a cost-plus contract were paid.
Uncleared Checks Submitted as Proof ofPayment. The contractor submits photocopies of
only the front side of the check to show that the subcontractors’ invoices on a cost-plus
contract were paid.
Timing ofProgress Payment Charges. Progress payments do not appear to coincide with
the contractor’s plan and ability to perform the contract.
Materials Not Yet Purchased. A progress payment claim made for materials is not
supported by a paid subcontractor invoice.

The types of fraud most likely to occur in cost-plus and cost-per unit contracts, as well as
the red flags, which may indicate the presence of fraud are shown in Table 13.5.
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Table 13.5 Red Flags: Screening Cost-Plus and Cost-Per-Unit Contracts
TYPE OF FRAUD THAT MAY BE INDICATED

Red Flags

Defective
Pricing

False
Invoices

FrontEnd
Loading

Phantom
Contractor

Progress
Payments

1. Inspection
Process
Incomplete

2. Charges
Higher Than
Contracted
3. No System
for Review of
Contractor’s
Invoices
4. Invoice
Identification
5. Invoice
Details
6. Verification
of Contract
Performance

7. Invoices Not
Certified as
Paid
8. Uncleared
Checks
Submitted as
Proof of
Payment

9. Timing of
Progress
Payment
Charges
10. Materials
Not Yet
Purchased
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13.2.5 Noncompetitive Contracts
No bids are solicited for the awarding of noncompetitive contracts; there is a selection
process only. A requirements definition must be developed, and the contractor must meet
the performance and evaluation criteria. This section addresses only those red flags
involving the selection stage of noncompetitive contracts.

Screening the Selection Stage
The most common frauds occurring in noncompetitive contracts are:

• Secret commissions and kickbacks

•
•
•
•

Conflict of interest
Abuse of local purchasing authorities
Purchases for personal use
Unnecessary purchases

Red Flags: Selection Stage
The following are red flags to identify in the selection stage:

1. Conversion of Competitive Contract. A contract initiated in the competitive process is
converted into a negotiated sole-source contract.
2. Documentation Supporting Sole-Source Contractor. The following are red flags:
• Documentation in the file in support of sole-source or noncompetitive contractor
does not make sense or is overly descriptive or aggressive.
• Employees working outside their job descriptions sign statements in support of sole
source contractors.
3. Contracts Repeatedly Awarded to One Contractor. Questionable practices include the
following:
• Goods and services are continually purchased from a single source without
development of secondary suppliers.
• Goods or services are purchased from the same source or contractor over a long
period of time, without documented verification of market price changes or
documentation showing the existence of other providers.
• No time limit set for mandatory review of the single source.
4. Repeated Small Purchase Orders. The following are possible red flags:
• Contracts have been split for the purpose of:
—Bypassing financial authority.
—Avoiding other levels of review.
• Purchases are split that in total would be above authorized spending limits.
These red flags may indicate the presence of fraud as shown in Table 13.6.
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Table 13.6 Red Flags : Screening the Selection Stage
TYPE OF FRAUD THAT MAY BE INDICATED

Red Flags

Secret
Commissions
and
Kickbacks

Conflict
of
Interest

Local
Purchasing
Authority
Fraud

Purchases
for
Personal Unnecessary
Use
Purchases

1. Conversion of
Competitive
Contract
2. Documentation
Supporting SoleSource
Contractor
3. Contracts
Repeatedly
Awarded to the
Contractor
4. Repeated Small

Purchase Orders

Detecting Fraud in Noncompetitive Contracts
In these types of fraud, there is some form of collusion between a company employee and
a contractor. It is difficult, however, to obtain evidence of fraud from company sources
during either the scrutinizing or in-depth examination phases. Secret commissions or
benefits are even more difficult to detect and investigate as they are often considered to be
a marketing cost by the contractor, which is one of the costs of doing business.
Contractors in the habit of offering secret commissions or other benefits will rarely make a
direct and blatant offer. Contractors usually begin with subtle overtures as they look for the
vulnerabilities of agents or employees, those areas in which they might be most easily
exploited. They might begin by discussing the employee’s lifestyle, family, salary, or job
satisfaction. They will probe into the hobbies or special interests of the employee. They
may learn that the employee is a new homeowner, and then steer the discussion to the high
cost of mortgages. They may suggest that a mortgage at a very favorable rate can be
arranged perhaps from a related corporation. The employee may not even suspect a
connection at the outset. As time goes on, additional benefits will be subtly arranged.
Christmas and birthday gifts may arrive from the contractor, or expensive luncheons or
dinners may be arranged. Once it becomes a habit for the employee to receive gifts and
other minor benefits, the contractor will likely increase the amount. Cash, cars, and travel
expenses will likely follow. Job offers and even corporate shares will usually put the
employee under full control of the contractor.
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Conflict of Interest Case Study

A contractor met a senior manager of a company for the first time at a luncheon,
and quickly learned that the manager had a great interest in quarter horses. He had
a small farm and the contractor had a 500-acre ranch. As they were parting from
the lunch, the contractor invited the manager to fly down to his ranch the next
weekend to see a matched pair of quarter horses. The manager accepted without
either party mentioning who would pay for the flight.
The following day a first-class return airline ticket arrived at the manager’s office.
The contractor personally met the manager at the airport and joined him on the
flight to the ranch. The manager offered to pay for the tickets, but the contractor
said they could deal with money later.

Contrary to what he told the manager at the lunch, the contractor did not have the
matched pair of quarter horses on his ranch. Before the manager arrived for the
weekend, the contractor ordered two matched horses from a horse dealer and had
them delivered to his ranch. The manager returned to the ranch with the contractor
on four other occasions. Subsequently, the contractor offered the manager the job
as president of his refining and smelting company, along with 60,000 shares of his
company, which were valued at more than US$1.50 per share on the market.

Shortly thereafter, the manager approved a major contract for the contractor’s
company. In this case, the pattern of conversation and dealings between the
contractor and the official demonstrate that a conflict of interest had developed. At
the outset, the manager had expected to pay for the airline tickets and other
expenses. After the second trip to the ranch, there was no further mention of
payment. The contractor had told the manager that he had set up an account
receivable in the manager’s name and that the manager could pay the amount
owed whenever he wished. The manager, of course, never paid any expenses. The
process of discovering and proving that this conflict of interest existed was quite
involved because little hard evidence was available to the fraud auditor.

Red Flags
The list of red flags previously outlined, which may indicate the presence of secret
commissions, breach of trust, or conflict of interest, is summarized in the following sections.

Requirements Definition
The requirements definition for contracts should prevent the occurrence of the following
red flags:
•
•
•
•
•

Improper marketing information in files
Acquisition of excessive stock
Short replacement period
Replacement of surplus goods
Rushed timing
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• Thin file syndrome
• Narrow requirements definition
• Senior management involvement

Biddingand Selection
Competitive Contracts
The competitiveness of contracts may be called into question by the following red flags:
• Unclear bid specifications
• Bid specifications unrelated to requirements definition
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Narrow bid specifications
Senior management involvement
Company personnel related to contractor
Company alumni involvement with contractor
Consultant involvement with contractor
Competition restricted
Preferred/unpreferred contractor documentation
Tender deadline exceptions

•
•
•
•

Withdrawals
Contractor selection unjustified
Award patterns
Changes to specifications after award but prior to contract signing

• No audit terms
• Payments from contractor to company personnel
Noncompetitive Contracts
Noncompetitive contracts may be indicated by the following:

• Conversion of competitive contract
• Documentation supporting sole-source contractor
• Contracts repeatedly awarded to one contractor
13.3 Scrutinizing Suspect Procurement Contracts

The purpose of the scrutinizing phase is to determine whether there is sufficient reason to
move into the more demanding and rigorous evidence collection process of the in-depth
examination phase of the fraud detection process. The way in which this decision is made
involves consideration of a series of issues.
This section introduces the method of scrutinizing suspect contracts by examining auxiliary
documents from various sources concerning the contract and contractor with provision for
some interviewing, if appropriate. The auditor should read beyond the contract to obtain
additional background information not only on the contract and but also on the persons
and companies involved. This bigger picture is obtained by reading all the file
26
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documentation related not only to the contract in question but others involving similar
persons and companies. The auditor should also consider asking a few key questions (if
appropriate) of the personnel involved, including the contractor.
The auditor should work until he or she is satisfied that all concerns and findings to date
are consistent with the possibility that a fraud has been committed. There are many ways
for the auditor to examine the red flags to dispel or confirm the presence of fraud.
Accordingly, the procedures presented here illustrate what the auditor can do, but should
not be considered definitive. The auditor’s experience and training, plus the knowledge
gained in the screening process, should direct the manner in which a suspect procurement
is scrutinized.

13.3.1 The Requirements Definition Stage
Table 13.3, Red Flags: Screening the Requirements Definition Stage, in Section 13.2.1, The
Requirements Definition Stage, (found in 13.2, Screening Procurement Contracts) lists the
red flags that may indicate the possible occurrence of the following types of fraud:
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
• Conflict of interest
• Tailored specifications

• Time limits
• Unnecessary purchases

Lists of the steps that may be involved in scrutinizing for tailored specifications and time
limits have not been prepared since the auditor should be able to prepare such lists based
on the type of steps to be performed when scrutinizing for unnecessary purchases.

Scrutinizing for Unnecessary Purchases
The steps involved in scrutinizing for unnecessary purchases include performing additional
research to confirm or refute the red flags. A few of the many procedures that could be
performed are indicated below:
1. Department or Agency Research. The auditor should ask the following questions:
• Do the goods or services contracted for fit the profile of the department or division?
• What level of employee or management approved or recommended the contract? Is
the level too high or too low?
• What research was carried out to determine whether the goods or services were
actually delivered?
• According to the division that ordered the goods or services, to what extent are the
goods or services being used?
• How long the company has been dealing with this particular contractor?
• How long the company has been using these particular goods or services?
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2. Contractor Research. The auditor should take the following steps to research the
contractor:
• Perform a background search to determine when the contracting company was
incorporated. A recent incorporation shows not only a lack of stability, but might
also indicate the company was set up merely to be used in a fraud.
• Perform a background check on the officials or directors of the contractor’s
company. This may reveal an association between the contractor and a company
employee.
• Examine contractor documentation. Is the address a post office box, for example?
• Call the contractor using the telephone number listed in the files or on invoices.
• Consider the numerous potential sources of documents and information that can be
obtained about a contractor from outside the company.

13.3.2 The Bidding and Selection Stage
Section 13.2.2, The Bidding and Selection Stage, (found in 13.2, Screening Procurement
Contracts), lists the red flags that may indicate the possible occurrence of the following
types of fraud:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Secret commissions and kickbacks
Bid rigging (also known as collusive bidding or bid fixing)
Commingling of contracts
Conflict of interest
Information theft
Purchases for personal use
Tailored specifications

• Time limits

Bid Rigging
One of the next most common problems and one of the most difficult to substantiate is that
of bid rigging. Bid rigging includes many forms of anticompetitive activity. The common
thread running through such activities, however, is arrangements among contractors
limiting competition. The variations on this theme are only limited by the imaginations of
the contractors involved. Common schemes include those described in the following
sections.
Bid Suppression
Contractors agree among themselves that at least one will refrain from bidding or agree to
withdraw a previously submitted bid to allow another bid to be accepted.

Complementary Bidding
Contractors submit unacceptably high token bids or bids with special but unacceptable
terms. Such bids are not intended to win but to create the appearance of competition.
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Bid Rotation
The colluding contractors submit bids but take turns submitting the lowest bid. Bid rotation
schemes often follow a cyclical pattern or a pattern related to the size of the contract.
Market Division
Contractors refrain from competing in a designated portion of a market divided by
government department, customer, or geographic area. Contractors will not bid or will
submit only complementary bids to a solicitation from a customer not assigned to them or
in a different geographic area.

Bid rigging has been found to be prevalent in the following industries:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Asphalt paving
Breadmaking
Building construction
Cigarettes
Coal
Dredging
Electrical equipment
Lumber
Milk
Retail gasoline
Roofing
Shipment of household goods
Waste disposal
Wholesale produce.

To demonstrate that bid rigging has occurred, it is necessary to establish with a reasonable
degree of certainty that an agreement has been made to restrain trade. It is necessary to
establish that the contractors had a common arrangement to fix prices or discounts, and/or
allocate customers, territories, or markets. The process of scrutinizing for bid rigging,
therefore, involves refuting or confirming the red flag indicators of such an agreement. The
following list indicates a few of the many possible procedures for verifying red flag
indicators:
1. Bidder Information. Perform corporate searches to find the date of incorporation plus
names of directors and officers of each bidder.
2. Bidder Histories. There are a number of procedures for compiling bidder histories, as
follows:
• Compare specifications with previous similar contracts, perhaps from another
department. For example, a contract undertaken in one territory should be
compared with a similar contract in another.
• Review previous contract files to determine timing, amount, and nature of each
contractor’s involvement in other bids.
• Prepare a schedule comparing the details of each bid and each winning contractor.
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• Examine each bidder’s previous contracts. Look for relationships with other
contractors and subcontractors and any patterns of bidding on other jobs. Determine
whether contractors switch places as contractor and subcontractor on different jobs.
Look for large consortiums among competing contractors. Check each contractor’s
involvement in a consortium or partnership arrangement on any other contract at
the time the competitive bids were submitted.
3. Request for Proposal Review. Requests for proposals should be investigated by comparing
the requirements definition, bid specifications, and request for proposal. Determine
whether the documents are so specific that only certain contractor(s) can fill the
requirements.
4. Complaint Review. Examine all files and correspondence for any unauthorized release of
information. Check for complaints by employees or others about this particular contract
or group of contractors.
5. Industry Review. Inquire of other departments, enforcement or government agencies
about collusive bidding in the contractor’s industry.

13.3.3 Fixed-Cost Contracts
Table 13.4, Red Flags: Screening Fixed-Cost Contracts, in Section 13.2.3, Fixed-Cost Contracts,
(found in 13.2, Screening Procurement Contracts), lists the red flags that may indicate the
possible occurrence of the following types of fraud:
• Change order abuse
• False representations
• Duplicate contract payments
• Product substitution

Product Substitution
Product-substitution fraud is probably the most serious of these offences. Contractors
deliver goods or services below contract specifications without giving notice of the change
but seek reimbursement based on the higher standard in the contract. Typical instances of
product substitution abuse are as follows:

• Furnishing items produced by a manufacturer other than the original equipment
manufacturer as specified in the contract
• Furnishing items produced in a country other than that specified in the contract
• Failing to conduct suitability and reliability tests specified in the contract
The following sections address a few of the many procedures that could be performed in
scrutinizing fixed-cost contracts for product substitution fraud.

Industry Complaints
Research industry complaints as follows:
• Call competitors to determine the contractor’s reputation.
• Canvass other departments and public sources for complaints of inferior products or
service.
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Employees and Files

Consult employees as well as the contract files, as follows:
• Ask employees who requested the goods or services whether they met their
requirements.
• Determine whether the tests contracted for were actually performed.

13.3.4 Cost-Plus and Cost-Per-Unit Contracts
Table 13.5, Red Flags: Screening Cost-Plus and Cost-Per-Unit Contracts, in Section 13.2.4, CostPlus and Cost-Per-Unit Contracts, (found in 13.2, Screening Procurement Contracts), lists
the red flags that may indicate the possible occurrence of the following types of fraud:
•
•
•
•
•

Defective pricing or cost mischarging
False invoices
Front-end loading
Phantom contractor
Progress payment

Scrutinizing for Defective Pricing or Cost Mischarging
Most cost-plus and cost-per unit contracts require the contractor to submit detailed certified
documentation supporting cost or pricing data.
Cost mischarging occurs when the contractor charges for costs that are not allowable, not
reasonable, or cannot be directly or indirectly allocated to the contract. Auditors are most
likely to encounter charges for unallowable costs concealed or misrepresented as allowable
costs or hidden in certain accounts not usually audited closely.

Labor costs are one of the easiest to mischarge because employees’ labor can be readily
shifted from contract to contract with the stroke of a pen on their timecards. The only way
to be absolutely certain that labor costs are charged to the correct contract is to observe the
actual work of each employee, then check the accounting records to ensure the cost is
charged to the right contract.
To prove that defective pricing or cost mischarging has occurred, the auditor must
demonstrate the suspect entry was not a mistake. Therefore, the auditor’s scrutiny must
confirm or deny the contractor’s intent.
A few of the many procedures that could be performed in scrutinizing cost-plus and cost-per
unit contracts for defective pricing and cost mischarging are listed in the sections below.

Competitor Pricing
Call competitors that provide similar goods and services and compare prices. Note any
large discrepancies.

Scrutinizing Subcontractor Invoices
Scrutinize subcontractor invoices as follows:
• Look for discrepancies between physical addresses and post office box addresses. Verify
the physical addresses.
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• Check the telephone numbers.
• Look up the subcontractor in a telephone book or business directory and compare
spelling, address, and other details to the invoice.

Scrutinizing for Progress Payment Fraud and Front-End Loading
Progress payments are made as work moves through the stages of a contract. They are
based on costs incurred, the percentage of work accomplished, or the completion of a
particular stage. Fraud in progress payments or front-end loading occurs when a contractor
submits a progress payment request based on false information, usually including a falsified
certificate that the required stage of the contract has been completed.
The purpose of progress payments is to provide contractors with a continuing source of
revenue to meet their contractual obligations. In some cases, the contractor’s work may be
the subject of inspection but for the most part companies rely solely on the contractor’s
integrity that the contracted obligations have been carried out. If a contractor requests
payment for costs not actually incurred, a fraud or other crime has been committed.
The procedures that could be performed in scrutinizing for progress payment fraud and
front-end loading include the following:

1. Scrutiny ofFiles. Review monthly contract status management reports and obtain a
detailed explanation of any differences between the scheduled completion dates and
actual completion dates.
2. Scrutiny ofInvoices. Examine invoices to determine whether goods appear to have been
shipped on odd dates such as weekends or holidays.
3. Contractor Review. Perform corporate searches to determine whether the contractor has
declared bankruptcy.
4. Inspection of theJob Site. Visit personally or send a qualified person such as an engineer to
check that work is actually progressing as reported.

13.3.5 Noncompetitive Contracts
For illustrative purposes, some of the steps to be undertaken in scrutinizing for small
purchase order fraud are presented herein.
Payments for small purchases, i.e., below established spending limits, are based on the
contractor’s submission of an invoice. That invoice is a representation by the contractor
that the goods or services have been delivered to the contracting office.

Auditors do not often audit such purchases because they are too small to be material.
However, since they are less controlled, auditors or designated employees should consider
them for inclusion in fraud audits. Because these files are typically quite thin, the auditor
will find it very difficult to establish any occurrence of fraud.
A few scrutinizing procedures are indicated below:

1. Company Files. Summarize all contracts awarded by a particular department. Note any
patterns such as the number of contracts awarded to particular contractors and their
dollar value and timing.
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2. Industry Review. Examine industry price lists. If contractor prices are higher than industry
prices, there is a problem, since the main reason for using the noncompetitive method is
to reduce cost.
3. Contractor Review. The review of the contractor should include the following:
• Determine names of the contractor’s directors and officials and compare these to a
list of employees in the departments and divisions involved in this contract to
discover any possible connections.
• Assess whether the location of the contractor is convenient to the department
needing the service. It should be.

13.3.6 Secret Commissions, Breach of Trust, and Conflicts of Interest
After discovering the red flags of fraud in the screening process, the auditor must then
substantiate or refute them. Falsified records may complicate this process. Nevertheless, the
auditor must carry out whatever scrutinizing steps are possible. These procedures could
include the following:

1. Review of Contractor Background. The following procedures should be included in a
review of the contractor’s background:
• Check out the ownership of the contractor’s company.
• Identify all the contractor’s related companies or businesses. The contractor may not
necessarily be the party who paid the benefit.
2. Examination of the Nature of the Relationship Between Contractor and Employees. Determine
the nature of any relationship between the contractor and the employee suspected of
having received a benefit. Discovery of a relationship could establish the motive for the
payment of the alleged secret commission.
3. Review ofEmployee Lifestyle. The following steps should be included in the review of
employees’ lifestyles:
• Gather information about employees in an unobtrusive manner to find out if any
employees:
—Are living beyond their means, that is, have cash, assets such as expensive cars or
jewelry, or lifestyles that include expensive vacations or gambling that cannot be
accounted for by known sources of income. Salary information may be required.
—Have personal or social commitments involving one or more contractors.
4. Review ofEmployee Roles and Responsibilities. Establish whether the suspected employee
has any authority to sign checks, authorize purchases, or grant credit up to a certain
limit. Has that limit been strictly observed?
5. Assessment of the Relation Between Employee Decision Making and Benefits Gained. The
following procedures are intended to assess the timing of the relation, if any, between
the benefit to an employee arising from his or her decisions:
• Determine whether the suspected employee has acted beyond the scope of his
normal responsibilities to approve or influence the approval of transactions.
• Compare the timing of the benefit with decisions made by the suspected employee.
Determine whether the contractor benefited. For instance, did a contractor win a
contract around the time of an alleged secret commission payment?
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13.3.7 Conclusion
On completion of the screening and scrutinizing phases of the fraud-detection process, if
wrongdoing is still a possibility, the auditor should prepare a list of planned procedures for
the in-depth examination phase. Approval from the appropriate authority may be
necessary, since the in-depth examination phase typically involves the following:
• Going into the field or elsewhere to obtain documents
• Analyzing the documents
• Interviewing

13.4 In-Depth Examination of Suspect Procurement Contracts
The purpose of the in-depth examination phase is to determine whether there is sufficient
reason to refer the suspect contract for legal consideration.

In the in-depth examination phase, the auditor should interview persons involved in or
with knowledge of any apparent fraudulent scheme. The auditor should seek out those
individuals in possible conflict with the contractor or any of the suppliers or subcontractors.
Employees terminated by the contractor, the supplier, or the subcontractor are usually
willing to provide details of any wrongdoing. Note: Every case is different and requires
careful consideration and development of a suitable investigative strategy.
The in-depth examination phase requires analyses of a wide range of evidence. The
auditors should examine all activities of any suspect including debt levels and servicing,
gambling, alcohol or drug use, and any other unusual behavior.

For instance, expense accounts or assets under the control of an employee should be
reviewed. Contractors and employees may frequent the same restaurants or belong to the
same social or sports clubs. A comparison of the employee expense accounts with those of
the contractor may indicate an undisclosed relationship.
The auditor should normally obtain approval from the appropriate higher corporate
authority, including the general counsel’s office, before conducting any interviews or
detailed analyses since the reputation of an innocent person could be damaged by a
mishandled inquiry.

There are a number of methodological issues that show up in the in-depth examination
phase:

• Correct conduct of interviews
• Gathering and preserving of evidence
• Definition of evidence
Typical considerations and steps undertaken during this stage include the following:

1. Establish the care, custody, and control of all available documents relating to the
contract.
2. Inform the corporate authorities of the current situation and its direction.

34

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

Chapter Thirteen: Detecting Procurement Fraud

3. Consider the interview process:
• Should other people within the department or contractor’s organization be
interviewed?
• Should other contractors be interviewed?
• Does the auditor have a right to meet with these people and examine their
documents?
4. How far back in time should one go?
5. Is additional documentation necessary and available? If so, where?
6. Does the available evidence form a pattern?
7. Evaluate the evidence and present the results to general counsel for his or her
consideration and reaction strategy.
8. Decide whether to consult experts.
Evidence may consist of statements from witnesses, confessions of perpetrators, documents,
and perhaps the report of an expert. Critical decisions must be reached regarding the
appropriate legal strategy, the effect of the investigation, and the timing and method used
to approach the contracting company, if at all.

13.4.1 The Requirements Definition Stage
The procedures that would be deferred at the scrutinizing stage are now considered in the
in-depth examination for unnecessary purchases:

1. Analysis of Contractor Records. The auditor should take the following steps:
• Obtain the contractor’s financial statements.
• Calculate the total dollar value of all contracts awarded to this contractor as a
percentage of his total revenue to measure the contractor’s dependence on the
company. Calculate the total dollar value of the contracts awarded to one particular
contractor as a percentage of all the contracts awarded by the company or
department to measure the degree to which the company is dependent on the
contractor.
2. Interviews of Company Employees. Interview company employees who ordered the goods
or services to find out why the goods or services were ordered but not used.
3. Interviews of Other Suppliers. Contact other suppliers of the same goods or services to
determine their use. Look for excessive support or total rejection of what these goods or
services can do.
4. Interview of Consultants. Interview consultants who may have carried out precontract
studies or analyses. Determine the relationships between the consultants and the
successful bidders.
5. Conflict Analysis. Examine the involvement of any employee from other divisions or a
related department. If these individuals have been involved in obtaining information or
preparing the needs or requirements documents, their relationship with the successful
bidder must be determined, even if they are senior management.
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13.4.2 The Bidding and Selection Stage
The procedures to be followed in an in-depth examination for bid rigging (pending
appropriate approvals) should include the following:

1. Interview ofEmployees and Consultants. The auditor should take the following steps in the
interview of employees and consultants:
• Check for any irregularities in the tendering and awarding of the contract.
Interviewees may not come out and say there were irregularities, but their demeanor
could indicate their feelings.
• Determine whether any former employee is now employed by the contractor or if
there are any other unreported relationships. Excessive support by one employee or
senior manager could indicate a relationship with the successful bidder or a
relationship with the real beneficiary of a fix in the bid process.
• Determine whether there is any preference for one contractor over another.
2. Interview of Unsuccessful Bidders Concerning the Bidding Process. The auditor should look for
the following in the interview of unsuccessful bidders:
• Excessive complaints or no complaint at all, which may indicate further evidence of
a problem
• Praise of the successful bidder, which could indicate the bidders fixed the process
themselves
These steps, along with others devised during the scrutinizing process, should be part of the
auditor’s action plan developed before the in-depth examination.

13.4.3 Fixed-Cost Contracts
The procedures to be conducted in an in-depth examination for product substitution in
fixed-cost contracts (pending appropriate approval) may include:
1. Interview Testing Organization's Employees. Determine whether testing was actually
performed and obtain test results.
2. Engage Technical Experts. Have independent experts carry out an examination of the
technical aspects of the products or services in question.
3. Customs Follow-Up. The auditor should carry out the following procedures:
• For contracts specifying only foreign goods, use a qualified investigator to verify the
types, quality, and quantity of items imported. Compare these to the contracted
products.
• Ask the investigator to do a search by type of product and address of importer to
determine whether the contractor is importing the contracted goods under another
name.
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13.4.4 Cost-Plus and Cost-Per-Unit Contracts
This section provides some procedures for examination of cost-plus and cost-per-unit
contracts where the types of fraud suspected are:
• Defective pricing or cost mischarging
• Progress payment fraud and front-end loading.

Defective Pricing or Cost Mischarging
The procedures used in an in-depth examination for defective pricing or cost mischarging
(pending appropriate approval) should include:

1. Interview Subcontractors. The auditor should:
• Contact subcontractors and discuss the nature of their work.
• Obtain evidence of completed work.
2. Contractor Review. The auditor should:

Compare catalog prices and service rates to the contract prices.
Obtain a complete employee list and all timecards for the contracted work.
Examine signatures on timecards for forgery or tracing through carbon.
Obtain all journal entries and allocation worksheets showing all cost allocations
between contracts, particularly between cost-plus and fixed-cost contracts.
Investigate any adjustments. Be aware that the contractor may claim the adjustments
were necessary because of accounting errors. Examine the alleged accounting errors.
• Examine timecards for changes to the contract number charged.

•
•
•
•

Progress Payment Fraud and Front-End Loading
The procedures to be performed in an in-depth examination of cost-plus and cost-per unit
contracts for progress payment fraud and front-end loading (pending appropriate approval)
may include:

1. Contractor Review. The auditor should:
• Examine the contractor’s subcontractor files for evidence of nonpayment for goods
or services charged to the company by the contractor.
• Obtain financial statements and cash flow projections to determine whether the
contractor is able to meet its liabilities.

2. Company File Review. Do a complete audit of all cost-plus submissions.
Subcontractor Review. Telephone or write suppliers to verify their existence and that they
supplied the goods and work specified. Verify the prices, quantity, and quality of the goods
or services supplied.
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13.4.5 Noncompetitive Contracts
The procedures to be performed at the in-depth examination phase may include the
following (pending appropriate approval):
1. Interview of Company Employees and Management. Interview users to find out whether the
service or goods were satisfactory. Poor performance but continued use identifies a
problem.
2. Interview Contractor. Interview the contractor to discover whether he learned about the
company’s need for goods or services or even got the contract through a possible link to
a particular employee.

13.4.6 Secret Commissions, Breach of Trust, and Conflicts of Interest
The examination performed in an investigation of secret commissions, breach of trust, or
conflict of interest is more delicate than that for any other suspected fraud, since the auditor
could be accusing an employee or contractor of committing a crime. The more parties
involved, the greater the danger that evidence will be destroyed prior to the formal
investigation. Hence, this section includes a list of procedures to be performed at the indepth examination stage. The auditor is cautioned to proceed with extreme care.

1. Review ofFinancial Records of Contractor. The auditor should carry out the following
procedures:
• Examine the contractor’s financial records to establish the nature of any relationship
and the extent of any dealings. Bear in mind that dishonest contractors regard secret
commissions as a cost of doing business and will include them in their records
suitably disguised as expenses.
• Determine the form and the purpose of the alleged secret commission by reviewing
the accounting and banking records of the contractor. Does the alleged secret
commission take the form of cash or payments to the benefit of the recipient, e.g.,
travel or a car? The books of account of the payor or of the appropriate related
company will have to be reviewed for supporting documentation such as checks and
supplier invoices. This review should also disclose how such payments were
recorded by the payor. In general, these payments are recorded as either an expense
or a loan.
• If the payment is recorded as a loan to the recipient:
—What was the purpose of the loan?
—Does a promissory note exist?
—Has any interest been charged on the loan or has any interest been collected?
—What are the terms of repayment, if any, and have any repayments been made?
—If the loan has been repaid, was a check presented for payment and did it clear the
banking system?
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• If the payment was recorded as an expense:
—Establish the nature of the expense, for example, promotion travel, and whether
such payments are in the normal course of business or reflect an unusual
transaction.
—Obtain documents such as invoices, purchase orders, contract or shipping
documents that describe the goods or services being paid for.
2. Review ofPersonal Financial Affairs of the Employee. The auditor should carry out the
following procedures:
• Review the suspected employee’s known assets by performing a search to determine
how and when such assets were acquired. Obtain any documentation in support of
these purchases.
• Examine the personal financial affairs of the employee. This may help establish a
lifestyle inconsistent with income.
• If possible, review the suspected employee’s banking documents to identify
unaccountable deposits.

13.4.7 Analytical Techniques
There is no one correct method or process for analyzing evidence. The type of analysis
required will depend on the nature of the allegations. This section will review some typical
types of analysis that should be familiar to the investigator. Some of the types of analysis
that can be conducted are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Vertical Analysis
Horizontal analysis
Ratio analysis
Net worth analysis
Statement of cash-flows analysis
Source and use of funds analysis

Vertical Analysis
Vertical analysis, which is sometimes referred to as common-size analysis, examines the
relationships between line items on an income statement, balance sheet, or statement of
cash flows by expressing components as percentages.
In the vertical analysis of an income statement, for example, net revenues is assigned 100
percent. For a balance sheet, total assets is 100 percent. All other line items are expressed
as a percentage of these two numbers. When completing the analyses, the changes must be
material.

Horizontal Analysis
Horizontal analysis examines the year-over-year change in individual financial statement
line items as a percentage. Each line of the base year is assigned 100 percent. The changes
in subsequent years are computed as a percentage of the base year’s balances.
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Ratio Analysis
Ratio analysis can be helpful in detecting potential errors and other irregularities with
respect to various balance-sheet and income items.

Net Worth Analysis
Net worth analysis is used to prove the suspect’s assets or expenditures for a given period
exceed that which can be accounted for from known sources of income. This tool is most
useful when the recipient is taking cash or other payments which cannot be traced directly
and when the amount greatly exceeds legitimate income. It is often used by the Internal
Revenue Service. Net worth analysis is also useful in bribery and corruption cases (offbooks). The two methods for completing net worth analysis are the assets method and the
expenditures method, and are described in the following:
Assets Method
The assets method should be used when the suspect has invested supposedly illegal funds to
increase net worth. The steps to complete this analysis are to:

1. Establish a base period such as the year before the one in question.
2. Compute the suspect’s net worth at the end of the base year. Identify all assets at cost
and all known liabilities. The difference is the net worth.
3. Repeat the computation for the year in question using the same method.
4. Determine the suspect’s known income during year two, and subtract known expenses
for year two. The difference between the suspect’s income and expenses equals the
increase or decrease in net worth from year one to year two attributed to known
sources.
5. Subtract the increase in net worth from known sources from the total increases in net
worth to determine the amount from unknown sources.
6. Repeat the computations as necessary for subsequent years.
Expenditures Method
This expenditures method is best used when the suspect spends allegedly ill-gotten gains on
lavish living, travel, and entertainment. Expenditures in excess of known revenues are
unexplained income. The steps to complete this analysis are:
1. Establish the suspect’s known expenditures for the relevant year. Expenditures include
the use or application of funds for any purpose. These expenditures include deposits to
bank accounts, purchase of major assets, travel and expenses, payment of loans, and
payment of credit cards.
2. Identify all sources of funds available to the suspect. These funds include cash on hand
from previous years’ loans and gifts.
3. Conclude that the amount in excess of known income shows the expenditures
attributable to unknown sources.
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Key Points in Determining Net Worth
The auditor should consider the following in determining net worth:
1. All assets should be valued at cost, not fair-market value.
2. Ignore depreciation or appreciation.
3. Give the suspect the benefit of the doubt when estimating income or assets.
4. Factor in expenses for living, such as food and entertainment.
5. Consider interviewing the suspect to identify all alleged sources and to rebut later
defenses.

Statement of Cash-Flows Analysis
Cash is the asset most often pilfered. Analysis of the statement of cash flows can be useful
in detecting fraud in small businesses. For example, suppose the bookkeeper
misappropriated cash instead of paying the company’s bills. The statement of cash flows
highlights the significant increase in payables. Cash receipts were stolen over a period of
years and the statement of cash flows shows one of the following:
—A significant increase in receivables
—Cash, as a percentage of sales, decreasing over time

Source and Use of Funds Analysis
The purpose of a source and use schedule is to provide an overview of the flow of funds. A
source and use schedule can show the individuals involved in the transactions and the
benefits obtained from the use of the funds. The level of examinable detail will be
determined by the availability of documents. There may be a number of disbursements for
which the canceled check is missing, or a number of deposits whose origin is unknown.
The investigator should ensure the information in the source and use schedule is complete
and accurate. The integrity of the investigator’s work will be undermined if the schedule
contains errors.

Methods of Displaying the Results of Analysis
Chronologies
Chronologies tell the story of events by organizing information along a time line. This
narrative can be developed through interviews. A sequencing of all relevant documents can
also be prepared. Comparisons of chronologies can expose inconsistencies between witness
statements and documentary evidence. Such conflicts may be important to investigations
such as bid rigging where the sequence of events is critical.
Chronologies keep the investigation team focused on the relevant events. They can also
highlight gaps requiring further investigation. Comparing chronologies may also lead the
investigators to a better understanding of the issues. The behavior of a certain person may
be explained by a change in their personal situation.
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Charts and Graphs
The fundamental purpose of charts is to present complex issues organized into a simple,
easy-to-understand format. They can be used in a variety of ways, such as illustrating
relationships between individuals and/or companies or visualizing the flow of information
within an organization.
Graphs are similar to charts in that they, too, are used to simplify the presentation of
information, especially quantifiable information. For example, monthly sales figures may
be more easily understood as a line or bar chart than as a column of numbers. Graphs tend
to have a greater impact than a column of numbers because the use of pictures puts the
numbers in context. A graph of an individual’s monthly expenses, for example, may
highlight a shift in the spending pattern that corresponds to a known event such as the
awarding of a contract. Graphs can be used to play up the strengths of one own position, or
point out the deficiencies of one’s adversary. They can also be used to great effect in
reports and later in court.
13.5

Reporting Fraud in Procurement Contracts
At the conclusion of the in-depth examination stage of the fraud detection process, the
auditor should be in a position to recommend various options:

• A full formal investigation
• A loss recovery action be instituted on behalf of the company
• A disciplinary action be taken against an employee and the case referred to general or
corporate counsel
• No further action is necessary since the suspicions were unfounded
Such recommendations should be made in a written report to management. If management
decides to take the case further, other reports are likely to be required for legal counsel or
government agencies. Once a case is referred to such agencies, a process of loss recovery,
criminal investigation, or other action may be contemplated.
If the auditor recommends the case go forward, the reports to management and legal
counsel should request a decision on how to proceed. Both reports should thus be written
simultaneously and have similar content.

As the case progresses, it becomes more organized and the evidence becomes easier to
manage. The reporting process would also be greatly simplified by an organized approach
to handling the evidence.

13.5.1 Organization of Evidence
Some cases may produce up to 100 binders of documents and working papers. It is
therefore vital to prepare indices for notes on findings. The casebook or working paper files
can then list the various documents and issues of the case that forms the basis of the written
report.

42

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

Chapter Thirteen: Detecting Procurement Fraud

The preparation of a complete index requires a command of the facts of the case. Such
knowledge, however, is usually not gained until near the end of the case. Accordingly, any
useful interim index must be capable of expansion and reorganization as the case
progresses. As the index expands, it may be necessary to create subindices to group related
documents and issues. Such organization keeps the auditor from becoming lost in the
paperwork. The lack of good housekeeping practices is probably the chief cause of
misplaced documents or forgotten information.

The documents filed in the working papers would typically include copies of documents
used as evidence for the case, file notes, and memoranda prepared by the auditor. The
copies used in the working paper files would be one of the two sets of copies taken of the
original documents (the other set being retained to prepare the document brief). At the
time of copying, post-it notes placed on the original documents would facilitate gathering
the original evidence required for submission in court. If one document relates to more
than one section of the working paper file, it would be advisable to copy that document for
inclusion wherever needed elsewhere in the file.

13.5.2 Working Paper File Sections
Most working paper files would contain similar types of documents. Standardization of the
filing method for these documents makes it possible for any auditor to find his way around
a given case. Included in this section is a list of documents typically included in a fraud
detection file prepared by auditors or designated employees. Since the order of these
documents has not been finalized, it is up to auditors or designated employees to determine
a suitable organizational standard for their working paper files.

Case Indices
Case indices should be prepared for each file. If a case requires more than one file, master
indices should be filed in the front of each file. It may even be necessary to prepare indices
of the indices, if the case is unusually complex. The indices should cover not only the issues
of the case but also the overview and background records.

Reports
All reports presenting findings in summary form to either management or external
agencies, should be filed in the working paper files. Among these reports should be drafts
of all reports seen by others.

Outstanding Matters
This section contains all material pertaining to methodology and any incidental materials.
Monitoring such loose ends may be crucial to a large investigation especially since there is
no standard methodology of fraud detection.
As the case develops, this section will likely be subdivided into a small number of broad
subject areas. As procedures are completed, such documents should be annotated and
retained to record the methodology when preparing the report.
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Case Overview
The case overview should be represented by a chart of the relevant issues or red flags and
any conclusions. If the case cannot be represented on one sheet of paper, either the person
preparing the overview chart does not understand the case, or the case is too complicated.
Such a chart should be prepared right at the beginning of the fraud detection process to
show what is known. This overview should change as new information changes the focus of
the auditor’s attention. This case overview will form the basis for organizing the evidence
and the findings section of the working papers file.

Chronology of Events
A case chronology permits new documentation and information to be put into perspective.
The chronology may include timing details for all the issues of the case, or, if the case is
complex, there may be an overall chronology of significant events and then subchron
ologies of events relating to particular issues.

Key Player Profiles
The particulars of all witnesses and suspects should be listed together with the details of
their involvement. This information is useful in detecting inconsistencies or gaps in later
interviews or other evidence.

Contact Lists
All investigators should also be listed along with a description of their role in the fraud
detection process and their telephone number(s). This list should be available to all
individuals working on the case.

Correspondence
All correspondence and attachments should be filed by date. Correspondence received
should be date-stamped. If these documents contain information required elsewhere in the
file, copies should be made and filed in the appropriate place.

Diary Entries
This section includes all records of meetings, telephone calls, and interviews. If the case is
large enough, such documentation might be split into several files. Meeting records should
include the date, time, and place of the meeting; the names of those attending; the topics
discussed; and a summary of all points resolved. Telephone logs should record the name of
the caller, date, and time of the call; and the topics discussed. Preparatory notes should be
filed together with interview transcripts. As new issues come up in the course of the
interview, a new working paper should be opened. This practice keeps topics distinct and
allows the auditor to build files in the relevant case sections.

Time Estimates
Although time estimates are difficult to prepare, a “best-guess” must be made near the
beginning as to the total estimated time for completion. This time estimate can be used in
staffing decisions and in estimating when the case will be ready for the report preparation
stage.
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Legal Documentation
Copies of all relevant legal documentation should be obtained and filed in the working
paper files for future reference. For example, a civil case file would usually include a
statement of claim, a statement of defense, and a statement of counterclaim. The attorney
on the case should be able to provide such documentation.

Findings and Supporting Documentation
All issues addressed in the case overview should be supported by working papers and their
related documents. Flexibility in working paper file organization should permit change as
the case overview changes.
Once the working paper file has been completed, the process of preparing a report should
be fairly simple, since the working paper file should already include all the findings. During
the writing of the report, there should be few, if any, calculations required.

13.5.3 The Formal Report
Most reports issued to either the company or external legal counsel will have similar
contents. Below is a list (in no particular order) of the types of things most often included in
reports:
1. Summary ofFindings. All points addressed in the case overview and the auditor’s
procedural recommendation should be included.
2. Scope. The scope of the auditor’s examination should be described in any report. This
would normally include a list based on the indices of the records and other evidence
examined.
3. Approach. The methodology used should be patterned after the case overview and may
include the completed procedures as documented in the outstanding matters section.
4. Findings. The text of the case findings should be written simply and chart summaries
and graphs used to support the findings.
5. Summary Charts and Graphs. These documents should be filed as appendices to the
report and cross-referenced to the supporting documentation.
6. Document Brief. A document brief is a collection of documents to be entered as exhibits
in court. Document briefs are usually indexed and the pages numbered consecutively to
facilitate cross-referencing during the formal investigative process and court
proceedings.

13.5.4 Evidence
The in-depth examination phase gathers additional evidence to support the allegations or
suspicions noted in the screening and scrutinizing stages. Evidence is required to perform
procedures such as the following:
•
•
•
•

Summarizing and explaining the accounting or other systems and any paper trail
Analyzing accounting and other records to identify additional areas of concern
Describing the position and responsibilities of the suspect within the system
Demonstrating the control exercised by the suspect on the accounting system
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Showing the suspect’s knowledge of the accounting system
Establishing and demonstrating any patterns of the fraud cover-up
Establishing and proving the extent of the fraud
Establishing and proving the financial position of the suspect
Considering the position of other people within the organization and the possibility of
collusion
• Documenting findings fully

•
•
•
•
•

Some of the evidence necessary to perform procedures such as these might have been
gathered in the screening and scrutinizing phases. Evidence may also be gathered during
interviews.
Since oral evidence alone will not support either a criminal or a civil action, the auditor
must retrieve other types of evidence. How much evidence is enough? That depends on
the type of action to be taken, either civil or criminal.

It is therefore necessary for fraud auditors to be aware of the rules of evidence and other
related issues. This knowledge will affect the way an auditor conducts the screening,
scrutinizing, and in-depth examination phases of the fraud detection process. Evidence
must be gathered and preserved in a form acceptable to the courts.

13.5.5 Practical Issues
In any case involving documentary evidence, the auditor is faced with three questions:

1. What documents should be obtained?
2. What is their source?
3. How should they be handled?

Deciding on What Documentation to Obtain
What documents to obtain should be decided during the screening and scrutinizing phase
with a view to the in-depth examination. Such decisions will be based on meetings with
witnesses and initial assessments of findings. The types of financial documentation likely to
be required include:
• Documents showing the movement of assets into and out of the company, contractor, or
third parties during the period under investigation
• Books of account, management reports, and statistical analyses pertaining to the
contractor or to an individual for the period under investigation
• Relevant correspondence and personal documents such as bank account records

Obtaining Documentation
Once the auditor has decided what records or other documents must be obtained, a list
should be prepared. This list can be used when obtaining permission to take originals or
copies or could form the basis of a subpoena. Document descriptions should include at
least the type and period required. This description can then form the basis of an
acquisition strategy that avoids “fishing expeditions.” Support may be gathered from
sources such as:
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• Public documents
• Documents provided voluntarily
• Witness interviews

This material will also be useful for the formal investigation stage.

Handling the Documents
Documents obtained during any stage of the fraud detection process must be carefully
handled, properly identified, and cataloged. They must not be written upon, altered,
stapled, or unstapled during the course of the examination.

The chain of custody must be recorded for all documentary evidence that may be used in
court All such documents should be marked, identified, inventoried, and preserved to
maintain their original condition. If gaps in the chain occur, the evidence may be
challenged in court on the theory that the writing or information on the evidence is not
original or is not in its original condition and is therefore of doubtful authenticity. For any
document to be admissible as evidence, it is necessary to prove that it is the same
document that was obtained and in the same condition. It should be marked at the time of
seizure for later identification. Because several persons may handle it between acquisition
and presentation in court, the complete chain of custody must be recorded. To maintain
the integrity of the document, the auditor must follow strict rules of evidence handling.
The auditor must mark the documents for later identification in court that they are indeed
the documents seized and that they are in the same condition as when seized. The auditor
may, for instance, initial and date each document in the margin, in a comer or some other
inconspicuous place. If such marking risks rendering the document open to question on the
grounds of defacement or other alteration, the auditor should make a copy for his files,
then seal the original in an envelope and write a description on the front.

These techniques should be applied any time the auditor comes into possession of an
original document that may be used as evidence in a trial. Steps should be taken to
preserve the copy’s authenticity in case it is needed to replace the original in court.
Once the documents have been marked, identified, and cataloged, photocopies should be
made to provide working copies for use when preparing schedules, completing interviews,
and building the working paper files. If one fresh copy is taken which is never marked, the
process of preparing a document brief will be that much easier.
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1

Construction

1.1 Introduction
Frauds in the construction industry are perpetrated in a wide range of activities from the
poor-quality overcharged renovations of an elderly homeowner to the building of any
structure that collapses as the result of a contractor’s comer-cutting workmanship or
substitution of inferior materials.
One obvious distinction between the construction industry and other industries that may
have sullied reputations is the ability of many industries to overcome the wariness of their
customers because their services or products, or both, are often more transparent than
buildings and bridges. The construction industry cannot so easily clear its name.

Fraud can happen to anyone in the construction industry. There are no universal panaceas.
Any remedy that reduces the trust necessary among the designers, builders, and owners,
however, will not succeed in the long run since distrust increases the cost of doing business
to prohibitive levels.
There is no substitute for vigilance and diligence. To research, prepare, verify, observe,
inspect, and compare the terms of any job with industry norms are activities that can be
neither curtailed nor cut short without a potential risk of economic harm. The cost of fraud
can be greater than the cost of watchfulness and thoroughness.

The construction industry sector includes entities conducting the following kinds of
operations:
1. Residential and commercial building construction and renovations
2. Construction of roads, bridges, and similar public works
3. Installation of plumbing, electrical, and similar infrastructures

Although every commercial transaction may be subject to the risk of fraud, the
construction industry has been especially affected by frauds resulting from, among other
factors:
• Dependence on consultants or government officials or both for obtaining regulatory
approvals

• Noncompliance with labor laws and collective bargaining agreements
• High-dollar value of many of the contracts
• Requirements to accept lowest bidders
• Dependence on consultants, including development managers, architects, and engineers
for good-faith exercise of discretion

1.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The primary key vulnerabilities to fraud in the construction-industry sector include the
following:
• Contract-biddingfraud (bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and so on). Competitive
pressures can lead to collusion among bidders on a contract, thus exposing the company
to criminal prosecution. Alternatively, managers and employees who feel they have
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little stake in the company may accept kickbacks or secret commissions from either the
company’s customers or its suppliers in exchange for under the table financial
consideration or preferred treatment.
• Materials substitution. Subcontractors may substitute materials of lower quality than
called for in the contract specifications in order to:
1. Make a profit on contracts they have underbid on.

2. Increase their profits. The company itself may also engage in this practice, thereby
exposing itself to criminal prosecution or civil liability.
• Tax evasion. Especially in residential construction and renovations, companies may
solicit or accept “cash-without-a-receipt” business in order to avoid sales taxes as well as
reduce their income taxes.
• Employee misbehavior (theft, sabotage, and the like). Depending on the nature of the
employee-employer relationship and the construction contract, some employees may
feel little loyalty to the projects they work on and have no inclination to complete work
on time. Line employees may steal materials or intentionally create time and cost
overruns to extend their own employment. As material and labor costs soar during the
construction phase, support personnel in accounting or purchasing departments may
concoct inventory or accounts payable schemes to defraud their employers or
customers.

Dependence on Consultants or Government Officials
Often, the control over real estate development exercised by government officials creates
the opportunity for bribery. Government officials and expediters may exploit the need for
compliance with zoning and other regulations that may result in serious risks of commercial
bribery and official misconduct.

Illicit Expedition Case Study
A major international construction company based in the southwest United States
was engaged in a business endeavor with the government of China and needed to
develop office space in Beijing. The construction manager required assistance to
comply with China’s byzantine rules and regulations. In selecting the consultant
whose services could be loosely described as “expediting the obtaining of permits
and compliance with other requirements imposed by the governments of China,”
the construction manager relied on the manager of the firm’s joint venture partner
located in the southeast United States. A consultant based in Hong Kong was hired.
How was this consultant chosen? The construction manager was under unrelenting
pressure to hold down and reduce costs because of the company owner’s strict
budget. Not surprisingly, when the joint-venture partner volunteered to take the
initiative and locate a suitable consultant, the construction manager was relieved to
be now taking a back seat. No background check of the consultant was undertaken.
He was represented as “a friend of a friend” who had performed such services for
other companies seeking to do similar business in China.

4
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Sometimes, when one sits in the back seat, one gets to enjoy the ride. This position
is not advisable in business. The construction manager got taken for a very bumpy
ride, indeed, through the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and United
States Attorney’s offices. The consultant played according to rules that were at best
inconsistent with the demands of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the United
States. He routinely extended bribes and other scandalous inducements to obtain
government access and approvals. After a falling out with the joint venture partner,
the construction manager ordered a comprehensive audit of the joint venture’s
records that disclosed substantial noncompliance with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Payments of questionable purpose ordered by and paid to the
consultant were exposed.

The construction manager’s misplaced confidence in both the joint venture partner
and his corrupt consultant resulted in significant financial penalties, attorneys’ fees,
and other costs. These costs could have been avoided with adequate due diligence.

Failure to Disclose Material Facts—Intentional Omissions
Occasionally, even fraudsters have a conscience. Outright lying may be distasteful to
fraudsters who exhibit good manners and a pretense of respectability. Instead, they simply
leave out a few important details. It must be remembered that fraud always involves
deception. Whether by telling lies or purposely concealing material facts, the fraudster
takes advantage of our gullibility, busy schedules, occasional laziness, or unguardedness.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell Case Study
A major financial services company called for competitive bids on a multi-milliondollar capital-improvements project to upgrade its computer hardware and
software. A review of the bids by independent forensic accountants discovered
significant inexplicable discrepancies in the prices of the elements and scope of the
work. These alert CPAs made numerous attempts to discuss their findings with the
individuals in the purchasing department responsible for awarding the contract;
however, all efforts were not only met with disinterest but ultimately were thwarted.
As a result, the suspicious CPAs researched the short-listed bidders and discovered
the following material conflicts of interest:

1. The purchasing department was controlled by a person on the technical
advisory board of one of the short-listed bidders.
2. A former senior employee of the department was on the board of directors of
the same short-listed bidder.
The most surprising discovery, however, was that the conflicted short-listed bidder’s
price was more than $1 million greater than the lowest nonconflicted short-listed
bidder. The department’s recommendation-of-contract-award memorandum, which
advised the financial services company to award the contract to the conflicted
bidder, was analyzed by the CPAs and ancillary experts. No qualitative- or value
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engineering benefits were discovered that could justify a commitment of that
premium. In addition, no disclosure of the conflict had been made by the parties
involved.
Compelled by the evidence and failure of the department to make the proper
disclosures, the CPAs reported the circumstances of the conflict and the
stonewalling by the department to the audit committee. As a result, the contract
was not awarded to the conflicted bidder.

Timely and aggressive actions by the CPAs resulted in savings in excess of $1
million for the financial services company and, in the process, the unscrupulous
senior employees were exposed without any embarrassing public scandal.

Materially Misleading Disclosures or Intentional Omissions
The misrepresentation or outright lie is the stock-in-trade of the fraudster. Omitting
material facts is comparatively easy on the conscience, whereas the lie creates difficulties in
keeping track of the trail of deception. Never underestimate the fraudster’s capacity for
audacity.

Just Because I Said, It—Doesn’t Mean I Meant It Case Study

A construction manager was responsible for soliciting “best and final” bids for a
lucrative contract for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning controls work. To
ensure that the process was handled fairly and above board, the construction
manager was required to keep the owner apprised of the progress of the bidding.
Three bids of $10.2, $10, and $8 million were tendered before the request for best
and final. As the deadline approached, the three bidders lowered their bids slightly,
with the original order preserved. An hour before the deadline, however, the
highest bidder abruptly dropped its bid by nearly $2 million, thereby tendering a
“second and real best and final bid” with the explanation that “the earlier submitted
best and final had been a mistake.”
Sensing a foul deal, the owner and his construction consultant immediately
confronted the construction manager, who assured them that although the
circumstances seemed suspicious, the bidding process had not been materially
compromised. He argued that the last-minute change in bid made no difference
because “the spread, while narrowed, was not altered enough to change the order
of the bidding.” The construction manager indicated that the lowest bidder before
the second special best and final would be offered the award. On the day of the
award, however, the bidder with the second opportunity at best and final was
awarded the contract.

The alarmed owner grilled all of the construction manager’s employees involved in
the bidding process, scrutinized correspondence, and other documents pertaining
to the ‘best and final’ negotiations. He discovered facsimiles to the bid award
winner from the purchasing agent advising the bidder of “the number he had to
make.” The construction manager denied any intentional misconduct and
reminded the owner that there was no requirement to accept the lowest bid since
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this was not a public contract. “Besides,” said the construction manager, “we had no
intention of awarding the contract to the lowest bidder.”
The owner was appalled at the brazen deception by the construction manager. To
mitigate the risk of any future bid favoritism, the owner hired a full-time
construction monitor to observe the bidding process in addition to the progress of
construction projects. The construction manager was permitted to keep his job but
was required to pay the additional monitoring costs.

Invitations to Bid
The fear of monopolies is widespread. To thwart such concentrations of selling power,
governments in the United States and Europe have spent millions on economic research
and legal talent. A similar but lesser known concept is monopsony, which is loosely defined
as an economic condition characterized by a concentration in buying power. This is the kind
of power wielded by many large prime contractors and construction managers today.
Modem day construction managers may hold a monopsony because they have the power
to heavily influence subcontractors and vendors by selling the scopes of work. Often, the
pool of buyers for the products and services required in the construction industry is not
deep.

It’s My Party Case Study

A major prime contractor in the northeast United States ran the competitive
bidding process of his operation much like an exclusive “by invitation only” party.
The invitation, however, came with a price, “Don’t go to a party without bringing a
gift.” Getting on the preliminary approved bidders’ list was halfway to a winning
bid.
In an effort to effect competitive bidding and obtain fair prices for the work, the
owner stipulated there be provisions in the prime contract with the construction
manager that required a minimum of four bids for every trade. The construction
manager’s practices were inconsistent, however, with the owner’s new terms which
were essentially ineffectual. After repeatedly failing to receive more than two or
three bids for numerous lucrative trades, the owner became weary of the
construction manager’s excuses: the industry’s busy, now; the union labor pool is
tight; these are the only contractors meeting our rigorous prequalification
procedures, and so on.

These reasons failed to explain to the owner why the construction manager was
unable to generate much interest in a multimillion dollar contract for a construction
project near a major port. When the lucrative project received fewer than the
requisite four bids, the owner decided to take matters into his own hands and
employ a sting operation targeting the construction manager. The owner and a
construction consultant established a covert drywall firm through connections in the
drywall trades in northern California.
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The covert contractor contacted the construction manager to obtain information
about becoming eligible to bid for work. After numerous failures of the construction
manager’s purchasing department to return telephone calls, messages, and written
correspondences, the covert contractor eventually secured a prequalification
application, completed it and hand delivered it to the construction manager’s office.

Because the covert contractor had not been approved after several weeks, he
contacted the purchasing department and was told that they had never received his
application. On the premise that that his application may have been misplaced, a
representative of the covert contractor visited the purchasing manager and arranged
a business lunch. The covert representative’s background in law enforcement and
his natural skepticism which had been sharpened after years of audit experience
prompted him to secretly record the conversation. (This investigative technique
may not be lawful in all states.)
The purchasing agent explained that prequalification applications might be
unnecessary if a fee were paid to the purchasing manager to “facilitate and
expedite” the contractor’s objective of becoming a prequalified bidder. This
revelation proved to be merely the tip of the iceberg. On later confronting the
purchasing manager’s supervisor with the circumstances of his attempt to extort, the
covert representative discovered that the supervisor promised that the covert
contractor would be “eligible” for jobs. The only stipulation was that the
representative keep quiet.
Recognizing that white-collar crime was not too far removed from street crime, the
owner and construction consultant prepared a summary report for the district
attorney.

Bid Rigging
Although the imposition of a requirement that subcontracts be opened for competitive bids
appears to ensure fair dealing, it is not necessarily an effective means of assuring that the
owner and other concerned parties receive the benefit of a free market. Cooperation,
generally a virtue, becomes less desirable when it occurs between bidders.

United We Stand

Divided We Fall Case Study

The contract to provide concrete and masonry work for a major project was valued
at nearly $3 million by the construction manager. To the construction manager’s
surprise, of the six bids received, two of the quoted prices barely exceeded $2
million. Apparently eager not to question the company’s good fortune, the
construction manager endeavored to fast-track awarding the low bid and set the
date for acceptance of final bids only a few days hence.
Timely supervision by the owner’s construction monitor caused the owner to order
that the award be deferred and an inquiry held to investigate the bidders and the
bidding process. The monitor disclosed the following:

4.4
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• The lowest bidder had affiliations with organized crime.
• The second lowest bidder’s principals had been the subjects of an investigation
into violations of the prevailing wage laws.
• The third lowest bidder whose bid was actually consistent with the construction
manager’s expectations complained of the “unrealistically cheap quotes” of the
two lower bidders that had “for years underbid” the third lowest bidder in
addition to many others in the trade.
• Other bidders complained of not receiving timely notice of the availability of
the bid package, in spite of numerous requests for such to the construction
manager.
• The construction manager submitted a bidders list for approval to the owner
that included defunct or nonexistent companies or both.
The monitor used accounting and technical experts to analyze the bids and
discovered that the two lowest bidders had quoted unrealistic amounts for the labor
and materials, respectively. That is, one bidder substantially understated the
expected cost of labor and the other substantially understated the expected cost of
materials. The unaccountably low figures undermined the competitiveness of the
bidding process. Bids based on realistic, intelligent assessments of the costs of the
scope of work were consequently comparatively high and not short-listed against
the severely cut-rate amounts.

The monitor then examined the extensive database of contractors and vendors and
discovered that the construction manager and the lowest bidder had worked
together on numerous occasions. Further inquiry disclosed that this same low
bidder had earned substantially more than the original winning bid amounts on
change orders on virtually all his contracts. Furthermore, the lowest and second
lowest bidders had often outbid other contractors in the industry by alternating
between submitting the lowest and second lowest bids on other jobs.

The owner confronted the construction manager about his hasty desire to award the
contract to the lowest but not necessarily most responsible bidder. To ensure fair
dealing, the owner stipulated that conditions be placed on awarding the bid: The
low bidder would be required to accept oversight by the monitor and must absorb
the monitoring costs.
Faced with the prospect of scrutiny by the monitor, the lowest and second-lowest
bidders abruptly lost interest in the work. Several months later, these bidders were
indicted for criminal conspiracy related to bid rigging on other jobs. Ultimately, a
principal of one of the accused bidders worked out a plea agreement by which he
would be convicted of conspiracy and agree to testify against the defendants in the
other compromised concrete and drywall contractor.

Prosecution of Work
Contracts won through competitive bidding often yield narrow profit margins that
unscrupulous contractors try to offset through a wide variety of illegal schemes. If the bid
seems too good to be true, it’s probably not!
Fraud Supp. 2—3/02
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Buy Now, Pay Later Case Study
The owner was very pleased that his prime contractor had negotiated a seemingly
favorable deal with a significant subcontractor for the purchase and installation of
information technology equipment.
The fixed-price contract clearly specified that the subcontractor would organize,
deliver, and configure the equipment for approximately $10 million by using only
union labor pursuant to the prime contract’s requirements.
The subcontractor used his knowledge of the IT industry to contract for wiring and
related installation work with lower-tiered subcontractors who would use only one
of the two union locals with jurisdiction for the types of work required. This did not
sit well with the excluded union.

Work began. In fact, it began over and over again. As each phase of the work was
completed it would be mysteriously undone. Subsequent investigation showed that
the attractive price negotiated between the prime and subcontractor depended on
the use of the union with the significantly lower pay scale. The better paid local
intended to show the owner, prime contractor, and subcontractors that it deserved
its higher wages because it did better work.
Unfortunately, after the owner became irate enough to dig deeper into the reasons
for of the subcontractor’s choice of local, he discovered that the subcontractor had
attempted to use the lower paid local on prior jobs with the same results: Work was
sabotaged. The subcontractor had only used the higher paid local when
comfortable that the other bidders would also quote labor costs based on the pay
scale of this local. However, when the subcontractor needed a competitive
advantage, however, especially in the cases of large contracts, he would quote
figures based on labor and material costs that he knew he could not control as bid.

When work was commenced, the subcontractor intended to transfer the risk of loss
to other parties including the owner. It often happens that during the final phase of
construction the owner’s leverage has less effect as contractors devise means to
derive revenues from outside the contract; that is, from “unanticipated
circumstances.”

1.3 Means to Effect Fraud: Tools of the Trade

Contracts
Common construction industry contracts:
• Fixed-price or lump sum
• Time and materials or cost-plus

4.6
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Not Only the Price was Fixed Case Study

Common sense would suggest that fixed-price contracts should reduce the risk of
fraud. The contractor’s agreement to perform the work at a guaranteed maximum
price implies that he is willing to bear the risks of fraud and loss. At least, this is
what the owner thought.
After an extensive search within the construction industry, the owner selected a
prime contractor to erect a forty-plus-floor office tower in a major northeastern city.
After being warned by numerous attorneys and experts about the business practices
of the construction industry, the owner decided to negotiate a guaranteed
maximum price contract with not only his prime contractor but also with all the
lower tiered subcontractors.

Discovering less resistance than anticipated, the owner was delighted with the
apparent ease and simplicity of negotiating agreements. With a budget of $550
million, the owner envisioned a satisfying return on investment.
As is common, the budget had allowances and contingency holds for unexpected
costs and small emergencies. Disconcertingly, these holds were consumed during
the early part of construction as the prime contractor and others approved various
construction means and methods to “meet the schedule.” The fixed budget was
exhausted before it had provided for much more than the core and shell. The
interiors and specialty contracts were effectively unfunded.

Irate and indignant, the owner battled the prime contractor. Should not the prime
contractor be liable for completion of the work under the original guaranteed
maximum price contract? What the owner had not anticipated was the complicity
of his own architect with the prime contractor. Following a lead from a confidential
source, the owner’s undercover agents conducted lawful surveillance and other licit
investigations on certain principals of the architect and prime contractor and
obtained evidence suggestive of commercial bribery of the architect by the prime
contractor.

Investigation uncovered an elaborate scheme by which the prime contractor would
order excessive products and services from suppliers and divert these to other jobs
also under the general supervision of the same architect. These jobs included the
erection of buildings owned by companies controlled by the architect. The architect
and prime contractor shared the profits of the diversions. Both the architect and
prime contractor had felt squeezed by the owner’s use what they perceived as
unreasonable demands to control costs. Faced with a potentially unprofitable
venture, they conspired to defraud the owner.
Like many other crimes, fraud may be borne when motivation meets opportunity.
Without proof of the architect’s bad faith and malfeasance, the owner would have
had to approve more of his own funds for the completion of the construction. Faced
with the evidence, the prime contractor agreed to withdraw its threats and claims
and paid for the remainder of the construction with its own funds.
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One of the risks of the fixed-price contract is that once a contracting entity has
exhausted all of its benefits from the contract, it becomes less likely to fulfill its
remaining obligations. As many matrimonial judges recognize, sometimes you
know that justice is served only when both parties are unhappy. A great deal for the
owner will not stand if it means a bad deal for everyone else.

Bid Package
The bid package is one of the most important contract documents. It details all the material
requirements of the job together with what must be purchased.

For Richer or Poorer— ‘Til Death Do Us Part Case Study
The architect was a well-respected member in an international firm. The project
owner was a financial services behemoth.

In designing the specifications for the parking garage of a $750 million construction
project in the Midwest United States, the architect limited the waterproofing sealant
to a particular brand. All bidders were required to use that brand.
Responding to the bid package, the bidders quoted prices for the sealant well in
excess of $1 million. Three bidders endeavoring to provide value engineering
submitted requests for approved equals that would have reduced the materials cost
by nearly 40 percent and to which the construction manager did not object.

The architect insisted: There would be no approved equals in this case.

The owner’s curiosity was piqued by the architect’s seemingly irrational insistence
on the use of his designated brand. The owner’s independent private sector
inspector general (IPSIG) investigated the issue.
Using experts from the fields of engineering, architecture, and building
construction, the IPSIG was unable to confirm any clear superiority in the
architect’s preferred brand. The IPSIG did, however, discover other material
circumstances: The sales representative of the sealant manufacturer and a principal
in the architect’s firm were married and living together near Detroit, MI.

On further investigation, including interviews, the architect conceded that she was
not entirely objective in demanding the use of her husband’s company’s brand. In
fact, her husband would have received a substantial commission from the sale of
the sealant.

Scope of Work
One of the most troubling aspects of some fraudulent activities is the apparent ease with
which fraudsters justify their conduct. In the case of contractors involved in the processes of
competitive bidding and difficult negotiating, many believe they are being nickel-and4.8
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dimed to death. This feeling often pushes morally weak contractors to improper or even
illegal ways to increase their profits. Fraud is deception. Whether through telling lies or
purposely concealing material facts, the fraudster takes advantage of our gullibility, busy
schedules, occasional laziness, or unguardedness.

The Words Mean What I Want Them to Mean Case Study
Back in the days when Wall Street and the dot-com industry were making multi
millionaires of the white-shoe-turned-khaki types and millionaires of college
dropouts with drive and dreams, one particular dropout decided he would build his
fantasy house.
Construction was proceeding apace and the dropout had suspended his critical
faculties to the point where he failed to notice how very odd it was that nearly
every supplier’s and subcontractor’s truck on the site bore the surname of his design
professional.

When the construction progressed to the point where the envelope of space was
beginning to seem more like a house and less like an architect’s blueprint, the
dropout had an epiphany. This was not his fantasy home. In fact, it didn’t even look
much like the plans in the construction documents. With improvisational skills any
comedian would envy, the design professional had decided sometime after the
contracts were signed but before the construction work had begun that the original
plan had to be altered. Items ranging from the vapor retarders and thermal
insulation of the roof assembly to the sizes, types, and brands of windows as well as
the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems were not consistent with the
contract documents. Even the texture and color of the brick façade were not what
was memorialized in the specifications. The design professional’s haughty response
to the dropout was, “Just not feasible otherwise.”

During lengthy litigation, the dropout discovered that many of the design
professional’s relatives were in various businesses supporting the construction
industry. They were more successful at bidding than making a profit, however.
Access to construction sites had provided opportunities to steal wood, windows,
ducts, brick, and other materials and equipment. By taking advantage of disgruntled
suppliers, incompetent security, and plain indifference, the design professional’s
relatives had diverted materials and equipment from other jobs in the area to
support the design professional who went to jail for possessing stolen property.

Change Orders
Patience is a virtue, even for fraudsters. It’s difficult to pay attention to all the material
details all the time, especially on construction projects of enormous complexity where
events sometimes get out of the owner’s control.
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This Ain’t No Chump Change Case Study

Everything about the construction of the 25-storey office tower with its luxurious
lobby and prestigious retail stores was going according to plan. The trade unions
were working well and the job was proceeding on schedule.

The owner had canceled an option on his current lease and was getting ready to
move in to the new headquarters when the construction manager discovered and
informed the owner that the common elevator lobby floors were not satisfactorily
elevated. “Flash it,” was the owner’s insouciant retort. One $25K change order
became another $25K, then another....
Faced with rising costs and shrinking time, the construction manager assured the
owner that he should not fault either the concrete trade that laid the floor or the tile
trade that alerted the construction manager to the deficiency. “No one’s to blame;
it’s just a nonnegligent error,” advised the construction manager. The owner’s
dilemma was not so unusual. With standardization falling out of favor and
customization becoming the fad, the construction industry was experiencing a
failure of design professionals and builders to coordinate effectively and, especially,
efficiently. Or at least that’s what the construction manager told the owner.

Careful scrutiny of the contract documents including the scope of work and
technical review meetings’ notes disclosed information incriminating the
construction manager. A tile trade bidder had inquired of the construction manager
whether merely meeting industry standards in the acceptable tolerance of the level
of the concrete subflooring was adequate given the specifications for the tile trade.
The construction manager dismissed the inquiry and did not recommend the tile
trade bidder for the job.

Expense reports submitted by the construction manager in support of his
reimbursable general conditions costs disclosed that several meetings had been held
at a particular restaurant in a nearby suburb. This restaurant was operated by a
brother of a principal of the bid award winner for the concrete trade. A check of
public media sources disclosed that the restaurant had recently been the site of
extensive surveillance and electronic eavesdropping by a federal and state task
force investigating organized crime. Upon further inquiry including an interview
with the winning tile trade contractor’s estimator, the owner discovered that the
estimator had denied any knowledge of the leveling issue prior to contract
acceptance. However, confronted with the construction manager’s logs that clearly
revealed the presence of all tile trade contractors at the meeting when the leveling
issue was first raised by the inquisitive tile trade bidder, the winning tile trade
estimator flatly responded, “I don’t remember.”

Enough evidence was accumulated by the owner’s investigators to persuade the
construction manager to work out an arrangement a little more favorable to the
owner.

4.10
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1.4 Key Preventive Controls
The primary purpose in writing this section on construction fraud is twofold:
1. To demonstrate to the reader that construction fraud is a serious risk that can be
effectively countered
2. To persuade the reader that resorting to the legal process is less effective than
implementing proactive risk mitigation measures

Some of the key preventive control measures are described below:
• Corporate policies, particularly in the areas of employee relations and enforcement, are
key to establishing an environment that minimizes the risk of fraud. Both management
and lower level employees are less likely to engage in fraud, commercial crime, or
destructive acts if they believe they have a stake in the company and:
1. They are being fairly treated, for example, with respect to compensation.
2. Any employee will be severely dealt with for any breach of the law or the company’s
policies.
• Physical access restrictions, for example, with respect to construction materials and
supplies at the company’s premises and at work sites, will deter theft or sabotage.
• Supervisory performance and independence checks will help ensure that the company’s
work is up to contract standards and minimize the potential for materials substitution or
other quality problems.
• Adequate insurance is especially important in this sector.

The Legal Process
With respect to mitigating the risk of serious construction fraud, the courts demand little
more than “clean hands” to preserve one’s standing and obtain a remedy.

Victims of fraud may use causes of action under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. These
causes would be based on breaches of contract or tortious conduct or both that include
intentional misrepresentation or omission of a material fact. Whereas the legal process is
helpful for proving the rightness of one’s claims or defenses, it is not particularly useful
other than as a general deterrent to ensure quality construction at the bargained-for price
within a time frame consistent with the contract documents.
Fraudsters in the construction industry will cheat when business is bustling by taking
advantage of the virtual intoxication of economic booms. Fraudsters will swindle even
when times are tight and the low number of opportunities require bigger sums to be
defrauded.

Although the desire to commit fraud is probably beyond the ability of owners and other
buyers in the construction industry to eradicate, the ability to materially reduce the
opportunity of becoming a fraudster’s victim can be accomplished without extraordinary
measures.
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Prevention, Deterrence, and Detection
The Independent Private Sector Inspector General
The independent private sector inspector general or construction monitor serves as an
objective, independent check on the integrity of the construction process. From providing
research on contractors, consultants, and vendors to observing the integrity of the bidding
process to inspecting the conformity of the physical construction with its invoicing and the
contract documents, the IPSIG provides an experienced check on the propriety of all
phases of construction.

Organization and Communication of the Audit Trail
Setting up procedures by which the contract documents and history of the negotiations are
recorded and distributed to all parties, including all the owner’s representatives, is essential.

If They Don’t Know About It—It Doesn’t Exist Case Study

The development manager’s contract with the owner of a successful construction
firm stipulated a fixed fee but if costs escalated beyond a given level, he would be
entitled to a percentage of the excess costs to complete the project. This
disincentive to hold down costs obviously posed a serious risk to the owner. The
owner had had the recent experience of a construction project in the same region
that was beset by costs well in excess of expectations. That experience made the
owner realize that construction was complex and difficult to manage precisely.
As work on the new building reached toward the sky and costs rose proportionally,
the projected budget was proving unrealistic. In discussions with the development
manager whose primary job was to provide an expert check on the activities of the
construction manager and three general contractors, the owner recognized that the
development manager had an apparently sound understanding of the progress of
construction. The owner’s employees assigned to manage the project lacked this
understanding, however, and seemed continually surprised at changes in plans,
work, and costs. The owner and a construction consultant reviewed samples of
construction documents maintained by the development manager. By comparing
these with the documents maintained by the owner’s employees, they discovered
that their documentation lacked the material detail of those possessed by the
development manager.

The owner’s investigative team analyzed among other buys the purchases by the
carpet consultant. From facsimile communications between the interiors general
contractor and the development manager, they found evidence that strongly
suggested the carpet consultant had not made any substantial effort to tender the
purchasing and installation job to all the bidders who had expressed interest.
Instead, the carpet consultant clearly had a bias in favor of a particular
subcontractor.

The evidence showed that the carpet consultant had made “mistakes” in his
leveling sheets, the construction documents intended to assure that the details of the
different bids are directly comparable. Expert scrutiny by the owner’s construction
4.12

Fraud Supp. 2—3/02

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

consultant disclosed a pattern and frequency of error that invariably favored the
preferred subcontractor and that could only mean the “errors” were not true
mistakes but were rather intentional obfuscation and misrepresentation of the bids.
Moreover, a subsequent investigation that included searches of public filings and
reference to proprietary databases disclosed that the principals of the carpet
consultant had previously worked for the favorite subcontractor. In fact, the five
principals of those two firms lived in the same exclusive community.

Eventually, a contrite employee of the carpet consultant disclosed the illicit alliance
between his firm and the subcontractor that included an arrangement of kickbacks
to the carpet consultant, the owner, and his construction consultant. To prevent
similar arrangements from occurring in the future, preventative measures were
taken that included the establishment of a permanent position for a construction
consultant.

What More is There To Say?
The point of the above has been brought home in a popular Hollywood comedy. The
innocent young female employee of a villainous politician embarking on a course of
conduct characterized by looting, lying, murder, and mayhem inquired of the venal man
after she learned of his nefarious misdeeds: “How can you do such things?”

With the calm and single-mindedness of a man habituated to evil, he replied, “It’s really
quite simple, darling. Remember, I used to be a building contractor.”

1.5 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the construction sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
(Text continues on page 5)
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Construction Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management—Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
construction sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, audit [especially
confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution (related controls include good
corporate policies and supervision)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, tax evasion, and violating
occupational health and safety laws (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision] and strong internal, audit
functions)
• Other key risk management issues for this sector: insurance
(continued)
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Construction Sector Checklist
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the construction
sector, and related controls, as set out on the attached grids,
been adequately addressed:

• Lapping frauds, such as accounts receivable lapping (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies, especially strict
enforcement)

6

Yes

No

NA

Ref
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Construction Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

Bid-rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (for example, inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X
X

False advertising

X

Insider trading
X

Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety laws

X

Violation of privacy

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Construction Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Construction Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

8
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2 Financial Services

2.1 Introduction
The extremely high liquid asset values of the financial-services industry when coupled with
the worldwide scope of its activities make it a prime target for fraud, from both inside and
outside. Indeed, Willie Sutton, the infamous bank robber, probably summed it up best
when he was asked why he robbed banks. He responded: “Because that’s where the money
is, stupid.”

Customers of this industry’s services are located throughout the world. Today, they can
access its services through the mail, the Internet, the telephone, and finally, the traditional
means, personally. Everyone, from small savers using their local bank’s ATM to
multinational conglomerates taking part in billion dollar mergers, requires this sector’s
services and products.
As a target for the fraudster, the financial-services industry is probably the richest and most
rewarding target there is. Therefore, there is a pressing need to ensure that adequate
internal controls are in place to deter and, when applicable, detect fraud on a timely basis.
This must be properly appreciated and addressed by the financial service entities’
managements, auditing and consulting CPAs, and customers.

For our purposes, the financial-services sector includes the following lines of business:
1. Banks (of all types including trust companies), and credit unions.
2. Insurance companies and insurance brokers.

3. Securities brokers (regardless of the type of investment or regulatory agency).
4. Mutual funds and retirement trust funds (including pension funds, 401ks and the like).
Although there may be a generally accepted perception that these entities are regulated by
government agencies, the level of official oversight varies greatly. Further, that oversight is
usually aimed at the solvency of the service entity itself, rather than whether an employee
of an entity or an entity’s customer is a fraudster. Therefore, neither the entities nor their
customers can afford complacency or carelessness.
The fraudster, relying on personal knowledge of what the oversight agencies regulate and
the controls that management has put in place, hatches his or her scheme to minimize the
risk of apprehension by avoiding those very controls. Yet, the fraudster proceeds with his
or her plan notwithstanding the general deterrence of criminal and civil laws. They know
what they are doing is wrong, but they do it anyway.

Moreover, the deregulation of the financial-services industry has lead to the creation of
super entities. Banks, insurance companies, investment brokers, and mutual funds are no
longer separate entities. They are complete financial-services entities providing one or
more services, all designed to provide their customers one-stop shopping. Unfortunately,
the resulting financial behemoths could become too large to be effectively monitored by
the same regulators and internal control systems that previously oversaw smaller, less
diversified entities. This consolidation has facilitated the entry of the fraudster into the
doors and portals of the industry and has provided increased opportunities for the fraudster
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to succeed. Incursions and fraudulent activity will likely become more widespread, more
remunerative, and more difficult to track down.
Therefore, CPAs, both internal and external, and managements of the financial-services
entities must actively develop and refine their systems of fraud prevention. They have to
keep in mind Willie Sutton’s observation; they are where the money is. They also must
keep the special risks inherent to the financial-services sector in the forefront of their
thinking. There is no gain to be made through profitable transactions if those profits are
flushed down unknown drains.
Well designed and diligently implemented internal control systems should provide a
special deterrence against the peculiar and prevalent types of fraud affecting the financialservices sector. As previously noted, the fraudster chooses to target the easy mark without
fear of the law. Making it harder for him or her to operate can only serve to plug the drain.

The following material, drawn from actual case experience endemic to financial-services
entities, summarizes and illustrates the kinds of fraudulent behavior to expect. These frauds
highlight the sector’s key vulnerabilities that are summarized and addressed by specific
recommendations and controls found in the Checklist and Grids.

2.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The financial-services sector is subject to fraud by a wide range of perpetrators. Those most
frequently encountered include:

• Employees. These frauds typically involve cash or accounts receivable. They range from
outright theft or skimming of cash to the setting up of phony customer accounts. For
example, some of the largest bank frauds have involved loan managers who set up
phony borrowers and diverted the loan proceeds to their own benefit.
• Customers. Banks are vulnerable to customer-perpetrated fraud schemes, such as check
kiting, credit-card/debit-card fraud, and phony loan security. Insurance companies are
particularly vulnerable to fake or inflated loss claims by their policyholders.

• Con artists. This wily group of individuals sees this sector as having deep pockets and
targets it with a wide variety of schemes, both direct and indirect. An example of a
direct fraud scheme is one in which a bank loan manager is approached with an
elaborate, seemingly irresistible short-term loan opportunity that would yield a quick
profit. The catch is that, in addition to the proposal being totally fraudulent, the loan
manager has to put up a large amount of bank funds for a short period of time. An
example of an indirect fraud scheme is the, so-called, bank inspector fraud, in which a
bank’s elderly customer is persuaded by the con artist to help in the investigation of a
teller. The catch is that the customer must withdraw a large amount of cash to further
the con artist’s phony investigation.
• Computers. The new tool of the fraudster. Hacking into other peoples’ accounts or
setting up fake transactions to net dollars is among the rapidly increasing number of
computer frauds that are showing up. The fraudster is relying on the sector’s heavy use
of automation and its inability to look at all transactions to provide the time needed to
grab the money and run.
• Breach of trust and related fiduciary activities: Fiduciary frauds include many types of
commercial crime; for example, a stock broker or money manager could abscond with
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a client’s funds or churn a client’s discretionary account with a series of unauthorized
transactions to increase commissions; money laundering; or invasion of privacy for gain.

Banks (of all Types Including Trust Companies), and Credit Unions
Banks (of all types including trust companies)1, and to a lesser extent credit unions, occupy
a special niche in our society. They are allowed to engage in both the receipt of deposits
and the lending of money. These cash-related activities offer numerous opportunities to the
fraudster, both internal and external to the organization.
A cause of concern for entities acting in a fiduciary capacity is the potential for fraud
through abuse of the relationship between a bank’s subsidiary acting as an investment
adviser and an investment vehicle, for example, a mutual fund sponsored and managed by
a different subsidiary of the bank. Although underlying trust documents impose a fiduciary
obligation on the bank as trustee to act in the best interest of the trust beneficiary,
individual officers may favor bank-sponsored investments to bolster their personal careers
to the detriment of the trust beneficiaries. Thus, internal relationships that induce,
especially through financial remuneration, the bank to disregard its own fiduciary
obligation may, depending on all of the attendant circumstances, lead to fraud. This is
especially true when there are willful failures to disclose possible conflicts of interest, as
happened with several banks implying to their customers that the pure investment products
they were selling were insured deposits. For a further discussion of this topic, see the
section below on mutual and pension funds.
Loan security is another bank vulnerability to fraud. Whether it is the loan applicant
providing collateral that is not what it purports to be or a loan officer knowingly accepting
insufficient collateral to show improved personal business, the potential for internal or
external fraud exists. If the loan is large enough and the collateral rotten enough, a bank’s
very financial stability could be threatened.

Collateral Can’t Be In Two Places At the Same Time Case Study

A bank sought to extend a substantial loan to a company in the precious-metals
industry. The company dutifully completed all of the forms, including granting a
security interest in its inventory of gold bars (bullion) to the bank. Following
established good practices, the bank obtained the right to periodically audit and
inspect the company’s inventory records and underlying inventory. Every three
months or so, the bank would send its internal audit team to check on its gold
bullion. On Friday, the team would visit a vault in South America and record the
presence of the hypothecated bullion. On Monday, the team would visit the vault
in New York City and again record the presence of the requisite gold horde.
Although the same gold bullion could not be in two different places at the same
time, it was discovered that the same gold bullion somehow managed to be in two
different places at two different times—just like the audit team!
1 For the purposes of this analysis, bank includes commercial banks, savings banks, trust companies, credit
unions and the like. There are important distinctions; for example, the agencies providing deposit insurance
are not of importance to this discussion of fraudulent behavior.
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Common sense and the willingness to devote adequate resources to important tasks
such as the verification of collateral are essential. The bank’s internal auditors failed
to take those steps that should normally be followed by a reasonable CPA
providing assurance services. For instance, the audits followed a recognizable
pattern: South America followed by New York, never the reverse; and the audits
were always sequential, never simultaneous.

Although there were probably other audit failings, such as giving the borrower
advance notice of the audit, the bank’s internal auditors had to establish a valid
audit program to assure the continued existence of the gold. A further open door to
fraud was the bank’s failure to take possession of the collateralized gold in escrow.
With the gold in its possession, the bank would be secure in its loan and its
customer would have been able to use the bullion for its own business purposes, but
with the bank’s knowledge and approval.

Collateral Must Exist To Be Collateral Case Study

A frozen-seafood distributor obtained a loan from a bank using its frozen-seafood
inventory as collateral. The bank properly executed all the normal collateralization
documents, including the right to inspect the inventory and value its existence.
Consistent with industry custom, the value of the collateral was indirectly related to
its age; that is, the value of the seafood substantially decreased as it aged in the
freezer.
Every three or four months, the bank would courteously call the seafood company,
and obtain a mutually convenient date on which the bank’s inspectors could inspect
and value the seafood inventory. Once notified of the impending audit, the seafood
company’s employees would change the dates on the inventory in the freezers,
making the old fresh and ever more valuable to the casual inspector.

In fact, the seafood company had been experiencing financial difficulties for a long
time. Sales were slow, and working capital was short. In brief, the company could
not afford to purchase new inventory.
The bank’s inspectors were more than polite. They also did not like to spend time
in the subzero temperatures inside the company’s freezers. After entering the cold
storage area, they would quickly check the dates of the boxes—labeled sea scallops,
count a few, and then perform rough estimates of value.

There are highly tasteful meals that could be made of frozen sea scallops: They
could be sauteed in garlic and olive oil and placed on a bed of saffron rice. This
company’s product, although labeled sea scallops, was actually detritus—inedible
filler. The only proper place for this collateral was in a landfill. As security, it cost
the bank more to haul it away than it would have fetched at market.
Among the lessons to be learned from this case are: know your customer, know
your customer’s product, go beyond the label on the package, and in all cases
follow established inventory audit practices. Failure to have the recognized
reasonable controls in place can only open the door wide for the external or
internal fraudster.
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Insurance Companies and Insurance Brokers
The insurance industry, which is an integral part of both the commercial and personal
economy, is made up of three overlapping discrete functions. First, there are the insurance
companies themselves (including reinsurance companies). They accept the risk of loss of
others, whether it be for accidents, earthquakes, injury or death. Then the brokerage sector
sells the product of the insurance companies to the world. Last is the claims function that
determines the validity and value of the loss claims, and whether or not the claim is
actually covered by the contract of insurance.
There is no uniformity in the insurance industry. Some insurance companies are totally
integrated. That is, all three functions are under one roof: underwriting, sales and claims
adjusting are all handled by the insurance company’s employees. Other insurance
companies “farm out” either the sales or adjustment functions to independent entities.
Further, these independent entities might contract to work exclusively for one insurance
company or agree to service a single insurance company.

Regardless of the structure, the same fraud opportunities, whether internal or external,
exist. However, as in any other industry, the effectiveness of the insurance policy and its
initiating sales step and subsequent potential for claims relies on the good-faith relationship
between the parties involved.

Reliance on good faith, however, is no deterrence for the fraudster. Sufficient internal
controls to make it difficult for the fraudster should be in place. Procedures at the insurance
company level as basic as randomly verifying application information or validity of claims
are needed (for example, was there really a hurricane on the date claimed?). Likewise at
the brokerage level there should also be controls in place to ensure that the application
information is valid. For instance, is the gray-haired, palsied applicant for a life insurance
policy really the macho 45-year old he claims to be? Or, for a claims department, is there a
methodology in place to determine that one doctor’s name is showing up on an inordinate
number of auto-accident injury claims?
At the same time, the customer of the insurance companies and its sales and claims
functions have to be aware of the frauds they could be subjected to. The simple step of
making sure that a company-issued contract of insurance is in hand will go a long way to
protect against sales fraud. In addition, it is important to check that any repairs to damaged
property are completed according to the terms of the insurance contract.

When Good Faith Becomes Bad Business Case Study
The ABC Company, a small start-up company, presents an interesting study of
reliance on good faith. ABC began operations as a small manufacturer of
specialized electronic parts for the defense industry. Due to good fortune and hard
work, ABC grew. It had always used the services of a particular insurance broker,
relying on it for all of the company’s and its principals’ insurance needs. Because
there had been no problems with the coverage or the service, there was no reason
for ABC to question the insured-broker relationship and certainly no reason to
change brokers. For years, premiums were dutifully sent to the broker, and the
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broker routinely sent broker-generated confirmations of insurance coverage to the
insured.

Unfortunately, the familiar maxim “you don’t know whether your basement takes
in water until it rains hard” was applicable in this instance. A terrible storm
engulfed the area. Many businesses and residences were devastated. Buildings,
equipment, and inventory were destroyed, including over a million dollars’ worth
of property damage to ABC.
“Thank God for the insurance,” exclaimed the principals of ABC. Unfortunately,
God was likely their best recourse. The long-trusted, premium-accumulating
insurance broker had discovered that there are warm and sunny places on the earth
where the long arms of the U.S. justice systems do not reach. What better place to
take all of those diverted premiums? The ABC Company discovered the hard way
that trust is like water. Some is essential to prevent dehydration; however, too much
will drown you. A simple, regular review of the insurance file to confirm the
presence of company-issued documents of valid insurance would have been
sufficient to avoid the loss.

The moral of this story: don’t accept the assurance of your insurance intermediaryyour broker-confirm that he or she spent your money with the insurance carrier;
look for the carrier-issued policy for verification.

Because this failure to pay over premiums was such a common occurrence, a
limited amount of the risk was shifted to the insurance companies. If a supposed
insured can prove payment of a premium to a fraudulent broker or agent, there is
some limited degree of protection. This is designed to help the unsophisticated
consumer. ABC’s losses would have far exceeded any industry or governmentordered protection.

Up in Smoke and Into Thin Air Case Study
In this case, the insurer was the deceived party. A New York City company, which
had a valid fire insurance policy covering structure and inventory, lost most of its
inventory in a warehouse fire. Unfortunately, the records proving the existence of
the inventory were also destroyed in the fire. The insurer quickly discovered that
you don’t necessarily know what you have until it’s gone, even if it was never really
there.

The insured prepared a million-dollar-plus claim for the lost inventory,
notwithstanding the absence of records and despite the existence of some eye
opening circumstances. Here are the obvious clues that all was not right with the
claim:
• First: the claimed value of the inventory was nearly three times the value of the
preceding year’s inventory. Was the company apparently anticipating an
unprecedented rush of sales or did it have an unexpected growth spurt?
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• Second: the non-financial records, including personnel files and insurance
policies, were removed from the warehouse office two weeks before the fire. The
financial records were the only records left in the office.
• Third: the insured tripled the insurance policy coverage on the last policy
renewal date one month prior to the fire. Was this the reasonable forward
looking planning of a profitable business or, in hindsight, the planning of an
unprofitable business?
• Fourth: in support of its proof of damages, the insured offered a valuation of the
company, including its inventory, dated less than two months before the fire.
The valuation was prepared for the owner as part of an apparently contentious
divorce proceeding with his estranged wife, who alleged that the owner had
incurred huge gambling debts.
The valuation was not credible, however, because it was tainted by irremediable
bias. Investigation revealed that the valuator and owner were brothers. In actual
fact, the only financial circumstance that could be verified was the owner’s
$100,000 payment to his brother, the valuator, for his fictitious valuation from
which both spouses hoped to reap a bonanza at the insurance company’s
expense.
• Fifth: the insured confirmed the suspicions of investigators when a fullyprepared claim was submitted less than two weeks after the fire.
Clearly, foresight is superior to hindsight; in this case the insured party was far too
well prepared. And the foresight of the insurance carrier to have the controls in
place to allow the recognition of the false claim illustrates that superiority of
foresight.

Cooking the Books Case Study
The construction industry is one of the most cyclical and seasonal. These expected
irregularities can threaten or impair a construction company’s ability to secure
surety bonding, a requirement necessary to bid for and obtain work. Pursuant to a
surety company’s demand, the construction company requested its independent
auditor, a CPA firm, to issue a report on the company’s financial statements for the
preceding year. The construction company’s management and the CPA firm’s audit
engagement partner foresaw some difficulties. The year in question was not a good
year for the company.

Business can be complicated. Thus, cooperation can be the foundation of success
for many ventures. Over the course of many years, the CPA firm had grown
dependent on the revenues received from its audits of the construction company. In
fact, the construction company was its best client.
The construction company management and the audit engagement partner agreed
that: the end justified the means. Besides, liberties, although improper, could be
taken with GAAP; there was apparent flexibility. Given the circumstances, the
company’s method, with the complicity of the auditor, of obtaining the bonding did
not seem relevant. Further, the auditor rationalized that it wasn’t as though the
company couldn’t do the job.
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In furtherance of the scheme, the company and the audit partner conspired to
prepare and issue fraudulent financial statements. Inevitably, Murphy’s Law (that
which will go wrong, will in fact go wrong) struck and the company, with a dire
shortage of working capital, defaulted on the job.

After the default the surety smelled a rat. Unfortunately, for the surety company, it
took the work of independent forensic accountants with an in-depth knowledge of
the construction industry to unravel and expose the deliberate falsity of the
financial statements. The surety, in relying exclusively on the company and its CPA
firm, did not perform its own due diligence.

A simple step, such as independently verifying bank accounts would have saved the
surety big bucks. Clearly, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Stock and Other Investment Brokers
With so much wealth invested under the custody of stock and other investment brokers,
clients of the investment-brokerage industry need to keep a vigilant watch on their
investments (and therefore their money). Notwithstanding the general observation that
most brokerage activities are perfectly legitimate, fraudulent activity does occur both within
the inner workings of the industry and externally.
Internal fraud in the securities markets usually involves complex transactions, such as
illegally parking stocks and undisclosed trading on insider information for illicit personal
gain. Externally, the foisting of fraudulent investments on unsophisticated investors, who
are only too ready to put their money in investments that are too good to be true, is all too
common.

Exceptional circumstances organized or exploited by fraudsters may wreak financial
devastation on swindled clients. Often, fraud in the brokerage industry results from an
omission to disclose material information or an intentional misstatement of a material fact.
The fraudster manipulatively preys on greed, gullibility, and an unwillingness to look
behind the fraudster’s spiel. Getting the rich to part with their money is an art to which
some fraudsters dedicate years.

IfIt Looks Too Good To Be True...Case Study
A prominent couple in a New Jersey suburb had savings to invest. The husband
had been the mayor of his medium-sized town for eight years. The wife worked for
many years as a manager for a major insurance carrier in the same town. Arguably,
the husband and wife were reasonably sophisticated. Then they threw a party.

Friends invited friends and the couple made new acquaintances, including a welldressed, well-spoken, gentleman who worked for a small but apparently successful
brokerage firm in Connecticut. The couple had not heard of this brokerage, but
they had known their mutual friend for nearly two decades. What better reference
would they need other than the word-of-mouth assurance from their trusted friend?
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The broker recommended a hot new investment: limited-partnership interests in oil
and gas properties off the coast of China. These investments were hot and
availability was selectively limited, so the broker urged the couple to act quickly or
risk being frozen out of the offering.
To be part of the buying syndicate, the couple had to put $200,000 up-front
immediately. They knew that they should wait for the prospectus but they were
afraid the delay could mean the possibility of losing the opportunity to put their
money into this sure-fire investment. So rather than wait, the couple transferred the
requested funds to the broker, and in due course they received papers verifying
their investment. For eighteen months the couple received a monthly statement
showing the value of their investment in the limited-partnership interests. It was a
good investment, or at least it seemed so on paper.

After two months passed without a statement, however, the couple called the
broker, using the telephone number on the earlier months’ statements. The
telephone company informed them that the number was no longer in service.

Further inquiry revealed the following:
• The limited partnerships never existed in economic reality.
• The brokerage had no employees other than their friend’s friend.
• Neither the brokerage nor its sole employee was registered at the state or federal
level to sell securities.
• The only asset owned or held by the brokerage was a computer with a highquality printer.
What went wrong here? Quite simply, the fraudster, posing as an investment
broker, was working on the principle that you can’t fool all of the people all of the
time, but you can fool some of the people some of the time. Especially if greed is
involved.

It is foolish for anyone to think that he or she is immune from being prey to such
tactics. It takes a wise person to recognize that anyone can be deceived, particularly
if there is pressure based on the importance of acting quickly—no need to perform
your normal due diligence, you know I’m legit—and greed—returns like this don’t
come along every day—are permitted to override reason. Wearing an expensive
suit, flashing luxury jewelry, and displaying the confidence of a person who has
profound familiarity with the capital markets are personal attributes that assure
neither any return on investment nor a commitment to act with integrity.

Among other types of fraud perpetrated by unscrupulous brokers are unauthorized trading,
churning, and market (price) manipulation. Occasionally, the compensation structure
applicable to brokers serves to promote fraudulent conduct. Brokers whose income
depends on commissions and bonuses based on the volume of trading generated by their
clients are directly rewarded for the quantity and not the quality of trades they initiate on
behalf of their clients. This suggests that clients should exercise careful scrutiny of their
broker’s conduct, especially when it comes to granting discretion to trade. Probably the
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best advice is: do not give unfettered trading discretion to a broker or investment adviser.
Although the broker could be totally honest when the relationship begins, a change in
circumstances brought about by events, such as losses at the racetrack or in the market, or
unexpected heavy medical expenses at home, could change the situation. The potential
temptation for fraud is always there.
Among the brokerage-related scams in vogue is a short-sellers’ spreading of intentionally
false and misleading information in an attempt to depress the value of a target company’s
publicly traded stock. This practice has become particularly prevalent on bulletin boards
through the Internet. Of course, the victim here is not only the company but also investors
who were duped into selling perfectly good stock for the wrong reason. Typically, in these
cases the short-selling broker-dealer accumulates a substantial uncovered short position in
the company’s stock. Essentially, the broker-dealer sells borrowed stock; that is, stock that
the broker-dealer is obligated to purchase in the future to apply against the uncovered short
position.
In the case of the good-faith short-seller, he or she is speculating that the price in the target
company’s stock will drop for any number of valid market reasons, such as failure to meet
earnings projections or the loss of a significant customer. Short selling is a valid and sound
trading tactic. However, in the case of the bad faith short-seller, he or she is deliberately
engaged in market manipulation for the purpose of depressing the target’s stock price for
personal gain. The fraudster posts rumors or tips on message boards warning of events,
such as high-level management dissension or recent inquiry by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or some other such risk-raising circumstance. Often in these cases, investors
cannot or will not engage in patient reasoning or exercising due diligence. The race goes to
the swift, and the herd-mentality takes over, causing a deluge of sell orders, depressing the
target company’s stock price to the joy and personal enrichment of the fraudster.
Although this kind of fraud is relatively easy for the short seller to perpetrate in stocks with
limited distribution, it is more difficult for widely held stocks. The new tool of the fraudster
is the Internet. It provides the opportunity to widely distribute opinions, regardless of their
validity. At the same time the Internet facilitates the fraudster’s trading activities from the
comfort of his or her home. As well, the Internet provides a certain degree of secrecy.
There is a tendency by users to accept the information posted and the trades don’t
necessarily show up immediately in the normal source sites. It behooves the investor to be
wary of and resist unfounded rumors and other misleading acts of market manipulation.

Mutual and Retirement Funds
The multi-billion-dollar value of investments in mutual and retirement funds presents a
strong appeal for the fraudster. The mutual fund managers and retirement fund trustees as
institutional investors have substantial market power and can command expert service,
including research, from the securities industry. Moreover, the money in these funds often
represents savings to be held for long-term investments for which custody has been given
to a fiduciary, that is, fund manager or retirement plan trustee. While most situations
involve reliable, competent administrators, it is always best to be aware of the pitfalls that
can and do occur. Although no one can anticipate all of the acts of the fraudster, care
should be taken to limit vulnerability and to maintain the flow of timely feedback. Few
people are so busy that they can afford to lose hundreds of thousands of dollars. There is
no substitute for vigilant monitoring of investments regardless of whether they are held in
mutual funds, retirement plans or “long,” that is, in the securities themselves.
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Too Busy, Too Trusting, Too Bad Case Study
Occasionally, the lines of communication between mutual fund administrator and
individual investors are subjected to malicious manipulation, often, as a result of the
investors’ own (misguided or erroneous) request. For instance, a well-respected
mutual fund regularly mailed its monthly statements to its investors. One investor
requested that his statements be mailed to his newly selected financial adviser,
notifying the mutual fund that he was too busy to read them. At a later date, the
adviser provided evidence of authority to act on behalf of the investor. Shortly
thereafter, the adviser, without advising the client, liquidated the entire mutual fund
investment, requesting that the proceeds be delivered to his address. The backoffice of the mutual fund complied, not suspecting the fraudulent action of the
adviser. Unfortunately, the financial adviser had no specific authority to order the
complete redemption on behalf of the investor. The documentation provided to the
mutual fund was bogus; the money disappeared into Nigeria. Worse, the investor
did not discover this swindle until several months after the fact. He was too busy.
Generally, mutual funds provide a ready means of diversifying a portfolio without
buying all the individual stocks (or bonds) held in the fund. Professionals, usually
with verifiable records of performance, manage the funds. Regulatory monitoring is
with the federal government (SEC), and some states offer additional regulation
through their blue-sky laws. This monitoring does not, however, extend to the type
or quality of the investments. Thus, the door is open for a mutual fund,
notwithstanding management by professionals who should know better, to fall
victim to fraudulent conduct. The competition to increase investment-return
performance, which it is hoped will stimulate sales of the mutual fund, can lead to
investments with a higher risk of fraud. For instance, investing in emerging nations
could successfully yield high returns, but often the lack of regulation, lax
enforcement of existing regulations, and different standards of business ethics lead
to fraud-induced investment losses. The further afield the search for an investment
takes the investment manager, the greater the risk of making an investment that is
likely to fail as a result of fraud.

Gambling by Any Other Name Is Still Gambling Case Study

Some mutual fund managers are as willing to buy rosy but unrealistic prospects and
forecasts as any other credulous investor. Returns from a manufacturing company
based in the Commonwealth of Independent States (the former Soviet Union) were
expected to increase dramatically. With privatization loosening the market and a
large influx of capital from U.S. mutual fund investors, this business could not lose.
It had made money under the rigid Soviet administration, so it stood to reason that
it could only make more money given the application of Western capitalism.
Unfortunately, the economic model practiced by the business was crony capitalism.
Only a fraction of the invested capital trickled down to the actual production, and
the debts incurred by the rapid expansion wreaked havoc, inducing a significant
restructuring in which millions of dollars were “lost.”
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Was this a fraud? Undoubtedly the application of principles of due diligence would
have disclosed both the especially high risk of the investment and the extreme
improbability of success. If the fund involved were advertised as a high-risk
overseas fund, the purchasers were put on notice as to what they were buying into.
The manager was following the investment objectives of the fund: high risk yields
high returns. Probably not fraud unless the manager had knowledge before
investing that the investment was itself a fraud.

If the fund was a large cap growth fund or some other moderate-risk fund, and the
same investment were made, the answer would probably be different. For example,
would the investment manager have invested his own funds in his moderate risk
fund knowing of the investment in the high-risk former Soviet business? A high-risk
investment might be said to be fraud or at the least negligence if the fund manager
makes the investment in an effort to see a relatively staid fund beat modest market
expectations and outperform the competition. Clearly, the manager strayed from
the published investment goals of the fund. Although the professional manager’s
mindset may not have been fraudulent, his willingness to buy into the fraudulent
scheme of the manufacturing company resulted in large losses for the fund.

There is a fine line. When does an act of investing become fraud? One obvious
situation is the case of the investment manager who makes a suspect investment
because of personal gain: as an inducement the subject company kicks back 10
percent of the investment to the manager off the books. Thus, investors have to
monitor the investments of the funds to make sure they meet the fund’s stated goals.
Likewise, the senior administrators of the umbrella group of funds to which the
individual fund belongs have to review their fund’s investment manager’s activities
to see whether the investments the manager made match the fund’s objectives, and
if not, why?
Retirement plan funds are particularly vulnerable to fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
and other dishonest conduct perpetrated by the plan trustee, plan sponsor, or other
persons responsible for investing these savings on the plan’s behalf. This is because
few persons monitor their own investments adequately. As with mutual funds, each
investor’s contribution is pooled with numerous other investors’ contributions. The
idea that somebody must be watching closely is widely—although mistakenly—held.
After all, an employer (plan sponsor) would always make its contributions, wouldn’t
it?

Never a Borrower Be . . . Case Study
The business’ profit margins were tight. Working capital was inadequate and the
cost of capital prohibitive. As well, the limit on the line of credit had been
exceeded. So, the business looked to the only source of ready cash it could find; it
“borrowed” from the pension fund. Just a little at first. A million here, a million
there; soon, it became easy, almost a habit.

To avoid scrutiny of the business’ CPAs who most certainly would have picked up
on the new source of cash, the business’ CFO and president conspired to get rid of
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the old CPA firm and hired a replacement CPA firm. Not surprisingly, the
conspirators chose a small, understaffed, somewhat inexperienced CPA firm. The
new CPA firm looked at the new engagement as a growth opportunity; it was an
engagement that represented the lion’s share of its billings. Disguising the borrowings
as seemingly legitimate and independent private placements in the pension fund’s
financial statements, the business continued the fraud. However, earnings didn’t
pick up, things remained slow. “No sense in borrowing all that good money only to
watch it disappear in the losing business, the fraudsters agreed; let’s keep it
ourselves.”

The threat of the criminal justice system and expected integrity go only so far. They
fall short sometimes, and the business also fell short for its employees. The business’
creditors, who were also shortchanged, forced it into involuntarily bankruptcy.
Unraveling the fraud proved embarrassing. The employees, that is, the true
investors in the retirement plan, had only the prison sentences of the malefactors
and worthless orders of restitution as solace. With the principal players in jail and
the money nowhere to be found, the employees have only the limited recovery that
can be expected from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to replace their
losses.

2.3 Key Preventative Controls
Because of the large asset values at stake, there are many fraud prevention controls in the
financial-services sector that must be in place to effectively reduce the risk of fraud. At best,
informed and watchful monitoring tends to deter the fraudster, chasing him or her
elsewhere. Or if the fraudster decides to challenge the controls taxing his or her cleverness,
the controls might induce an exposing mistake. At worst, the controls can make the
fraudster even more ingenious than before.
Notwithstanding adequate controls, the world is not perfect. There are no guarantees; the
fraudster will at times succeed. But the controls are a success if their effect is to make the
fraudsters’ successes fewer and less frequent.

• Remember that fraudsters will invent or exaggerate insurance claims, divert premiums,
and otherwise take undue advantage of a given situation. Controls must be in place that
will make it difficult and so challenging for the fraudster that he or she will shop
elsewhere for an insurance broker or company. Verify details and research
relationships. Do not assume that all lies will be small ones. This is not to suggest that
insurance companies should erect insurmountable obstacles against all parties seeking
payment on claims. No company employing reasonable compliance practices coupled
with sound internal controls and plain common sense need sacrifice the goodwill of its
policyholders.
• Mutual fund and retirement plan statements should be reviewed and read with
understanding by all investors. This should be done as a matter of course shortly after
the statements are received. Unless otherwise unavoidable, do not delegate this
important activity to others, especially those who have access to the accounts. Do not
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assume anyone will bear the burden without sticking his or her hand into the pot
containing the funds.
• Ask questions about particular investments. At least make the plan sponsor and plan
trustee aware that people are looking. Follow-up on potential red flags such as an
unexplained or unexpected change in the independent CPA firm.
• Employees contributing to 401(k) plans should actively monitor their accounts. Track
employer contributions on the statements periodically received from the trustee. At year
end reconcile trustee’s statements with the amounts shown on Form W-2 as having been
deducted. In addition, verify that the investments have been placed into the proper
funds. Understand what are the allowable investments, and understand what fees are
proper.
• When selecting a broker for stock and other investments, clients should confirm that the
broker is properly registered and is covered by the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC). The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), state regulatory agencies, and the Federal Trade Commission are
sources of information about the brokerage industry and individual brokers. Moreover,
clients should carefully review the documentation supporting the client-broker
relationship, including contracts and dispute procedures. In a continuing investment
relationship, the client should promptly review transaction confirmations and monthly
statements. If unauthorized trading or other misconduct is evident, immediately lodge a
complaint with the brokerage’s management. If this does not provide satisfaction,
further steps, such as contacting the SEC or state authorities, should be taken without
delay even if the unauthorized trade appeared to be a profitable investment decision for
the client.

• Because product offerings are complex, clients should not overestimate their own level
of competence. Some investments are suitable only for those who can afford large
losses. Unfortunately, in a climate of volatile markets and sexy products, for example
the class of product called derivatives, some clients let greed get the best of them,
choosing to gamble rather than invest. The fraudster takes advantage of the get-richquick dream driven by greed. The potential for making an investment based on greed
exists in everyone, and the sweet-talking fraudster is ready to exploit this human failing.
• In addition, it is essential that the following controls be put in place for all businesses
within the financial-services sector:
—A strong written code of ethics and well-defined business conduct should be
mandatory for all employees. There should be sanctions for any employee who fails to
adhere to these guidelines.
—Effective physical access controls.
—Thorough screening of employees prior to hiring. At a minimum this should include
checking all references, including education and work history. Some organizations in
this sector should go even farther, especially for more sensitive positions. This could
include more extensive background checks, psychological testing and even drug
testing.
—Mandatory annual vacations of, at a minium, two consecutive weeks. Ongoing
schemes are common in this sector. These schemes often fall apart or are easily
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detected when the perpetrator is removed from the scene for a consecutive period of
even a few weeks.

—Prohibition of management override of basic controls. There have been many
instances of branch managers in this sector who were able to circumvent or override
basic controls. This power to override enabled them to perpetrate extremely large
frauds sometimes running in the millions of dollars.
—Good computer security including access restrictions, disaster recovery contingencies
and control over software and program development.
—Supervisory controls including a well-defined review and approval process, test
checking and monitoring of employee performance, and thorough follow-up of any
exceptions or customer complaints.
—A strong internal audit function, and periodic external audits.

2.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the financial services sector follows, along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.

(Text continued on page 11)
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Financial Services Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the financial
services sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Customer and other outsider frauds, such as false loan
applications, con schemes, and the like (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, good corporate policies, and strong internal
audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, money laundering, and violation of privacy (related
controls include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision] and strong internal audit
functions and periodic external audits

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

11
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Financial Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (sabotage, espionage, and the like)

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (theft of funds, misuse of information,and the like)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

X

Violating occupational health and safety laws
Violation of privacy
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Financial Services Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Financial Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like
Mandatory annual vacations

X
X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

Prohibition of management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Internal-Audit Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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3 Government

3.1 Introduction
Government organizations are established for a wide range of purposes. Many employ
large numbers of individuals and command multi-million-dollar budgets. In total, the value
of goods and services produced by all levels of government is approximately one-third of
the gross domestic product (GDP) for the entire United States.

Where there are plenty of dollars, there are always great opportunities for fraud. There
may be no ground more fertile for the commission of waste, fraud, and abuse than the
presence of numerous government employees whose accountability may be barely visible
under layers of management charged with overseeing the disposal of seemingly limitless
taxpayer money. The fact is that the public sector is rife with opportunity for the fraudster.
The government (public) sector includes:

• Federal, state, and local governments
• Government agencies and government-owned corporations including public-benefit
corporations such as housing authorities, highway authorities, solid waste management
authorities
• Organizations whose primary means of support is funding from government sources,
including public elementary and secondary school districts, institutions of higher
education, state hospitals, local ambulance services, fire departments
• Not-for-profit organizations are mentioned in this list because they rely primarily on the
same method of recording and reporting accounting data used by governments, that is,
fund accounting. Additionally, many not-for-profit organizations have streamlined
operations to fit tight budgets because of the need to conserve funds. For a detailed
overview of fraud in not-for-profit organizations, see Section 7, “Nonprofit,” of this
appendix.
Many government actions tend to be shrouded in secrecy. Despite the fact that budgets are
made available to the public, only the roughest comparisons of actual expenditures to the
budget are usually possible. Fraud cannot be detected by merely observing that the line
items in the budget have been met, exceeded, or remain partly unused.

Governments often have excellent policies and procedures spelled out in excruciatingly
difficult-to-read and even more difficult-to-understand “bureaucrat-ese.” Often, those
policies and procedures are designed under the guidance of inside experts and outside
consultants proficient in the science and art of management controls. It is not enough to
have a good plan, however, when the public sector may not be well enough funded or
staffed to carry it out. Perhaps the biggest problem is the ease with which governments fail
to carry out well-designed policies and procedures.
Government revenue comes from two sources: nonexchange transactions and exchange
transactions. Nonexchange transactions include taxes, duties, lines, and penalties; exchange
transactions occur when a government entity provides goods and services to the public for a
price. Exchange transactions include revenues from the U.S. postal service for postage and
mailings and Medicare part B premiums collected by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services for insurance coverage.
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Dependence on nonexchange revenue such as the collection of taxes makes the
government vulnerable to fraud. The tax itself is generated only when money is received
by a tax-paying entity, which acts as tax collector. The presence of this intermediary
increases the risk that not all the collected money will advance to the government since
there is no ready check to guarantee accurate collection or remittance.

Federal Government
Federal taxes are collected mainly through personal income taxes, social insurance taxes,
and corporate income taxes. The principal accounting authority regulating the collection
process is the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), sponsored by the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government. However, additional
authorities include the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) and Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), both of which are sponsored by the Financial
Accounting Foundation (FAF), a private-sector agency.

Even the federal government has not been able to get a clean audit opinion from its own
internal auditors, the General Accounting Office (GAO). For the fiscal years since
government-wide, consolidated, audited financial statements were first required in 1997,
federal law has forbidden the GAO to offer an opinion on the federal government’s
consolidated financial statements. In brief, management controls are unreliable and the
GAO must rely on the financial statements of the various government departments.

State and Local Government
The primary sources of revenues for state and local governments include sales and gross
receipts taxes, transfers from the federal government, property taxes, and individual
income taxes. The prevailing accounting authority for state and local governments is
GASB, which in turn draws significantly from the principles and statements of position
developed by FASB.
FASAB, GASB, and FASB are required to consider the effects of specific legislation,
including statutes enacted by Congress, directed at the accounting profession and reporting
entities. Federal and state law requires that government and not-for-profit organizations be
subject to audit by independent auditors.

Fraud in the Public Sector
Public-sector fraud usually arises from the same causes that underlie fraud in the private
sector. The employee sees an opportunity to place his or her own interests before those of
the government employer. The most effective means of prevention is, therefore, the
employer’s own management control systems.
Management control is often focused on preventing, deterring, and detecting errors and
irregularities, including fraud, orchestrated by low-level employees. Operating as if only
this level of employee presents the primary risk of loss from fraud is often penny-wise and
dollar-foolish.
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School-Board Fraud Case Study
The board of education of a midsized town had budgeted $35,000 for what should
have been insignificant repairs and maintenance to the sports field of the local high
school. Now, three years later, an inexplicable shortfall of $370,000 was attributed
to that budgeted item! In fact, the actual expenditures to date had skyrocketed to
almost $600,000!

Local taxpayers were understandably irate when the board sheepishly revealed
their “miscalculation.” They became incensed, however, when the new municipal
budget proposed paying for the board’s “mistake” through a substantial increase in
property taxes.
Fortunately, the local newspaper had a managing editor with a reputation for
hanging all the town’s dirty laundry out for everyone to see. Even more fortunately,
the editor’s spouse was a senior investigative CPA working for one of the country’s
top forensic accounting firms. The newspaper launched an investigation with
material assistance, provided pro bono, by the editor’s spouse. The sequence of
events uncovered by the audit trail was, to say the least, disconcerting to concerned
citizens. Through a detailed analysis of documentary evidence and in-depth
interviews with, among others, board members, municipal government employees,
and those involved in carrying out the actual work, the newspaper disclosed the
following:

1. The original budget item for repairs and maintenance had been approved
without question in the board’s budget, and the work was to have been
completed by the board’s groundskeepers.
2. Shortly after the work had begun, the board informed the high school’s
treasurer, who was also the town’s business administrator, that “extra work” was
necessary. No details of the extra work were provided.
3. The annual budgets in the two subsequent years did not disclose details of the
extra work, nor was the matter even referred to in semiannual revisions to the
budgets.
4. Documents showed the completed work over a three-year period included the
installation of sprinkler systems, the resurfacing of the track with state-of-the-art
support, excavation, and other work required for the installation of a new field.
Additional miscellaneous work, which should have been detailed, planned, and
documented in the general fund or capital projects fund budget, was performed
over the three-year period.
5. All expenditures for the “repairs and maintenance” were issued from the general
fund within the catchall line item “Miscellaneous.”
6. The PST General Contracting firm performed more than $400,000 of the total
billed work without any purchase orders or competitive bidding.
7. A principal of the PST firm was related to the school treasurer and business
administrator.
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8. The expenditures for the “repairs and maintenance” were literally rubberstamped by the school treasurer and business administrator, that is, she did not
actually sign or initial the required approvals for payment of the invoices.
9. The school treasurer and business administrator had routinely exceeded her
authority by approving expenditures above the $5,000 limit without seeking
board approval.
10. The high school had consistently approved payments without requiring
purchase orders for numerous other projects.
As a result of the local newspaper’s expose, a team of forensic accountants
undertook additional fact-finding and analyses that ultimately proved that fraud
had, indeed, occurred. Kickbacks had been paid by PST to the school treasurer and
business administrator to facilitate the issuance of payments in support of the
“repairs and maintenance.”
Since deception and dishonesty are an unfortunate part of society, the potential for
fraud and consequent victimization of the board and taxpayers were foreseeable
events. The moral of this story? A combination of conflicts of interest, unenforced
policies, and uninformed oversight can be a deadly recipe for fraud.

A Raise in Compensation Without a Salary Increase Case Study

William had a reputation for running his government office exceptionally well.
Even the inspector general of the department, normally a neurotic faultfinder,
could not find anything amiss with William’s operations. Everyone seemed happy.
Some of William’s better-performing middle managers, however, were frustrated
with the office salary structure, which usually gave them only modest increases that
hovered near or just above the increase in the cost of living. William knew the
threatened departure of some valued but frustrated employees would seriously
jeopardize his excellent managerial reputation.

One of the hallmarks of William’s success was his understanding of the merits of a
budget. As a result, he had always managed his department within its guidelines.
Perhaps one of the admirable qualities of the public sector is its attention to the
budget, which is usually subject to political pressures external to the office and
department. However, William was creative. He asked certain, particularly valued
employees what it would take to make them stay. He was confident he could keep
his loyal and trustworthy managers happy if they were willing to cooperate.
William explained that, although he was committed to running his department
within the budget, he did have some leeway with supplier contracts. He began
inquiring whether any spouses offered services that could be valuable to the
department. Occasionally, they did. More often than not, the spouses,
unknowingly, became post office boxes with trendy names. In this way, William
was able to override internal controls without arousing suspicion among any of his
other employees. In fact, few of William’s employees understood the alleged
purpose of the expenditures. Most did not want to appear ignorant and inquire
further about them because, if William had initialed the invoices, they must have
had his prior approval.
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As with many illicit conspiracies, it was successful at first. Murphy’s law, however,
eventually caught up even with William. The scheme unraveled when Gwen, one
of William’s favorite subordinates, decided to get a divorce. Gwen’s husband had
become accustomed to enjoying both the licit and, unwittingly, the illicit fruits of
his wife’s government position. As he reviewed the schedule of income and
expenses she was required by law to complete for divorce court, Gwen’s husband
remarked to his divorce attorney that her deposits were much greater before the
separation. The attorney subpoenaed Gwen’s prior deposits and the “outside
services expenditures” payable to her husband’s nonexistent business were
discovered. The entire scheme was exposed; the middle managers not only lost
their lucrative government jobs, but also, along with William, all were indicted for
fraud.

Conclusion and Analysis
The primary organizational tool to deter and detect fraud is accounting and
administrative elements of management controls. Accounting controls address
preventive measures and administrative controls, which in turn address feedback
systems. These controls should include the following:
1. Authorization. All key activities should require specific, documented
authorization from management.
2. Recordkeeping. Once authorized, all financial transactions should be meaningfully
recorded so that financial statements (reports) may be readily prepared and
responsibility for assets maintained.
3. Access to assets. Physical or electronic access to assets should be limited to those
with specific management authorization.
4. Actual-to-record asset comparisons. Periodic comparisons of the assets that are
actually maintained to assets recorded in the journals should be conducted, with
discrepancies reconciled.

3.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to public-sector fraud include:
• Theft or diversion ofgovernment-owned inventory or property. This may include office
supplies, computers and other equipment, classified information, and so on. Some assets
such as databases are intangible. Governments maintain enormous databases of their
own and purchase access to a wide range of other database as well. For a corrupt civil
servant, these facilities are resources that could be sold for thousands of dollars to buyers
in the private sector, who could only assemble such databases at the cost of millions.
Government does a much worse job of accounting for inventory than the private sector.
Until recently, governments used to report primarily under the modified accrual basis of
accounting, which did not record inventories using the same methods as the private
sector does at the time of acquisition. Under this previous system, at the time of any
purchase, the government recorded an expenditure—and not inventory—in order to
focus the accounting process on the decrease in net financial resources available. This
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aspect of fund accounting continues in the recordkeeping of many governments. This
will change with the introduction of GASB Statement No. 34, Basic Financial
Statements—and Management’s Discussion and Analysis—for State and Local Governments,
which becomes effective for governments with revenues of $100 million, $10 million or
less than $10 million after June 15, 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively.

No Harm, No Foul Case Study

Peter had been an investigator for the county government for nearly twenty years.
During this period, he had seen less talented investigators promoted and had
become tired of the Democrat and Republican partisanship that played such a
significant role in any career with the county.

Peter also wanted to live in a style not possible on his government salary. He knew
many attorneys through his work in the courthouse building, which housed the
county investigators. Many of these attorney acquaintances practiced in fields
requiring investigative assistance. In fact, Peter discovered that there was a market
for background information ranging from criminal records to drivers’ license and
registration records, to other information useful in locating individuals involved in
personal injury and matrimonial matters. Moreover, defense attorneys need reliable
information quickly.
Peter had access to various databases containing classified and confidential
information and became quite proficient in conducting “searches” for his “cases.”
No one was carefully reviewing the database charges under the case numbers Peter
invoiced.

Business was good. Before long, word spread throughout the legal community of a
new, efficient, effective, and reliable information provider. Before long, Peter
needed to expand. He began to hire agents and soon controlled a virtual enterprise
with order-takers, marketers, and cash-collectors.
A business this big could not be kept under cover for long. Rumor became fact
when a departmental investigation examined the database charges and could not
correlate them with any cases on file. Peter was arrested, charged, and convicted of
official misconduct and sentenced to five to ten years in federal prison.

• Bogus accounts-payable schemes. Governments and other large organizations that tolerate
poor management controls put themselves at serious risk of bogus accounts payable
schemes involving fictitious suppliers, inflated invoices, and all the usual apparatus of
sophisticated frauds perpetrated by managers or employees with accounting knowledge.
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It’s Not Like He Didn’t Deserve It Case Study
The Acme Concrete Company had provided services for the city government for
many years and had a reputation for excellent service and value.

Alice, the accounts payable clerk for the city, had known Joe, the sole proprietor of
Acme, for many years through mutual friends and membership in the same clubs.
Business talk between Joe and Alice easily became an extension of their relaxed
social relationship.
On one such occasion, Joe explained how he was losing money on a contract
currently being completed for the city. Alice suggested that if he increased the price
charged for the concrete, she would approve it.

Joe submitted the next invoice with the higher price, and Alice accepted it. Soon
Alice was receiving gifts and cash, and the invoicing scheme had spread to other
items such as reinforcing rods and concrete forms. Unfortunately, within a year or
so, the auditors began to ask Alice awkward questions about what were now regular
cost overruns on city contracts with Acme that never seemed to occur with other
contractors.
When the full extent of the scheme was revealed, Joe and Alice were arrested,
charged with fraud, and sentenced to short terms in prison.

• Overstated expense accounts, especially by top management. Expense accounts are often an
open invitation to abuse. It is all too easy to take friends to lunch, conduct love affairs,
and submit false invoices for equipment and services unless there are strict controls.

Mayors Are Supposed To Be Extravagant Case Study
The town council of a bedroom community outside Sacramento was considering a
vendor’s proposal for a radical new way to dispose of community waste. The mayor
proposed to perform a kind of due diligence by visiting the vendor’s principals,
looking at their operation, and forming a sense of their integrity and competence in
a face-to-face meeting.
The mayor visited the vendors at their place of business in nearby Sacramento,
discussed the council’s concerns, viewed the mockup of the proposed sewage
system, and then moved on to Hawaii for three weeks to study the results.

When the township clerk reviewed the mayor’s expense report, she was surprised at
the high cost of the three days in Sacramento and refused to pay the expense
voucher. After being threatened with dismissal by the mayor, the clerk took the
voucher to the chief accountant who demanded more detailed supporting
documentation.
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After the mayor relented and produced his credit card receipts from the hotels and
restaurants in Hawaii, the matter was brought before the full council, and he was
forced to resign. The mayor was further disgraced after the clerk told her story to
the local papers.

• Acceptance of bribes (for example, kickbacks disguised as commissions) in exchange for contract
approvals. This may also include the privatization of government functions, inflated price
approvals, and bid rigging.

The Free Market Is Not Always Free Case Study
State governments are pressed to find money when tax revenues are down because
of unemployment and slower business activity during recessions. To keep
government expenditures in line with lower revenues, government work is
sometimes outsourced to the private sector. Voters often find this process attractive
since it creates jobs and fees instead of taxes are paid for the services.
The decision to sell the public water authority to the highest responsible bidder was
hailed as a brilliant idea by local newspapers, pundits, and voters’ organizations.
The government would receive cash up front and not have to operate and subsidize
the utility, and the bidders recognized the opportunities inherent in the right to
control the distribution and price of a commodity valued by the state’s millions of
residents.

Pursuant to state procurement laws, regulations, and policies, a detailed request for
proposal (RFP) was prepared for distribution to prospective bidders. The detailed
RFP outlined bidder requirements including financial responsibility, integrity,
business plan, and affiliated relationships.

However, a special condition was inserted inconspicuously into the repairs and
maintenance section outlining the requirements to assure the state that the
infrastructure would be properly maintained, as follows:
“The vendor shall contract for the services of a repairs and maintenance
independent contractor that shall have a branch or field office(s) within onehour’s travel of at least one reservoir in the water system.” Moreover, “. . .
proof of the commitment of such contract shall be a condition precedent to
the award under this RFP.”

Pipe & Drains Co. Inc. was the only contractor in the state able to meet this
condition.

A losing bidder challenged the award to Pipe & Drains but his claim for a review
was rejected for reasons that seemed obscure to his lawyers. The challenge was
taken to the courts.
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Investigation by a forensic accounting team revealed that Pipe & Drains Co. had
bribed the state employee responsible for approval of the RFP. The employee had
assured Pipe & Drains that the cost of the bribe could be recovered from all the
losing bidders (except, of course, the one challenging the contract award) whom the
state would hire as subcontractors. The cost of the bribe would be allocated among
the four bidders by requiring them to advance good-faith nonrefundable payments.
These advances would allow Pipe & Drains Co. to recoup the bribe while keeping
its own repairs and maintenance costs within the specifications of the RFP.

After some careful bid leveling, other astute analysis, and the obtaining of
incriminating testimonial evidence by the state inspector general, the state
discovered the bribe and dismissed the state employee.

• Frauds by suppliers. Examples of frauds committed by government suppliers include
overbilling, double-billing, product substitution, and so on.

The Screw: It’s Not Just A Fastener Case Study

Competitive bidding is an effective way to get the best price for a job and may be
required under federal, state, or local law on large contracts. Unfortunately, it is
often an open door to fraud.

The government agency had no reservations in offering Perks Galore Inc. the
contract for several millions of dollars of improvements to a high-rise government
office building. Perks management was no stranger to government work and knew
the disadvantages—the competitive bidding process would hold down margins and
would involve red tape. However, the market was soft, and the job would keep the
staff working and pay the bills. A month or two into the work, Perks discovered that
it had made a couple of significant estimating errors that could not be legitimately
recouped through a claim against the government. The managers felt the company
risked bankruptcy if it continued to perform the contract at a loss.
Fraudsters can be very clever, especially if they believe that they can turn the
honesty and integrity of others to their own advantage; it’s harder to cheat a
cheater. The field and project managers reexamined the RFP and their firm’s
response and concluded they could cut comers on small items such as fasteners and
screws and bolts as long as no inspectors checked too closely. They were
calculating, especially, that they could deceive a young and relatively
inexperienced government inspector, who, they hoped, might not know all the
tricks. The quality of the fasteners was quietly reduced by having deliveries made in
boxes deliberately mislabeled to show compliance with the RFP. The field manager
exercised excessive care in supervising the field laborers so no one would complain
about the stepdown in quality.
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Unfortunately for the field and project managers, the young inspector was more
attentive to detail than they had anticipated. He noticed that screws used to install
the door hinges were shorter than required by the contract. He told his supervisor,
who carried out a more thorough check and found a pattern of noncompliance
through the substitution of lower quality fasteners of different types. In fact, the
cheaper substitutes had been used so frequently that the safety of the building was
in question.

In the end, the whole scheme was revealed, and the screws were replaced at
company expense. The field and project managers were dismissed. Perks Galore
teetered on the brink of bankruptcy after the completion of the contract, but
managed to recover, and bid successfully and profitably on subsequent jobs.

• Computer-relatedfraud. Computer fraud is common. The restrictions of government
budgets often prevent the purchase of up-to-date software to control unauthorized
access to workstations. Unauthorized personnel knowledgeable about computers can
interfere with existing systems either for personal profit or to maliciously inflict damage.

Academic Performance Is Like A Fine Wine Case Study

Jason was a high-school dropout and self-described amateur computer hacker who
worked as a janitor at a small Midwestern university. He usually worked the 4 P.M.to-midnight shift cleaning the offices in the main administration building. The first
thing Jason did every night was to empty the wastebaskets in the offices into plastic
bags, which were then taken to a dumpster to be hauled away by a contract
disposal company.
One night he noticed a piece of paper bearing the heading “Data Transmittal—
Final Grades” in one of the wastebaskets. Below the heading was a list of student
names together with their dates of birth, social security numbers, and grades. Angry
at the academic institutions that had frustrated his own dreams, Jason conceived of
a malicious prank to play on the university. Using his own knowledge of computers
and the policies and procedures manual sitting in the office of the data input
supervisor, Jason hacked into the university system through the supervisor’s
workstation and enhanced the grades of every student on the list.

Jason was not caught by any student reporting an improved grade but by the
security system installed on the university administration computers. The hack was
detected, and the time and workstation noted. A short investigation showed the
only person who could possibly have been in the office at the time of the hack was
Jason. After a brief interview, Jason could not resist telling the investigators how
smart he was and confessed to the whole incident. He was dismissed with cause.
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• Money Laundering. Money-laundering schemes include the abuse of governmentoperated lotteries or pari-mutuel betting facilities, the issuance of bribes through
government-owned corporations and/or agencies seeking foreign sales, and so on .

It’s Only Gambling If You Don’t Know Who’s Going To Win Case Study

Law enforcement authorities have described money laundering as typically a threestage process:
1. Proceeds of illicit activity in the form of cash are exchanged for monetary
instruments such as money orders or other drafts on financial institutions or
deposited into checking, savings, brokerage, and other types of accounts.
2. The money is then commingled with legitimate proceeds by transferring to, for
instance, an operating account of a legitimate business for use as working capital.
3. In the final stage, the money is used to pay for normal business expenses such as
the purchase of raw materials or labor for legitimate business activity.

The most difficult part of any money-laundering scheme is the first stage, namely,
finding a point for illegal money to enter the legitimate economy unnoticed. A
group of drug dealers and horserace fixers working for an organized crime family
thought they had found one such spot at a state pari-mutuel betting facility. The
scheme used dozens of runners to place bets, over several months, using the
proceeds of illegal drug sales. The horses on which the bets were placed were
running in races fixed through extortion of the jockeys.
The laundering took place as the bets were converted to winnings which were then
deposited to the runners’ personal bank accounts which had been opened using
false social security numbers and other fake identification. The money was later
withdrawn to purchase trucks for use in a quasi-legitimate trucking business run by
the organized crime family.
The scheme began to unravel when state and federal authorities started an
investigation into the effects of organized crime on interstate commerce. Using
independent private sector inspectors general (IPSIGs), the government authorities
analyzed the sources and uses of cash by the trucking company and discovered the
money-laundering operation providing cash to what should have been a cashstarved and underperforming business. The owners of the trucking company and
many of the runners and drug dealers were arrested and convicted on numerous
charges related to money laundering.

• Violations ofprivacy and privacy law such as identity theft. These may occur when the
extensive records maintained by governmental and other agencies such as credit card
companies are abused.
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The United States Is Still the Land of Opportunity Case Study
The United States, described as the “land of the free and the home of the brave”
has long represented the “American Dream” for many foreign residents—persons
dissatisfied with the economic and social conditions of their native lands. With a
little audacity and even less conscience, things may indeed come free.
The state’s Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) handled the licensing of drivers and
the registration of vehicles. Most of these transactions were managed without error.
Generally, work at the DMV was neither secure nor rewarding. At least every other
month, stories and rumors of plans to privatize the DMV would circulate.
Promotions were rare, and the clerical jobs were at best mundane.
Sandra was an immigrant from Eastern Europe who had come to the United States
to realize her dreams of wealth in the land of unlimited opportunities. Because of
her limited English and her even more limited educational qualifications, she could
only find work as a poorly paid data entry clerk at the DMV. Opening her mail one
day, Sandra discovered a credit card application addressed to a Susan Smith. The
superintendent, who had lived in the apartment since it had been built 10 years
before, knew of no Susan Smith. At dinner later that day, some friends told her the
amusing story that had appeared in the newspaper recently of how a credit card
application had been sent to a dog. Sandra had an idea. She proposed a scheme to
her friends, who were also new immigrants struggling to improve themselves in a
country more challenging than they had anticipated.

Sandra began taking personal information off the license forms at the DMV and
passing it to her coconspirators, who used the details to complete credit card
application forms, which they then submitted to different banks. Her friends and
coconspirators also phoned the persons whose identities they were assuming to
obtain employment information. Soon the banks were issuing credit cards to the
phony applicants.
Sandra and her friends bought the latest computers, software, DVDs, clothing, and
even dined in a manner to which they were definitely not previously accustomed.
Each credit card had a life of about two months before the bank issued a denial of
authorization. This did not bother the fraudsters since the number of names in the
DMV files that could be used to get new cards was, for all practical purposes,
limitless. While Sandra and her friends were living very well, the persons whose
identities had been stolen began to find themselves in trouble with the credit rating
agencies.

Sandra was caught when she tried to return an expensive audio-visual
entertainment system to a store that, by then, was aware it had been victimized by
one of her bad debts. She turned in her friends in exchange for a reduced sentence.
Of course, once the banks discovered what had happened, they blamed the DMV
for making it so easy for fraudsters to steal their information. The DMV protested
that licenses and registrations would be prohibitively expensive if controls that
would be powerful enough to prevent all theft were put into place.
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Both sides were right. The DMV should have had better controls but even controls
such as a simple separation of duties are expensive. For example, if one employee
had been responsible for entering only social security numbers, another for entering
only dates of birth, and so on, Sandra could never have gathered enough data
about any single person to make the credit card application.

The DMV was faced with the classic problem of trying to strike a balance between
cost and effectiveness. As an organization endeavors to make do with less yet
maintain or even improve efficiency, its ability to assure compliance with its
policies and procedures becomes impaired. Management controls may become
cost-prohibitive or of secondary importance, especially where increased revenue
generation through raising taxes is politically sensitive.

• Tax evasion. Among the more publicized types of fraud affecting government
organizations is tax evasion. When taxpayers simply do not pay taxes, government
revenues necessary for funding operations and programs are not available.

What They Don’t Know Can’t Hurt ’Em Case Study
John graduated from college with a business degree and joined a public accounting
firm specializing in tax-preparation services to work toward his license as a certified
public accountant (CPA). Rick, a partner in the firm, became John’s mentor. Rick
had more than two hundred individuals and small businesses as clients and was
regarded as one of the best CPAs in the firm.

John’s job was to take in the records and documentation provided by Rick’s clients
for the preparation of their income tax returns. As part of his training, John
prepared a few of the simpler returns and sent them to Rick for review. He had
only submitted a few when Rick called him into his office to talk about the returns
for the Smiths, a wealthy couple well known for their charity work. Rick told John
that their deductions were not big enough to give them the kind of refund they had
been used to. John was puzzled because he had done his calculations carefully.
Rick told him that the Smiths’ charitable contributions were down for the year
along with the deductible expenses for Schedule C (sole proprietorship business)
and Schedule F (income producing property) assets. Rick told John he would
simply have to find more deductible expenses and suggested that adding 10 percent
to the previous year’s expenses would be a good place to start. John was also told
that if the Smiths were audited, the accounting firm was paid for hours worked and,
if the Smiths were charged with tax evasion, the firm would bill yet more hours
defending them.

John refused to adjust the Smiths’ returns, knowing that it was unlikely Rick could
fire him without revealing his own dishonesty. John immediately began looking for
another firm with which he could complete his CPA licensing requirements.
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Conclusion and Analysis
Many government methods of determining and collecting taxes, especially income
taxes, are not entirely effective. The government’s dependence on self-assessment
of one’s income tax liability invites unscrupulous persons to understate their
earnings with confidence that they will not be detected.

The only means the government has of controlling tax evasion is the audit, which
requires significant additional resources such as trained revenue agents and
examiners. The problem of evasion is compounded by the fact the government
lacks independent checks against many of the abusive or illicit practices. For
instance, the federal government requires brokerage houses to provide the Internal
Revenue Service with information on the proceeds of securities sales by clients. The
federal government has no way of measuring the true capital gain or loss since it
has no way of determining the adjusted cost base of those sales. As a result,
taxpayers can easily underreport capital gains and overstate capital losses.

3.3

Key Preventive Controls

The objective of accounting and administrative controls is to provide reasonable assurance
that top management’s goals, strategies, and business methods are operating effectively and
efficiently. Since the objective is “reasonable” but not absolute assurance, top management,
with the assistance of consultants competent in the field of management controls, is
required to make decisions based on cost-benefit analyses.

Each organization must be analyzed individually to determine the controls needed to fit its
unique strengths and weaknesses. Controls must not be so threatening to the congeniality
of the office that employees work in constant fear of reprimand. Controls must be discussed
and interpreted for the employees so that everyone understands their importance and
believes in their purpose. Some of the traditional key fraud-prevention controls in the
government sector follow below:
• Policies and procedures must be documented in writing. A policies and procedures manual
should be written and delivered to all affected employees. Doing things by the book
should be expected and, if that expectation proves too rigid or unrealistic, the manual
should be amended to reflect sound yet practical Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
Unfortunately, many organizations have SOP manuals providing procedures to prevent
or detect most frauds, yet they are not followed. Well-thought-out SOPs will not require
substantial increases in the work force or security costs to reduce the incidence of fraud.
Management controls should be devised to obtain reasonable assurance but not
complete assurance. Controls and manuals that are insensitive to the realities of the
workplace and attempt to do too much will not be respected.
• Policies and procedures must be enforced. Enforcement must be commensurate with the
importance of any possible breach. Employees expect to be fairly but firmly
reprimanded for failure to conform to requirements. Transparency, objectivity, and
consistency are necessary for the effective administration of discipline.
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There are few things more destructive to effective management controls than double
standards. The “do-as-I-say-and-not-as-I-do” technique simply does not work and will
prove counterproductive, especially in the public sector where the most competent and
motivated employees want high standards of business practice and work well for
managers of integrity.
• A mutually beneficial control environment must be maintained. The establishment of an
employer-employee relationship based on mutual respect, interest, and disclosure is
especially important when many government employees are unionized. Civil service
unions are large and strong and should be respected by the employer.
Effective controls should be part of ethical working conditions. They should be part of
the rules of acceptable conduct, remove temptations for unethical behavior, and provide
for uniform and fair discipline. These provisions should be memorialized in written
policies and procedures and codes of ethics.
Managing employer-employee relationships by confrontation may lead to antagonism,
which may in turn lower productivity and increase the risks of fraud, sabotage, and
other illegal acts. Managers need to understand human nature. Many frauds and
intentional misconduct are the product of both opportunity and motive. It is the foolish
manager whose behavior creates an atmosphere that may provide the incentive for the
discontent employee to commit wrongful acts.
Even a cursory review of recent business news shows the effects of imposing an
unsatisfactory system of rewards. In several high-profile cases in the private sector, top
management was tempted by lucrative stock options awards to allow the publication of
misleading financial statements.
Clearly, the public sector cannot provide the lure of stock options incentives. High-level
personnel in government regulatory agencies can, however, become “captive
regulators.” They are public servants who have become “soft” in their regulatory duties
in the hope of moving to a well-paying job at a regulated company they have treated
favorably in the past. This temptation becomes stronger as one climbs the ladder of
management in the agencies; the higher the position, the greater the opportunity to
benefit from going soft. The result of this lowered sense of responsibility is a weak
regulatory process that is not in the public interest.
• Job descriptions should be accurate and satisfactorily segregated. Job descriptions should be
clear in theory and respected in practice. Duties should be distinctly segregated. For
example, the person who approves the invoice should not be the person who writes the
check to pay it.
Responsibilities at each stage in the accounts payable and accounts receivable cycles
should be segregated to minimize the risk of fraud and maximize the probability of
detection of any error or irregularity. Duties such as negotiating contracts, preparing
requisitions, writing purchase orders, documenting receipt of goods or services,
verifying the completeness of accounts payable vouchers, preparing checks, depositing
of monetary instruments, preparing deposit tickets, opening of the mail, posting of cash
receipts to specific taxpayer accounts, performing internal audit functions, and so on,
should each be performed by a different person.
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Efficient and effective segregation of duties requires intelligent and informed
management analysis. Management tends to entrust more duty and responsibility to
trusted individuals in the expectation of getting work done competently yet without
additional costs.
The proper segregation of duties is more art than science. Textbook segregation may
not be practical. Consultants trained in the development of management control
systems can assist management to adapt the best textbook practices to the needs of
management of the organization.
• General and applications controls over computers (hardware and software) and computer-based
records should be satisfactory. Good computer security includes physical and remote access
restrictions, disaster recovery contingencies, and control over software and program
development to assure smooth operations and avoid breaches of confidentiality,
including the misuse of information.
Programs should be written and tested by persons who would not be expected to apply
them in practice. Passwords should be required and routinely changed. Data entered in
the information processing should undergo edit checks.
Effective application controls assure transactions performed by computer programs are
valid, authorized, and accurately and completely processed and reported. They protect
data, files, and programs from unauthorized access. They should also limit and monitor
access to programs and files controlling computer hardware and secure applications.
They will prevent unauthorized changes to systems and applications software as well as
segregate duties so no one individual can control all computer operations. In addition,
they should assure the recovery of computer processing operations in case of
unexpected interruption, including disaster recovery.
Within the private sector, management controls over computer-based assets and
information are especially important. Many companies are highly dependent on the
latest technology for the oversight and operation of their businesses, including
administrative and accounting controls.
Government is as dependent as the private sector on technology but usually cannot
afford the latest equipment. Consequently, the public sector needs a higher level of
written procedures and personal standards of integrity to monitor the administration of
computer operations.
• All transactions should be evidenced by documentation of authorization. A sound management
control system must include an audit trail, competent personnel, segregation of duties,
and other checks against rogue conduct. For instance, documentation should be
maintained to assure that all transactions and other significant activities are authorized
and conducted within the scope of established authority. Documentary evidence that
these transactions have been promptly and accurately recorded should be readily
available and accessible for internal or independent review.
Documentary evidence including hard copy and magnetic media should be considered
as valuable as the underlying assets for the purpose of assessing compliance with
management’s policies and procedures. Originals and copies of complete files should be
within the physical custody of an office or unit independent of the initiating authority.
This practice would promote compliance with policy and reduce the risk of employees
exceeding their authority.
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• The organization should satisfactorily review and monitor all employees right up to senior
management together with their control systems. Supervisory controls, including a welldefined review and approval process, are essential. Having competent employees is
necessary but not sufficient; employees should be carefully supervised and higher levels
of management should review the supervisors.
Key performance indicators should be developed and monitored. These standards
would vary according to the responsibilities of each employee. They should, however,
be both indicative of the employee’s relevant performance and permit the employee to
improve performance.

Standards that make the employee responsible for obtaining specific objectives without
granting sufficient authority to carry out the task are undesirable. Responsibility without
authority may promote fraud by requiring employees to exceed their authority.
The employee’s compensation plan should reflect realistic goals. For instance,
employees whose bonuses or salary increases are tied exclusively to the performance of
their office or group may not have sufficient incentive to stand out among a group of
underachievers.
• The organization should dedicate sufficient resources to the internal audit function. A strong
internal audit function is necessary. Employees should expect their acts to be routinely,
randomly, and carefully, subject to review for conformity to policy and procedure.
The internal audit function should both seem and be independent. Audit staff should be
competent. It should perform periodic thorough reviews of operations without having
such a predictable schedule that might allow any fraudster to know where and when the
audit falls.
Too frequently, internal audit is understaffed and not respected. Many persons in the
top management in both the public and private sectors would prefer the audit be
ineffective lest it discover embarrassing practices.

• The organization should subject itselfto regular evaluation by independent reviewers. Independ
ent contractors including external auditors should perform periodic monitoring of
government operations. These activities should evaluate the effectiveness of
management controls and the internal and external audit function.
Outside auditors usually have experience of various control systems as used in the
private sector. They know what works and what does not work. They also have a better
eye for the “red flags” that persons entrenched in the operating culture may take for
granted or not assess accurately.
The organization should consider the periodic rotation of independent external auditors
to bring in those unfamiliar with the organization’s operations and key employees. This
type of review would promote objectivity of evaluation.

3.5 Checklists and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the government sector follows with related
grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls.

(Text continues on page 7 7)

Fraud Supp. 3—3/03

16.15

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

Government Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
government sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees, and expense report fraud
(related controls include job descriptions and segregation of
duties, audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good management policies [especially
strict enforcement])

• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good management
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good management policies and
supervision)
• Commercial crime by or against the government, including
money laundering (for example, for government-run
lotteries and pari-mutual betting operations), tax evasion,
and violation of privacy (related controls include good
management policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit functions [especially
internal audit])
(continued)
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Government Sector Checklist (continued)
Government Sector Checklist

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the government
sector, and related controls, as set out on the attached grids,
been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good management policies [especially
strict enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees or others (related
controls include physical access restrictions, and good
management policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Government Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by managers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
X

Theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X
X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like.

Use of Computers in Fraud

X

Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (theft of funds, misuse of information, and the like)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

Money laundering (for example, lotteries and pari-mutual betting
operations)

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion (that is, where the taxpayer is the perpetrator)

X
X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy

X

Government Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X
(continued)

19

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Government Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Government Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts payable
variance)

X

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

X

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

Supervisory review and approval
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)
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4 High Technology

4.1 Introduction
High technology is the constant process of technical innovation in every industry. However,
the current use of what has become a modern everyday term usually refers to the fields of
electronics, computers and other data processing equipment, telecommunications,
biotechnology, defense and aerospace, and other related fields. The Merriam Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Edition) defines high technology as, “the scientific technology
involving the production or use of advanced or sophisticated devices esp. in the fields of
electronics and computers.” The common thread among the various definitions is always
the latest or most recent technical advancement in a field or industry.

These technologies were made possible by the breakthroughs in mathematics, physics and
biology of the 20th century. High technology is distinguished not only for the products that
have increased the convenience and enjoyment of our lives but also for the revolutionary
business strategies that have changed the way business entities think about management,
markets and customers.
High technology is not an industry as such but is a means of digitizing information and
managing processes that cut across all industries. Technology permits the improvement of
manufacturing operations on the shop floor in addition to the flow of information in the
front office. We identify high technology as the latest advancement and permutation in an
industry that augments an existing process to the point of possible revolution.
For our purposes, we will focus on the possible frauds and controls in the high technology
sector, which includes the following fields or industries:

1. Computer hardware and software development, installation and implementation

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

E-commerce and cyberfraud
Telecommunications
Biotechnology
Defense and aerospace
Other leading-edge scientific or industrial research and development

In addition, we will consider both the creation and use of this new technology in
nonscientific or nontechnical areas. For example, many industries such as the automotive
industry are a mixture of old and new technologies. A car is still four wheels on a frame but
it also has a wide array of electronic equipment, from the automated voice that tells you
your seatbelt is undone to the sensors that automatically adjust your speed relative to your
proximity to adjacent vehicles.

What is common to high technology in all industries, however, is usually a new idea or
product that could be very valuable on the open market for that industry. These products
also carry high-risk levels, and major research and development expenditures to support
them. Unfortunately, the presence of large funds and the bottomless appetite of a gullible
public for new places to speculate with their money has attracted a new generation of
fraudsters practicing many of the same old tricks and a few new ones. As always, big
money attracts big crime. The fact that small companies have proliferated in this sector of
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the economy has attracted fraudsters who float new companies, take shareholders’ money
and disappear. The proprietary nature of much of the research has also raised the profile of
the industrial spy. Getting the jump on the competition is essential when the financial
stakes are so huge. Knowing who’s doing what and when a competitor’s new product is
coming to market can mean life or death to a young startup living on a limited amount of
venture capital.

4.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The primary key vulnerabilities to fraud in the high-technology sector include the
following:

• Theft or diversion of inventory, for example, small items, such as computer chips, that
have a high per-unit dollar value. In this area, the computer can be both the target of
the fraud and used as the instrument to commit the fraud. The main vulnerability with
new or leading-edge computer technology is the proprietary nature of the intellectual
property involved in the product. The physical targeting of a computer is not limited to
theft of its various components. The information stored on a hard drive of a targeted
computer can be sold, especially if it contains important proprietary information, such
as customer lists or prototype design information. Trafficking in counterfeit computer
components is a major problem, especially with the many so-called discount merchants
clamoring for the consumers’ dollars. For instance, in once case a company was indicted
on charges of trafficking in counterfeit CPU (Central Processing Unit) chips and
software. Legitimate computer CPU manufacturers, such as Intel Corporation, qualify
their CPUs to operate at specified speeds, mark that speed on the CPUs themselves, and
further mark the CPU with their trademarks and other identifying information. To
ensure the quality and life expectancy of the CPU, the legitimate manufacturer specifies
each CPU to operate at less than top speed, and incorporates a speed-lock mechanism
into each CPU to prevent operation at a speed greater than that specified.
• Counterfeiters, however, typically acquire genuine computer CPUs, remark them so
that they will appear to be of superior quality and speed than they actually are, and
disable the speed-lock mechanism. The counterfeiter then puts the mismarked CPUs in
the supply chain through wholesalers, and in turn sells to retailers at steep discounts.
The end consumer buys the inferior CPU, assuming it to be the genuine article with the
expected superior quality and speed, at a price commensurate with the real thing. As a
result, the purchasers are victimized because the remarked CPUs are more likely to
burn out from ordinary use sooner than the properly adjusted legitimate ones. This
results from the strain of operating at a higher speed than the true specification. So the
consumer doesn’t get what he or she thinks was paid for and the legitimate
manufacturers are victimized by lost sales of their superior quality CPUs and the loss of
faith in their genuine, quality products.
• Frauds by officers or directors, such as fraudulent financial reporting, stock touting,
manipulation of share prices, insider trading, antitrust violations, or organizational
bribes given as part of the contract bidding process.
• Sabotage and espionage, both from inside and outside the organization.
• Failure to communicate the potential security gaps to employees, businesses, and
customers of the technology they use on a daily basis. This is especially true when
interacting with the Internet.
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• Failure of a company to install adequate security measures, properly maintain and up
date them, and to make the fact that they are in place known to system users, both
internal and external.
• Allowing one person or a discrete group to have sole control of important company
information and technology. Dividing authority will go a long way to reduce the risk of
the system and the information it holds being invaded from the inside, especially by a
disgruntled employee.
• Companies should protect against piracy by setting up an anti-piracy group and
demonstrating its commitment to ensuring that its customers receive legitimate, licensed
software, and that commercial partners receive the appropriate revenues for the
distribution of their software. Further, there should be no hesitation in prosecuting a
discovered pirate.
• Be alert to con artists, who approach potential technology users with schemes requiring
the payment of advances or up front seed money, but then disappearing or never
delivering on their end of the contract. Due diligence should be performed before
money changes hands.
• Among the risks associated with the operation of purchasing systems are false input of
invoices, diversion of payments, and misappropriation of purchases.
• Because high tech involves cutting-edge intellectual property, constant attention should
be paid to possible breaches of licensing agreements and patent infringement. The more
unique the product, the more it has to be protected.
• Dishonest contractors padding bills on big dollar defense and aerospace contracts are a
constant task for government internal auditors.
• Falsified research results at academic and private laboratories.
Not surprisingly, the different fields and/or industries in the high tech sector experience
both similar and varying vulnerabilities. Some of the most prevalent are highlighted
according to the individual areas within this sector.

Computer Hardware and Software Development, Installation, and
Implementation
Most companies or industries concerned about the security of their product focus on
attacks from outside. As a result, there are security loopholes for the internal fraudster to
slip through. The controls a company establishes are the only way to address and
significantly reduce the vulnerabilities of high-tech computer products. These controls
should be designed to thwart the outside attack from a hacker, the inside attack by a
current or former employee, and the combined attack of an employee and an outsider.

While vandals can attack the machines and hackers can invade the systems, the real
problem is with a company’s own employees. The days of the giant mainframe housed in a
locked, air-conditioned room and operated by only a few people on site are long gone.
Today, the proliferation of the personal computer (PC) has permitted the creation of local
and wide area networks (LANs and WANs) that give large numbers of people access to the
system through workstations both at the home offices and at locations far removed from
there. The computer-adept fraudster is now most likely to be a company employee with a
good knowledge of the systems and their vulnerabilities.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

22.1

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Disgruntled Employees Can Be a Time Bomb Case Study
U.S. Attorney Robert J. Cleary announced that a federal jury found a former chief
computer network administrator guilty of unleashing a computer programming
time bomb that deleted all design and production programs of a New Jersey-based
high-tech measurement and control instruments manufacturer. The Omega
Engineering Corp. of Bridgeport, N.J.—a manufacturing firm serving National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Navy, as well as private
companies—suffered damages from lost contracts and lost productivity that totaled
more than $10 million.

This case illustrates the ironic fact that the tools that allow and facilitate the
development of high technology are the very same tools that create the
vulnerability and susceptibility of the product. The ability and knowledge of an
insider, usually the developer, to adversely use computer software to attack a new
product should always be a major concern to any company or industry.

Starting in the early 1990s computer chips were a major commodity in the criminal market.
As a result of the high demand and limited supply—chip manufacturers could not produce
enough to keep up with the demand—the prices skyrocketed. An underworld trade in high
speed memory chips developed: there were now high-tech thieves. Around the world
thieves vandalized the desktop and laptop computers of numerous companies for the sole
purpose of stealing these now precious memory chips. The high-tech thefts increased
operating costs for businesses. The increased theft-insurance premium for covering
company assets was one result. Likewise, consumers were not shielded from this high-tech
crime wave.

The central problem of computer hardware and software development is building secure
machines and systems. Security is paramount because these machines and systems house a
company’s intellectual assets, which includes more than secret, technical product
information. The computers are the residence of a company’s internal operating processes
for managing customer lists and analyzing marketing, billing, and every other type of
information essential to profitability.

E-Commerce and Cyberfraud
The more employees, customers, and suppliers are connected to the growing number of
computers that, in turn, are connected to a company’s nationwide or global operations, the
more vulnerable a company is to unauthorized intrusions. Probably the scariest aspect of
this word-wide hook up is that the intruder does not physically have to invade an entity’s
premises to do damage. Any place on earth is a good starting point from which to attack a
business half way around the world.
Cyberfraud is a crime that is perpetrated, aided, or abetted most often by technology
specialists in information systems. The definition covers computer-related crime, theft of
proprietary information, electronic intrusion, credit-card fraud, embezzlement, extortion,
and sabotage. Businesses use firewalls and encryption, which employ the principle of
separation of responsibilities, to compartmentalize the workplace and to protect internal
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systems from unauthorized external access. However, information and communications
systems change rapidly, making security upgrades costly and sometimes difficult to
implement. Also, as IT systems get more complex, security becomes even more
complicated and layered with slower authorization procedures, which can be time
consuming and costly.

E-commerce businesses are faced with the challenge for a market-driven system of
controlling costs and increasing profits versus protecting proprietary information. There are
an increasing number of cases that illustrate how a fraudster can enrich him- or herself by
gaining access to another’s intellectual property.

E-Commerce Alias Case Study

In a suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, Novell
alleged that a Mr. Bonner used several alias accounts on eBay’s auction site as a
vehicle to distribute unlicensed copies of Novell’s Net Services software. Novell
contended that Bonner conducted more than forty illegal auctions of its software
over a six-month period.
Cases like this one show that not only does the creator of the proprietary property
lose but also the intermediary, in this instance the sales channel, which is trying to
compete fairly, loses. And the honest customers, who are seeking to acquire
legitimate, licensed software, end up confused, harmed, and possibly resolved to
stay away from e-commerce.

E-Hacker Havoc Case Study
A recent article in the Canadian National Post stated that “[A] Canadian hacker
made headlines last autumn when his antics slowed Websites to a crawl. The
resulting loss for e-businesses? $1.2 million in revenues. According to an IBM
survey, 75% of companies had their sites hacked into at least once last year, and the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission reported a $10-billion loss from Internet fraud in
1999.”

Another target of a systems invader is the proprietary customer information stored on a
company’s computers. It is difficult to place a value on this information when it is in the
hands of competitors. But there is no doubt that it is worth a lot. The fraudster with the
right high-tech knowledge can steal the ideas, customers, and business of another. In the
world of e-commerce, the same technology and tools are used to compete legitimately or
fraudulently. The sad thing is that the instructions on how to use otherwise legitimate
technology is readily available to the potential fraudster on the Internet.
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E-Commerce Dirty Dealing Case Study

An Internet bookseller in Boston, MA, which also operated an Internet
communications service, was charged in federal court with intercepting electronic
communications and the unauthorized possession of password files. The
Information presented in court alleged that the purpose of the interception was, in
part, to gain a competitive commercial advantage for ALIBRIS/INTERLOC’s own
online book-selling business by compiling a database of other dealers’ purchases
and by analyzing the book-selling market. The Information alleged that ALIBRIS’s
corporate predecessor, INTERLOC, INC. was an on-line bookseller, and also
operated a business called Valinet, which provided Internet service in the
Greenfield, MA area. INTERLOC provided email service to its customer book
dealers. The Information alleged that for periods of time between January and June
1998, ALIBRIS/INTERLOC intercepted email messages sent by online bookseller
Amazon.com to ALIBRIS/INTERLOC bookseller clients who had INTERLOC
email addresses.

Gaining Unauthorized Access Can Lead toJail Case Study

An Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigation resulted in the filing of an
Information against a contractor’s former employee charging him with computer
fraud. The Information alleged that the fraudster used his NASA-owned computer
workstation to hack into the computers of private businesses. The OIG
investigation disclosed that the former employee used his NASA-provided
workstation to gain unauthorized access to a computer network domain located at
an academic institution. Once he gained access to the domain, he downloaded
stored password files. The accused pled guilty to the charge and made restitution to
the institution and other business that were victimized.

The high-tech-age ability to warehouse and manipulate data has added a new twist to
raiding a competitor’s personnel. Because of rapid changes, there is a limited pool of
potential employees with the requisite knowledge of the technology, the hardware and
expertise. Today’s high tech companies have far more to worry about than just protecting
their physical and intellectual property. As the expression goes “a company is only as good
as its employees . . . .”

One Against Four Case Study
A new competitor, Triple One Technology, started hiring employees away from
Four Four Four, Inc., an established IT business. Over a period of time, Triple One
wooed Four’s CEO and others on down to the level of research analyst. Four’s
employees were systematically targeted in small groups. Once the pattern of
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employee raiding was recognized, there was an immediate concern for the loss of
intellectual property, which became the stimulus for possible litigation.

When the CEOs of both companies were unable to come to some agreement, Four
tightened its security and controls. Employees who left Four were investigated for
possible breaches of contract. Their computers and emails were searched for
evidence of preparations to take or the actual taking of proprietary information with
them to their new jobs. One former employee was caught with proprietary
information. He had emailed the proprietary files to himself at home.
It is interesting to note that in this case, although the established business was itself
a high-tech company, the information at risk here was the customer lists, pricing
sheets, vendor discounts, and structured margins. It is most noteworthy, of course,
that all of this information was acquired by hiring away Four’s employees who had
access to the information. In one underhanded move, Triple One was able to get
both the highly trained professional personnel it needed to compete in the global
marketplace and to acquire the invaluable inside information that would give it the
competitive edge. This particular case was successfully prosecuted under the
Industrial Espionage Act.

The advent of e-commerce and the low cost of setting up phony businesses on the World
Wide Web make consumers more vulnerable to fraudsters. Names, addresses, credit card
numbers and expiration dates are freely sent often without any guarantee that the
transmission is protected by one of the available secure line softwares. The Internet enables
scam artists to victimize consumers all over the world in simple and inexpensive ways.

An offshore World Wide Web site offering the sale of fictitious goods may attract U.S.
consumers who can shop at the site without incurring international phone charges, be
contacted through email messages, and may not even know that the merchant they are
dealing with is offshore.
The original purpose of the Internet was communication, specifically around the world and
between coasts at record speeds. This type of speed can be detrimental when the wrong
type of communication is sent, especially because we have not perfected the means to
instantly verify the communicated information or its true source.

Cyber-styled Stock Market Manipulation Case Study
Emulex, which is based in Costa Mesa, California, was the target of a stock
manipulation scheme. According to the indictment, a false press release was sent to
Internet Wire on August 24, 2000, for distribution. The bogus press release, which
purportedly was issued by Emulex, claimed that (1) Emulex was under
investigation by the SEC, (2) the company’s chief executive officer was resigning,
and (3) Emulex had revised its latest earnings report to show a loss instead of the
profit previously reported.
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The false press release was distributed by Internet Wire on the morning of August
25, and a number of news organizations—including CBS Market Watch,
Bloomberg, and CNBC—reported the story. As a result of the false press release and
its subsequent reportage, the stock price of Emulex plummeted from more than
$110 a share to approximately $43 a share in less than one hour. There was also a
significant increase in the trading volume of Emulex stock, most of which was done
by individual traders—many of whom experienced significant losses because they
sold their shares at prices significantly lower than the true value of the stock.

This type of fraudulent Internet activity is easily accomplished with today’s technology.
The impact of cyberfraud is growing as the number of household computers multiplies and
the availability of user-friendly, simpler software makes access to the Internet even easier.
Tied to this are the high-tech kids, preteens and teens, who no longer spend time outdoors
in physical activity, but rather amuse themselves with new challenges: invading companies
worldwide via the Internet.

Kids Will be Kids Case Study
In April 1999, Patrick W. Gregory was responsible for the transmission of a
computer program that allowed him to gain unauthorized access to a protected
computer owned by “1688.com.” Gregory stole banking information and passwords
and posted it all on the Internet, and he compromised the site’s users’ personal
email accounts.

Typically, Gregory and his coconspirators would replace the legitimate Web pages
of their victims’ sites with text and graphics relating to their organization, globalHell.
In some instances other coconspirators, who were members of total-kaOs and
globalHell would obtain complete and unauthorized control over a victim’s system,
known as “root level access.” Thereafter, total-kaOs and globalHell members would
intentionally crash and delete data on protected computer systems causing untold
damage to the victims’ networks. The damages were sometimes financial and
sometimes intangible, including the loss of faith in the victimized organizations and
loss of brand name impact as a result of the public defacements of their web sites.

The Internet provides a con artist with the unprecedented ability to reach millions of
potential victims without leaving the comforts of home, wherever in the world that might
be. As far back as December 1994 (almost a millennium in computer development time),
the Justice Department indicted two people for fraud on the Internet. Among other things,
they had placed advertisements on the Internet that promised the potential victims
“valuable goods upon payment of money.” But the defendants never had access to the
goods, and never intended to deliver them to their victims. Both pleaded guilty to wire
fraud.
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Telecommunications
Telecommunication companies can either be the target of a direct attack or taken over and
used by hackers to access targeted companies. Fraudsters can choose to weave their
communications through service providers in a number of different countries to hide their
tracks. As a result, crimes or abuses that seem to be local in nature might require
international assistance and cooperation.

The use of technology and high-tech devices to accomplish the fraudsters’ goals is also a
key concern of many industries. These devices are used to access either customer
information or proprietary company information. These powerful high technologies can
have powerful consequences.

Phone Phreak Case Study

By using stolen unauthorized access devices, such as telephone numbers, personal
identification numbers (PINs), and credit card numbers, Patrick W. Gregory
illegally accessed numerous teleconferences using the facilities of victims AT&T,
MCI, Sprint, Latitude Communications, and various other telecommunications
Gregory routinely accessed the teleconferences, which routinely lasted more than
six hours, with the aid of unauthorized access devices. This allowed him to steal free
telephone service in order to share and coordinate attacks on protected computers
throughout the world. Gregory also used the unauthorized access devices to listen
to or to disrupt teleconferences of legitimate third parties using the
telecommunications services of these victim companies. Specifically, in June 1998,
Gregory participated in an AT&T teleconference for which he and others caused
billing in excess of $4,200 to be charged to an innocent third party legitimately
using the conference services. In October 1998, Gregory, using stolen
teleconference access information from Latitude Communications, gained access to
Dallas Community College District’s teleconference system and caused
teleconference classes at the College to be disrupted. That break-in resulted in a
telephone charge in excess of $18,500 to be made to the College.

Spam isJunk Foodfor Computers Case Study

There are also the problems of internal attacks on a company’s computer
communication systems. A federal grand jury indicted Scott D. Dennis of
Anchorage, AK, on April 18, 2000, for allegedly interfering with a governmentowned communication system. The indictment states that Dennis, who was the
system administrator and computer security officer for the U. S. District Court for
the District of Alaska, initiated at least one of five attacks on Judsys, which is a mail
list server that runs on a computer owned and operated by the U. S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York.
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Dennis attacked the system through an email flood that impaired the availability of
the Judsys system to others. The system was overwhelmed with spam, that is,
inappropriate “junk” email. Specifically, Judsys subscribed to numerous other mail
list servers on the Internet. When the other mail list servers sent an acknowledging
email, Judsys was flooded with emails. The Judsys computer had to be shut down and
taken out of operation, reconfigured, and brought back on-line. An investigation
determined that the attacks came from computers traced to Dennis through the
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that were used.

Fraudsters use computers to position themselves in new kinds of consumer fraud that
would have never been previously possible. In one case, two hackers in Los Angeles
pleaded guilty to computer crimes committed to ensure they would win prizes given away
by local radio stations. When the stations announced that they would award prizes to a
particular caller, for example, the ninth caller, the hackers manipulated the local telephone
switching equipment to ensure that the winning call was their own. Their prizes included
two Porsche automobiles and $30,000 in cash. Both of the fraudsters received substantial
jail terms.
There are other cases in which the consumer is unknowingly used as a resource for
fraudulent telephone calls and other telecommunication scams. According to an FTC
complaint, people who visited certain pornographic Web sites were told they had to
download a special computer program. Unknown to them, the program secretly rerouted
their phone calls from their own local Internet provider to a phone number in Moldova, a
former Soviet republic, from which a charge of more than two dollars a minute could be
billed. According to the FTC, more than 800,000 minutes of calling time were billed to
unsuspecting U.S. customers.

Biotechnology
Biotechnology, a relatively new industry, is at the heart of the development of patents for
products derived from the growing knowledge of the human and other genomes. New
drugs for humans and animals as well as genetically engineered plants that resist insects, rot
and disease are coming from discoveries in this field. The competition for knowledge is
intense because of the billions to be earned from sales of these new products. As a result,
biotechnology is prone to industrial espionage and to the theft of specialized equipment
and computers.

Cloned DNA Does Equal Cloned Patents Case Study

In a recent fraud case involving biotechnology patents, the question was for
Promega to prove that it was Cetus’ intent to mislead the Patent and Trademark
Office through withholding material information in a patent application.
A polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is widely held as one of the most important
inventions in molecular biology in the last half of this century. PCR makes it
possible to take a small amount of DNA and make many copies of it. Forensic
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testing, rapid identification of infections, and faster gene manipulation (what once
took six months can be done in an afternoon) are all applications of PCR. The key
component of PCR is Taq polymerase, an enzyme that copies DNA.
In 1992 Hoffman-La Roche sued Promega for breach of license agreement
Maintaining that there were other applications of Taq polymerase and that end
users were responsible for ensuring that they were licensed to use Taq polymerase
for PCR, Promega denied the breach of contract claim and countered by
challenging the validity of the Taq patent. Promega claimed that the Cetus
inventors knew that they did not have a novel invention when they applied for the
U.S. patent for the use of Taq polymerase for PCR and knowingly withheld that
information.

The trial court decided in 1996 that it had clear and convincing evidence that Cetus
withheld material information from the Patent and Trademark Office in its patent
application. Thus, an attempt at fraud through omission failed. Remember, failure
to act can be as much a fraudulent act as actually performing a fraudulent act.

Defense and Aerospace
The end of the cold war did not reduce the need to upgrade weapons and equipment for
the military. In fact, military and defense needs moved forward with space exploration. Just
as in the movies and best-selling books, the development of weapons systems is now and
always has been the subject of criminal intent either through espionage or theft. Spies both
internal and external are constantly seeking access to secret information. Both military and
aerospace contractors often experience cost overruns that sometimes have involved
fraudulent overcharging. In general the frauds perpetrated in this area revolve around
vendor frauds (both with and without an internal confederate) such as bribery, kickbacks,
and false claims.

Conspiracy Where You Least Expect It Case Study
A joint investigation by the OIG, Defense Criminal Investigation Service (DCIS),
and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) resulted in an indictment of
a NASA contractor’s former buyer and the owner of a subcontractor company. The
indictment charged them with conspiracy, false claims, and kickbacks.

The investigation disclosed that the former buyer solicited and received kickbacks
from the subcontractor totaling $11,000. The subcontractor disguised some of the
kickbacks as “ghost” employees. The individuals conspired to inflate invoices billed
to the Government through a contract valued at $700,000.
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Robotics Contractor's Employee Fraud Case Study

A joint investigation by the OIG, FBI, and DCIS led to an indictment charging
three of a contractor’s employees with eleven counts of conspiracy to defraud the
United States and making false claims on contracts. Two of the three employees
were also charged with making false statements to a bank to obtain a line of credit.
Criminal Informations were filed against two other employees charging them with
conspiracy. At the heart of the fraud were false progress payment requests the
employees submitted on which they overstated the contract work performed

False Certification ofMicroelectronic Devices Case Study

A joint investigation of a NASA/Department of Defense (DOD) contractor by the
OIG and the DCIS resulted in an indictment against a contractor and five of its
employees for conspiracy, and making false statements and false claims. The
indictment alleged that the accused falsely certified that they had performed tests of
microelectronic devices in conformance with the Government contract
specifications. The fraudulent activity took place over a nine-year period. The
devices had application in a number of significant NASA and military programs,
including the Space Shuttle, F-14 aircraft, and submarines.
A separate indictment alleged that a Government quality assurance representative
falsely certified that he had witnessed the tests at the contractor site (the internal
cooperative fraudster).

High-Tech Crime Caught by Low-Tech Method Case Study
Fraud perpetrated through old-fashioned, low-tech methods, in this case mail fraud,
can show up in high-tech situations. For example, an investigation by the OIG, FBI,
DCIS, Department of Transportation (DOT), and AFOSI led to the indictment of a
fastener supplier and its owner. The indictment on fifteen counts of mail fraud
charged them with selling commercial grade fasteners to the Government, but
falsely certifying they met more stringent military specifications. The fasteners were
used on Space Shuttle applications, other NASA spacecraft, FAA radar systems,
and DOD radar and launch systems.

Trade Secrets Theft Case Study
An OIG investigation resulted in charges against two of a contractor’s former
employees at a NASA Center in connection with the theft of trade secrets. The
investigation confirmed that one of the former employees offered to sell what was
purported to be technical and cost proprietary data relating to a NASA
procurement competition. A defendant agreed to sell computer disks containing
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confidential material for $25,000. He claimed that the information pertained to a
pending NASA procurement program valued at approximately $30 million.

The DOD has 2.1 million computers on 10,000 LANs around the world and
requires a high level of proprietary encryption to protect itself. Without the
encryption facility, the whole DOD system would be open to compromise because
it runs over public circuits using commercial software and hardware. The threat to
the DOD system is mainly from international terrorists, criminals, or those wishing
to spread knowledge of weapons of mass destruction. The DOD has allocated more
than $500 million to develop a secure system. One of the most important aspects of
the new system has been controls on the export of encryption technology.

Other Leading Edge Scientific or Industrial Research and Development
Academic research as well as research in private labs at major manufacturers are also the
targets of theft and industrial espionage. Academic research presents a special case because
so much of it is done with publicly funded resources. The publication in academic journals
of falsified university-based and funded research to advance the careers of the researchers is
not unheard of.
In the private sector, research results are kept under wraps as much as possible because of
the huge amounts of money to be made from the development and marketing of products
designed with the proprietary information. Because many companies may be
simultaneously, but independently, carrying on similar research, the resulting patents,
trademarks, and copyrighted materials are frequently the subject of litigation. It is a
question of who won the race, and was it won legitimately or through fraud. The latter
reflects the loser’s mentality: we could only have lost if our competition cheated.

4.3 Key Preventative Controls
Internal controls are the most frequently cited method for reducing the risk of fraud and
detecting fraud. Encouraging employees to take an active role in reducing fraud also pays
dividends. Sometimes, fraud is discovered by accident. A survey, by Ernst & Young (Fraud,
the Unmanaged Risk : An International Survey of the Effects ofFraud on Business, May 1996),
suggested that as much as 60 percent of reported frauds, . . were discovered by chance,
i.e., by outside information, anonymous external tip-off, internal whistle-blower, accident
or change of management.”
Tip-offs from internal or external sources are an important source of fraud detection. Many
businesses have installed ‘hotlines’ or ‘helplines’ to enable staff and outsiders to voice their
concerns about behavior that may indicate the presence of fraud. These lines may be
manned or unmanned (that is, linked to an answering machine). The advantage of a
manned line is that it provides a live contact from whom the whistle-blowing staff member
can seek advice on fraud risks, the internal controls, and how to proceed.

Make sure you know your employees. Verifying backgrounds, references, and past
employment history is key to a company’s reducing internal exposure to fraud. This is
especially true for high tech departments in which easy access to important, proprietary
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information is part of the normal work activities. Employees are not always who they
appear to be. Recent studies suggest that many dotcom executives have suspicious, if not
totally suspect, backgrounds.
Some environments are generally more vulnerable to fraud. Consider the following, for
example:

• Management does not perceive fraud to be a risk or management has made no effort to
assess its fraud risk exposure
• Management ignores irregularities; takes the ostrich “head-in-the-sand” approach
• Management has failed to clearly communicate to its staff the types of behavior that are
not acceptable

• For one reason or another, management has failed to keep staff morale at an acceptably
high level
• Management’s actions have induced high staff turnover
• Management failed to provide adequate staff training for the systems and procedures its
personnel operates
Fraudsters frequently use a number of techniques to conceal evidence of their crimes.
There are, however, certain signs that generally indicate the presence of fraud. For
example, consider the following telltale signs.

• Staff who take no holidays or who regularly work alone after normal hours or on
weekends

• Employees whose lifestyles appear to exceed their salaries
• Staff who won’t delegate certain tasks, keep their work to themselves, and discourage
others from learning about their jobs’ responsibilities
• Staff who resent being questioned about their work or who answer evasively when
questioned about their work
• Staff who always have plausible excuses—always a little too smooth—for errors
• Staff who insist on dealing personally with certain suppliers or particular transactions
This is not an exhaustive list but a reminder that line managers should be alert to behavior
that, in isolation or in conjunction with other possible warning signs, may suggest the
concealment of irregular activities.

Many organizations use the format of a fraud policy statement to communicate the
organization’s attitude and approach to the threat of fraud. These statements may include
some or all of the following points.
• Assigning responsibilities for the overall management of fraud; that is, establishing the
necessary controls, monitoring the operation of the controls, and handling the
discovered fraud
• The formal procedures that staff should follow when a fraud is discovered
• Providing the necessary staff training for reducing the opportunities for fraud and
increasing the possibility of detecting fraud
• Creating of awareness among the staff that response plans exist, and will be
implemented, to deal with and minimize the damage caused by any fraudulent attack
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Organizing the fraud reduction and discovery teams involves assigning responsibility to
individuals or groups so that they work together as a team to achieve the desired objectives
in the most efficient manner. Major principles in establishing the organizational structure to
combat fraud are:

• Clearly defining the responsibilities of individuals for resources, activities, objectives,
and targets. For example, establishing levels of authority as a preventive measure, such
as setting dollar limits on the payments that can be authorized by an individual without
a second signature. To be effective, periodic audits should be made to ensure that
transactions have been properly authorized
• Establishing clear reporting lines that embody the most effective chain of command to
allow adequate supervision
• Separating duties to reduce opportunities for fraud. This is also largely a preventive
measure that ensures that all the key functions and controls over a process are not
carried out by the same individual; for example, purchasing goods should be kept
separate from the receiving function; similarly the acknowledgement of the receipt of
goods should be separated from the authority to pay invoices
• And, as a general rule, avoiding placing too many functions in any one individual’s
hands, regardless of how responsible that employee may appear to be

Suggested Controls for Contract Frauds in the Aerospace and Defense
Industries
The following will help to ensure that proper contract tendering procedures will not fail
because of collusion or cozy relationships between staff and contractors.

• An approved list of suppliers should be considered. This list should be regularly
updated with any amendments appropriately authorized.
• Clear and unambiguous tendering procedures should be established. Adherence to
these procedures should be closely monitored.
• The bidders should deliver tenders directly to those responsible for selection without
passing through intervening hands not involved in the bidding process.
• Late tenders should not be accepted.
• Staff should be required to declare any personal interests or possible conflict of interests
they may have that could affect the tendering process.
The following will help to assure that payments are only made for work actually
performed.

• To prevent collusion between a contractor and an employee, invoices should only be
paid when accompanied by an independent certification that the contracted work has
been satisfactorily completed.
• The purchaser of services should maintain a register of contracts in progress.
• The only contracts that can be added to the contract register must be properly approved
and authorized according to established protocols.
• All contract changes in the original contract terms should be documented, change
orders should be sequentially numbered, with the documentation prepared in an agreed
format and authorized before payment.
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• Prior to approval of a payment, the payment should be reconciled with the budget by
someone other than the person requesting the payment be made. Further, the payment
should be within the parameters of the planned expenditures.

Suggested Controls for Computer Hardware and Other Valuable Assets
The following describes some of the controls that should be in place to reduce the threat of
fraud or other irregularities associated with a company’s procurement and proper use of
computer hardware and other valuable assets within departments.
• An up-to-date asset register should be maintained with the assets assigned to individual
budget centers.
• The assets should be adequately described and identified on the asset register.

• When possible, the assets should be marked for identification.
• Controls should be established to assure the physical security of the assets.
• Spot checks should be regularly carried out to ensure the existence of the listed assets
where they are supposed to be.
• Details of proposed sales, reason for the sales, expected prices to be received, the date of
the sales, and expected results should be reviewed and approved prior to the sales.
There should be a follow-up after the sale to review the results including confirming that
the expected price was in fact received and that the funds received were promptly
deposited in the appropriate account.

Risks Associated with Sensitive Documentation
The following describes some of the controls that should be in place to reduce the threat of
fraud or other irregularities that could arise from improper access to sensitive information
or misuse of information for private gain.

• Controls should be established to protect third party’s information held on company
computers, and steps should be taken to assure compliance with the requirements of the
Data Protection Act; further, staff should be informed of the rules.
• Official documentation should be held in a secure environment.
• Vetting of staff should be at an appropriate level, which should relate to the nature of
the post held.
• Access to computer records should be entered into a log and spot checks should be
made to confirm that there were independently verified valid reasons for any unusual
accesses.
4.4 Checklist and Grids

A fraud risk management checklist specific to the high-technology sector follows, along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.

(Text continued on page 23)
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High Technology Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the high
technology sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion of computer
chips (related controls include physical access restrictions
and surveillance, periodic and surprise counts, job
descriptions and segregation of duties, supervision, and
good corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like, (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit function)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies particularly at the hiring stage)

• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by or against the organization, including
patent infringement, antitrust violations, and organizational
bribe giving (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement and supervision],
strong internal audit functions, and periodic outside audits)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the high technology
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
(continued)
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High Technology Sector Checklist (continued)
High Technology Sector Checklist

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, strong internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

24

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

Fraud Vulnerability Grid
High Technology Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Interned Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (for example, front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers, or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (theft or diversion of computer chips)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (for example, inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud

X

Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading and antitrust violations

X

Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving

X
X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—High Technology Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
High Technology Sector

High

Avg

Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud
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X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft.)

X

Low
or NA
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5 Manufacturing

5 . 1 Introduction
The manufacturing sector contains numerous varieties of businesses. A few of the major
segments include:

• Auto and auto parts manufacturing

• Clothing and textile industries
• Production of other consumer goods (ranging from durable goods, such as televisions,
washing machines, and furniture to everyday items such as soap and garbage bags)
• Food processing and packaging

This sector is fairly average in its overall susceptibility to fraud.

5.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:

• Employee frauds, typically involving inventory, accounts payable, or payroll. These
frauds are sometimes carried out in collusion with outsiders.
• Supplier frauds such as overbilling or materials substitution.
• Some forms of commercial crime, such as environmental crime, or violation of
occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws, or both.

5.3 Key Preventive Controls
The manufacturing sector is fairly average across the board in terms of the importance of
specific controls.

The best defense against the potential for inventory, accounts payable, and payroll frauds is
a good segregation of duties and regular accounting reconciliations. Included in the latter
should be periodic inventory counts for comparison with the perpetual records. Consistent
unexplained shortages in raw materials, for example, may indicate the presence of fraud.

5.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the manufacturing sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Manufacturing Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
manufacturing sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, periodic external
audits [especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime and violating occupational health and
safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement],
supervision, and strong internal audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the manufacturing
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions, [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Manufacturing Sector Checklist (continued)
Manufacturing Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
etc. (related controls include good corporate policies
[especially strong enforcement, and strong internal audit
functions])

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Manufacturing Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

X

False advertising
Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X
X

Organizational bribe giving
X

Tax evasion

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
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Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Manufacturing Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Manufacturing Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable, and inventory)

X

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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6 Media and Communications

6.1 Introduction
The media and communications sector includes:
• Book publishing
• Print and broadcast media
• Music and motion picture industries
• Telephone, cable, and satellite industries

Although certain parts of this sector are in decline (for example, newspaper and fiction
book publishing), for the most part the sector has been characterized by very high growth,
especially over the last two decades. As is the case with the high technology sector, the
growth and the glamorous nature of some parts of the media and communications sector
contribute to the risk of fraud.

6.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Frauds by officers or directors, such as fraudulent financial reporting, manipulation of
share prices, insider trading, and antitrust violations.

• Frauds by customers. Some parts of this sector—for example, telephone and cable
companies-are vulnerable to equipment theft by customers.
• Con artists, who may approach this sector with schemes requiring the payment of
advances or up front seed money, but then disappear or never deliver on their end of the
contract.
• Copyright and patent infringement, which can be a problem for some parts of this
sector-for example, unauthorized decoder boxes in the cable industry.
• Violation of privacy. The nature of the sector can sometimes make this a problem,
although violations have to be weighed against other rights, such as freedom of the
press.

6.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the media and communications sector
include:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong enforcement—for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt
with for any antitrust violations (by both the company and society generally), and
prosecuting copyright and patent infringers to the fullest extent of the law.
• Physical access controls, such as credit screening of customers before allowing them to
walk off with leased company equipment.
• Good computer security, to protect against fraud and avoid breaches of confidentiality,
or the misuse of information, or both.
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• A strong internal audit function and periodic external audits. This should include
periodic direct confirmation of customer statement information.

6.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the media and communications sector follows
along with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in
that sector.
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Media and Communications Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the media and
communications sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Management fraud, such as making false financial
statements, inflating income, manipulating share prices,
insider trading, and the like (controls include good
corporate policies such as strong enforcement, and internal
audit functions)
• Customer and outsider frauds, such as theft of equipment,
copyright and patent infringement, con schemes, (related
controls include good corporate policies, supervision, and
enforcement)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including violation
of privacy (related controls include good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement and supervision])
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the media and
communications sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
division of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
(continued)
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Media and Communications Sector Checklist (continued)
Media and Communications Sector Checklist

• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Media and Communications Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X
X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like
Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X
X

Employee sabotage or espionage
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading and antitrust violations

X
X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

X

Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Media and Communications Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Media and Communications Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (fair compensation, counseling, and the like)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (locks, alarms, security), and the like

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X
X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (physical access, passwords, and the like)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (antivirus, full documentation, and the like)

X

Programmer controls (supervision, antisabotage, and the like)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

38

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (fidelity, fire, liability, theft, and the like)

X

Low
or NA
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7 Nonprofit
7.1 Introduction
The nonprofit sector, for purposes of this section, consists primarily of charitable and
benevolent organizations. It excludes operations set out under the government sector
heading in section 3.
Except for cash theft and skimming, this sector is generally less prone to fraud from either
within or outside the organization. However, there are a number of commercial crime risks.

7.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:

• Employee or volunteer frauds, typically involving the theft or skimming of cash.
• Commercial crime involving such things as breach of trust (that is, cash theft or
skimming at the organizational level), con schemes in which funds received are not used
for the advertised purposes, and tax evasion by phony charities. Since this sector collects
large volumes of information in the form of mailing lists and other data about
contributors, there is also the potential for abuse of this information, invasion of privacy,
and so on.

7.3 Key Preventive Controls
Three key fraud prevention controls in the nonprofit sector are:

1. Strong enforcement, that is ensuring that employees are severely dealt with for any
breach of the law. This is important to send a deterrent message as well as to maintain
public faith and support in the organization.
2. Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, especially with respect to segregation and
duplication of duties. For example, the opening of mail should be carefully controlled
because it may contain cash. An appropriate system might be for two people to open
mail, one of whom records cash receipts in a log for later balancing against deposit slips,
charitable receipts issued, and so on.
3. Follow-up of contributor complaints (for example, no receipt received).

7.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the nonprofit sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Nonprofit Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the nonprofit
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, false advertising, tax evasion, and violation of privacy
(related controls include good corporate policies [especially
strict enforcement and supervision], and strong internal
audit functions)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the nonprofit sector,
and related controls, as also set out on the attached grids, been
adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal and external
audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Nonprofit Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (lapping, phony customers or credits, and the like)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X
X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and so on

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising (perpetration of con schemes)

X
X

Insider trading
Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion (illegitimate charities)

X
X

Violating occupational health and (OSHA) safety laws

Violation of privacy

X

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)

41

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Nonprofit Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Nonprofit Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
X

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, contributor complaints)
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X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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8 Professional Services

8.1 Introduction
The professional services sector includes:
• Accountants

• Architects and engineers

• Doctors, dentists, and other medical professionals
• Lawyers

The distinguishing characteristics of this sector are: (1) the form of the businesspartnership, professional corporation, limited liability company or-sole practitioner; and (2)
the professional-client relationship, as well as an element of public trust.
Because the management of the business is also generally in the hands of the ownership,
there is more at stake here in terms of fraud losses. Every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar out
of the professional’s pocket, and not merely a management embarrassment.

8.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Frauds involving accounts receivable, for example, accounts receivable lapping
schemes. Also, in partnership situations, some partners may commit fraud by
undertaking work directly, or billing clients directly, or both, rather than for the benefit
of the partnership as required in the partnership agreement.

• Inflated expense reports.
• Breach of trust such as theft of client funds.

8.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the professional services sector include:

• A strong code of ethics.
• Good basic controls such as (1) job descriptions, such as appropriate segregation of
duties, (2) mandatory annual vacations, (3) regular accounting reconciliations, and (4) no
management override of basic controls.
• Good computer controls especially in the area of access restrictions and disaster
recovery contingencies. This is important not only to ensure smooth operations, but also
to avoid breaches of confidentiality, or the misuse of information, or both.
• An awareness of the possibility of fraud, something that is absent among many
nonaccounting professionals. Doctors and lawyers, for example, are often unaware of
the issue because they are too preoccupied with the practice of their own profession.
Adequate insurance is also important, but more from a liability standpoint than in the areas
of theft or fidelity.
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8.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the professional services sector follows along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.
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Professional Services Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
professional services sector, and related controls, as also set
out on the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts receivable lapping (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, mandatory annual
vacations, regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of
exceptions [for example, relating to patient or client
complaints or confirmation discrepancies], and good
management policies [especially strict enforcement])

• Inflated expense report fraud (related controls include
internal audit and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust and money laundering (related controls include good
management policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit function and periodic
external audits
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the professional
services sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good management policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good management policies and
supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Professional Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, personal billings)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and so on

X

Manipulation of financial statements by the owning professionals

X

Manipulation of valuation of ownership interest by the owning
professionals

X
X

Employee sabotage or espionage

External Frauds:
Client or patient theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
False advertising

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy
Professional Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics
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Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

_____________ ............

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Professional Services Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Professional Services Sector

High

Avg

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Senior professionals acting as a good role models

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X
X

Patient or client account statements, or confirmations, or both

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Professionals’ awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Senior professional’s follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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9 RealEstate

9.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section, the real estate sector includes principals or agents conducting
the following kinds of operations:

• Buying and selling of commercial and residential real estate (land and buildings)
• Leasing or rental of commercial and residential real estate (land and buildings)

9.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Three key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
1. Employee frauds involving cash, accounts receivable, or the acceptance of secret
commissions.
2. Con schemes involving inflated real estate values, for example flipping a property
several times in nonarm’s-length transactions-each time increasing the price-in order to
ultimately induce an arm’s-length third-party to pay a fraudulently inflated price. A
variation of this is when the fraudulently inflated price is used to obtain an inflated
mortgage or loan on the property.
3. False advertising or representation concerning the property being sold, leased, or rented.

9.3 Key Preventive Controls
This sector is quite average in terms of the importance of specific controls.

Some of the best defenses against fraud in this sector include:
• Strong enforcement, (for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt
with for any violations of law or the company’s policies).
• Adequate segregation of duties (for example, between cash handling and record
keeping).
• Good supervisory and audit-investigative controls (for example independent checks to
ensure that purported real estate values make sense).

9.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the real estate sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Real Estate Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the real estate
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Outsider frauds, such as con schemes (related controls
include good corporate policies and supervision)
• False advertising and representation, (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision], and strong internal audit
functions and periodic external audits
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the real estate
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, and the like (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strong enforcement], and
strong internal audit functions)
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Real Estate Sector Checklist (continued)
Real Estate Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, environmental crime, money laundering, tax evasion,
and violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
(related controls include good corporate policies [especially
strict enforcement and supervision], and strong internal
audit functions
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Real Estate Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising or representation

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy
Corporate Policies:

X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Real Estate Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Real Estate Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X
X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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10 Recreation

10.1 Introduction
The recreation sector includes operations such as:
• Amusement parks

• Movie theaters
• Professional sports clubs
• Golf, tennis, and similar sport or recreation clubs

10.2 Key Vulnerabilities
With one major exception, this sector actually has a relatively low vulnerability to fraud.
Unfortunately, the exception involves a very important asset: cash. However, controls over
cash tend to be well developed in most of these businesses, so that in practice the main risk
is outright theft of cash rather than fraud.

Because of the seasonal and part-time nature of much of the employment in this sector, the
opportunity for payroll-related fraud may also be slightly higher.

10.3 Key Preventive Controls
The key fraud prevention control in this sector is good cash control. This includes good
physical controls (for example, cash register-ticket dispensing systems with accompanying
counters, all of which provide an audit trail), segregation of duties for cash handling and
record-keeping, and accounting reconciliations.
Other important controls are: (1) a termination-prosecution policy for the commission of
fraud or theft, and (2) a good internal audit function.

10.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the recreation sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Recreation Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the recreation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft and cash
skimming (related controls include admission counters,
physical controls and surveillance, supervision, and good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Payroll fraud [for example, ghost employees], (related
controls include strong internal audit and supervision)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the recreation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable fraud, such as phony suppliers (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
internal audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, violating occupational health and safety
(OSHA) laws, and violation of privacy (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision], and strong internal audit
function and periodic external audits
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Recreation Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X
X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving
X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Recreation Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Recreation Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X
X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls
Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)
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X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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11

Natural Resources

11.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section the natural resource sector primarily includes entities
conducting mining, and oil and gas operations.

11.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector are:
• Inventory, accounts payable, payroll, and expense report frauds. Because of the largeproject nature of the resource sector, companies can be particularly vulnerable to these
types of frauds.
• Frauds-by senior managers, officers, or directors-such as bid rigging, kickbacks, or
secret commissions; fraudulent financial reporting, stock touting and manipulation of
share prices; insider trading and antitrust violations; or organizational bribe giving as
part of the contract bidding process. Just as in the high technology sector, many stockrelated frauds involve mining companies.
• Supplier frauds involving inflated prices, product substitution, or substandard materials.
• Commercial crime in the areas of environmental crime and the violation of occupational
health and safety (OSHA) laws.

11.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the more important controls in the resource sector include:

• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong physical controls, particularly with respect to the company’s precious inventory.
• Supervisor awareness of fraud and the possibility of fraud.
• A strong internal audit function, and periodic external audits.

11.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the natural resources sector follows, along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.
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Natural Resources Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the natural
resources sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies particularly at the hiring stage)
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)

• Environmental crime, and violating occupational health
and safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit functions)
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Natural Resources Sector Checklist (continued)
Natural Resources Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the natural
resources sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and accounts receivable lapping frauds (related
controls include job descriptions, division of duties, annual
vacations, regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of
exceptions, [for example, relating to customer complaints
or confirmation discrepancies], and good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
division of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Natural Resources Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

X

False advertising
Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy
Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

62

X

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Natural Resources Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Natural Resources Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (especially inventory)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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12 Retail

12.1 Introduction
The retail sector is one of the largest and its diversity precludes a comprehensive list of its
elements. Any operation that caters to the consumer, from department stores to specialty
retail stores (clothing, hardware, and so on), fits this category.
Outright theft rather than fraud is the key threat to the retail sector. Just as the insurance
sector is very conscious of the cost of fraud to its industry, the retail sector is very conscious
of the cost of theft. Both industries regularly research and publish estimates of the extent of
fraud and theft in their industries, which is substantial.

12.2 Key Vulnerabilities
As noted, the key vulnerability in this sector stems not so much from fraud as it does from
theft by the industry’s employees and its customers, perhaps in equal measure although
shoplifting by customers receives by far the greatest amount of publicity.
Major fraud risks can involve cash, accounts receivable, and inventory, because all of these
are important to the industry. Outright theft of cash and especially inventory-by both
customers and employees—receives the largest amount of attention, and it is undeniably the
biggest in terms of losses. However, the fraud risks in other areas should not be ignored.

The heavily computerized nature of the industry, even among smaller retailers, means that
the opportunity to use computers in fraud is also increased.
On the commercial crime side, false advertising is a major problem in the industry, even
among some large retailers who have been charged and convicted of it. Tax evasion can
also be a problem, but mainly among smaller retailers who make cash-only deals to avoid
sales and excise taxes.

12.3 Key Preventive Controls
Among retailers of any significant size—for Mom and Pop stores, see section 13, Small
Business-virtually all the basic and computer controls are critical. Obviously, good physical
security—especially control over cash and inventory—are the most important. These controls
range from good point of sale and cash register systems that provide a proper audit trail, to
security surveillance systems that dissuade thieves.
Other important controls are: (1) a termination-prosecution policy for the commission of
fraud or theft, (2) supervisory follow-up on all customer complaints, and (3) a good internal
audit function.

12.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the retail sector follows, along with related
grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Retail Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the retail
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies especially strict
enforcement)
• Inventory fraud, such as customer or employee theft or
diversion (related controls include physical access
restrictions and surveillance, periodic and surprise counts,
job descriptions and segregation of duties, supervision, and
good corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

• False advertising and tax evasion (related controls include
good corporate policies, strict enforcement, and internal
audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the retail sector, and
related controls, as also set out on the attached grids, been
adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
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Retail Sector Checklist (continued)
Retail Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, and the like (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strong enforcement], and
strong internal audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Retail Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions (to buyers)

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

Use of Computers in Fraud

X
X

Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X
X

Organizational bribe giving

Tax evasion

X

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—retail sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Retail Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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13

Small Business
13.1 Introduction
The small business sector is made up of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and certain
classes of corporations. Because of its size, there is often a sense of family and belonging
that sets the small business apart from any other kind of enterprise. Income and losses pass
through to the individual for tax purposes in a sole proprietorship or partnership or to the
shareholder in a Sub-S corporation. A Sub-S has a maximum of 35 shareholders, only one
class of stock, no non-resident shareholders and the shareholders must elect to be registered
as such. Another form of organization is that of a “regular” or Sub-C corporation.
Most businesses in America are small businesses. Some are incorporated as Sub-S and SubC companies, but most are sole proprietorships or partnerships. In 1998, of the 23.6 million
business income tax returns filed with the federal government, 72.7 percent were filed by
sole proprietorships and 7.4 percent from partnerships while only 19.9 percent were from
corporations of all sizes. Of the $18.6 trillion in business tax receipts taken in by the
government, however, only $870 billion or 4.7 percent were paid by sole proprietorships
and $1.1 trillion or 6.1 percent by partnerships compared with $16.6 trillion or 89.2
percent by corporations of all classes.
Of those 23.6 million businesses filing tax returns in 1998, 18.1 million or 76.5 percent had
no employees other than the partners or sole proprietor. Of the 5.5 million companies with
employees, 4.5 million or 80.5 percent had revenues of less than $1 million and 791,000
firms or 14.3 percent had revenues between $1 million and $5 million. To get some sense
of scale, it is only necessary to point out that the 4.8 percent of companies with revenues
between $5 million and $100 million accounted for 23.9 percent of all employees and 22.2
percent of total tax receipts while the 0.4 percent of companies with revenues above $100
million accounted for 42.7 percent of all employees and 62.5 percent of all business tax
receipts!

The picture of the American business landscape presented by these statistics is one of
millions of persons working alone or with a few partners or employees and producing a
low level of revenues. The typical small business is started by a sole proprietor
entrepreneur running a business off the kitchen table. A great idea, a little money to get a
PC, an Internet connection, a list of prospective clients, and a small business is established.
If the business catches on, it is soon moved to a small office or plant. The dot-com success
stories of the 1990s are classic examples of this process before these upstart companies were
co-opted by the venture capitalists during the heady days of the stock market boom.
Though usually controlled by only one or a few individuals, small businesses are very
much a part of the mainstream. They might have multiple locations, conduct business with
other countries, or even operate overseas for that matter. What is certain is that the risk of
fraud arrives the moment the first non-owner employee is hired. The risk arises if this
person becomes jealous of the owner, is greedy, or simply yearns for a higher standard of
living than the business can afford to provide for him or her.

Unfortunately, even the smallest business can have big problems with fraud. The effects of
fraud on a small business can be devastating since the owner or partners will probably have
most of their life savings invested along with all their energies and hopes. The small
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businessperson runs the risk of losing everything to a slick fraudster. In contrast to the hard
work and total commitment of the sole proprietor or the partners, the fraudster has little at
risk. The tragedy is that it is all too easy for fraudsters to set themselves up in a position of
trust, work the fraud, and abscond with thousands of dollars, if not more, before getting
caught, if indeed they are caught. Every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar out of the small
businessperson’s pocket.

13.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The small business is just as vulnerable to fraud from its own employees as any large
corporation since experience shows that most fraud is committed by employees. This is not
to say, of course, that partners never defraud each other.

The typical small-business fraudster tends to be a trusted employee, often very closely
connected with the owner of the enterprise because of the inevitably intimate relationships
that are in the nature of small business. Since the amount of funds at risk for any one
transaction is usually not large, careful fraudsters can often carry on their schemes
undetected for years. Nevertheless, while the dollar amounts may be small in each
transaction, over time, this constant erosion can create a very large and devastating loss for
a small business. The cumulative loss may even be big enough to cause the small business
to go under.
The small businessperson is primarily vulnerable to employee fraud in the following ways:
• Cash thefts. The unique nature of the small business allows employees to gain access to
cash deposits from sales, have control over bank statements and reconciliations, as well
as write and record checks to vendors and other employees for payroll and business
expenses. The establishment of a close personal relationship with the owner-operator
allows the fraudster to conceal small amounts of fraud over long periods either through
“skimming” or “kiting.” By the time these thefts are detected, small amounts have often
become sizeable sums. The theft is usually well concealed until the departure of the
offending employee.
• Accounts Receivable. As in the case of cash thefts, the employee has total control over the
billing and receipt collection. To compensate for the usual lower salary paid in the small
business sector, the employee might convince him- or herself that he or she is entitled to
“a little extra.” These fraudsters tell themselves they work hard, put in overtime, talk to
cranky customers but do not get to go golfing during business hours or drive a luxury
car as the owner does. By instituting a lapping scheme, they can hide the fraud over an
extended period. This usually necessitates the keeping of a second set of books by the
employee to control and keep track of the amounts and customers lapped. Once again,
the fraud can go undetected for months or even years before a customer might question
the amounts outstanding on a statement received and talk to someone other than the
employee controlling the customer records.
• Proprietary intellectual property. The financial assets in a small business may not be the
only important assets targeted by fraudsters. Proprietary intellectual property is often
the very foundation of the entire business. Assets such as patents, licenses, product
specifications, and confidential reports both internally generated and from consultants
are just as vulnerable to the fraudster as money and perhaps even more worth stealing.
From the fraudster’s point of view, intellectual property is an ideal object of desire since
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it can be stolen by electronic copying yet left in place. It’s gone but it’s not gone;
nothing will be missing. The small business owner will not even know he or she has
been robbed. The entire business is under a new and as yet unknown competitive threat
from that moment on.
• Inventory and supplies. The small business is often thought of as a “family” business
regardless of its size. The employees notice the owner-operator taking inventory and
supplies, or both, for personal use. Having that sense of belonging and being one of the
family, employees might feel that it is okay to take a few things home for their own
personal use since, after all, “the boss does it!” The employee then starts to think that it
is also within the bounds of the company’s tolerance or permissiveness for their friends
to get some free merchandise or supplies. Soon the problem of pilferage or shrinkage
has mushroomed to the point where it is pervasive, abusive and often destructive.
A sector-by-sector review follows. In our discussion, we will no doubt cross over into areas
of concern for business of all sizes but our focus will be the owner-operated, nonpublic
enterprise. Note that any one of the above frauds can occur in any one of the sectors.

For our purposes, we will focus on the possible frauds in the following business sectors:
1. Service
2. Hospitality
3. Retail

4. Wholesale
5. Manufacturing

Service
Many small businesses fall under this sector. It might include doctors, dentists,
chiropractors, consultants, lawyers, accountants, and other self-employed persons (such as
the nation’s 650,000 real estate agents, 500,000 nannies, and 1.1 million persons employed
in their own direct-sales businesses).

A Steady Diet OfSkim Cash Case Study

When a new physicians medical group was formed, an office manager was hired to
run the business. This woman was married with two teen-aged children. Her
husband had a well-paid position in a successful dot-com company and the family
enjoyed a comfortable, middle-class lifestyle. The office manager held her position
for two years before the family experienced hard times. Unfortunately, her spouse
lost his position in the economic downturn that affected many dot-com companies
just at the time the children were getting ready to attend college. The loss of the
husband’s paycheck meant there was no longer enough money coming into the
household to pay all the bills. The office manager and her husband had always
appeared to the community to be prosperous and respectable and, therefore, did
not want to admit to friends or neighbors that they were in trouble.
One day during this period, a patient came into the office and paid her copayment
in cash. The office manager put the cash aside to handle other matters and
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neglected to record the receipt. Since it was a particularly busy day, this happened
several times. Tempted by the thought, she put the small amounts of cash (a few
hundred dollars) in her purse and went home. Fearing any reprisal and ready to
return the money on discovery, she kept those amounts separated in her purse for
several days. When, a week later, she had not been questioned and the theft had
apparently gone unnoticed, the office manager felt safe doing the same thing again.
By now the seed of a plan had germinated and taken root in her mind. As taking
the money seemed easy and no questions were ever asked, the office manager
began to take the copayment cash two or three days a week every week. This
practice continued for a period of five years until all her children were through
college and the household personal debts had been cleared up.
As the volume of patients and the stream of fees were growing steadily larger
during this period, the accountant, who only prepared quarterly statements and the
annual tax return, failed to notice any problems on the daily collection sheets. One
day, however, as the practitioners were preparing to sell their business to a medical
management firm, due diligence was performed on the fees records. After a review
of the daily collection sheets, the office manager was questioned about the way she
made the cash deposits. She explained that she would hold cash and only make
deposits of cash on certain days. As the questions started getting tougher, the office
manager began running out of explanations. One afternoon, she left the office and
never returned! It was later discovered that she has skimmed more than $250,000
over the five-year period.

The freedom to carry out the multiple functions of taking in, recording, and
depositing the cash-fee payments without supervision proved to be too much
temptation for the office manager. There was also a failure of the doctors and the
accountant to check the record of patient visits against the record of patient co
payments and bank deposits.

Hospitality
Large numbers of entrepreneurs enter the hospitality field because it offers many
opportunities, not the least of which is a steady flow of income with very little overhead. In
addition, it offers rewards even under absentee ownership. One can generate a good
income stream from an 80 to 150-room motel with a good location off an Interstate or at a
major highway intersection. The key to profitability is to have sufficient controls in place
and to hire trustworthy individuals. Unfortunately, this is typically a very low-paying
industry and seems to attract people who easily give in to the temptation of getting easy
money by illegal means.

The City Ledger That Flew the Kite Case Study
The day manager at a motel worked the shift from 7 A.M. to 3 P.M.. Her duties were
to collect the overnight room rentals as the occupants checked out. Unfortunately,
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her other duties involved posting those receipts to the corresponding receivables
ledger and income reports.
This motel sat at the crossroads of two major rural state highways and was a
popular truck stop because of its convenient location. It was only minutes from
major manufacturing facilities that were visited regularly by long-haul truckers and
equipment sales people. Because many companies had a steady stream of drivers
and salespersons staying at the motel, corporate billing accounts were set up to
permit direct billing of the companies and thus the elimination of travel-expense
fraud.
The day manager set up a scheme whereby she altered the occupancy reports for
the night, endorsed checks received on billings over to herself, and cashed them at
banks in the local small town where she knew the employees and then lapped the
accounts of one company with the checks of another. This scheme went on for two
years until one day the owner reviewed the accounts and saw large balances
outstanding for certain customers. He called them. They disputed the amounts
claimed to be owed and provided proof of payment.

Retail
A retail enterprise offers many opportunities for the small businessperson. The forms of
business available offer the entrepreneur many rewards for hard work and long hours if the
right location and market are provided. This business usually abounds in cash, plentiful
inventory items, and voluminous transactions.
The franchise is a common form for this type of business. Franchises are usually operated
by managers who might be well versed in sales generation but inexperienced in the control
function. However, if the business is a sole proprietorship, the owner is typically precluded
from working the long hours necessary to make the business a success. A night or off-hours
manager is employed to cover the owner’s “family time.” Therefore, when the person who
owns all of the business can only be on the job for part of the time, opportunities abound
for the fraudster.

Bringing Home the Greenbacks Case Study
A family-owned furniture retailer operated at many locations under the name of a
well-known national manufacturer. The bookkeeper for the family’s group of stores
had risen through the company from her first job as accounts payable clerk.

As the business expanded, money got tighter and the owner looked at different
ways to cut costs. CPAs from an outside accounting firm did all the “write-up” work
and bank reconciliations for a monthly fee. The owner also engaged the same firm
to do the annual audit, and asked them to install the write-up software so his clerk
could prepare the monthly statements in the old familiar format.
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The owner advanced the accounts playable clerk and gave her the responsibility of
transferring the entries and data from the existing integrated system (inventory
payables, and so on) to the write-up system to generate the monthly financial
statements. The accountants’ role was thus reduced to reviewing the monthly bank
reconciliations and recording adjustments in order to produce a monthly financial
statement for the owner.
The owner was, however, not aware that the newly promoted bookkeeper now had
to transfer all entries from one system to the other on a monthly basis. More
important, he did not realize that not only was there now the possibility of errors in
doing the manual entries, but also the potential for fraud.

Once the bookkeeper settled into her job, she quickly realized she could siphon off
funds by writing checks either to herself or to customers for refunds on one system
and then not recording these refunds on the “new” system that would contain the
data used to produce the company’s financial reports. She was able to falsify the
bank reconciliations sufficiently over a five-year period to deceive the auditors by
explaining discrepancies as deposits in transit, refund checks to customers, and so
on. The auditors even deceived themselves by arguing that the level of refunds was
in line with sales growth.
Finally, after five years, the auditors started to ask pointed questions about certain
figures and adjustments. When she was unable to give satisfactory answers to these
questions, the bookkeeper denied all but a small amount of theft. It was ultimately
discovered that the bookkeeper had a gambling problem that took her almost every
weekend from Central Alabama to the casinos in Biloxi, Mississippi, where she
usually lost heavily. She lost so heavily, in fact, that she could only keep her
standing at the casinos by absconding with more than $500,000 from her employer
by way of countersigned customer refund checks and falsified expense checks made
out to herself.

Wholesale
The wholesale business typically involves warehousing many items of inventory for
different customers at various locations. Laborers on the loading docks are often
immigrants speaking little or no English and working at or only slightly above minimum
wage. These poorly paid workers often talk with and get to know the truckers who might
be independents or work for some of the large retailers. Because the language barrier
separates the loading-dock workers from the surrounding English-speaking world, laborers
often form a closed society within the warehouse. This social isolation and low pay come
together as an incentive to collude either among themselves or with the truckers who are
often poorly paid if driving for the retailers or heavily in debt to buy their rigs if
independent.

Collusion by these two groups of disgruntled workers can result in pure theft on a large
scale. Such an inside job could occur, for example, when night alarms are left off on a
weekend to allow an intruder to enter undetected and drive away with goods left waiting.
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Such brazen thievery is only part of the risk to the warehouse owner and the businesses
that use his or her facility. There are other problems in the office. Since not much cash
moves in and out of the warehouse on any given day, control of cash is not the primary
concern of internal controls. Movement of inventory is the key problem. The endless
loading and unloading of inventory creates opportunities for fraudster to “move”
merchandise without the knowledge of the owner or manager. Such movements can go
undetected for long periods of time even with the best controls when collusion on the
loading dock extends into the accounting office.

Mixing up the Blenders Case Study

A warehouse operation in the Midwest served as a wholesale distribution center for
a major manufacturer of large and small appliances. The business was founded to
provide “just-in-time” delivery to the major retail chains around the country. The
retailers would send their orders electronically to the distribution center where they
would then automatically generate “pick tickets” for the warehouse workers to stage
the orders at the loading dock. The retailers’ trucks would arrive in the evening, be
loaded overnight, and leave in the morning.

The warehouse owners thought the process was foolproof. After all, they had
created a totally automated system: the “pick tickets” could not be written without
an electronically generated order from an approved source, and the guard checked
all the paperwork before the trucks left the yard. What they did not figure on was
collusion and irregular shortages.
The thieves took advantage of the fact that the major retailers counted and verified
the receipt of merchandise only at the destination; they did not make their drivers
responsible for verifying the quantities loaded. In fact, the drivers did not even
supervise the loading of the freight onto the trailer. Deliveries were only verified
when the retailer’s clerks at outlets along the driver’s route checked the delivery
against the order and the invoice. All shortages noted were charged back to the
wholesaler. The wholesaler then had to research the claim and typically allowed
smaller claims almost automatically for fear of losing the account.
In this case, a conspiracy developed among those responsible for the “pick tickets”,
the loaders, and the drivers. The “pick tickets” were falsified to increase each order
by a few cases. These were put on the trucks by the loaders who were in on the
scheme and driven off by colluding drivers. The drivers made unauthorized stops
along their way that were carefully selected so as not to run up much additional
mileage. Here they handed off the extra cases as well as a few others to groups that
paid them cash at prices under the market prices for these goods. This money was
then split among the participants on a predetermined basis at the next pickup.
When the drivers made their scheduled stops, the invoices were still in order since
the stolen material had been listed only on the “pick tickets” that allowed the goods
to be taken out of warehouse inventory and loaded onto the trucks. The result of
this scam was that the retailer was hit with inventory shortages while the wholesaler
was forced to honor the charge backs.
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This scheme went along for a number of years until the retailer’s management
became suspicious that something must be going on because of the constant
inventory shortages in the warehouse. They conducted a sting operation and caught
the culprits in action but not before being defrauded of close to $1 million.

Manufacturing
There is no business sector that is not vulnerable to the fraudster and the small
manufacturing operation is no exception since control standards are often loose and waste
is common.
Manufacturers’ goods are created through many processes. Bonuses are frequently awarded
to those who meet preset targets of efficiency and productivity. These targets, however, are
all too often so unrealistically high they can seldom be achieved. The levels of output and
sales implicit in the meeting of these goals work their way into and ultimately skew the
expense budgeting process and ultimately the profit margins.
Employees caught up in these unrealistic calculations often go to great lengths to create
accounting fictions that allow them to win bonuses, get promotions, and keep their jobs.
Stories of the purchasing agent who buys from ghost companies that only receive payments
but never supply anything, and kickback schemes between a purchasing agent and his
favorite supplier are part of many corporate legends. In those cases, the fraud affects both
the purchasing and the supplying entities.
The following, however, is an atypical manufacturing fraud scheme that was so good it
remained undetected until the company reevaluated its method of establishing its
standards.

Blowing Smoke Case Study

A Mexican company was in the business of growing tobacco, drying it, and
producing cigars for export to the United States and other countries. The
manufacturing arm of the business paid its employees on a piecework basis using
the number of cigars rolled in a given period to calculate a worker’s earnings.
Standards were set to give the worker a goal; any production over that level would
earn the worker a bonus. As is often the case, however, only a few very
experienced employees would exceed the quota and earn a bonus. These model
employees became the pride of the factory and showed the rest of the workers that
the dangling carrot was achievable.

Each cigar goes through many rolling and cutting processes. A new leaf is used for
each stage of the rolling process and each worker on a line carries out only one
stage of the process. As each stage is completed, the cigar is “racked” and pressed to
achieve some uniformity in length and width.
One clever employee noted over time that the quality control inspectors were not
very careful. The cigars were neither properly weighed nor checked for width. On
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the basis of this simple observation, the worker was able to devise a fraud scheme
that went unnoticed for years. The fraudster figured he could make his bonus by
producing a cigar with just a one-leaf cover instead of the normal two. Because the
omission of this second leaf reduced his production time for each cigar, he was able
to wrap more than the standard number of cigars for his line and thus earn his
bonus each and every period. He was able to avoid detection because, as he rolled
his cigars, he made the motions of cutting the second leaf, but never really wrapped
it. His cigars all met the minimum standards because the variance in weight and
thickness from one leaf to another disguised the absence of the second leaf.

As is the case in most frauds, his acts were only discovered after he left, in this case,
more than a year later. It would not have been discovered even then if the line
manager had not begun to wonder why his workers were taking longer to produce
fewer cigars and why the leaf inventory was being worked down more quickly. An
examination of excessive returns from customers during a slowdown in cigar sales
combined with an analysis of inventory finally revealed the scheme. A calculation
determined that the fraudster had walked away with the equivalent of $100,000
over five years, a lot of money for a Mexican cigar roller or, indeed, for any other
Mexican handworker at the time.

13.3 Computer Fraud and Small Business
The subject of computer fraud in small business is a special topic that requires separate
treatment since it is a growing problem as recordkeeping moves from paper to bits and
bytes. The move away from mainframes to individual workstations has decentralized data
control and increased system vulnerability since more people now have access to data. In
addition, the Internet and intranets have multiplied the number of people who can access
internal business information. The more access points, the more vulnerable the business.
The role of the Internet and intranets in day-to-day business will continue to grow because
of their speed and increased efficiency.

Perpetrators of Small-Business Computer Crimes
The first fact to recognize is that the computer fraudster is not likely to be the hacker
famous from so many media stories. The greatest danger comes instead from employees.
The ratio of computer frauds committed by insiders to those committed by outsiders is
believed to be about 80 percent for the insiders, compared with 20 percent for the
outsiders. Surprisingly, many frauds are committed not by sophisticated employees such as
computer programmers, analysts or even data-entry clerks. Modem user-friendly software
permits persons with very limited knowledge of technology to commit fraud when
opportunity presents itself. There is also danger from contractors, suppliers, consultants,
customers, and anybody who has access to your system even temporarily such as contract
clerical and other workers. The threat from all these sources is only likely to increase, as
more and more people become computer competent.

Motivating Factors for Committing Small-Business Computer Crimes
Most computer fraud is just paper fraud committed by other means. All the old tricks for
cooking the books are still in play but now they are practiced electronically. Unfortunately,
Fraud Supp. 2—3/02

72.7

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

computers make these crimes easier to commit and harder to detect than they were in the
days of paper records. The old motives are also still there.

Fraud is usually committed against small business for the following reasons:
• Economic. The economically motivated fraudster is usually the employee who feels
underpaid and generally unrewarded for his or her dedication to the company. These
people feel the company owes them something, and they take it.
• Psychotic. Psychotic personalities suffering delusions of persecution may see the company
as responsible for their sufferings and seek to disrupt the systems or even physically
destroy the computers. These troubled individuals may believe they have been
overlooked for a promotion, or suffered abuse, or mistreatment by an employer
• Egocentric. Egotism is at the root of many hacking attacks by cyberpunks who just want
to show that no firewall is strong enough to keep them out. They are not trying to steal
money; they just want to experience the thrill of getting inside the system for its own
sake.
• Ideological. Your company may be at risk if you are, for example, a consultant to a major
corporation that is the object of ecoterrorism or some other form of ideological violence.
These terrorist groups often use a destructive attack to advertise their existence in the
hopes of extorting concessions such as the abandonment of plans to build a dam or
some other project. They attack the object of their wrath at its weakest point and you
are it.

Kinds of Small-Business Computer Crimes
Broadly speaking, computer fraud is perpetrated by one or more of the following methods:
• Manipulation of input. These scams seem to be the most common because they are
probably the easiest to commit. They require alteration or outright fabrication of data,
which is then entered into the computer and thereafter identified and controlled by the
fraudster. Ironically, this type of fraud is easiest to control through simple security
measures such as access controls, the separation of duties in the creation of the
information trail, control totals, and other means. This crime is more likely to be
committed by an insider.
• Manipulation of output. Output crimes include the theft of information through electronic
copying or the theft of computer time or paid services. This kind of crime is equally
likely to be committed by an insider or outsider.
• Manipulation of throughput. Frauds of this nature are more difficult to commit because
they require sophisticated knowledge of programming. The creation of viruses or worms
is an example of a throughput crime. This kind of crime is more likely to be committed
by an outsider.

The Cloned Web Site Case Study

An upstart Web-hosting firm was growing quickly and hiring new employees to
handle inquiries for proposals and assignments from potential clients. Among the
new hires was a woman who had programming and design talents that were the

72.8

Fraud Supp. 2—3/02

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

perfect complement to the existing skill set of the company. She was assigned the
task of creating a new, innovative self-help Web site. Because strange working
hours are part of the dot-com culture, she set up an office at her home that allowed
her to work late or early or not to come into the downtown office at all for days at a
time. This arrangement worked to the complete satisfaction of everyone.

About ten months into the project, the uniquely designed Web site was completed.
It was copyrighted and advertised under the firm’s domain name. About two
months later, while surfing the Web, one of the principals noticed a site that looked
strikingly familiar. It was familiar, in fact, because it was practically a replica of their
own recently released site.
After performing a due diligence investigation, the matter was handed over to the
police who obtained a warrant to search the woman’s home where they found a
number of desktop PCs. Computer forensic specialists were called, the hard drives
were mirrored, and a complete copy of the code was discovered on one hard drive
and a modified copy on another.

Case of the Disappearing Engineer Case Study
An internationally well-known civil engineering firm opened a regional office in
one of the smaller cities of the Southwest. A marketing manager was hired who, in
turn, hired an assistant and a secretary.

After two years, the manager announced he was leaving the company to start his
own business and that his employees were going with him. This move meant that
the international firm was going to lose its representation in the region since the
manager and his staff were the only employees in the office. They were also the
only persons who knew all the proposals, plans, budgets, and so on, for the
company’s projects in the area.
A forensic investigation discovered that copies of plans had been removed from the
hard drives of the office’s PCs then copied onto new laptops that had been
purchased when the manager and his team left.

13.4 Key Preventive Controls
The key to fraud prevention is a good system of internal controls. One of the biggest
obstacles to installing good controls in a small business is the size of the organization and,
as a result, the limited number of employees. Unfortunately, the small business is typically
too small to employ a good system of internal controls. This is because the owner often
believes the cost benefit of installing and implementing good internal controls outweighs
the risk of fraud. A good system of internal controls often requires more employees than
the small business can spare; all employees are needed to provide the level of service that
its customers expect. Many managements feel that adding such employees would amount
to costly overstaffing and would affect margins and return on investment given the low
levels of revenues inherent in a small business in the first place.
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Some of the key fraud prevention internal controls in the small business sector include:
• Separation of duties. The typical small business may have the same person writing the
checks, keeping the books, and sometimes even reconciling the bank statements. This,
of course, is a recipe for fraud. Unfortunately, the small number of employees necessary
to make a profit may be too few to permit the segregation of duties essential for a proper
system of internal controls. To prevent fraud from occurring in a small business, it is
essential that employers segregate the custody, authorization, and recordkeeping
functions. In the case of sales and collections, it is important to separate the functions of
credit granting and sales. In addition, the functions of sales, recordkeeping, and cash
handling should also be separate.
• Good physical controls over cash and inventory.
1. Control over physical access to valuable assets is one of the fundamental preventive
controls in businesses of any size but it is particularly important in a small business
since a small staff must perform many functions. All too often, the principle of
separation of responsibilities is broken because of a shortage of personnel. In other
words, a proper control system needs more people than the company can employ
and still make a profit. Having an employee perform both functions of recording and
depositing cash payments without at least the proper supervision may prove too
tempting for some employees.
2. Random surprise inventory checks are important in controlling theft. On the loading
dock and among those driving the forklifts or otherwise physically handling the
stock, duty changes and shift rotations can reduce the possibility of collusion
between those responsible for areas that would have to work together to carry out a
theft of any size beyond mere pilfering. Careful control must be kept over product
returns.
3. Small business owners must recognize that they cannot expect auditors to find all the
problems. Not all auditors are created equal and, besides, they can only find what
the company’s accounting system is capable of telling them. It is the responsibility of
the small business owner to install an accounting system that carries sufficient
internal controls to red flag any irregularities before they create too much damage.
Because small companies are small they cannot absorb large losses and still stay in
business.
• Employee screening. Investigation of the personal history of anyone coming into physical
contact with assets of any value, especially cash, is a vital precaution. This check is
essential for both full-time and temporary employees. The giving in to temptation by a
person of otherwise impeccable character is, unfortunately, unpredictable.
• Regular accounting reconciliations. Sound reconciliation practices are fundamental to fraud
prevention in any company. Accounting reconciliations should be performed on a
monthly basis. Bank reconciliations should be made for all accounts. Accounts
receivable reconciliations should be made regularly both month to month and general
ledger to subledger. Accounts receivable reconciliations should be carried out in the
same way and with the same frequency. These reconciliations should be followed up by
accounting analyses of various kinds depending on the type of business.
Most companies would benefit from a variance analysis comparing budget projections
with actual performance and comparing year-over-year performance. Vertical analyses
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are also useful in that they measure margins and allow comparison with historical
performance or budget projections. Detailed sales and expense analyses can be done by
product or sales territory.
These analyses are not only useful for measuring the company’s overall performance by
historical standards but they may also highlight problem areas that could be the first
indicators of fraud. Prenumbered checks and invoices are essential to the reconciliation
process as are prenumbered sales orders, shipping documents, sales invoices, credit
memos and remittance advices. Processes such as granting credit, allowing write-offs
and shipping all goods should have clear evidence in the form of documents showing
amounts and signed approvals that can testify to any stage in the transaction. Sales and
all other revenues must be correctly documented.
• Good supervisory control. This is one of the most important means of internal control. Job
descriptions must clearly define areas of responsibility. The authority vested in those
positions must be understood by everyone above and below as well by those in the
positions. The essential element that must be in the design of these positions is the
principle of division of duties. The basic divisions of responsibility are between custody
and authorization and authorization and recordkeeping. The president of a small
business should not also be the chief financial officer, for example, and the sales
manager should not have the authority to grant credit to customers. Good supervisory
control includes awareness of the possibility of fraud, something that is absent among
many small business owners. They often become preoccupied with other areas of the
business and fail to see the security holes, the overlap of incompatible responsibilities,
and the possibilities for fraud.

• Enforcement. This means that the company is prepared to dismiss and even prosecute
any employee for the commission of fraud. Clear policies must be in place and there
must be endless education of employees about fraud prevention and the criminal risks
to themselves of any fraudulent act. Employees must be aware of the internal controls
and what the company expects in the way of personal ethical behavior. All prospective
permanent or temporary employees must be screened. Senior management must lead
by example. Cheating on expense accounts or personal use of company property are all
observable by employees and impair the moral atmosphere of a company.
• Fair treatment of employees. In closely held businesses, it is important that a good rapport
be established between the owner and his or her employees. Owners should not
distance themselves from their employees. Small business owners should be prepared to
hear their employees’ grievances and act upon them appropriately. Every employee has
a sense of his or her economic worth and would like to be paid a fair and equitable
wage that reflects that belief. Good pay and good working conditions eliminate many of
the potential grounds for grievances that employees might express in vengeful
fraudulent acts against the company. Most fraudulent acts are committed by employees
seeking to get something back from the company for grievances real or imagined. A
generous vacation policy not only gives employees a good feeling of self worth but it
also exposes fraudsters who hate to take holidays in case their activities might be
exposed during their absences.
• Adequate insurance coverage. It is imperative that the small business is protected with the
proper insurance and limits of coverage for any fraud that might occur.
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• Financial statement fraud. The small, closely held private company can experience
financial statement fraud just as well as the large public corporation. The attachment of
management bonuses to earnings performance, the need for good earnings in order to
secure bank credit, or the need for a high share price in the face of a prospective buyout
can be strong motives for the manipulation of income statement and balance sheet
accounts. The key to the prevention of this type of fraud is a board of directors that
includes outside members and has an audit committee that includes experienced
financial professionals. The board must recognize its independence from operating
issues, understand its fiduciary role on behalf of the shareholders and be committed to
full disclosure, transparency, and compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles. For example, the president’s brother-in-law should not be on the audit
committee nor should he be the outside auditor. A strong board and audit committee
will ensure that internal controls are in place and enforced.

Suggested Controls for Computer Frauds in Small Businesses
• Essential Controls and Oversights. Many of the same principles apply to computer security
as apply to paper security. Many controls are computer specific.
1. No person should be responsible for the whole of any financial transaction.
2. Countersigning of checks and fixed-dollar spending limits should remain standard
practice. Management software now can keep tight control on these limits.

3. Electronic signatures should be tightly controlled.
4. Use of directories, programs, and databases should be controlled and restricted to
those who need to work with them. Some data should be accessible on a read-only
basis and even that should be restricted to authorized personnel.
5. Data copying and transfer as well as the transmission of attachments to emails must
be monitored especially in a company where proprietary information is the bedrock
of its business.
6. Passwords should be assigned and not left to be created by the imaginations of
employees.
7. Encryption should be standard practice.
8. Those employees responsible for the computer system should keep themselves up on
the latest news concerning security holes in the commercial software programs in
place at the company.
9. Patches are frequently available and should be installed immediately before a
violation occurs.
• Cooperative effort. Good controls require a cooperative effort. The establishment of
adequate controls is the joint work of management, auditors, and computer experts.
Owners and managers must understand their business thoroughly and have identified
the risks. The auditors must also have an intimate knowledge of the business and be
able to identify any weaknesses through testing. Computer experts must know what
equipment will be most effective within a reasonable budget.
• Inventory control. In this day of “just-in-time” delivery, inventory control usually means
implementing controls against computer fraud. The small business owner must ensure
that controls are in place to recognize unfamiliar customers or unusual quantities of
inventory
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• Backup of computer records. Regular backup of records is essential to the operation of any
business. A set of dated records stored offsite will provide the material needed to
compare with daily operating documents if a suspicion of fraud should arise. A fraud
involving backdating of records, for example, would be easily detectable by comparing
the two sets of documents. Payroll records, personnel files, and accounts receivable
information and other essential information must be backed up and stored offsite on a
regular basis. There must also be security controls at the offsite location to ensure the
continuing integrity of the stored records. How secure is the offsite location not only to
the common risks of fire and water but also to tampering? Who has access? What are
the retrieval procedures and how secure are they?

Defending the Small Business Against Computer Crimes
Defending your small business against computer fraud is a growing responsibility of the
owner or manager, or both. Internal controls are the first line of defense. They must be
designed to meet the company’s security needs while being cost effective, easily
understood, and respected by employees. They must be designed to discourage the
commission of an opportunistic crime by that trusted employee who would otherwise not
be dishonest.
The following are some suggestions for preventing computer crimes in small business.

• Reevaluate Security Issues. The small business owner must be prepared to change his or
her way of thinking about security. Many small business owners look only at the cost of
installation and difficulty of implementation. Employees often find it irritating to have to
break an old habit to learn new procedures. They often argue that the new systems will
slow down information flows with no obvious benefit since the threat being protected
against “can’t happen here.” In the face of this kind of criticism, the small business
owner need remember only one thing: The moment the small business hires its first
salaried employee, a line is crossed that opens up the possibility for fraud. An outsider
has been brought into the tent who will be sharing information. The company now has
a new dynamic that can turn out well or badly. At this point, the grounds for possible
disgruntlement and disaffection are in place that could be very costly down the road if
the relationship becomes difficult. From now on, security controls are essential to
protect the owner’s interests.
• Implement Security Measures. The design of the security system must be based on a
thorough risk analysis. Small business owners or managers can evaluate their own
systems by considering some pertinent questions:
1. What is the primary risk? It may not be what you think. Perhaps the potential theft
of intellectual property is more important to protect against than the theft of money.
2. What are your key systems? The loss of what system would most disrupt business?
The loss of money may be bad but tolerable whereas the disruption of a system may
prevent you from doing business at all.
3. What system is currently vulnerable because it is not controlled by adequate
documentation ?
4. Are your important inputs verifiable, especially those generated outside your area of
control such as at suppliers?

Fraud Supp. 2—3/02

72.13

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

5. Has there been a recent internal or external audit? Were your systems established in
consultation with outside auditors who understand your business?
6. Is your organizational structure consistent with the functions that need to be
performed and the security required to protect them?
7. Do adequate login procedures and encryption protect your system?
These and many other questions need to be asked in order to identify the real structure of
your organization and force you to look at ways to improve and protect it.

13.5 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the small business sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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13.5 Checklists and Grids
Small Business Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

• Accounts payable fraud, such as phony suppliers, inflated
invoices, and the like (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, and especially
supervision)

□

□

□

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good policies [especially strict
enforcement])

□

□

□

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good policies [particularly at the hiring stage])

□

□

□

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, and supervision)

□

□

□

Ref

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the small
business sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good policies especially strict
enforcement)

• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good policies
[especially strict enforcement])

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the small business
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

(Text continued on page 73)
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Small Business Sector Checklist (continued)
Small Business Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Commercial crime by the business, including breach of
trust, environmental crime, false advertising, money
laundering, tax evasion, and violating occupational health
and safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
policies [especially strict enforcement and supervision])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Small Business Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by principals

X

Manipulation of business valuations by principals

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X
X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading
Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics
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Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Small Business Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Small Business Sector

Fair performance appraisal and review system

High

Avg

Low
or NA

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Principals acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No principal’s override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Principal’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Principal’s follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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14 Transportation

14.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section, the transportation sector includes:
• Trucking industry

• Railway and airline companies (both passenger and freight)

• Other passenger transportation systems (buses, subways, ferries, etc.)

14.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The most important vulnerability to fraud in this sector is in the billing and accounts
receivable area. Accounts receivable lapping schemes, for example, are a major risk
especially among smaller carriers. Cash frauds may also exist where payment by customers
is in cash.
Because of the competitiveness of the industry and the fact that much of it is contract-based,
there is also a higher risk of frauds involving bid rigging, kickbacks, and secret
commissions.

14.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the transportation sector include:
• Strong enforcement, including dismissal and prosecution of employees for fraud.

• Job descriptions with good segregation of duties.
• Reconciliations, especially bank and accounts receivable.
• Customer statements with supervisory follow-up on any related customer complaints or
exceptions.
• A good internal audit function and periodic external audits.

14.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the transportation sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Transportation Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
transportation sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies] and good corporate policies especially strict
enforcement)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the transportation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement and strong internal
audit functions])

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, and
the like (related controls include access restrictions, and
good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
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Yes

No

NA

Ref
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Transportation Sector Checklist (continued)
Transportation Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
segregation of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, and violating occupational health and safety
laws (related controls include good corporate policies, strict
enforcement, supervision, and strong internal audit
functions)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Transportation Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Transportation Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Transportation Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations
Accounting reconcihations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X
X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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15

Wholesale
15.1 Introduction
The wholesale sector basically consists of distributors and importers of just about any form
of merchandise. Typically, the sector is the bridge between the manufacturing and retail
sectors.

15.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Employee schemes involving any one or more of the following-accounts receivable,
inventory, or accounts payable-are probably the most common threats, as well as frauds by
suppliers, such as overbilling and product substitution.

15.3 Key Preventive Controls
Key controls include:

• Enforcement, including dismissal and prosecution for fraud.
• Strong physical access controls over assets, especially inventory.
• Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, including appropriate segregation of
duties.
• Mandatory annual vacations. Ongoing schemes are common in this sector. These
schemes often fall apart and are easily detected when the perpetrator is removed from
the scene for even a few weeks.
• Regular (that is, monthly) accounting reconciliations, including bank, accounts
receivable and accounts payable.
• Good computer security, especially access restrictions.
• Supervisory follow-up on exceptions and customer complaints.
• A strong internal audit function and periodic external audits.

15.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the wholesale sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Wholesale Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the wholesale
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, especially accounts
receivable lapping (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions
[for example, relating to customer complaints or
confirmation discrepancies], and good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement])

• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable frauds, especially phony suppliers and
inflated invoices (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, internal audit [especially
confirmations], and supervision)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the transportation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, and
the like (related controls include access restrictions, and
good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring stage])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
segregation of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
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Yes

No

NA

Ref
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Wholesale Sector Checklist (continued)
Wholesale Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, and violating occupational health and safety
(OSHA) laws (related controls include good corporate
policies, strict enforcement, supervision, and strong internal
audit functions)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Wholesale Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid-rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X
X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X
X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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X
X

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector
Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Wholesale Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Wholesale Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

X

Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

........

X
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Abuse of trust: See Trust, abuse of.

Account manipulation, direct: The alteration of computer programs to obtain direct but
unauthorized access to account files for the purpose of manipulation.
See also: Computer crime.
Account, nominee: A bank or trust account set up under an alias, an assumed name, a

company name, a corporate name, or a blind trust.
Account, posting improper credits to: Concealing a fraud involving the sales and

collection cycle. In this scheme, an employee posts credit memos or other noncash items,
for example, a sales return or writeoff, to the customer account from which the funds were
diverted.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Accounts receivable, misappropriation of: The diversion of payments received

from customers. An employee may open a personal bank account with a name similar to
that of the customer (for example, Acme Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer
payments can then be taken by the employee and deposited into the employee’s bank
account.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Acquisition and payment cycle: The sequence of accounting procedures that

address the procurement of and payment for all goods and services except payroll and
capital acquisitions.

See also: Capital acquisition and repayment cycle; Payroll and personnel cycle; Procurement fraud.
Advance-fee fraud: A scheme in which assurances of some future benefit (for

example, a loan) are given to the proposed victim in return for a payment described as an
advance service fee or other advance good-faith deposit (often falsely described as a
“returnable” deposit).

Typical victims of advance-fee schemes are business people who cannot obtain banking
services or credit from customary sources. They pay “deposits” or “fees” to others on the
promise that the perpetrator will arrange loans or credit for them.
See also: Commercial crime; Finance fraud.
Advertising, false and misleading: Use of untrue or deceptive promotional

techniques resulting in consumer fraud.
Victims are consumers who rely on the false or misleading advertising or promotion.
Noteworthy practices include the following:
1. Advertising as a “sale” item an item that is actually at the regular or higher price

2. Misrepresenting the size, weight, volume, or utility of an item
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3. Making false claims about an attribute that a good or service does not in fact possess
4. Misstating the true costs of a good or service through the use of confusing payment
provisions or otherwise
See also: Bait and switch; Consumer fraud.
Allegation: In litigation, a formal assertion, claim, declaration, or statement of a party to

an action, made in a pleading, setting out what that party expects to prove. In a nonlitigious
situation, a concern backed by evidence that a party has committed fraud.
Anti-trust offense: An offence consisting of one or more of the following:

1. Combinations in restraint of trade, price fixing, predatory pricing or other schemes for
the purpose of unlawfully driving competitors out of business.

2. Agreements among competitors to share business according to some agreed formula,
for example, bid-rigging conspiracies and discriminatory pricing agreements.
3. Domination of a business area by one or a few enterprises.
Victims of anti-trust offenses are businesses and purchasers of goods or services who pay
prices higher than they would if the offenses were not committed.
See also: Price fixing; Procurement fraud; Trade, restraint of
Appraisal, false: False and inflated appraisal used to support a loan for an amount

larger than would be granted if the true value of the property were known.
See also: External fraud; landfraud; real estate fraud.
Arson for profit: Intentional burning of a house or property whether one’s own or

another’s to collect the payment from the insurance company on a claim for the loss.
See also: Commercial crime; Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud.
Auto-repair fraud: A form of consumer fraud involving maintenance services to

automobiles.

Auto repair fraud falls into several categories, including the following:
1. Overcharging for labor or parts or use of shoddy or substandard parts

2. Failure to perform promised services or repairs
3. Charging for services not performed or parts not used
4. Performing services or repairs that are unnecessary or unwanted
See also: Consumer fraud; Repair fraud.
Backdooring: Sale of shares by “friends” of a promoter in a stock market manipulation

scheme as the price rises but contrary to their agreement to sell only on his or her
instructions.

See also: Distribution network, setting up; Stock market manipulation; Warehousing.
Bagman: The person who carries cash as a bribe to the recipient.

2
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Bait and switch: A form of consumer fraud involving misleading advertising. A bargain

(the bait) is advertised as an inducement to lure customers to the store where they are
presented with a similar but higher priced item (the switch). Thus, the advertisement does
not constitute a bona fide offer for sale of the merchandise in question. This scheme may
be used because the advertised item is not available or is in short supply. The sales staff
may try to prevent the customer from purchasing the advertised item by directing him or
her to higher priced merchandise by criticizing the advertised goods.
See also: Advertising, false and misleading; Consumerfraud.
Banking fraud: Violations by insiders or customers of banks, trust companies or credit

unions. Insider violations generally involve embezzlement or self-dealing whereby insiders
lend money to themselves or to businesses in which they have an interest, take bribes to
make loans or refrain from collecting loans, provide special favours to outsiders or
defalcations from customer accounts. Violations by outsiders would include submitting
false financial statements to induce a bank to make a loan, the use of fraudulent collateral,
check kiting, and similar offenses.
Victims of banking fraud are bank depositors and shareholders, creditors, the federal
government as the insurer of deposits, and surety companies that bond bank employees
and officers.

See also: Check kiting; Collateral fraud; Commercial bribery; Trust, abuse of
Bankruptcy fraud: Fraud against parties to a bankruptcy. Victims are usually creditors

and suppliers of the failed or failing business, although managers of fraudulently operating
businesses can also victimize silent partners and shareholders. The following are the two
major kinds of bankruptcy fraud.

1. Fraudulently planned bankruptcy. The assets, credit, and viability of a business are
purposely and systematically used to obtain cash, which is then hidden.
2. Fraudulent concealment or diversion of assets in anticipation offilingfor bankruptcy. This
prevents the assets from being sold for the benefit of creditors.

Planned thefts and fencing activities may be associated with either kind of bankruptcy
fraud as a means of diverting assets for the purpose of converting them to cash.
See also: Finance fraud.
Bid rigging: A conspiracy among contractors to set the price or terms of a contract for
the purpose of raising the cost to the purchaser.

See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud.
Biometrics: A method to ensure that only authorized people have access to computer

systems, restricted areas, and/or equipment. It can include the checking of fingerprints, iris
recognition, and hand geometry.

See also: Computer-access control.
Blowing off: The sale of unusually large amounts of stock during a stock market

manipulation (also referred to as blowing a position).
See also: Stock market manipulation.
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Boiler room: A place of business used to promote fraudulent sales of securities,

charitable donations, lotteries, and so on, through telephone solicitation. Salespeople
working from call lists ask victims to buy a particular product or service. They call both
locally and long distance, use glibly scripted presentations and work on high commissions.
Legitimate enterprises, especially charitable institutions, often mistakenly use the services of
these operators and, as a result, rarely see much of the money collected in their names.

See also: Charity and religious fraud; Securities fraud.
Borrower misapplication of funds: Loan fraud in which a borrower, with little or no

personal risk in the collateral, misapplies borrowed funds.
See also: Loan or lending fraud.
Bundling and unbundling claims: See Claims, bundling and unbundling.
Business-opportunity fraud: One of the most common but varied forms of fraud, in

which the victim is offered the opportunity to make a living or to supplement his or her
income by going into business, full- or part-time, or by purchasing a franchise or
equipment to manufacture some item, sell merchandise, or perform some service.

Victims are generally individuals with a small pool of savings, who are enticed by the
prospect of independence and/or income.
This kind of scheme ranges from being a total sham to an “opportunity” whose promised
return is highly illusory. Work-at-home merchandising schemes, such as selling knitting
machines or raising mink, or the sale of distributorships in cosmetics, special rug cleaning
processes, and so on, are common examples of the kinds of opportunities offered in this
form of fraud. The opportunity presented by the fraudster often includes the promise of
“guaranteed” markets for the goods or services to be produced. This kind of fraud can turn
into a pyramid scheme if victims are induced to enlist other prospective victims.

See also: Franchise fraud; Pyramid scheme; Self-improvement scheme.
Capital acquisition and repayment cycle: The sequence of accounting
procedures whereby capital items are purchased and paid for. This process is sometimes
referred to as the financing cycle.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud.
Casualty-insurance fraud: Claims for staged accidents and false claims for real

accidents submitted under a casualty-insurance policy covering personal injuries and
property damage that may be sustained as the result of an accident.
See also: Claim, accident with false; Insurance fraud; Personal-injury insurance fraud.
Chain-referral scheme: Fraud in which the victim is induced to part with money or
property on the representation that he or she will make money by persuading others to buy
in.

First-tier victims usually believe that those they involve in the scheme (second-tier victims)
will make money. Since second-tier victims can only make money by involving third-tier
victims and so on, the scheme must eventually collapse. Generally, only the fraudster
makes money; few first or second-tier victims (especially if they are honest) have a
sufficient number of participating friends and acquaintances to come out whole.
4
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One common form of chain-referral scheme is the chain-letter. A more sophisticated
version is the pyramid scheme. Here, the victim is sold a franchise to sell both merchandise
and other franchises. Profits are promised to come from both merchandise sold and
commissions or “overrides” on merchandise sold by any second or later-tier victims who
buy a franchise. The profits appear, therefore, to be in selling franchises rather than in
selling merchandise. These schemes ultimately collapse under their own weight.

See also: Merchandisingfraud; Pyramid scheme.
Charity and religious fraud: Fraud arising out of the fund-raising activities of

charitable and/or religious groups.

Almost anyone can be the victim of this type of fraud often without knowing it. Even if the
victim may later suspect the fraud, however, his or her individual loss may be so small that
there is little desire to pursue the matter. The following two kinds of fraud are common.
1. Fake charity. Money is solicited for a nonexistent charitable organization or cause or for
a charitable front set up to defraud donors.

2. Misrepresentation ofassociation with a charity or religious group. Individuals solicited for
donations to a legitimate charity or religious organization are not aware that most of the
money collected is used to cover the cost of professional fund raisers and/or
administrative overhead expenses, rather than the charity. (This is a gray area in law
since professional fund raisers perform a legitimate service for which they may properly
and legally be compensated).
In some instances, charitable organizations themselves are the victims of con artists who
use them as a front to keep the largest part of the money collected. In other instances, the
solicitation falls into a gray area where otherwise legitimate charities cover up the fact that
most of the money collected goes to salaries and fund raising.
See also: Boiler room; Sham, corporate.
Check forgery: The copying of a check or some of its components (most often the

signature) onto a fraudulent check to induce a financial institution to believe it is a bona
fide check.
See also: Check fraud.
Check fraud: A general term for the attempted or actual negotiation of a bad check at a
financial institution. Kinds of fraud in this category include: a false deposit made by a new
customer, forged, altered or stolen check and check kiting.

See also: Check kiting; New-account fraud.
Check kiting: A kind of fraud against banks that depends for success on the length of

time the banking system takes to clear checks. The most common form of check kiting
involves at least two bad checks used intentionally to temporarily obtain credit. In the
simplest case, the fraudster must open two bank accounts, each of which contains little or
no money. The accounts are often established at different banks in different cities in order
to create and take advantage of a longer clearing period. A check is then written on one
account for deposit in the other. This process may be repeated within the next day or so to
build up the amount the fraudster needs to carry out the scheme. Money is then withdrawn
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from one of the accounts before the first checks are cleared. The process can continue with
multiple accounts in different cities and a constant stream of deposits and withdrawals.

Banks are victims of check kites. When first discovered, check kites often appear to have
cost the bank far more than they actually have after all transactions have been analyzed,
since hundreds of thousands of dollars in checks may have been circulated to steal only a
few thousand dollars. In some instances, however, massive amounts have been stolen. In
many cases, businesses employ check kites when they cannot get loans from banks to tide
themselves over a temporary business crisis and intend to (and often do) put the money
back into the accounts before the check kite is discovered. In these instances, the bank has
been fraudulently induced to unwittingly grant what amounts to an interest-free loan. This
form of fraud is becoming increasingly difficult to perpetrate because of the speed of
electronic clearing.

See also: Bankingfraud; Check fraud.
Churning: The buying and selling of stock for a client by a broker solely to generate

commissions rather than to meet the client’s investment objectives.
Claim, accident with false: An individual involved in a real accident later
exaggerates the seriousness of his or her personal injuries in order to collect an excessive
insurance claim.

See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Claim, false or fraudulent: Fraudulently written claim for payment for goods or

services not provided as claimed. False claims may involve activities such as the following:
1. Presentation of a bogus claim or claimant; for example, ghost payrolling

2. Misrepresentation of the qualifications of an otherwise ineligible claim or claimant, for
example, welfare fraud
3. Misrepresentation of the extent of payment or benefits to which a claimant is entitled,
for example, overtime-pay fraud

4. Claims for reimbursement for goods and services allegedly provided to nonexistent
recipients, for example, health care fraud, by service providers

The false claim will carry all the trappings of a legitimate claim and is most successfully
undertaken by individuals with a thorough knowledge of the system being defrauded. The
false claim will sometimes involve the cooperation of executives or officials of the entity to
which the claims are submitted.

See also: Commercial bribery; Ghost employee; Government-benefit program, fraud against;
insurance fraud; Health-care fraud; Welfare fraud.
Claims, bundling and unbundling: The practice of physicians or clinics billing a
patient’s health insurance provider (government or private carrier) separately for medical
services performed at the same time.

See also: Health-insurance fraud.
Cleaning up the market: Buying up as many shares of a company as possible when

they become available. (Also referred to as taking out the market.)

6
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Collateral fraud: The holding, taking, or offering of defective collateral pursuant to a
financial transaction. In many instances collateral fraud will be related to bank loan
transactions. Beyond this, however, this kind of fraud may be encountered in connection
with any transaction in which defective security is provided, such as security for private
loans, non-existent accounts receivable sold or pledged to factors, and the like. In some
cases, collateral used as security may not belong to the person offering it. The collateral
could be stolen (for example, securities), borrowed, or already subject to an undisclosed
lien or other encumbrance. Alternatively, there may be some gross misrepresentation as to
the collateral’s value.

Collateral frauds are typically violations of federal fraud and banking laws. There may be
elements in banking or corporate violations involving self-dealing, such as when a bank
officer makes a loan knowing the collateral is bad. Collateral frauds may also be involved
in organized crime activities, for example, obtaining proceeds of stolen securities not by an
attempted sale, which would precipitate discovery when title was transferred, but by their
use as collateral for loans.

See also: Banking fraud.
Collusion or collusive fraud: A private agreement in which several parties plan to

commit fraud against another party or organization. The group of fraudsters could be as
few as two people and could include parties who are internal or external to an
organization, or both. For example, collusion occurs if an internal fraudster helps an
external fraudster commit a crime in return for a secret commission, kickback, or bribe.
See also: External fraud; Internal fraud.
Commercial bribery: A form of insider fraud or abuse of trust in which an employee

or officer of a business, charitable organization, or government entity is given a bribe or
some other valuable consideration to induce the employee or official to make a purchase,
grant a contract, or provide some special privilege (such as a zoning variance or license).

See also: Trust, abuse of; Procurement fraud.
Commercial crime: A white-collar crime committed by an individual or group of
individuals in a company for the benefit of that company and, indirectly, themselves.

See also: Economic crime; Externalfraud; Procurement fraud; White-collar crime.
Compartmentalization: A restriction that limits computer users’ access to the specific
files and programs for which they have a job-related requirement.

See also: Computer access control.
Computer-access control: A series of controls used to help ensure that only

authorized persons are permitted to access computer systems. Controls include passwords,
compartmentalization, the use of biometrics, one-time passwords, automatic log-off, timeday controls, dialback systems, requests for random personal information, and Internet
authentication.

See also: Biometrics; Compartmentalization; Computer crime; Dialback systems; Internet
authentication; Information, random personal; Controls, time-day.
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Computer crime: A crime in which a computer is used either to commit a crime or as
the target of crime. Crimes committed using a computer may include embezzlement,
larceny, fraud, forgery, and counterfeiting. Crimes that target computers may include
sabotage, vandalism, electronic burglary, wire tapping, and gaining illegal access. The most
common forms of computer crime involve the manipulation of inputs and outputs.

See also: Computer-access control.
Computer fraud: Fraud arising out of the increasing use of the computer to maintain
business and government records, such as those relating to inventories, accounts payable
and receivable, and customer and payroll records. Most computer frauds are really
traditional kinds of fraud that are committed by using a computer to alter electronic
records rather than manually altering paper records. True computer frauds do exist, such as
those involving unauthorized changes to a computer’s programming, but these are
relatively less common and are most often committed by technical computer people.

See also: Computer crime.
Computer intrusion: Unauthorized access to another organization’s computers.

See also: Computer-access control; Computer crime.
Consumer fraud: A deception in the marketplace involving sellers’ misrepresentations

to buyers. Victims are consumers of all kinds, individual and institutional, public and
private. Common forms of consumer fraud include the following:
1. Sale of useless goods or services, represented as beneficial, for example, “miracle face
creams”

2. Misrepresentation of product performance, benefits, or safety
3. False and misleading advertising

4. Failure to service items after sale, including reneging on warranties

5. Repair fraud
6. Hidden charges with respect to financing, necessary follow-up services, and so on
7. Weights and measures violations
See also: Advertising, false and misleading; Auto-repair fraud; Bait and switch; Chain-referral
scheme; Merchandising fraud; Repair fraud; Weights and measures fraud.
Controls, time-day: Controls that restrict access to computer systems to those times

when employees are supposed to be on duty. An extension of this concept uses automated
time-clock systems to deny access; the system reports a violation if access is attempted
when an employee is shown as not being authorized to be present.
See also: Computer-access control.
Copyright piracy: The use of another’s copyright or other business rights for profit
without the legal right to manufacture or copy the product.

See also: Commercial crime.

8
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Corruption, public or official: An abuse of trust violation involving commercial

bribery, collusion with bid-rigging, avoidance of the competitive process in connection
with the purchase of goods and services by government entities, self-dealing in connection
with government purchases, or grants of franchise to use public property and real estate.
Most public corruption has its parallel in the private sector. Thus conflict of interest is the
public equivalent of insider trading.
See also: Commercial bribery; Procurement fraud; Government-benefit program, fraud against;
Trust, abuse of
Coupon-redemption fraud: Cheating manufacturers or merchandisers who promote

sales of their products by offering coupons that return part of the purchase price when the
products are purchased.

Many manufacturers, primarily in the food business, place coupons in newspaper and
magazine ads offering, for example, “15 CENTS OFF” if the product is purchased. The
grocery store is supposed to redeem the coupon, and will customarily receive a service
charge of about 5 cents for handling the transaction. Frauds are committed against the
manufacturers by amassing large numbers of coupons and submitting them to
manufacturers without any bona fide purchases of the products.

This kind of fraud involves two basic steps, as follows.
1. Collect coupons.

2. Process the coupons for redemption.
Coupons can be collected by going through large numbers of old newspapers and
magazines; sometimes this is done by trash collection or waste disposal companies as a side
venture. Processing for collection requires the collaboration of retail merchants and is most
efficiently done with the cooperation of officials of food retail chains.

See also: Commercial crime.
Credit-card fraud: Fraudulent application for, extension, and use of credit cards.
Victims are the issuers of the credit cards. Common credit card abuses include the
following:

1. Use of stolen credit cards

2. False statements in the application for a credit card, including application under a false
name
3. Making a purchase using a legitimate credit card with no intention of paying

4. Manufacture and use of fake credit cards
5. Electronic swiping of a card to capture card data later used to make unauthorized
purchases

See also: Bankingfraud.
Credit-card receipt, altered: A fraudulent increase in the amount recorded on a

credit-card receipt.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
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Credit, false application for: False information on a credit application including

overstated assets, nonexistent assets, understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue, and
understated expenses.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lendingfraud.
Credit rating fraud: Fraudulent application for, extension, and use of credit. Victims

are generally the providers of credit. Common credit-related schemes include the
following:

1. Sale of good credit ratings to high-risk applicants

2. False statements in credit applications
3. Creation of false credit accounts for the purpose of theft
The modus operandi of these schemes varies widely. Recently, employees of credit rating
organizations have altered credit ratings for payment, sometimes using computer
techniques. The creation of false financial statements is another common method. On a
smaller scale is a fraud that operates like shoplifting—opening a charge account with false
information in order to purchase and immediately take away goods.

See also: Loan or lending fraud.
Customs duty fraud: The false understatement by an importer of the value of goods to

be imported to reduce the amount of customs duty paid to the government of the country
into which the goods are imported.

See also: Commercial crime; Tax and revenue violation.
Debt-consolidation or adjustment swindle: The purported bundling of a debtor’s

assets and income to repay all creditors over a period of time in order to keep creditors
from pressing for the immediate payment of all sums due.

There are legitimate private agencies that provide these services and they have similar
workout procedures available after filing for bankruptcy.
The usual modus operandi is to use heavy television and newspaper advertising to lure
debtors into signing up. Sometimes the perpetrators will talk creditors into waiting for their
money; in other instances, they falsely tell the debtors they have been able to call the
creditors off. They then take the debtors’ assets and a portion of their weekly or monthly
earnings, paying themselves first and (usually only after they have their entire “fee”) dole
out the remainder to creditors. Frequently, creditors receive little or nothing and the
debtors are left minus their fees and still in debt.

See also: Finance fraud.
Dialback systems: A computer security system that accepts a user identification (ID)

and password then hangs up and dials a predetermined number. The system is only
accessible by dialing in from a set location.

See also: Computer-access control.

10
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Differential association: A theory established by Edwin H. Sutherland that explains

why crime is committed. There are ten principles to his theory which, in summary, asserts
that a person becomes a criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation
of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.
Diploma mill: An outlet that grants diplomas to all people who apply for them in

exchange for a hefty fee. Because the diploma mill is not accredited, the diplomas are
worthless.
See also: Externalfraud; Self-improvement scheme.
Directory-advertising fraud: Fraud arising from the selling of printed mass

advertising services. The following are the two basic kinds.

1. Impersonation schemes involve con artists who send bills to business enterprises
resembling those customarily received; for example, purported bills from the phone
company for yellow page advertising, with directions to make checks payable to entities
whose names are similar to legitimate payees of the bills.

2. Another kind of scheme involves promising that advertising will appear in a
publication distributed to potential customers even though distribution will actually be
limited to the advertisers themselves, if the directory is printed at all.
See also: Externalfraud.
Distribution network, setting up: A term used in stock market manipulation. The

network is set up with the promoter as its head and several distributors located in cities
with facilities for trading the stock in question. Each distributor has access to a brokerage
house’s sales force which in turn has access to the floor traders who will actually be
executing the trades. Via this network, the promoter has control over trading in the subject
stock.
Double-indemnity fraud: The report by a beneficiary of a life insurance policy of a

natural death as having been accidental in order to obtain more than the face value of the
policy.

See also: Insurance fraud; Life-insurance fraud.
Double-pledging collateral: Fraudulently pledging the same collateral to different

lenders before the related liens are recorded and registered.
See also: Externalfraud; Landfraud; Real estate fraud.
Down payments and retainers, absconding with: A fraud in which the fraudster

absconds with money obtained from the victim in advance by the false promise to provide
goods or services.
Economic crime: A crime that is similar to white-collar crime but broader in its scope

in that it includes violent crimes committed by people without any particular occupational
status.
See also: White-collar crime.
Economic espionage: An act in which business secrets are stolen for the benefit of

another organization.
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Economic extortion: A crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained

through intimidation or persistent demands.

See also: Commercial crime.
Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud: The conversion to one’s own use or benefit of

the money or property of another, over which one has custody with which one has been
entrusted or over which one exerts a fiduciary’s control. Victims include institutions,
businesses in general, pension funds, and beneficiaries of estates managed by fiduciaries.
See also: Banking fraud; Insider trading; Loan or lendingfraud; Trust, abuse of
Employment-agency fraud: Fraudulent solicitations of money or fees in order to find

employment for, to guarantee the employment of, or to improve the employability of
another. Victims are generally individuals seeking jobs or hoping to improve their skills in
order to obtain better paying jobs. Variations of employment-related fraud include the
following.

1. Phony job agencies. An agency solicits advance fees in order to find employment for the
victim, when in fact, the service is neither provided nor is it intended to be.

2. Job trainingfraud. Money is received from victims to train them for specific
employment. The training is not supplied; “guaranteed” job opportunities on
completion of training do not materialize; the training is misrepresented as being
“certified” or “recognized” by employers when it is not.
Energy-crisis fraud: Fraud arising out of the sale of goods or services related to energy

or fuel use, saving, and production.

Victims are generally consumers interested in saving on energy costs. Energy schemes
include the following.

1. Merchandise schemes. Sale of worthless or bogus items that do not deliver the specific
benefits promised or the degree of benefit promised; for example, carburetor gadgets to
save gasoline or phony solar heating systems. Often, these kinds of fraud occur because
of the novelty of the items involved combined with the naivete of the victims.

2. Weights and measures violations. Short weighing or measuring fuels to customers; for
example, the manipulation of gas pump measuring devices or the misrepresentation of
fuel types by changing octane ratings on fuel pumps.
3. Distributors' discriminatory allocation offuel. Distribution to subdistributors and retailers,
in consideration of commercial bribes to distributors’ executives or special payments to
companies with the power to make distribution, in the form of under-the-table
payments or required purchases of other items, in violation of antitrust or other laws.

See also: Antitrust offense; Commercial bribery; Merchandising fraud; Weights and measures fraud.
Environmental abuse: Business behavior that can harm the environment. The legal

system considers these acts to be crimes. The two major practices are pollution and the
misuse of natural resources. Businesses commit these crimes to avoid the costs associated
with compliance.
See also: Commercial crime; Pollution and environmental protection violation.
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Ethics: Principles or standards of human conduct.

Evidence: Oral, written, or physical material presented as proof in a trial or other

hearing for the purpose of convincing the trier of fact (that is, judge, jury, mediator,
arbitrator, and so on) of the truth of the facts and allegations.
Expense report, false: Expense report containing any combination of overstated,
fictitious, or duplicated items prepared and submitted for reimbursement to an employee.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Claim, false or fraudulent.
Expert witness: A person possessing specialized knowledge acquired through

experience, education, or training. Expert witnesses can provide opinions in court, whereas
lay witnesses can only provide evidence regarding their physical experiences—what they
saw, smelled, heard, tasted, or touched.
External fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by arm’s-length parties.

See also: Commercial crime; Internalfraud.
Fictitious company, payment of invoices to: The embezzler establishes a fake

entity (often with a post-office box for an address, and a name similar to that of a legitimate
company) and gets the fake entity entered into company records as a legitimate vendor.
The embezzler then produces invoices for the fake vendor, has them processed in the
accounts payable system, and pockets the payments made to satisfy the fake invoices.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud; Sham, corporate.
File-maintenance instructions, failure to enter: Failure to input information

into the computer system because of an intention to deceive. For example, deliberately not
updating computer files when an employee has left the firm and not removing that
employee from the payroll records. This kind of “omission” might be for the purpose of
creating a ghost employee.
See also: Payroll and personnel cycle.
File-maintenance transactions, phony: Performing file maintenance transactions

such as changing a customer’s address or adding a new employee to the payroll. These
transactions can lay the groundwork for any number of frauds, for example, the use of
ghost employees to embezzle funds.

See also: Computer crime; Payroll and personnel cycle; Sales and collection cycle.
Finance fraud: One of several kinds of fraud, including the following:

1. False mortgage security. The mortgage loan is larger than the underlying value of the
property secured by the mortgage.

2. Advance fee fraud. The victim pays an up-front finder’s fee in exchange for a promise to
receive an advance on a loan.
3. Debt consolidation scheme. A fraudulent debt consolidation agency makes money by
organizing the debtors’ affairs and collecting and retaining most, if not all, the money
handled on the debtor’s behalf.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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4. Bankruptcy fraud. This includes fraudulent conveyances, concealed assets, asset
stripping, or fraudulently planned bankruptcy.
The victims of financial fraud are generally financial institutions.

See also: Advance-fee fraud; Bankruptcy fraud; Commercial crime; Mortgage security, false.
Financial-statement auditing: A methodology used by auditors to evaluate the

accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of recorded business transactions through sampling,
confirmation, and analytical techniques.
Financial statement, false: False information created by upper-level managers with

intent to manipulate data to enhance reported profitability and thereby earn higher
bonuses, impress supervisors or executives, impress stockholders or lenders, or simply to
comply with the goals set by senior management. The methods of creating a false financial
statement include overstating revenue, overstating assets, understating expenses,
understating liabilities, and misrepresenting information in the notes to the financial
statements.
See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud; Statement, false.
Forensic: Material that is used in, or suitable to courts of law.

See also: Forensic accounting; Forensic standard.
Forensic accounting: An accounting subdiscipline that investigates alleged financial

wrongdoing or damage for the purpose of providing evidence to meet the evidentiary
standards of the courts. The forensic accountant also supplies expert testimony for
arbitration hearings, mediation, and other business dispute resolution processes.

See also: Forensic; Forensic standard.
Forensic standard: The evidentiary test of the courts. Evidence must meet the

standards of court admissibility and be able to withstand cross examination.
See also: Forensic; Forensic accounting.
Franchise fraud: Fraud in the sale or service of a franchise.

Franchise fraud generally occurs in one or more of the following ways.

1. The franchisor has no intention of honoring any of its obligations; that is, the
“franchise” is a complete ruse to acquire the victim-franchisee’s initial investment
money.
2. The franchisor fails to provide promised goods or services essential to the success of the
franchise.

3. The franchisor makes success for the franchisee either difficult or impossible by
allowing too many franchises in a given market area.
4. The franchisor has misrepresented the market or demand for goods or services central
to the franchise, or has misrepresented the level of skill needed to realize franchise
profitability.
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Item 1 is outright fraud, while items 2 to 4 represent variations that range from fraud to
shady dealing and the failure to fulfill contractual obligations.
See also: Business-opportunity fraud; Chain-referral scheme.
Fraud: Criminal deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver. The deception

must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.

See also: Commercial crime; Externalfraud; Internalfraud.
Fraud auditing: A methodology used by fraud auditors to find transactions that differ

from the normal series of transactions and suggest irregularities that could be fraudulent.
See also: Financial-statement auditing.
Fraudulent disbursement: The theft (embezzlement) of a company’s cash by an

employee, for example, by using company checks either to withdraw cash directly or to
pay personal expenses.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Front-end fraud: The improper direction given to a company’s customers to take their

business elsewhere thereby depriving the company of profits it would otherwise have
earned.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Funeral fraud: A class of guilt-inducement fraud that relies on the emotional stress of

victims who have lost or are about to lose loved ones through death. Victims are the
relatives or friends of the deceased or terminally ill.
Funeral-related fraud often takes the form of consumer and merchandising fraud and
generally involves one or more of the following practices.
1. Relying on the guilt or anxiety of bereaved relatives. Victims are persuaded to contract for
unnecessary or unduly elaborate funeral services or merchandise.

2. Billingfor funeral expenses to include charges for services not performed. The fraudster relies on
the victim’s grief to cloud his or her memory as to whether or not a particular service
was performed and/or to preempt the victim’s challenge of the bill for payment.
3. Misrepresentation. Victims are told that certain goods or services are required by law
when they are not.
4. Fraudulent contracts. The victim is sold and pays for the future provision of goods or
services the fraudster has neither the intention nor the capacity to provide; for example,
the sale of nonexistent cemetery plots.
See also: Consumer fraud; Guilt-inducement fraud; Merchandisingfraud.
Generic risk factors: Risk factors within the control of the entity protecting itself but

outside the control of potential perpetrators.
Ghost employee: A payroll fraud in which the embezzler enters the name of a fictitious
employee into the payroll system and receives the resulting payroll check. Fictitious
employees are commonly referred to as “ghosts.”

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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In one variation of this scheme, the names of individuals whose employment has
terminated are kept on the payroll for several pay periods after they leave their jobs. The
embezzler then receives the paychecks for the former employees. In another variation of
the ghost payroll, the fraudster develops an overtime-pay scheme in which false claims are
made for overtime work performed by bona fide employees.
Victims are generally public and private entities responsible for honoring payroll claims.
Often, the ghost payroll is a device used to defraud government programs designed to
provide employment for the unemployed or disadvantaged. This is closely related to
welfare and unemployment insurance fraud. This device is used in cost-plus contracts to
cheat government entities or by managers of sub-units in private enterprises to steal from
their parent organizations.

See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Government-benefit program, fraud against; Payroll and
personnel cycle.
Government-benefit program, fraud against: Unlawful application for and
receipt of money, property, or benefit from a public program designed to confer money,
property, or benefit under specific guidelines.

Victims are federal, state, county, and municipal governments; their taxpayers; and
qualified, intended beneficiaries of the programs. Typical kinds of fraud suffered by
government programs include the following:

1. The misrepresentation of applicants’ qualifications concerning program eligibility; for
example, welfare received by ineligible people

2. False billing or vouchering for services not rendered or for nonexistent beneficiaries;
for example, physician’s claims under provincial health programs for patients not
treated or for specific treatments not provided
3. Inflated billing, vouchering, or claiming that charges public programs more than the
allowable costs; for example, housing fraud in which the cost of construction is inflated
so that the builder or owner receives more than the total cost of land and buildings and
avoids making the investment required by law and administrative guidelines
4. Embezzlement by employees or officials misusing their custodial or fiduciary positions
to convert public funds, property, or benefits to their own use; for example, licensed
dispensers of food stamps converting them to their own use
5. Use of properly obtained funds in which money, property, or benefit are used for
purposes other than those for which they were intended; for example, the use of
student loans for purposes other than education
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Health-care fraud;
Statement, false; Welfare fraud.
Guilt-inducement fraud: Fraud perpetrated by inducing guilt or anxiety in the victim

concerning a child, parent, spouse, or friend. Victims are persuaded to part with money or
property in the belief that they are atoning for any “shortcomings” or fulfilling
“obligations” toward another.
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Guilt inducement is used in many kinds of fraud. A few examples are the following.

1. Encyclopedia salespeople induce victims to sign purchase contracts by suggesting that
their children will fail at school unless the books are bought.
2. Children of deceased parents are persuaded to purchase elaborate and unnecessary
funeral arrangements for fear of not giving a “decent” burial. Victims are urged to
believe that their failure to make these purchases implies a lack of affection or respect
for the deceased.
3. Unnecessary and imprudent expenditure for life insurance is induced by the suggestion
that failure to do so implies a lack of care for spouse and children.
4. Self-improvement merchandise and facilities are marketed to victims on the basis of
guilt inducements such as, “You owe it to your spouse to be as [lovely, manly, successful, or
whatever] as you can be” or “You can only be a failure if you fail to take advantage of
opportunities to improve your [looks, job, speaking ability, or whatever]."

See also: Funeral fraud; Self improvement scheme.
Health-care fraud: This term covers numerous types of fraud in the health care

industry, for example, marketing drugs without adequate testing or for which the test results
have been falsified.

See also: Commercial crime; Health-insurance fraud; Medicalfraud.
Health-insurance fraud: There are several forms of health insurance fraud, for

example, mobile labs, bundling or unbundling claims, or collusion between an insured and
a provider to claim health insurance for his or her own benefit.
See also: Claims, bundling and unbundling; health-care fraud; insurance fraud.
Home-repair or home-improvement fraud: Fraud arising from the provision of

goods and services in connection with the repair, maintenance, or renovation of housing
units.

Victims are generally homeowners but may also include public agencies or programs that
subsidize or underwrite home purchase and ownership. Home repair or improvement
fraud includes the following practices:
1. Intentionally shoddy or incompetent workmanship
2. Sale of overpriced or unfit materials or services
3. Failure to provide services or goods paid for by the customer
4. Submission of false claims for materials or work not provided

5. Misrepresentation of the need for particular materials or services to be performed
6. Misrepresentations or concealment of the costs of credit or of the nature of liens
securing the payment obligations

The victim may be told that the home is in violation of building codes or in a condition
substandard to the rest of the neighborhood thus lowering the value of the home or
compromising the safety of the victim’s family.
See also: Consumer fraud; Merchandisingfraud; Repair fraud.
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Homicide for profit: A homicide in which a victim is murdered for financial gain by

the murderer or the person hiring the murderer.
See also: Homicide fraud; Insurance fraud; Life-insurance fraud.
Homicide fraud: A fraud in which a beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the
policy holder to collect benefits.

Income tax fraud: The evasion of a tax by any means including filing false or

fraudulent returns.
See also: External fraud.
Inflated costs: Expenses that have been artificially inflated and invoiced when a

contractor is paid on a cost-plus basis.
See also: Commercialfraud; Procurement fraud.
Information, random personal: Information, known only to an authorized

individual, that is used as a means of identifying unauthorized log-in attempts to a
computer system. The computer randomly transmits a question using this information and
denies access to the user unless it receives the right answer. If several dozen questions are
on file, it can be a very useful technique for stopping unauthorized computer use.
Input tampering: A computer scheme that can be accomplished by altering, forging,

or fabricating computer input documents. In an entity, especially a small business with
inadequate logical access control, input tampering is quite easy to accomplish.

See also: Computer crime.
Insider trading: Benefiting oneself or others in whom one has an interest by trading on

privileged information or position. Typical situations include those in which a corporate
officer or director trades in the stock of his or her company on the basis of inside
information as to prospective profits or losses; bank officers lending money to themselves
or businesses in which they have an interest; corporate executives or purchasing officials
setting up suppliers of goods and services to contract with their companies.
See also: Bankingfraud; Commercial bribery; Securities fraud; Trust, abuse of.
Instructions, unauthorized: Commands placed by a computer programmer into a

computer program to perform unauthorized functions, for example, making payments to a
vendor not on an approved list.
See also: Computer crime.
Insurance fraud: Fraud perpetrated by or against insurance companies. Victims may

be the clients or stockholders of insurance companies or the insurer itself.

Insurance fraud breaks down into the following categories and subclasses.
1. Fraud perpetrated by insurers against clients or stockholders includes the following:
a. Failure to provide coverage promised and paid for when claim is made

b. Failure to compensate or reimburse fully on claims

c.
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d. Embezzlement or abuse of trust in management of premium funds and other assets
of insurance companies
e.

Twisting, that is, illegal sales practices in which the insurer persuades customers to
cancel current policies and purchase new replacement ones

2. Fraud perpetrated by policy holders against insurance providers includes the following:

a. Filing of bogus claims for compensation or reimbursement, or of multiple
claims for the same loss from different insurers, and so on
b. Inflating reimbursable costs on claim statements
c.

Paying bribes or kickbacks to local agents to retain coverage or to obtain
coverage in an improper risk category

d. Failing to disclose information or making false statements in an application for
insurance
See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Claim, accident with false; Claim, false or fraudulent; Double
indemnity fraud; Homicide fraud; Life-insurance fraud; Mortgage-insurance fraud; Personal-injury
insurance fraud; Trust, abuse of
Intellectual-property theft: The theft of intellectual assets such as business plans or

trade secrets.
Internal fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by its employees, officers, or

directors.

See also: Externalfraud.
Internet authentication: A computerized security measure used to identify a specific
Internet user and to send information across the Internet safely.

See also: Computer-access control.
Inventory balances, understating beginning: Fraudulent financial reporting to

conceal inventory shortages or theft. A common method for understating beginning
inventory is to overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence. For example,
understating may be perpetrated if there has been a change in management and current
management wishes to report improved profitability.

See also: Financial statement, false; Inventory and warehousing cycle.
Inventory and warehousing cycle: The accounting process that deals with the
purchase and warehousing of merchandise for manufacture or resale or both.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Investment fraud: The use of imprudent, illusory, or bogus projects or businesses to

attract investors through the prospect of high rates of return.
Investment fraud generally victimizes those with a pool of liquid or convertible assets,
ranging from retirees or near-retirement age people, widows and widowers, to high-income
professionals and businessmen. Hallmarks of this kind of fraud may include the following.
1. The investment promises a higher-than-average rate of return.
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2. The investment project is still in development, that is, the project or business is not a
mature entity.
3. The buyer purchases the investment from a stranger.
4. The investment has a generalized definition of its nature and scope and lacks detailed
plans for measuring any progress.
5. The object or site of the investment is geographically remote or distant from investors.
6. The seller fails to fully disclose facts that are material to the investor prior to his
commitment of money.

7. The seller is not registered with the appropriate regulatory agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission or a state's securities commission.
8. The seller promises special advantages such as tax benefits.
See also: Land fraud; Ponzi scheme; Pyramid scheme; Securities fraud.
Invoice, false: An invoice submitted by a contractor for goods not delivered or for

service not performed.
See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud.
Invoice, false sales: An altered company copy of the sales invoice showing a lower

sales amount than the original invoice sent to the client. The difference between the real
sale amount and the adjusted lower amount is then misappropriated when payment is
received.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Invoice, false supplier: A supplier’s invoice is prepared and submitted for payment to

the company even though no goods have been delivered, no services rendered, or the
invoice shows inflated quantity, inflated value, or both.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud.
Jitney: The buy/sell broker disclosed on the exchange printout is acting on behalf of

another broker.
Kickback: A form of off-book fraud in which the funds used for illegal payments or

transfers are not drawn from the payer’s regular company bank account and the payments
do not appear on the payer’s books and records. In collusion with suppliers, a purchasing
agent may get paid a kickback for any number of activities, including allowing the supplier
to submit fraudulent billing and approving the payment, excess purchasing of property or
services, or bid-rigging.

See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud; Off-book fraud; Secret commission.
Land fraud: The sale of land, based on extensive misrepresentations as to value, quality,

facilities, and/or state of development.

Victims are usually individuals buying land for retirement and/or investment. Land fraud
usually consists of the direct sale of land or the sale of an interest in land—
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1. To which the seller has no present title or claim of right; that is, the seller cannot
properly transfer title or interest to the buyer as represented at the time of the sale.
2. About which there has been a misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact.

3. At inflated or unjustified prices based on misrepresentations made to the purchaser.

4. On the promise of future performance or development, which the seller neither intends
to provide nor can reasonably expect to occur. Misrepresentations usually claim the
presence of utilities, water, roads, recreational facilities, credit terms, and so on.
See also: Investment fraud.
Landlord-tenant fraud: Unlawful leasing or renting of property. Common fraud

practices by landlords include the following:
1.

Keeping two sets of books, in support of tax fraud

2. Schemes to avoid the return of security deposits
3. Rental of property to which one has no title claim or right

4. . Deliberate and persistent violations of safety and health regulations; failure to provide
heat, services, and so on.
Lapping: A customer’s payment is embezzled and then recorded as paid sometime after

the receipt of a subsequent payment from another customer. To keep customer A from
complaining, the payment from customer B is applied to customer A's account. Customer
C’s payment is applied to customer B’s account, and so on.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Legitimate front: A form of money laundering in which a legitimate front business

operating with large cash receipts is opened so that illegally earned money can be mingled
with the bank deposits of the legitimate income of the business to disguise the source of the
illegal money.

See also: Money laundering.
Life-insurance fraud: Any form of fraud making a life insurance company the victim.

See also: Double-indemnity fraud; Homicide fraud.
Loan fraud, single-family housing: Misapplication of funds by a borrower who
purchases single-family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality is
purchasing rental properties for resale.

See also: Loan or lendingfraud.
Loan or lending fraud: The use of false information or the omission of material

information for the purpose of granting or extending a loan.
When perpetrated by borrowers, loan fraud may take on any of the following forms:

1.

Obtaining a loan through false statements

2. Using the loan for a purpose other than that for which the loan was granted
3. Larceny by false pretenses by which a loan is obtained with no intention of repayment
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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When perpetrated by the lending officer, loan fraud may take on any of the following
forms:
1.

Lending to oneself through ghost accounts

2. Lending to friends or entities in which one has an interest
3. Commercial bribery, meaning, approving loans to those who would not otherwise
qualify as borrowers in exchange for kickbacks or other considerations
4. Advance fee schemes by which would-be borrowers remit money to secure a loan that
is not forthcoming or for which no payment was necessary
A separate and important dimension of loan fraud involves the misuse or misrepresentation
of items of collateral and collateral accounts.
See also: Banking fraud; Collateral fraud; Statement, false; Trust, abuse of
Loan, nominee: A loan made in the name of a straw borrower or agent while the

identity of the real borrower is undisclosed to the lender.
Loan to non-existent borrower fraud: Use of a false identity to obtain a loan. This

scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower or with the assistance of an insider
such as a loan officer.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lending fraud.
Long the stock: Buying stock. Your long position represents the number of shares

owned (also referred to as going long).
Market manipulation: The intentional inflation of a stock price accomplished by

stock purchases, usually in a small-cap market, with a sudden sale to third parties who are
left with stock that is worth substantially less than they paid for it.
Medicaid-Medicare fraud: Fraudulent practices involving the receipt or provision of
health-care services under government-financed Medicare or Medicaid programs. This
kind of fraud is usually perpetrated by health-care providers (both professional and facility
operators) against the government financing the programs or the intended beneficiaries of
the programs, or both. Specific Medicaid-Medicare fraud practices include the following.

1. Ping-ponging. Referring patients to other doctors in a clinic to claim reimbursement for
the “consultation” rather than for bona fide patient treatment or observation.

2. Upgrading. Billing for services not provided.
3. Steering. Sending patients to a particular pharmacy, medical lab, and so on, for required
prescriptions or services and receiving improper payments in return.
4. Shorting. Delivering less medication (for example, pills) than prescribed while charging
for full amount.
5. Procurement abuses. Establishing supply-purchase arrangements with firms that pay
kickbacks to health care facilities or providers with firms that are owned by those
controlling the facility itself.
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6. False claims. Submitting claims for payment by the government for patients who do not
exist, or who were never seen or treated.

See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Government-benefit program, fraud against; Kickback;
Procurement fraud.
Medical fraud: Provision and sale of bogus, highly questionable or dangerous medical

services, cures, or medications.

Victims are often terminally or incurably ill patients seeking miracles. Also victimized are
the poorly informed, who are vulnerable to false claims for beauty treatments and
cosmetics.

Medical fraud generally includes one or more of the following.
1. Quackery. False representation of oneself as a legally trained and licensed health care
professional

2. Fake cures. Sale of bogus or highly questionable “cures” for specific illnesses or diseases
3. Misrepresentation. In addition to misrepresenting the therapeutic value of medication, the
intentional omission of the known side effects of medication
4. Misrepresentation of treatment. False statement about the therapeutic value of a particular
treatment and the degree of its “acceptance” in bona fide medical practice; omission of
material information concerning known side effects of a treatment that would affect the
patient’s choice of treatment program
See also: Health-care fraud.
Merchandising fraud: An umbrella term for a broad variety of consumer fraud
involving false inducements to purchase merchandise, which either is not as represented or
will never be delivered.

These kinds of fraud usually involve one or more of the following:

1. Representation that the item is sold at a lower than usual price, even though it is
actually sold at the usual retail price or higher
2. Misrepresentation of the quality or utility of the merchandise

3. Misrepresentation of the ultimate price or credit terms

4. Misleading information on warranties, the return policy or the validity of “money back
guarantees”
5. Solicitation of money with no intention to deliver the merchandise promised

6. “Bait and switch” fraud
Victims customarily buy from door-to-door salespeople or are entrapped when they
respond to newspaper, magazine, telephone, radio, or television advertisements.

See also: Consumer fraud.
Mixing of funds: Commingling client funds with the funds of the brokerage firm,
which then enables the broker to post the winning trades to the brokerage firm or the
losing trades to their clients.

See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Mobile lab: A scheme in which a group of people posing as medical professionals set up

a lab in a storefront located in a blue-collar, low-income area to offer free physicals to
people who have medical insurance. The insured is subjected to extensive, expensive tests
that are billed to his or her insurance company. The mobile labs are gone when the insured
returns for the test results.

See also: Health-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Modeling-school fraud: Fraudulent schools tell students they must have a portfolio of
portraits to send to potential customers in order to get modeling assignments. The victim is
then charged greatly inflated prices by a photographer who is often a participant in the
scam.

See also: External fraud; Self-improvement scheme.
Money laundering: The process of turning “dirty” money, that is, illegally obtained

money, into “clean” money to conceal its existence, source or use, or to obstruct
investigative efforts, to preserve assets from forfeiture or to evade taxes.

See also: Legitimate front; Offshore banks and tax havens; Reporting guidelines, breach of;
Smurfing.
Money-transfer fraud: Funds are stolen by an outsider or bank employee with access

to the correct identification numbers needed to transfer funds by wire.

See also: External fraud.
Mortgage-insurance fraud: A scheme in which a healthy individual, who has a

mortgage insurance policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the
purchaser of the property defaults because of death or disability, falsely claims that he or
she is disabled in order to have the insurance company pay the mortgage.

See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Mortgage security, false: Security offered for mortgage financing purposes that is

nonexistent or has a value far lower than represented.

See also: Commercial crime; Finance fraud.
New-account fraud: The use of false identification to open new accounts and steal

money before the bank collects the funds from fresh deposits.

See also: Check fraud.
Nominee account: See Account, nominee.

Nursing-home fraud: Various kinds of fraud perpetrated by individuals providing

institutional nursing and convalescent care to patients, particularly the aged.

Victims are the patients of the facilities, their families, and/or governmental entities that
subsidize the cost of care.
Forms of nursing home fraud abuses include the following:

1. Unlawful conversion or attachment of patients’ assets

2. False claims to patient, family, or government entity regarding services delivered
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3. False statements in license applications or renewals
4. Maintenance of fraudulent records as to general or overhead costs of operation of
facilities as a basis for false claims to governmental entities

5. Receipt of kickbacks from facility suppliers
6. Employment of inadequate or unqualified staff in violation of licensing guidelines

See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Embezzlement andfiduciary fraud; Government-benefit
program, fraud against; Health-care fraud; Procurement fraud.
Off-book fraud: Fraud that occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit

trail is likely to exist.
See also: On-book fraud.
Offshore banks and tax havens: Banks or financial institutions located in tax havens
that conduct local and international business transactions in which money and other
securities can be held or transferred from one jurisdiction to another in secrecy under the
protection of banking privileges. The owners of the assets direct the transactions—
personally or through an intermediary, such as a trust to minimize taxes, evade taxes, or
avoid creditors.

See also: Money laundering.
On-book fraud: Fraud occurring in a business in which an audit trail (sometimes

obscure) exists that could aid in its detection.

See also: Off-book fraud.
Overhead charge, false: Fraudulently inflating costs through the addition of bogus

labor charges or overbilling of materials to increase profits in a cost-plus contract to allow
the contractor to keep the difference between actual and inflated costs.

See also: Property-improvement fraud.
Patent fraud: A variation of the advance fee fraud. The fraudster solicits “patentable”

ideas or gadgets through newspaper advertisements, and so on, for “evaluation by experts.”
The “evaluation” usually involves a fee, or at least “further processing” of the submission
may involve a fee. The fraudster usually has neither the intention nor the capacity to
evaluate or process a patentable item.
See also: Advance-fee fraud; Self-improvement scheme; Vanity-publishing scheme.
Payroll and personnel cycle: The accounting process that handles the hiring, firing,

and payment of employees along with timekeeping, expense accounts, and travel
reimbursement and insurance matters.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Pension-fund fraud: Theft and fraudulent conversion of pension fund assets either by

trustees, employers, or employees.
Fraud perpetuated by trustees in violation of their fiduciary duty in the management of
pension funds through the following:
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1. Poor investments tied to self-dealing or commercial bribery

2. Embezzlement
This fraud victimizes both the individuals who have contributed to the fund and those
intending to benefit from it. Victims are employees whose potential benefits are reduced
either by fraud or bankruptcy, as well as the employer whose contributions to the pension
plan could be inflated or lost.

See also: Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Claim, false or fraudulent; Commercial bribery; Trust,
abuse of
Personal checks, substituting for cash: An employee takes money from the cash

register and substitutes a personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always in balance,
but the employee never submits the personal check for deposit to the company’s bank
account. Consequently, the employee receives free use of the cash.
Personal-injury insurance fraud: Report of a real but overstated physical injury or

a false injury to an insurance company to recover unentitled benefits such as for a tort
claim or reimbursement of fake medical expenses.
See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Personal property pawned: The perpetrator inflates the value of his or her personal

belongings, insures them, and then pawns them for a lesser amount of cash. He or she then
reports them stolen and files a claim. If the insurance payment is received, he or she then
recovers the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance payment and pockets
the difference.

See also: Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud.
Pigeon drop or pocketbook drop: One of a large variety of street con games. The

victim is persuaded to withdraw a large sum of cash from a bank account to show good
faith or financial responsibility regarding the sharing of a “discovered” cache of money
with two other persons (who are con artists). In the course of the con, both the “discovered”
money and the victim’s “good faith” money disappear as do the con artists.
Victims may be anyone, since perpetrators of this fraud have a remarkable ability through
words to disarm their victims. Keys to the pigeon drop con are the following:
1.

The con artists do not appear to be associated or know each other in any way.

2. A pocketbook, envelop, and so on, containing a sizable amount of money and no
owner identification is “found” by one of the perpetrators who suggests the money is
illicitly generated, for example, a gambler’s proceeds.

3. The fraudsters agree to share the money with the victim who shows “good faith” to
those involved by putting up money. Alternately, all may agree to put money into a
pool to be held by a coconspirator, meaning, the one who did not find the money.
4. A switch is made while the victim is distracted, and his or her money is stolen by one of
the perpetrators.
Pollution and environmental protection violation: One of many abuses that

violates specific environmental- and pollution-control statutes and orders. White-collar
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crime abuses in this area consist primarily of the making or submitting of false statements
concerning the degree of compliance with regulations for pollution control in order to
cover up violations or lack of compliance with environmental standards. Falsification of test
or sample data designed to measure compliance with standards represents another form of
this violation.

See also: Commercial crime; Environmental abuse; Statement, false.
Ponzi scheme: This is a general class of fraud (a variation of the pyramid scheme) in

which the fraudster uses money invested by later victims to pay a high rate of return to the
first group of investors instead of making promised investments. These schemes must
inevitably collapse because it is mathematically impossible to continue them indefinitely.
The length of time they can continue will depend upon the promised rate of return to
investors, the amount of money the fraudster takes out for him- or herself and the costs of
inducing victims to part with their money (for example, sales commissions). Many of these
frauds have cheated their victims of millions of dollars; some frauds have operated over a
period of years.

Ponzi elements exist in many varieties of investment fraud under different guises and in
different variations; for example, long-term investments and short-term business financing.
See also: Investment fraud.
Possession of property obtained by crime: An offense that refers either to the

actual possession of property obtained by a crime or to the possession of proceeds from the
disposal of property obtained by a crime.

See also: Fraud.
Price fixing: Illegal combinations by sellers to administer the price of a good or service,

thus depriving customers of a competitive marketplace, restraining competition, and
maintaining an artificial price structure.
Victims are customers who are deprived of freely determined prices for the goods and
services they purchase. Secondary victims may be competitors of the firms participating in
the price-fixing agreement.
See also: Anti-trust offense; Trade, restraint of
Procurement fraud: Unlawful manipulation of the public or private contracting
process to obtain an advantage.

Victims are competitors, the public or private entity soliciting bids it believes to be
competitive as well as customers or constituents of those entities who do not realize the
benefits that would be derived from a truly competitive procurement process.
Three main forms of competitive procurement fraud are the following.

1. Bid rigging. A form of illegal anticompetitive activity in which bidders in a competitive
procurement collusively set their bids in such a way as to deprive the bid solicitor of a
competitive process. The effect is an administered bidding process in which the winner
and the terms and prices of the goods and services involved are set by the conspirators
rather than by the competitive process. Parties to the conspiracy are thus able to divide
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among themselves a set of procurement contracts and to fix prices for goods and
services at the same time.
2. Bidfixing. A form of illegal manipulation of the procurement process whereby one
bidding party is provided with inside information by the bid solicitor or an agent,
which enables the said bidder to gain an unfair advantage over other bidders.
3. Bribery and kickbacks. The awarding of procurement contracts on the basis of the
payment of bribes and kickbacks to procurement officials rather than on the basis of
competitive procurement guidelines.

See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Commercial bribery; Kickback; Corruption, public or official.
Product substitution: The substitution, without the knowledge of the purchaser, of a

less expensive product or service. The purchaser is charged for the more expensive product
or service and the fraudster pockets the difference.
See also: Commercial crime; Externalfraud; Procurement fraud; Property-improvement fraud.
Property-improvement fraud: The fraudster goes door-to-door promising repairs to

property at bargain rates, collecting up-front money and then absconding with the
proceeds. The victims are usually senior citizens.

See also: Externalfraud.
Property-insurance fraud: An insured reports a false theft, inflates the value of his or

her personal belongings and pawns them or purposely destroys them to collect a benefit
from the insurer.
See also: Arson for profit; Insurance fraud; Personal property pawned; Repossessed household goods.
Public or official corruption: See Corruption, public or official.
Purchases, unnecessary: Inventory ordered specifically for personal use, theft, or

scrap proceeds. The embezzlements are then charged to inventory.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Inventory and warehousing cycle; Procurement fraud.
Pyramid scheme: The commercial version of the chain letter scheme used by

fraudsters to sell phony investments (Ponzi scheme), distributorships, franchises, and
business opportunity plans.

See also: Chain-referral scheme; Franchise fraud; Investment fraud.
Real estate fraud: A form of loan fraud involving the purchase of under- or over

valued real estate.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lendingfraud; Mortgage security, false.
Referral sales fraud: See Chain-referral scheme; Merchandisingfraud.

Repair fraud: Consumer fraud involving repair or maintenance service performed on

consumer goods.
These white-collar crime schemes generally involve the following:

1. Overcharging for services performed
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2. Charging for services and parts not used
3. Performing services or repairs not wanted or needed
4. Failing to perform services or repairs promised

See also: Consumer fraud.
Reporting guidelines, breach of: A breach in defiance of a government

requirement that banks assist in the prevention of money laundering by reporting details of
large cash deposits. For example, a bank employee who conspires with a money launderer
to make deposits without reporting the required details is breaching the reporting
guidelines.

See also: Money laundering
Repossessed household goods: Household items are repossessed and the insured

submits a false claim to the insurer reporting the property was stolen.
See also: Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud.
Repurchasing: A stock market manipulation in which the promoter buys back control

of the company when the stock price reaches rock bottom.

See also: Stock market manipulation.
Risk factors, generic: Risk factors within the control of the entity protecting itself but

outside the control of potential perpetrators.
Revenue recognition in the improper period: Preparation of false financial

statements through the improper accruals of revenue on future, anticipated sales.
Techniques include altering dates on shipping documents or holding the books open until
after shipments have occurred. This technique is often used to inflate reported profits.

See also: Financial statement, false; Revenue recognition on transactions that do not meet revenue
recognition criteria.
Revenue recognition on transactions that do not meet revenue
recognition criteria: Preparation of false financial statements by improperly

recognizing revenue on transactions for which the earning process is incomplete—for
example, when the right of return exists, or on bill-and-hold transactions. The items
involved are often concealed through the use of written side agreements or oral agreements
that are not included with the company’s books of account.
See also: Financial statement, false; Revenue recognition in the improper period.
Running a box: One or more persons control the movement of a stock to manipulate

its price. They are called “the box.”
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Sales and collection cycle: The billing of goods or services to customers, the setting
up of accounts receivable for customers who purchase goods or services on credit and the
collection of funds relating to those receivables.
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Scrap, theft of: This kind of theft can be significant, especially if the thief has the

authority to designate saleable inventory as scrap. In most companies, inventory scrap is
easy to steal because it is not recorded or well controlled.
See also: Procurement fraud.
Secret commission: The most common form of procurement fraud. A secret payment

is given, usually by a supplier to a purchasing agent, to buy the purchasing agent’s
influence on his or her employer’s decision making.

See also: Commercial crime; Kickback; Procurement fraud.
Securities fraud: Fraudulent activities involving the sale, transfer, or purchase of

securities or money interests in the business activities of others.
Victims are generally investors who are not aware of the full facts regarding transactions
into which they enter. Abuses cover a broad range and can include, for example, the
following situations.

1. Businesses or promoters seek to raise capital unlawfully or without proper registration
and monitoring.
2. Securities of no value are sold or are misrepresented as being worth far more than their
actual value.
3. Purchasers are not advised of all facts regarding securities and/or of the failure to file
appropriate disclosures with federal and provincial regulatory agencies.
4. Insiders use special knowledge to trade in securities to the disadvantage of the general
public.

5. Broker-dealers and investment advisers act for their own benefit rather than for the
benefit of their clients.
6. False information is provided to security holders and the investing public in financial
statements published or filed with securities regulatory agencies or in the media as a
result of payments to financial writers or publications.

7. Manipulation of the price of securities by purchases and sales on the stock exchanges or
over-the-counter markets.
Securities violations potentially exist wherever investors rely on others to manage and
conduct the business in which an investment is made. It is not necessary that there be any
formal certificates such as stocks and bonds. Any form of investment agreement is
potentially a “security.”

See also: Advance-fee fraud; Boiler room; Insider trading; Investment fraud; Statement, false.
Self-improvement scheme: This kind of fraud appeals to the victim’s desire to

improve him- or herself personally or financially by the acquisition of social, employment,
or physical skills or attributes.

Schemes in this category tend to run on a continuum from improving purely personal or
social skills and attributes to those tied to an individual’s employment opportunities. On
the personal end of the scale are the dance studio or charm school schemes; on the
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employment end of the scale are fraudulent job training schemes and advance fee
employment agencies.
Somewhere in the middle are modeling agencies which purport to both improve the
“person” and his or her employment prospects. Also included are courses on improving
one’s image or ability to communicate with others. Some business opportunity schemes,
which hold out the prospect of financial improvement plus “being a respected community
businessperson,” also fall into this category by appealing to the victim’s desire to improve
his or her finances and lifestyle.

See also: Business-opportunity fraud; Employment-agency fraud; Vanity-publishing scheme.
“Sewer” service: A term used to describe the kinds of activity noted below.

Many merchandising, home repair, and other kinds of fraud rely on the use of litigation for
ultimate collection of the proceeds of the fraud. Likewise, many enterprises that are not
strictly speaking fraudulent, for example, those that sell much overpriced merchandise on
credit, also depend on litigation or the threat of litigation to squeeze money from victims.

In both these situations, devices are often adopted to fraudulently deprive victims of the
opportunity to defend against litigation-usually by not informing them that litigation has
been initiated against them (that is, dropping the summons or subpoena “down the sewer”).
This is accomplished, usually, by false affidavits, filed in court, that a summons and
complaint were served on the victim.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Sham, corporate: The use of a corporate entity to provide a veil of respectability and

substance for fraudulent activity.

See also: Commercial crime.
Sham transaction: A fraudulent transaction giving the impression of a legitimate

transaction at a higher price. These transactions are particularly difficult to detect because
they involve collusion with a co-conspirator outside the entity.

See also: Sham, corporate.
Shell company: An inactive company whose shares have been repurchased.

Short weighting or loading: Deliberate shorting of the volume or quantity of a cargo

or other purchase. The short load is accompanied by a false invoice demanding payment
for the full amount. This kind of fraud is easiest to perpetrate where the goods involved are
of a nature or bulk that it is difficult for the receiver to detect shortages.

The reverse of the short weighting or loading fraud is often used as a modus operandi for
theft of cargo. In this situation, a transport vehicle is intentionally overloaded; the overage
is not recorded and the overloaded amount forms the basis of kickbacks to the scheme
operators from the recipient of the shipment, who is often the fence for the stolen goods.
Manipulation of the size or volume of loads must always be accompanied by false
documentation.

This violation involves either a false claim to a customer or a plain and simple theft from
the shipper. Because insiders are frequently involved, it will often involve commercial
bribery, kickbacks, and so on.
See also: Weights and measures fraud.
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Short selling: A technique whereby the trader is gambling that the price of a stock will

fall. Thus, he or she anticipates a profit on the transaction by selling a number of shares
first, for later delivery at a specified price. The trader then buys those shares at a later date,
when, if his or her gamble were correct, the share price has fallen and he or she delivers
them. Thus, the trader makes a profit during a period of declining prices of the stock.
Siphoning funds: Illegal withdrawal of money in small amounts from a large number

of accounts. For example, pennies and portions of pennies (resulting from rounding off)
can be shaved from thousands of savings accounts. The money is then accumulated in a
single account that is accessed by the embezzler.
Skimming: A scheme in which cash is skimmed before it enters the accounting system.
For example, an employee accepts cash but never prepares a receipt or prepares a receipt
for less than the amount received.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Smurfing: The use of couriers (also known as smurfs} to deposit and withdraw cash or

cash equivalents at financial institutions in amounts less than the reporting limit to avoid
reporting requirements.
See also: Money laundering.
Statement, false: The concealment or misrepresentation of a fact material to the

decision-making process of an entity. The false statement is often the means by which a
fraudulent scheme to obtain money or benefit is effected for either of the following, among
other, reasons.
1. The false statement constitutes the underlying documentation for a false claim.

2. The false statement impedes discovery of the fraudulent scheme, that is, covers up the
fraud. These statements often provide the opportunity for conditioning the victim to
unquestioningly accept and approve a false claim.
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Ghost employee; Government-benefit program, fraud against.
Stock market manipulation: A crime perpetrated by a stock promoter who

artificially influences the market price of shares in a company for personal gain at the
expense of the investing public.
See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud.
Street certificate: A stock certificate that has been issued in the name of a brokerage
firm and then endorsed by it. It is now like a bearer certificate and can change hands
several times in many trades without being returned to a trust company for transfer.
Taking out the market: See Cleaning up the market.
Talent-agency scheme: See: Self-improvement scheme; Vanity-publishing scheme.

Tax and revenue violation: Fraud perpetrated with the intent to deprive a taxing

authority of revenue to which it is entitled or of information it needs to make a judgment
regarding revenues to which it is entitled or to avoid admission of involvement in illicit,
though profitable, business activities.
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Tax fraud may be perpetrated through the filing of a false return, as in personal income tax
fraud; through the bribery of a public official, as may occur in property tax assessment
fraud; or in the failure to file appropriately, as with an organized crime-figure who may not
be concerned with avoiding tax liability but rather with revealing the sources of his or her
taxable income. Many white-collar crimes obligate the offender to commit tax fraud
because of illicitly obtained money he or she does not wish to report, for example, assets
due to bribe, larceny, kickback, or embezzlement proceeds. Common crimes, especially of
a business nature, also result in tax violations, for example, bookmaking and fencing stolen
goods, which could be income and sales tax abuses.
Tax avoidance through false statements may be a component of otherwise legitimate
business enterprises, especially in the areas of business and occupation taxes, inventory
taxes, and sales taxes. Individuals and businesses will also seek to avoid or evade excise
taxes, for example, on cigarettes or in the case of tanker trucks by the substitution of lowtaxed home heating oil for higher-taxed diesel fuel.

See also: Income tax fraud.
Trade, restraint of: Actions, combinations, or schemes that interfere with unfettered

marketplace transactions. Examples are price fixing, bribery and kickbacks for commercial
advantage, interference with competitive bidding processes, dictation of price structure to
customers or dealers, and exclusive buying arrangements.
See also: Commercial bribery; Price fixing; Procurement fraud.
Transactions, entering false: Entering invoices for fake vendors into the accounts

payable system or recording false credit memos to reduce legitimate accounts receivable.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Sales and collection cycle.
Trust, abuse of: Misuse of one’s position and/or privileged information gained by

virtue of that position to acquire money, property, or some privilege to which one is not
entitled. Abuse of trust also often involves a violation of fiduciary duty.
Abuse of trust can occur in many areas but arises most frequently in the following four
white-collar crime areas.

1. Banking. Self-dealing in connection with loans or credit to oneself, one’s friends, or
business associates.
2. Securities. Insider information used for personal benefit at the expense of clients,
stockholders, and others.

3. Commercial bribery. Manipulation of procurement and competitive bidding processes.

4. Embezzlement. Misuse of property or funds in the custody of a trustee.
See also: Banking fraud; Commercial bribery; Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Insider trading;
Procurement fraud; Securities fraud.
Trust fund, misappropriation of: The diversion of client funds held in trust and use

of the money for purposes other than those intended by the client.

See also: External fraud.
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Vanity-publishing scheme: Any scheme that involves eliciting fees from individuals

on the promise of promoting their creative “talents” (real or imaginary) or assisting them in
the development of said “talent.”

The success of these kinds of fraud relies on the victim’s vanity about his or her hitherto
unrecognized talent. These schemes work best in areas such as literary publishing or song
writing, where taste is more important than performance standards.

The fraudster will imply a promise of national advertising, book reviews, distribution, and
special marketing services but not so concretely that he or she will be held to any
obligation. The victims usually invest heavily and lose both their money and their hopes.
They are left with a few copies of a printed and scored song arrangement or a number of
copies of books that established book review publications have not troubled to look at
because of their publishing source.
See also: Self-improvement scheme.
Warehousing: Part of a stock market manipulation that places shares into the hands of

people who are friendly to the promoter—warehousing or parking—to allow the promoter
to maintain control of the shares and continue to restrict and regulate their availability.
Wash-trading: A flurry of trading activity falsely created by the promoter’s group to

give the appearance of great interest in the stock to increase demand for the stock among
the public to whom the promoter plans to eventually sell his holdings when the price
reaches a certain level.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Weights and measures fraud: Cheating customers by failure to deliver prescribed

weights or volumes of desired goods. The victim is defrauded by relying on the false
documents provided by the fraudster testifying to the delivered quantities.
Examples of white-collar crimes include the following:
1. Gas pump meter manipulation to show more gas pumped than received by the
customer

2. Odometer rollbacks in auto sales
These kinds of fraud are most successful if the victim cannot easily verify the accuracy of
the measuring devices or if the victim has no reason to question the seller’s claim or
statement, for example, when the products sold are bottled or packaged.
See also: Short weighting or loading.
Welfare fraud: Abuses of government income and family subsidy programs.

Government welfare programs are often exploited by applicants who apply for benefits to
which they are not entitled or continue to claim eligibility even though they no longer meet
the eligibility criteria.
Receipt of money from claimants by officials processing welfare claims represents another
dimension of this fraud. These monies may be solicited as kickbacks in exchange for the
filing of inflated claims; as bribes to certify claimants who are ineligible or to avoid
reporting claimants’ ineligibility or as extortion for processing claims to which a recipient is
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fully eligible. In some cases, nonexistent recipients (ghosts) may be created to fraudulently
siphon money out of the programs.
See also: Government-benefit program, fraud against.
White-collar crime: Nonviolent crime for financial gain committed through deception

by entrepreneurs, professionals, or semiprofessionals using their special occupational skills
and opportunities. This category also includes similar crimes committed by anyone having
special technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of
the person’s occupation.

See also: Commercial crime; Economic crime.
Work-at-home schemes: See Business-opportunity fraud; Franchise fraud.

Written-off account, diversion of payments from: Diversion of payments

received from a customer whose account has been written off. Because most companies do
not monitor defunct accounts, this activity is rarely detected. For example, an employee
will work with a customer to collect an overdue receivable. Before the customer pays, the
employee writes off the account, removes it from the books, and pockets the funds
received.

See also: Internal fraud; Sales and collection cycle.
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WEB SITES
Approximately 1,200 new Web sites are created every day and an untold number become
derelict. It is important, therefore, to understand that no list can ever be up-to-date or
guarantee accuracy.
AFU and Urban Legends Archive (The), www.urbanlegends.com
This site separates the myriad hoaxes on the Internet (and in society) from those
with a grain or more of truth.
American College of Forensic Examiners, www.acfe.com
The American College of Forensic Examiners has more than 15,000 members and
is a networking opportunity for forensic sciences experts of all disciplines. It is the
largest association established for forensic experts of all disciplines to promote
continuing education, networking and seminars, conferences, workshops, Internet,
continuing education courses, and home study courses.

Asiaweek.com. www.asiaweek.com
This newsmagazine Web site also includes a list of the region's 1,000 largest
companies and 500 largest banks.

Association of Certified Forensic Investigators of Canada (The). www.homewoodave.com
This nonprofit Canadian organization's objective is to promote and foster a national
forum and governing body for the affiliation of professionals who provide to the
public, governments, and employers their expertise and services in the areas of
fraud prevention, detection, and investigation.

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (The). www.cfenet.com
This is the Web site for The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, an
international, 25,000-member professional organization dedicated to fighting fraud
and white-collar crime. With offices in North America and chapters around the
globe, the Association is networked to respond to the needs of antifraud
professionals anywhere in the world.
Billy's Money Laundering Information Website. www.laundryman.u-net.com
This site provides information about UK Government money laundering laws. This
is not a government authorized site, however, some of the interesting and valuable
material includes an overview of the business areas prone to money laundering
activities, UK legislation, money laundering offenses, and international initiatives in
place to prevent this crime.

Business Credit USA. www.businesscreditusa.com/index.asp
Offers free and inexpensive credit ratings, credit reports, and customer opinions on
12 million businesses.
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California Business Search Program, www.ss.ca.gov/automate.htm
Allows you to search California corporations, limited partnerships, and limited
liability company databases. Provides access to more than two million records with
frequently requested business entity information, such as status, Secretary of State
file number, date of filing, and agent for service of process. The information is not a
complete file and is currently updated weekly rather than daily.
ChinaOnline. www.chinaonline.com
This daily online paper provides real-time, in-depth news and information about
the rapidly growing Chinese marketplace, including industry updates, analyses and
in-depth reports, and company and media profiles, including fraud-newsworthy
events.

Consumer Scams in Canada. www.canadaonline.about.com/cs/scams/
This Web site provides warnings, alerts, and safety precautions to protect you from
Canadian scams and fraud, online and offline. It includes consumer information
and assistance, invention company scams, and job scams, Net hoaxes, 1-900 phone
scams, cheque fraud, counterfeit bank notes, online auction fraud, phone fraud,
telemarketing fraud, and the latest RCMP fraud cases.

Experts.com. www.experts.com
This is an extensive directory of qualified and professional experts from all over the
world in many areas of expertise. Experts.com promotes and matches high-level
expert professionals with individual business or legal needs.
Fighting Fraud and Corruption. http://www.ex.ac.uk/~RDavies/arian/scandals/fight.html
This site provides links to a host of other fraud-related Web sites that include
professional bodies, investigative services, forensic accounting firms, pressure
groups, and so on.

Financial Services Regulation. www.fsa.gov.uk
The Financial Services Authority is an independent body that regulates the
financial services industry in the UK. The FSA has four objectives under the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which are to maintain market confidence;
promote public understanding of the financial system; protect consumers; and fight
financial crime.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. www.icaew.co.uk
This is the Web site of the largest professional accountancy body in Europe, with
more than 120,000 members. Information contained includes professional
standards, library and information services, policy, education and training and an
online directory of over 25,000 CA firms worldwide.

InsuranceFraud.com. www.insurancefraud.com
This Web site links organizations and professionals in the anti-insurance fraud
community. It provides a unique forum for the anti-fraud executives and
independent professionals who do not normally have the resources on hand to
identify insurance fraud and abuse in the industry, to quickly investigate and
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subsequently recover from the fraudster's activities, and/or to identify ways to
prevent the occurrence or recurrence of fraud in the insurance industry. It includes
a data base listing of anti-fraud professionals, vendors, and regulators.
International Association of Financial Crimes Investigators, www.iafci.org
This organization was formed by a small group of law enforcement officers and
special agents of the credit card industry to represent the professional fraud
investigator. The Association, a nonprofit international organization, provides
services and facilitates the collection and exchange of information about financial
fraud, fraud investigation and fraud prevention methods.

Internet Scambusters. www.scambusters.org
This Web site provides information about the latest Internet frauds and scams as
well as virus updates.

National Bureau of Asian Research. www.nbr.org
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan
institution that conducts advanced research on policy-relevant issues in Asia. It also
serves as the global clearinghouse for Asia research conducted by specialists and
institutions worldwide.
National Check Fraud Center. www.ckfraud.org
This private organization provides nationwide, updated multisource intelligence to
support local law enforcement, federal agencies and the financial and retail
communities in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of known check fraud
and other white collar crimes.

National Fraud Information Center (The). www.fraud.org
The NFIC offers consumers advice about promotions in cyberspace and route
reports of suspected online and Internet fraud to the appropriate government
agencies. The NFIC was originally established in 1992 by the National Consumers
League, the oldest nonprofit consumer organization in the United States, to fight
the growing menace of telemarketing fraud by improving prevention and
enforcement. The NFIC provides the only nationwide toll-free hotline for
consumers to get advice about telephone solicitations and report possible
telemarketing fraud to law enforcement agencies.

Sinosource. www.sinosource.com
This is a private, Internet-based business info provider in China to help foreign
business, particularly small- and middle-sized companies, communicate directly
with businesses in China. Includes a business directory of China.

Statistics Singapore, www.singstat.gov.sg
This is the national statistical authority responsible for disseminating official
statistics on Singapore.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. http://www.sec.gov/consumer/cyberfr.htm
This site provides valuable information about Internet fraud and how to avoid
Internet Investment Scams. This alert tells you how to spot different types of
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Internet fraud, what the SEC is doing to fight Internet investment scams, and how
to use the Internet to invest wisely.

Vodatel Networks Holdings Limited, www.irasia.com
This is an investor relations site that includes profiles of publicly listed South Asian
companies. It has annual reports, press releases, stock quotes, and so on.
World Trade Database, www.wtdb.com
This is a Web site and database designed as a resource for companies and
individuals to do business in Asia. This site has information about Teletext Program
in China, China Central Television. It provides business guide, China offices of
American companies, companies information and Taiwan economic daily news.
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IT SEEMS ONLY FITTING that the city founded by mobster Bugsy
Siegel in the 1940s has become the destination of choice for felons
fleeing the law. Las Vegas is America’s fastest growing metropolitan area,
with a population of 1.3 million. It also welcomes about a half million
people a week, making it a seemingly ideal place to become lost in the
crowd.
“Sooner or later they all end up in Vegas,” Alfredo Cervantes, a
sergeant with the Las Vegas Criminal Apprehension Team, told the Los
Angeles Times. “Criminals, like everybody else, know they can get
anything and everything here, from girls to gambling. If they do get
caught, at least they had one last hurrah in Sin City.”
And many of them do get caught, at a higher rate than anywhere else
in the U.S. “During the first 10 months of fiscal year 1999, the Las Vegas
task force arrested 840 felons, the largest number by any of the 56
fugitive U.S. apprehension teams,” reported the Times. “In the same
period, the Los Angeles team netted 382 arrests, New York’s 301 and
San Francisco’s 251.”
Among the apprehended fraudsters was a disgraced New Jersey
prosecutor who skipped bail after being arrested on corruption and tax
fraud charges. During his time in Las Vegas he may have taken in a strip
show performed by a New York drug dealer. She was arrested onstage
when task force officers noticed her tell-tale snake tattoos.
One of the more unusual arrests occurred last September, soon after a
restaurant cashier finished a Reader’s Digest article about Grant Warren
Beaucage, who was wanted in Canada for the murder of his wife. The
cashier put down the magazine and looked up at the man about to pay
for his meal. She recognized him as Beaucage, from the picture in the
article, and alerted hotel security. He was apprehended a short time
later.
Considering that fraudsters often have a large stash of money with
them, it seems likely that Vegas’ bright lights would be a particularly
compelling lure for them. And it might turn out to be a smart place to
hide. “Sorting through 700 warrants each month, [the Criminal
Apprehension Team] forsake embezzlers and scam artists for the more
violent elusive offenders,” reported the Times. But even if fraudsters do
gain freedom in Las Vegas, we can take some solace in assuming that
most of them will lose their ill-gotten gains in the casinos.
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Giving
Fraud the
Finger

Think only criminals have their fingerprints taken? Then you don't
know about biometrics security. You likely soon will.

PIN NUMBERS and other types
of security codes, passwords and
cards for banking and other
financial transactions will likely
become obsolete in the next few
years. “As we know, these systems
offer a limited level of security
from fraud,” says Dr. Edward
Cheng, VP of Public Relations
with SecuGen Corporation, a
global biometrics company located
in Silicon Valley, CA. “But a
fingerprint is unique to each
person. Even identical twins have
different fingerprints. So a
fingerprint cannot be stolen or
copied.”
Biometrics is the automated
method of using an individual’s
distinct biological features for
security purposes. This technique
can verify an individual’s identity
using physical measurements such
as fingerprints, palm size, facial
features, iris scans and voice
recognition.
SecuGen has recently begun a
pilot project with ING Direct,
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Canada using a fingerprint
biometrics security system for
ING’s Internet banking products.
ING Direct is a member of the
ING Group, one of the world’s
largest financial institutions, with
assets exceeding US$430 billion.
Under the project, about 500 of
ING’s customers will use a special
mouse developed by SecuGen,
known as EyeD Mouse II, that has
built-in fingerprint recognition
technology.
The users must first register their
thumbprint with ING (a one-time
enrollment done over the Internet).
When they log on to conduct a
banking transaction, for example,
their thumbprint is scanned by
their mouse (there is a small glass
section on the left side of the
mouse, known as a platen, where
the thumb of the right hand
typically rests) to confirm their
identity. The verification takes less
than a second.
“We’re already using this type
of system with other companies,

for things such as security access to
offices,” says Dr. Cheng. “But this
project, I believe is the first ever
with a financial institution.” He
says the system is highly accurate,
which was not necessarily the case
with earlier versions of this
technology. “A person’s unique
features are extracted and turned
into a 60-digit code number,” he
says. “The image is basically
distortion-free. ”
Less worrisome than the quality
of the technology is the question
about consumer response to having
their fingerprints stored in the
computers of a large corporation.
“The fear of ‘Big Brother’ is
certainly a concern with some
people,” says Dr. Cheng. “But
we’ve found that once they
understand how secure their
fingerprints are from misuse, they
are very happy to cooperate with a
system that protects them from
fraud.” ■
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Fraud detection goes high-tech as
many industries turn to software

programs to uncover scams.

4

THE 3-D COMPUTER graphic
swirled around and revealed a tall
tower with many strings attached.
It was a graphic representation of a
high-rise building on Toronto’s
Yonge Street and the strings
represented 167 people from that
address who had filed insurance
claims with a prominent Canadian
insurance company.
The next graphic showed that
130 people from a two-story
building outside Ottawa had all
made claims with the same insurer.
With a look of horror, an
executive from the insurance firm
scribbled down the addresses as he
suddenly realized both buildings
were office towers — not residential
locations, as the claims indicated.
It was a telltale sign the claims
were suspect.

In the very recent past those
fraudulent claims might not have
been uncovered. They would
likely have contributed to the $1.3
billion insurance losses a year,
which makes insurance fraud one
of Canada’s biggest white-collar
crime problems. But they were
detected, during an impressive
demonstration of a new software
program called “Fraud
Investigator” from InfoGlide Corp.
Fraud Investigator was run on
the insurance company’s computer
database. In a matter of minutes,
the software found serious
problems that the insurance
company’s existing fraud detection
methods had not discovered.
“We searched claims and
residential addresses and then had
the program visualize the
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addresses with the most claimants,”
says Lee Thistle of TSI Solutions
Inc., the Canadian distributor of
Fraud Investigator.
Most insurance computer
systems in Canada have little or no
ability to search their own
databases to find suspect claims.
But the patented “similarity search
engine” at the heart of Fraud
Investigator can detect any
possible interrelated data in
insurance claims.
Fraud-detecting software is a
recently new tool on the
marketplace. It’s of value to most
sectors that face large-scale fraud,
but particularly the insurance
industry, banks, telephone
companies and government health
insurance plans.

One Size Doesn’t Fit All
Report on Fraud set out to discover
what software was on the market
and how companies and
professionals can best judge what
will work for them. We quickly
discovered there is no “one size fits
all” solution.
Insurance industry chatter is
focused on Fraud Investigator
because it was the clear winner of
an informal fraud detection
software test run by the U.S.
National Insurance Crime Bureau
(NICB). (See sidebar on page 7.)
Fraud Investigator’s similarity
search engine can cross-search
multiple databases even if
they have different formats
and “dirty data” containing
numerous errors. It can
find names, addresses and
as many as 30 other identifiers,
even if criminals have carefully
changed the data to avoid
detection. As well, it can
incorporate other public records to
expand its own detection
effectiveness.
Scott Bothwell of the NICB says
it plans to use the Internet so that
insurance companies using Fraud
Investigator can access NICB’s
questionable claims database to
check to see if a person, or
someone similar to that person,
has filed multiple claims with
different companies. This would
allow them to conduct a search in
real time and approve or reject a
claim very quickly.
Another characteristic that
makes Fraud Investigator popular
is its ease of use. Field investigators

need only a day’s training and do
not require the assistance of
computer programmers.
InfoGlide is initially marketing
the software to the property and
casualty segment of the insurance
industry, but will soon target auto
and healthcare insurers. It says the
similarity search technology is also
being used by a U.S. intelligence
agency to help track terrorists.
Fraud Investigator may also
prove effective in combating some
forms of Internet fraud. InfoGlide
just signed a contract with the
leading Internet auction site, eBay
Inc., to help it attack identity fraud.
The problem of customers who
take money from purchasers and
then never deliver the goods has
plagued eBay. It will use InfoGlide
software to keep known fraudsters
off its network even if they change
their names and other identifiers.
In a test on eBay’s computer
system, the InfoGlide software
found one person posing as 345
others, the company says.

Tracking Telephone Fraud
A very different type of software is
being used to combat fraud in the
telephone industry. Most phone
companies use a form of neural
network technology that tracks
customer calling-patterns and flags
any unusual deviations.
An explosion of wireless and
Internet services has made the
telecom industry more prone to
fraud than ever. An estimated
$6-$8 billion a year is siphoned
from telephone revenue in the U.S.
Typical frauds include:
...continued
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• cloning cell phones — duplicating

transmitter codes of individual
phones and then using the code to
run up huge long distance charges
that are billed to the unsuspecting
cell phone owner. It’s a favorite
trick of Canadian telemarketing
fraudsters who target Americans
• dial-through fraud — hacking into
corporate PBX systems and then
making long distance calls
• calling card theft — stealing calling
card numbers and selling them on
the black market
• clip-on fraud — tapping into an
exposed telephone line outside an
office building and then selling
access to unlimited numbers of
people. It’s prominent in poor
ethnic communities where many
people lack the means to make
telephone calls home.
MCI Worldcom’s “Sheriff”
program and “Supersleuth” from
Nortel Networks are leading
solutions in the telecom industry.
Nortel developed its anti-fraud
software over the past decade in its
UK labs and commercialized it two
years ago. It’s based on neural
network artificial intelligence
technology that is modeled on
human thought patterns, says Walt
Shedd, Nortel’s vice president of
business development for North
America.
Supersleuth has been a hot seller
with German, Dutch and Central
American cell phone firms. As well,
four local exchange carriers in the
U.S. are using it, as are two
Canadian companies.
The rise of flexible, unified voice,
data and Internet networks has
increased the vulnerability to fraud.
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There are about 50 different forms
of fraud, including subscription
fraud, identity fraud, technical
cloning fraud in analog wireless
networks and clip-on fraud in
landline networks.
“We see different types of fraud
emerge almost on a daily basis and
a lot of times it may be just a
variation of an old scheme,” Shedd
says. “It takes awhile for people to
see it.”

With Supersleuth, he adds, “we’re
looking at 70 different events or
characteristics in any given record
and mapping that to known fraud
types. We’re also looking at what is
expected behavior within this
service being provided and we’re
tracking deviations from that
behavior. We’ve found that 100 per
cent of the time if a new fraud is
perpetrated it may not show up and
be recognizable as something we’ve
seen in the past. But it certainly will
show up as something that is not
expected.”
Supersleuth can work with any
type of computer network. It
reaches into a database and collects
records, analyzes them and
produces results so an analyst can
see if it’s a high priority alarm.
An independent study of 40
global wireless operators, each with

its own anti-fraud program, showed
they averaged one fraud analyst per
133,000 subscribers. Those using
Supersleuth averaged one analyst
for every 666,000 subscribers,
making the phone company’s “hair
and blood” costs substantially lower,
Shedd says.
As well, the hardware costs
associated with installing
Supersleuth were one-quarter to
one-half the cost of competitive
systems. Pricing for the software is
based on the size of a company’s
subscriber base, typically being less
for smaller companies and more for
larger.
Benefit to Banks
Banks are a prime target of
fraudsters. Stolen credit and debit
cards (see “Card Tricks” page 8) are
a multi-billion dollar a year problem
for banks and the outsourcing
industry that banks use to process
credit and debit card transactions.
As with telephone companies,
banks use neural networking
software to scan transaction patterns
and recognize any deviations from
established customer practices. For
instance, if a credit card is used
normally in a certain geographic
area, say Quebec, and then
suddenly is used in Mexico, the
software will flag the transaction. A
bank analyst may then decide to
require an identification check of the
cardholder before the bank will
approve further charges.
International Neural Machines
Inc. (INM) of Waterloo, ON has
developed anti-fraud software for
Canadian and Mexican banks. The
data mining software searches the
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bank’s databases and analyzes
transactions, comparing them to
the past history of customers and
merchants to recognize potentially
fraudulent activity. Its software has
the advantage
of learning
from the data it
searches to
pick up new
tactics that
criminals may
develop, says
Oleg Feldgajer,
president of
INM. The
company
recently
received a contract from the World
Bank to install its hybrid software
in the Central Bank of Estonia
specifically to combat money
laundering in the country’s small
banking sector.
INM is also in discussions with
Canada’s new anti-money
laundering agency, FINTRAC, to
provide it with software to help
monitor cross-border financial
transactions including inter-bank
wire transfers to detect money
laundering. In time, the scrutiny
will be run via the Internet, making
laundering analysis much faster
and more effective. ■
Jock Ferguson is a Toronto writer.

January 2000

Tests
How do you decide which software is best for

your needs? Put them to the test.

OBVIOUSLY you can hire a
consultant to advise you of
your needs, but at the end of
the day there is only one
reliable method for selecting
anti-fraud software: have
competing software vendors
run a demonstration on your
company’s own computer
database.
That was the approach taken
last year by Scott Bothwell at
the National Insurance Crime
Bureau to evaluate anti-fraud
software technologies. He
salted the NICB’s database
with information from a
sophisticated Russian fraud ring
that it had stopped in 1998. He
gave the database to two
companies to see what they
could find.
In just three days InfoGlide
found the fraud ring while the
other software product found
nothing. The similarity search

engine was able to search
several dozen fields besides
names, addresses and vehicle
identification numbers to find
the clever criminal who had
changed data to avoid
detection. Fraud Investigator
found the Russian crime gang
material in the database “but it
also found things we weren’t
aware of in our own data,”
Bothwell says.
NICB is a non-profit
investigative agency supported
by more than 1,000 U.S.
property and casualty
insurance companies. Bothwell
advises any company to do
what NICB did — have various
vendors do pilot studies using
their own company data and
then judge the results. “Some
software packages are very
expensive so you want to make
sure what you buy will work,”
he says. ■
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Losses from credit card, debit card and ATM

fraud exceed more than a billion dollars
annually in the U.S. alone. But the problem is no

longer a national one, as an expert tells us. It’s
now become an international crime.

JOE MAJKA (pronounced Mykah) is a Regional Director for Visa
U.S.A.’s Risk Management Fraud
Control Department. He has over
24 years experience in corporate
security and criminal investigations,
specializing in the area of financial
crime, and is certified by the
American Society of Industrial
Security as a Certified Protection
Professional. During his career,
Majka has been Director of Security
for Eurekabank and Corporate
Security Manager for Homefed
Bank, in San Diego. He holds a
Bachelor’s degree from California
State University, Hayward and a
lifetime teaching credential from the
University of California at Berkeley.

ROF: From Visa’s perspective, how
serious a problem is fraud?

JM: It’s very serious. Overall, fraud
increased last year, from the
previous year, by approximately

8

14 per cent. However, I should also
say that for Visa, in terms of fraud
to sales volume, fraud only
represents 6 cents for every one
hundred dollars in sales volume, or
.06 per cent.

ROF: Many of the crimes related to the
fraud losses have some kind of
international connection.
JM: That’s exactly right. From a
banking and law enforcement
perspective, if you are still thinking
locally you are behind already,
because the crooks are thinking
globally. And, to no surprise, the
Internet is bringing them to you. In
the past, a merchant was used to
doing business locally or maybe
state wide. Most customers would
walk into the business to conduct
their transactions. The Internet
takes that all away. Today, you can
be doing business with somebody
in the UK or Russia or Latin

America. They don’t have to walk
into your store any more. And the
criminals are using that to their
advantage.
ROF: Can you give an example?
JM: A Wisconsin merchant
received an order from Belarus,
part of the former Soviet Union, for
50,000 pentium chips. The guy in
Belarus gave a credit card number
that he’d obtained from a fraud
program available on the Internet
called CreditMaster. The merchant
called his bank and got
authorization and shipped the stuff
out. Now you and I might be a little
suspect about sending a first order
of 50,000 chips to someone in
Belarus that you’ve never done
business with before. But the
merchant wasn’t. After it was too
late, it was discovered that the card
number, which was from Canada,
had been stolen.
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ROF: How did that happen?
JM: CreditMaster, which anyone
who surfs the Net can find, was
developed in 1992 by a group of
hackers who decided to have fun
with the financial industry. It’s in
version 4.0 now. This program
allows you to generate credit card
and debit card account numbers.
The way it works best is to take
one good account number, which
can be obtained off a receipt. They
know that the first four to six
numbers identify whether it’s a
Visa, Mastercard, American
Express or Discovery number.
They put the number into a
program and ask it to give them
999 account numbers, half above
and half below the good number.
The program then generates a
number, usually 13-16 digits, that
meet a very simple algorithm used
in the banking industry to create a
credit card number. It’s that simple.

remember a few years ago, crooks
were stealing credit card numbers
by copying them off a restaurant
receipt, for example. To combat
that, the industry put this little
three-digit number on a card’s
magnetic stripe, which didn’t show
up on the receipt. If it wasn’t on an
authorization, the transaction was
refused. But the crooks now have a
device that we call a wedge. It can
be as small as a pack of cigarettes
or a pager. If they take your card,
typically at a restaurant, and swipe
it through the device, it stores
everything on the card: your name,
number and the three-digit code.
They then download that onto their
computer and transfer it onto a
counterfeit card. You still have your
card in your wallet. It hasn’t been
stolen or lost but the crooks can use
it. Often somewhere far away.
ROF: Where have stolen U.S. card
numbers turned up?

JM: No they don’t. But if a bank
issues their numbers sequentially,
which many of them do, chances
are they’re going to come up with a
lot of good numbers. Then what
they do is test the number out. For
example, they call AOL and if they
can open up an account with that
number, then it’s good. Or, they
transfer the number to a piece of
plastic and go to a gas station
where you can pay at the pump
with a credit card. And, as one of
my colleagues likes to say, if it
passes gas then they know they can
go ahead and commit fraud.

JM: The crooks often email the
numbers outside the country. We
have found numbers skimmed from
a restaurant in Virginia on some
suspects arrested in Taiwan. They
were linked to individuals selling
skimming devices in Japan,
Malaysia, Korea and the U.S.
Interestingly, they used the Royal
Bank logo on all their plastic.
Another example was a little
Chinese restaurant in Wilson,
Oregon. Within three to five days
after skimming customers’
numbers, those numbers showed
up in Beijing, China. Months later
we saw the same numbers in
Chicago and Latin America.

ROF: How else are numbers stolen

ROF: As a recent case in Canada

these days?

revealed, skimming also takes place at
ATM machines.

ROF: But they don’t know if the
numbers are legitimate.

JM: The most current method is
something called skimming. If you
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Russian nationals arrested in
Sweden had equipment on them
that they would lay over the PIN
pad of an ATM machine. When
you entered your PIN number it
would capture it. They also put a
device on the face of the machine
that would capture everything on
your card.
ROF: Are mostly amateurs or
organized criminals involved in this?

JM: Both, but increasingly we see
international organized crime. And
they’re using the profits from this
type of fraud to fund other
activities, such as drugs and guns.
About two years ago in southern
California, a highway patrolman
was shot and killed when he made
a routine traffic stop. In the trunk
of the car were counterfeit
travellers’ cheques. The person who
shot and killed him was a member
of an Asian organized crime group.
That’s how serious this business is.
I met with the Secret Service
recently and they were telling us
everything lately involving these
kinds of frauds seems to come back
to Hong Kong, Vancouver and San
Francisco. There’s always that
connection there.

ROF: Can you stop this kind of
fraud?

JM: We can and we’re working on
ways right now. But whatever we
come up with, the crooks will likely
find a way to crack it. What we
hope to do is stay ahead of them
for as long as we can, and to keep
the losses down to as minimum a

JM: That’s right. Last year some

9

REPORT

"Fraud

for Fraud
by Jock Ferguson

IPs becoming an all too familiar

story: a high flying financial wizard
crashes down to earth amid

THE
LATEST
FALLEN hero is
Martin A. Armstrong,
the head of the Princeton
Economic Institute (located
in Princeton, NJ., but not
connected to Princeton University),
who was charged last fall by the
U.S. Attorney of the Southern
District of New York with “a
massive scheme through which
billions of dollars of promissory
notes were fraudulently sold to
Japanese corporate investors.” The
same day the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filed
a civil action and obtained an
injunction to freeze his assets, stop
him carrying on business and
appoint a receiver to take over his
companies. Armstrong is currently
out on $5-million bail.
Prior to the charges, the
Princeton Economic Institute billed
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itself as “perhaps
the largest global
advisory firm in the world
to major multinationals,
governments and institutions.”

Made His Stamp at Age 13
A child prodigy, Armstrong, now
49, began his career as a 13-yearold stamp dealer. The author of
several influential books on stamp
collecting, he was drummed out of
the philatelic community in 1972
after being accused of having sold
rare stamps that he didn’t own.
Undaunted, Armstrong
reinvented himself over the next
two decades as a financial guru,
establishing an impressivesounding legend. He claimed that
his $60-million artificial
intelligence forecasting system
correctly predicted crashes in the
U.S. stock and bond markets in
1987 and 1994 respectively. He

also boasted how he had correctly
forecasted the steep downturn in
the Japanese economy in 1989,
and more recent fluctuations in the
value of the yen against the U.S.
dollar. His web site showed a
picture of him with former UK
prime minister Margaret Thatcher
in 1996.
His stellar reputation as an
economic forecasting guru
attracted well-heeled institutional
investors, particularly from Japan.
In the last half of the 1990s they
gave his Tokyo office more than $3
billion to manage.

Ponzi Scheme
The breaks were applied to
Armstrong’s wild ride when he was
charged with criminally
masterminding an international
Ponzi scheme that defrauded his
Japanese corporate investors of
close to US$1 billion.
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allegations of wrongdoing.

Documents filed in criminal and
civil proceedings show a vast
chasm between appearance and
reality, a gulf that is embarrassing
for professional advisors and
executives deceived in the scam, as
there is little evidence of thorough
due diligence by investors. The
case illustrates vividly the inherent
dangers of entrusting money with
people who promise greater
returns than those being offered by
most of the market.
Investors thought Armstrong
had unique economic forecasting
expertise that other money
managers lacked, giving them an
advantage that would produce
higher returns. His crystal ball
skills, he claimed, had produced an
average annual return of 28 per
cent for six consecutive years, a
performance that would double
investors’ money in just three
years. At the time, Japanese banks
were paying zero interest.
Armstrong promised a minimum
of four per cent annual return with
an upside potential for much more.
A key to the facade were regular
reporting letters sent to investors
that falsely claimed they were
earning large returns. In fact, for
almost two years Armstrong’s
trading activity produced dramatic
losses of at least $500 million.
The greatest losses were in the
18 months prior to his arrest. As
the yen grew stronger and
stronger, Armstrong became more
desperate. Still convinced of his
own forecasting rhetoric, he bet
the U.S. dollar heavily against the
yen. It was a dreadful mistake.
Most investors bought into his
deals in U.S. dollars and were to
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be paid back in yen. This
significantly compounded
Armstrong’s problem. Deals that
had a stated interest rate of four
per cent were in fact owed over
twenty per cent with the rise in the
value of the yen against the dollar.
It’s fascinating to go back and
look at Armstrong’s published
views on the Japanese yen during

“Someday I want to be
rich. Some people get so

rich they lose all respect for
humanity. That’s how rich
I want to be. ”
- Rita Rudner

those 18 months in 1998 and 1999.
He appeared to have used his
writings to try and stem the yen’s
downward flow. In July 1999, for
example, Armstrong engaged in
some self-serving warning that if
the yen closed below 110.65 yen to
the dollar, then it could “result in
an economic catastrophe. Such a
decline in the dollar will wipe out
any sign of economic recovery and
plunge Japan into yet another
massive round of deflation. This
would most likely impact the
entire Asian region and at the
same time perhaps push China
over the edge.” But in the end, it
was Armstrong who fell.

When the FBI raided
Armstrong’s Princeton office they
found records showing obligations
to repay between $700 million and
$ 1 billion at a time when there was
only $46 million left in the kitty.
They also found that many early
investors had been repaid with
funds raised from recent investors,
the classic hallmark of a criminal
Ponzi scheme. Investigators found
at least 113 separate investment
accounts under Armstrong’s
umbrella and one company, Alps
Electric Company, could lose as
much as $185 million this year,
Bloomberg News reported. It’s not
yet been determined how much
Armstrong pocketed in
management and performance fees
or where that money is located.

Says He’s a Scapegoat
Armstrong strongly denies the
criminal allegations. His lawyer
was quoted as saying that
Armstrong is being made a
scapegoat for “honest non-criminal
trading losses.”
No matter how the criminal and
civil proceedings resolve, it is
obvious that many investors —
including upward of 80 Japanese
companies — put their blind faith
in Armstrong’s self-proclaimed
genius. Just as there are too many
stories lately of financial gurus who
may be anything but, there are
even more examples of supposedly
sophisticated investors who failed
to look beneath the surface to
determine whether a deal that
seemed too good to be true was in
fact just that. ■
Jock Ferguson is a Toronto writer.
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the globe

A Really Sick Fraud
Bobby Heaton fleeced five
investors of $6,100 late last year
from a scam he ran out of his
hospital bed. Heaton, who used a
fake name, pretended to have had
a heart attack to get into St.
Joseph’s Hospital in Houston.
Then he convinced a pastor’s wife,
who counseled the ill, to get her
friends to invest in a scheme that
promised them a 600 per cent
return on their money. Heaton not
only fled with their money, but left
without paying his $41,000 medical
bill.

Soccer Fraud Balls-Up
Twenty-two football players with
Newcastle United were double
crossed by a scalper last December
after they tried to sell their
complimentary FA Cup Final
tickets, with a face value of £36,
for £450 each. When reserve
goalkeeper Peter Keen, who was
the plan’s mastermind, returned
from handing over the tickets to
the scalper, he discovered the
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payment envelope contained only
Monopoly money. According to
The Mirror, some of the players,
many of whom earn thousands of
pounds a week, wanted the money
to pay for vacations with their
girlfriends.

Send Him to Sing Sing
Ever thought of filling out more
than one of those offers from
music companies that send you up
to a dozen CDs for the price of
one? David Russo, 33, of New
Jersey sure did. Over a four-year
period, Russo opened 1,630 fake
accounts with BMG Music
Services and Columbia House. He
used the 22,260 CDs, worth about
$350,000, to stock his flea-market
booths. Russo, who paid about
$50,000 for the CDs that he had
sent to post-office boxes under
false names, was charged with mail
fraud.

Get Your Money
Smelling Pacific Ocean
Fresh
How can Nauru, an eight-squaremile coral island in the Pacific
Ocean near Australia, have one of

the highest per capita incomes in
the world? By doing laundry for
the Russian Mafia. According to
The Sunday Times ofLondon, the
Russian mob washed about US$70
billion worth of dirty money
through the island’s 200 banks last
year. Nauru’s inhabitants were
already wealthy from the island’s
fossilized, phosphate-rich bird
droppings. They are now even
better off, thanks to a different
kind of deposit: proceeds from
drug trafficking, prostitution and
people smuggling. ■
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The CPA's Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention
Supplement 1

March 2001
Dear Subscriber:
Enclosed is the March 2001 Supplement, your first annual supplement, to your CPA's Handbook of
Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention. You will continue to receive your bi-monthly Report on
Fraud newsletter. Your 2001 Supplement includes the following important features.
New Chapter

Financial statements, sensitive areas for practitioners, are tied so closely to a CPA's activities that any
hint of fraudulent practices cannot be overlooked. Whether the motivation for fiddling with financial
statements is an effort to hide a business's worth in a messy divorce or an attempt to induce a lender to
extend further credit, the CPA's role is pivotal. We have added a completely new Handbook chapter,
"Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud," by Charles Lundelius, Jr., CPA, ABV, BS, MBA, of
Kroll Lindquist Avey, Washington, D.C. The Handbook's new chapter has been carefully constructed to
bring together all the key issues and considerations to assist you in meeting your clients' requirements or
carrying out your staff responsibilities.

The new chapter includes the following:
• The pervasive nature of financial statement fraud, exploring the most common financial
statement frauds and who is most likely to attempt the fraud
• The kinds of financial statement fraud, describing earnings manipulation and management,
balance sheet manipulation, and problems of closely held entities
• The predictors of financial statement fraud, explaining both quantitative and qualitative
predictors and how to apply them

• The special areas of financial statement fraud, delving into matters such as loss
contingencies, asset write-offs, the role of acquisition reserves, and fictitious revenues
• The financial statement fraud checklist, which is a ready-to-use tool that assists you in
covering the bases in your fight to reduce the risk of financial statement fraud

New Diskette
Your supplement includes a new Microsoft® Word diskette containing the Financial Statement Fraud
Checklist in addition to all the other checklists and fraud vulnerability grids from your old diskette. You
can download and adapt the new checklist to meet specific client or organizational needs.
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New Sector-by-Sector Introductions
Your supplement includes expanded introductions to two of the business sectors found in Appendix A:

• The new Financial Services Sector introduction exposes the potential attack points for the
fraudster in this multi-faceted industry, which is where the money is: banking, insurance,
securities, and mutual funds. Because this sector cannot be divorced from money in all its
iterations, fraudsters make it their prime point of attack. This new information will help you to
install the fraud-reducing controls for both the financial services industry and its customers.
• The new High-Technology Sector introduction zeroes in on the fraudsters’ targets: businesses
that develop high-technology products or use high-technology to produce their products.
Fraudsters can attack these businesses using new techniques—computer invasion—or old scams
modified for new technologies. To help you strike a blow against the fraudsters, your new
information highlights the controls you can use to combat the internal or external high-tech
fraudster.

New Developments

Your supplement contains multiple replacement pages containing information on new developments in
fraud awareness and highlighting the controls that should be considered in the constant fight against the
fraudster.

Glossary and Bibliography
The new Glossary and Bibliography have more references for your information.

Report on Fraud
You will also continue to receive the Report on Fraud as part of your subscription to The CPA's
Handbook ofFraud and Commercial Crime Prevention. This bi-monthly newsletter keeps you cunent
on the newest, worldwide fraud developments.
Contact Us

If you have any questions regarding your subscription or any other AICPA product, please call the
AICPA Member Satisfaction Team at (888) 777-7077, where any agent will be pleased to assist you. Or
you may email your questions to memsat@aicpa.org.
As always, thank you for giving us the opportunity to provide timely and practical professional
information.
Sincerely,

Linda Prentice Cohen
Publisher
Professional Publications & Technology Products
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The CPA’s Handbook ofFraud and Commercial Crime Prevention
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Copyright © 2000, 2001 AICPA
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

LICENSE AGREEMENT
The disk provided with The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention contains
electronic versions of the checklists found in the book. Subject to the conditions in this License Agreement
and the Limited Warranty herein, you may duplicate the files on this disk and/or modify them as necessary
for internal use only.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, for purposes other than internal
use without the prior written permission of the AICPA.

Limited Warranty
AICPA warrants that the program will substantially conform to the published specifications and to the
documentation, provided that it is used on the computer hardware and with the operating system for which
it was designed. AICPA also warrants that the magnetic media on which the program is distributed and the
documentation are free from defects in materials and workmanship. AICPA will replace defective media at
no charge, provided you return the item with the original packaging with the book to AICPA within 90
days of the date of delivery.
Except as specifically provided above, AICPA makes no warranty or representation, either express or
implied, with respect to this program or documentation.

In no event will AICPA be liable for direct, indirect, special incidental, or consequential damages arising
out of the use of or inability to use the program or documentation, even if advised of the possibility of such
damages. Specifically, AICPA is not responsible for any costs including, but not limited to, those incurred
as a result of lost profits or revenue, loss of use of the computer program, loss of data, the costs of
recovering such programs or data, the cost of any substitute program, claims by third parties, or for other
similar costs. In no case shall AICPA’s liability exceed the amount of the license fee (i.e., cost of product).

The warranty and remedies set forth above are exclusive and in lieu of all others, oral or written, express or
implied. No AICPA dealer, distributor, agent, or employee is authorized to make any modification or
addition to this warranty.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of implied warranties or limitation for incidental or
consequential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you. In the U.K., this
warranty does not affect the statutory rights of a consumer.

General
The material on this disk is designed to provide information in regard to the subject matter covered and
does not represent an official position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and it is
distributed with the understanding that the publisher, authors, and editors are not rendering legal,
accounting, or other professional services on this disk. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required,
the services of a competent professional should be sought.
AICPA retains all rights not expressly granted. Nothing in this License Agreement constitutes a waiver of
AICPA’s rights under the copyright laws or any other Federal or State law.

Installation of the Fraud handbook Companion Diskette

How to Install and Use the disk:
There are numerous ways to open, copy, and save files. Use the method you prefer. Refer to your
computer’s user manual for help with saving and opening files if needed. These directions are generic in
nature and not specific to all computers or user preferences.
Installing:
Open Word 97 on your screen and insert the companion disk into your computer’s disk
drive (a or b) and wait to click. Go to the file button and select open (with disk drive a or b selected). A list
of files will appear. All files or Word Documents should be selected in dialog box. Select the file you
want to open. You can now work on the file you have selected. The Sector-by-Sector checklists can be
found in the Sector-by-Sector folder.

Note on Fonts: The exhibits on disk were produced in Word for Windows 97 using True Type fonts. If you
do not have this font library available, the exhibits may not convert correctly. You will have to substitute a
different font and may have to replace/correct formatting that does not convert correctly.

Saving: If you plan to continually use and update the template file with client or other information, you
must use the Save As feature when saving the file with new information for the first time. Go to the File
button and select Save As. Save the file selected under a new name that you will remember for later use.
Direct the saved file to your hard drive or other location as appropriate for your needs.
Note to Users: As a general rule, remember to save your data frequently. Note that The CPA’s Handbook
of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention checklists were produced to be used as template documents
only. In order to maintain the template, you must save your work under the Save As window the first time
you use a document and give your work a different name. This will allow you to always have the template
available and to continue to customize the forms as needed.

Warning:
If you use the Save function the first time you save your work, you will overwrite the
template. This means that you will have to clean up your saved file to return it to template status or reload
the file from the disk.
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NOTE: A 2001 CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention Checklists diskette is
included with Supplement 1. It replaces the previous version in its entirety.

This completes the filing of Fraud Supplement One.
Upon completion, insert this Update Letter behind the “Filing Instructions” tab card included
with your supplement. It should be inserted immediately after the “Report on Fraud” tab card.
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The CPA's Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention
Supplement 2

March 2002

Dear Subscriber:
Enclosed is the March 2002 Supplement to your CPA's Handbook of Fraud and Commercial
Crime Prevention. You will continue to receive your bi-monthly Report on Fraud newsletter.
Your 2002 Supplement contains the following important features.

Two New Chapters
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, businesses are taking a new look at their
ability to deal with security threats. Many businesses would have to improvise if confronted by a
disaster, whether man-made or natural. This brand-new new chapter, Corporate Security:
Threat and Crisis Management, covers the primary issues involved in preventing or detecting
threats, plus how-to's for physical security, business resumption, and emergency planning. You'll
find a case study on a World Trade Center firm's recovery, and results from an October 2001
survey on security risk management. The author is Hazel de Burgh, BMath, CA•IFA, CFE, a
Principal of Kroll Lindquist Avey.
The second brand-new chapter covers Bankruptcy Fraud, a topic that is high on any CPA's list
of professional concerns right now. The author, Todd Neilson, BS, CPA, a founding partner of
Neilson Elggren LLP and a former FBI agent, describes the elements of bankruptcy fraud and
explains various kinds of bankruptcy fraud. To understand bankruptcy fraud, it's necessary to
understand the basics of the bankruptcy process, which are included in this chapter.

Updates on Computer-Related Fraud

Two Handbook chapters, Computer Security and System Recovery, and Computer Crime
and Computer Criminals, have been updated for this supplement in order to reflect recent
developments in this rapidly-evolving field.
Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM

Your supplement includes a CD-ROM that carries checklists: the Comprehensive Risk
Assessment Checklist, the Threat and Crisis Management Planning Checklist, the Financial
Issues to Address When Disaster Strikes Checklist, and the Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist in
addition to all the other checklists and fraud vulnerability grids that were on the 2001 diskette.
The CD-ROM also carries sample forms used in Bankruptcy proceedings. You can download
and adapt the checklists to meet specific client or organizational needs.
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New Sector-by-Sector Introductions
Your supplement includes expanded introductions to two of the business sectors found in
Appendix A:

• The new Construction Sector introduction discusses the wide range of activities in
which the fraudster can operate. The authors suggest that the cost of fraud can be higher
than the cost of watchfulness and thoroughness. Key vulnerabilities include contract
bidding fraud, materials substitution, tax evasion, and employee misbehavior. The
authors describe key preventive control measures.
• The new Small Business Sector introduction confronts the fact that even a small
business can have big problems with fraud. A small business is particularly vulnerable to
cash thefts, accounts receivable fraud, theft of intellectual property, and theft of inventory
or supplies. The risk of fraud arrives with the first non-owner employee. The authors
explain how to implement remedies in the areas of personnel policies, accounting
controls, and physical controls, including a list of "essential controls and oversights" that
you can put in place to thwart fraudsters.

New References Section

The new References section includes more than 120 selected books, and a brand-new list of
relevant web sites for your further exploration.

Report on Fraud
You will also continue to receive the Report on Fraud as part of your subscription to The CPA's
Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention. This bi-monthly newsletter keeps you

current on the newest, worldwide fraud developments.
Contact Us
If you have any questions regarding your subscription or any other AICPA product, please call
the AICPA Member Satisfaction Team at (888) 777-7077, where any agent will be pleased to
assist you. Or you may email your questions to memsat@aicpa.org.

As always, thank you for giving us the opportunity to provide timely and practical professional
information.
Sincerely,

Linda Prentice Cohen
Publisher
Professional Publications & Technology Products

AICPA Software License Agreement

AICPA SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT

Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM
Copyright © 2002 AICPA
All rights reserved.

LICENSE AGREEMENT
The Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM provided with The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial
Crime Prevention contains electronic versions of the checklists found in the book. Subject to the
conditions in this License Agreement and the Limited Warranty herein, you may duplicate the files on this
disk and/or modify them as necessary.

Limited Warranty
AICPA warrants that the program will substantially conform to the published specifications and to the
documentation, provided that it is used on the computer hardware and with the operating system for which
it was designed. AICPA also warrants that the magnetic media on which the program is distributed and the
documentation are free from defects in materials and workmanship. AICPA will replace defective media at
no charge, provided you return the item with the original packaging with the book to AICPA within 90
days of the date of delivery.

Except as specifically provided above, AICPA makes no warranty or representation, either express or
implied, with respect to this program or documentation.
In no event will AICPA be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental, or consequential damages arising
out of the use of or inability to use the program or documentation, even if advised of the possibility of such
damages. Specifically, AICPA is not responsible for any costs including, but not limited to, those incurred
as a result of lost profits or revenue, loss of use of the computer program, loss of data, the costs of
recovering such programs or data, the cost of any substitute program, claims by third parties, or for other
similar costs. In no case shall AICPA’s liability exceed the amount of the license fee (ie: cost of product).

The warranty and remedies set forth above are exclusive and in lieu of all others, oral or written, express or
implied. No AICPA dealer, distributor, agent, or employee is authorized to make any modification or
addition to this warranty.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of implied warranties or limitation for incidental or
consequential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you. In the U.K., this
warranty does not affect the statutory rights of a consumer.

General

The material on this disk is designed to provide information in regard to the subject matter covered and
does not represent an official position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and it is
distributed with the understanding that the publisher, authors, and editors are not rendering legal,
accounting, or other professional services on this disk. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required,
the services of a competent professional should be sought.

AICPA retains all rights not expressly granted. Nothing in this License Agreement constitutes a waiver of
AICPA’s rights under the copyright laws or any other Federal or State law.

Fraud Supp. 2—3/02
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Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM Installation

Installation of the Fraud prevention checklists CD-ROM

Installation:
Open Word for Windows on your screen and insert the Fraud Prevention Checklists
CD-ROM into your computer’s CD-ROM drive (d or e). Go to the file button and select open (with disk
drive d or e selected). A list of files and folders will appear. All Files or Word Documents should be
selected in dialog box. Select the file you want to open. You can now work on the file you have selected.
For example, the Sector-by-Sector checklists can be found in the Sector-by-Sector folder.

Note on Fonts: The exhibits on the CD-ROM (with the exception of Exhibit A from Chapter 12) were
produced in Word for Windows 98 using True Type fonts. If you do not have this version of Word or this
font library available, the exhibits may not convert correctly. You will have to substitute a different font
and may have to replace/correct formatting that does not convert correctly.
Chapter 12—Exhibit A documents: In order to use the Chapter 12 Exhibit A documents you must have
Adobe Acrobat Reader to view the portable document format (pdf) files. Go to www.adobe.com and
download the Adobe Acrobat Reader following the Web site’s instructions. Once the Adobe Acrobat
Reader is installed on your computer you can access the pdf files on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CDROM.

Saving Files:
You cannot overwrite the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM. If you plan to
continually use and update the checklist files with client or other information, use the Save As feature when
saving a file with new information for the first time. Go to the File button and select Save As. Save the file
selected under a new name that you will remember for later use. Direct the saved file to your hard drive or
other location as appropriate for your needs.
As a general rule, remember to save your data frequently. If you use the Save function the first time you
save your work, you will overwrite the template. This means that you will have to clean up your saved file
to return it to it’s original format or reload the file from the CD-ROM again.
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NOTE: The 2002 Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM, included with Supplement 2, replaces the
2001 diskette of The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention Checklists in its
entirety.
The 2002 Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM contains new checklists, plus Exhibit A “Bankruptcy
Schedules” from chapter 12 in pdf format. It would be unable to fit on a conventional 3.5" diskette.

This completes the filing of Fraud Supplement Two.

Upon completion, insert this Update Letter behind the “Filing Instructions” tab card.
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AICPA
The CPA's Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention
March 2003—Supplement 3
Dear Subscriber:

Enclosed is the March 2003 Supplement to your CPA's Handbook of Fraud and Commercial
Crime Prevention. Your 2003 Supplement contains the following important features.

New Chapter - Chapter 13, Detecting Procurement Fraud
Few areas of fraud are more common and resistant to detection than the procurement area of a
company. Procurement fraud succeeds even when barriers to it are put in place. Despite its
persistence as an area where fraud succeeds, the procurement process is one area that companies
frequently overlook.

Chapter 13, Detecting Procurement Fraud, by Paul Dopp, CPA, CGA, CFE, and Hazel de
Burgh, BMath, CA•IFA, CFE, provides a comprehensive overview of the procurement fraud area,
followed by a discussion of the specific tasks and controls needed to combat it: Screening
Procurement Contracts, Scrutinizing Suspect Procurement Contracts, In-depth Examination of
Suspect Procurement Contracts, and Reporting Fraud in Procurement Contracts. The chapter also
includes discussion of red to look for.

Updated Chapters
Although the risk of loss from fraud and other forms of dishonesty can be reduced, no amount of
spending on prevention can eliminate it completely. Chapter 3, Insurance Against Fraud
(formerly “Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance”) has been substantially revised by authors Ted
Baskerville, BA, CA•IFA, CFE and Patricia Woytek, BA, MIS, CPA. The chapter highlights
organizations’ changing insurance needs as they relate to fraud. The chapter reviews the kinds of
insurance coverage generally available against employee fraud, as well as general issues relating
to the policies, common exemptions, and the insured’s responsibilities.

The costs of financial statement fraud have been highlighted by the recent revelations in the
marketplace and the media that once respected companies (and the darlings of Wall Street) were
built on fraudulent manipulation of their financial statements. Chapter 10, Reducing the Risk of
Financial Statement Fraud has been revised and updated by William (Bill) L. Jennings, BS,
CPA, CFE and Pamela J. Parizek, JD. The chapter contains detailed discussion of the motives
behind financial statement fraud and highlights special areas of financial statement fraud. The
chapter also covers the impact of SAS 99, the changing regulatory environment, audit failures,
guidance for auditors, and talks about the new fraud profile.
Chapter 1, Managing the Risk of Fraud has been updated to reflect Statement on Auditing
Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit and additions to
the “Risk Management Checklist.”

New Sector-by-Sector Introduction
The Government section in Appendix A, Fraud Sector-by-Sector has been updated to reflect
new developments and further discussion of this growing fraud area.
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Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM
Your supplement includes an updated version of the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM
2003-2004 which carries the complete text of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit as well as updated checklists for Risk
Management, Insurance Fraud, and Financial Statements.. The CD-ROM also includes
sample forms used in Bankruptcy proceedings. You can download and adapt the checklists to
meet specific client or organizational needs.

Report on Fraud
You will also continue to receive the Report on Fraud as part of your subscription to The CPA's
Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention. This bi-monthly newsletter keeps you
current on the newest, worldwide fraud developments.
Contact Us
If you have any questions regarding your subscription or any other AICPA product, please call
the AICPA Member Satisfaction Team at (888) 777-7077, where any agent will be pleased to
assist you. Or you may email your questions to memsat@aicpa.org.

As always, thank you for giving us the opportunity to provide timely and practical professional
information.
Sincerely,

Linda Prentice Cohen
Publisher
Professional Publications & Technology Products

AICPA Software License Agreement

AICPA SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT

Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM (2003-2004)
Copyright © 2003 AICPA
All rights reserved.

LICENSE AGREEMENT
The Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM provided with The CPA's Handbook ofFraud and Commercial
Crime Prevention contains electronic versions of the checklists and other materials found in the book.
Subject to the conditions in this License Agreement and the Limited Warranty herein, you may duplicate
the files on this disk and/or modify them as necessary.

Limited Warranty
AICPA warrants that the program will substantially conform to the published specifications and to the
documentation, provided that it used on the computer hardware and with the operating system for which it
was designed. AICPA also warrants that the magnetic media on which the program is distributed and the
documentation are free from defects in materials and workmanship. AICPA will replace defective media at
no charge, provided you return the item with the original packaging with the book to AICPA within 90
days of the date of delivery.

Except as specifically provided above, AICPA makes no warranty or representation, either express or
implied, with respect to this program or documentation.
In no event will AICPA be liable for direct, indirect, special incidental, or consequential damages arising
out of the use of or inability to use the program or documentation, even if advised of the possibility of such
damages. Specifically, AICPA is not responsible for any costs including, but not limited to, those incurred
as result of lost profits or revenue, loss of use of the computer program, loss of data, the costs of recovering
such programs or data, the cost of any substitute program, claims by third parties, or for other similar costs.
In no case shall AICPA’s liability exceed the amount of the license fee (ie: cost of product).

The warranty and remedies set forth above are exclusive and in lieu of all others, oral or written, express or
implied. No AICPA dealer, distributor, agent, or employee is authorized to make any modification or
addition to this warranty.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of implied warranties or limitation for incidental or
consequential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you. In the U.K., this
warranty does not affect the statutory rights of a consumer.
General

The material on this CD-ROM is designed to provide information in regard to the subject matter covered
and does not represent an official position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and is
distributed with the understanding that the publisher, authors, and editors are not rendering legal,
accounting, or other professional services on this CD-ROM. If legal advice or other expert assistance is
required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

AICPA retains all rights not expressly granted. Nothing in this License Agreement constitutes a waiver of
AICPA’s rights under the copyright laws or any other Federal or State law.
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Installation of the Fraud prevention checklists CD-ROM

Installation:
Open Word for Windows on your screen and insert the Fraud Prevention Checklists
CD-ROM into your computer’s CD-ROM drive (d or e). Go to the file button and select open (with disk
drive d or e selected). A list of files and folders will appear. All Files or Word Documents should be
selected in the dialog box. Select the file you want to open from one of the folders included in the CDROM. You can now work on the file you have selected.
There are 4 folders of material found on the CD-ROM:
1.
Fraud Chapter checklists folder,
2.
2002 Fraud Chapter 12 Exhibit A folder,
3.
Appendix A, Sector-by-Sector checklists folder, and
4.
Appendix B, SAS 99 folder

For example, the Sector-by-Sector checklists can be found in the Sector-by-Sector folder.
Note on Fonts: The exhibits on the CD-ROM (with the exception of Exhibit A from Chapter 12, and
Appendix B SAS 99) were produced in Word for Windows 98 using True Type fonts. If you do not have
this version of Word or this font library available, the exhibits may not convert correctly. You will have to
substitute a different font and may have to replace/correct formatting that does not convert correctly.

PDF Documents: In order to view/use the Chapter 12 Exhibit A and Appendix B SAS 99 material, you
must have Adobe Acrobat Reader to view the portable document format (pdf) files. Go to www.adobe.com
and download the Adobe Acrobat Reader following the Web site’s instructions. Once the Adobe Acrobat
Reader is installed on your computer you can access the pdf files on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CDROM.
Saving Files: You cannot overwrite the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM. If you plan to continually
use and update the checklist files with client or other information, use the Save As feature when saving a
file with new information for the first time. Go to the File button and select Save As. Save the file selected
under a new name that you will remember for later use. Direct the saved file to your hard drive or other
location as appropriate for your needs. —

As a general rule, remember to save your data frequently. If you use the Save function the first time you
save your work, you will overwrite the template. This means that you will have to clean up your saved file
to return it to its original format or reload the file from the CD-ROM again.
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SAS 99: Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit
can be found as a portable
document format (pdf) file on the
2003-2004 edition of the Fraud
Prevention Checklists CD-ROM

NOTE: The 2003-2004 Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM, included with Supplement 3, replaces
the 2002-2003 edition.
The 2003-2004 Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM contains new checklists for chapters 1, 3, and
10, plus Appendix B in pdf format. Previous forms and checklists are unchanged.

This completes the filing of Fraud Supplement Three.
Upon completion, insert this Update Letter behind the “Filing Instructions” tab card.
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